Algorithmic Desirability Hierarchies and the Class Politics of Dating‑App Culture

The dating-app industry portrays itself as a neutral platform that facilitates human connection. However, it is fundamentally a part of platform capitalism, where the main goal is turning intimacy into a commodity. Its algorithms do more than “match” users—they rank, sort, and stratify them based on criteria that mirror and reinforce existing class, racial, and gender inequalities. Consequently, this creates a digital marketplace where desirability is not a natural human preference but a calculated metric generated through data collection and optimised for profit.

The Commodity Form of Intimacy

Marx’s idea that capitalism turns human abilities into commodities is especially relevant to dating apps. Here, it’s not labour but visibility, desirability, and emotional bonds that are commercialised. The user becomes a product: their profile is a commodity, swipes are acts of consumption, matches are conversion points, and ongoing relationships serve as retention metrics. This isn’t accidental; it’s necessary for making money. The platform first needs to convert users into data—photos, prompts, preferences, behavioural traces—so it can rank, segment, and sell access to them.

While dating-app algorithms are proprietary, their influence is evident. They establish hierarchies of desirability closely linked to class indicators such as income and education—assessed through occupation, location, and lifestyle cues—as well as consumption habits like travel photos, dining choices, and fashion brands. Cultural capital, including writing style, hobbies, and conversational signals, also plays a role, along with physical presentation, including fitness, grooming, and photo quality. These hierarchies are not objective; they reinforce bourgeois standards of attractiveness prevalent in advertising, media, and consumer culture. The algorithms favour those who can display middle-class aesthetic traits and penalise individuals whose material circumstances hinder such performances.

In this context, dating apps act as mechanisms for maintaining class boundaries. They promote assortative mating within the professional-managerial class, while relegating less privileged users to lower visibility. The “80/20” discussion in incel and Femcel circles—where 20 per cent of users get 80 per cent of attention—does not reflect a mental health issue but rather a misperception of this structural pattern.

Visibility on dating apps isn’t a right but a limited resource managed by the platform. The algorithm controls who sees whom, how often, and under what conditions. This scarcity is monetised through superlikes, premium visibility tiers, and pay-to-message options. The platform initially enforces invisibility, then offers temporary visibility as a paid service. This mirrors a classic capitalist pattern: creating scarcity and then commercialising access. As a result, a two-tier system emerges—those who can afford greater visibility and those who cannot. Consequently, dating apps effectively turn economic inequality into romantic inequality, linking class status directly to access to intimate opportunities.

Women disproportionately handle self-presentation tasks such as selecting photos, writing prompts, and maintaining conversations. This unpaid emotional labour is crucial to the platform’s profit because increased user effort generates more data and engagement that can be monetised. Corporate feminism serves as a guise here, where the theme of ’empowerment’ conceals that women are being co-opted into a new kind of reproductive labour: creating appealing digital identities for corporate benefit.

The Crisis of App‑Mediated Intimacy

Bumble’s mythos collapsing exemplifies a wider industry crisis, marked by decreased engagement, user fatigue, declining subscriptions, and mistrust of algorithms. This stems from a fundamental conflict: capital’s need for churn and dissatisfaction clashes with the human desire for stable, reciprocal relationships. As economic instability worsens—driven by rising rents, stagnant wages, and declining living standards, especially among younger users —the conditions for dating and meaningful connections diminish. The traditional dating-app model, reliant on social atomization, becomes unsustainable amid these economic strains.

The algorithm doesn’t just mirror user preferences; it actively shapes them. It trains users to desire what the platform promotes—specific body types, lifestyles, and self-presentation. This process isn’t neutral; it’s how capitalist aesthetics infiltrate intimate life. The algorithm acts as a disciplinary tool, influencing how users perceive themselves and others, and reinforcing market-driven standards of attractiveness. In this way, dating apps function not merely as markets but as ideological tools, teaching users to accept competition, scarcity, and self-commodification as natural.

A Marxist perspective shows that the crisis with dating apps is rooted in social issues, not technology. It stems from the commodification of intimacy, social atomization, the breakdown of communal institutions, and relationships being driven by market logic. Solutions like improved algorithms, ethical design, or “AI matchmakers’ are misguided, as they attempt to fix a fundamentally flawed system. True liberation of intimacy can’t occur within a marketplace that treats it as a commodity.

The way forward involves challenging the social structures that make algorithmic mediation necessary. This includes rebuilding the material basis of human connection—such as stable housing, secure jobs, public spaces, and collective activities—and decommodifying intimacy itself.

The Political Disintegration of the Latin American Boom: A Marxist Critique of Vargas Llosa, García Márquez, Cortázar, Fuentes, and the Historical Absence of Trotskyism

Patrick Martin’s biography, “Mario Vargas Llosa: A Life of Letters and Politics,” reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of its subject’s political journey. It offers a detailed narrative focused on literary growth and early successes. Still, it is also written from the perspective of the petty-bourgeois intellectual class whose political decline it explores. The book presents evidence supporting a Marxist view of the Latin American Boom but stops short of providing that analysis. Its true significance is found in what it uncovers despite its limitations.

Martin’s main point—that Vargas Llosa’s political change illustrates the failure of the Boom generation—is convincingly argued. He explains how a group of writers, intellectuals, and artists who matured during the crisis of oligarchic control and the promise of the Cuban Revolution eventually distanced themselves from radical politics in favour of market liberalism. The biography traces Vargas Llosa’s shift from early enthusiasm for Castroism to his later support for neoliberal policies and right-wing leaders. Martin rightly emphasises that social forces, not personal traits, drive this change.

However, the biography lacks an essential analytical framework to elucidate this logic. It considers Vargas Llosa’s political development as a series of intellectual “changes of mind”, focusing on ideas over class interests. This approach exemplifies bourgeois biography, which reduces political stances to personal beliefs and treats history as the spontaneous play of ideas in the minds of influential individuals. This perspective fails to recognise that political ideas are rooted in social forces. To grasp Vargas Llosa’s path—and the broader context of the Boom generation—it is crucial to examine the historical conditions that shaped their political formation, especially the destruction and marginalisation of the revolutionary Marxist tradition.

The Boom as a Social Layer

The Latin American Boom extended beyond literature, embodying the cultural voice of a specific social segment—the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia—that emerged during a deep crisis in Latin American capitalism. These writers were more than novelists; they served as ideological representatives of a class faction whose political development reflected the societal contradictions from which it emerged. The international acclaim of the Boom was closely linked to the period’s political upheavals: the rise of military dictatorships, the ideological impact of the Cuban Revolution, the spread of guerrilla movements, the crisis within Stalinism, and the lack of a revolutionary Marxist alternative.

The Boom generation’s literary innovations — the fragmentation of narrative, the use of multiple perspectives, the exploration of political violence, the critique of oligarchic hypocrisy — were inseparable from this historical context. But their political evolution was shaped not by the working class but by the ideological monopoly of Stalinism and its petty‑bourgeois offshoots.

Vargas Llosa and the Bankruptcy of Petty‑Bourgeois Radicalism

Vargas Llosa’s early radicalism was authentic but unstable, rooted in moral outrage, aesthetic rebellion, and intellectual curiosity rather than a systematic engagement with the working class or Marxist ideas. His support for the Cuban Revolution stemmed from the misconception that Castroism represented socialism, a perception shared by his generation. The Padilla affair shattered this illusion. Vargas Llosa’s departure from Castroism did not mean abandoning socialism but was a rejection of a specific form of petty-bourgeois radicalism. However, because Stalinism and Castroism had successfully aligned themselves with “socialism” in many people’s minds, his break was seen as an outright rejection of the entire left.

His later embrace of liberalism was more a withdrawal from political chaos than a discovery of freedom. His support for right-wing figures was not a breach of his principles but the natural consequence of a political approach that starts by rejecting pseudo-left radicalism and ends up aligning with the true right. Vargas Llosa’s consistency, praised by Martin, reflects a man who followed the logic of his disillusionment to its end. However, this was the wrong logic, since his disillusionment was with a counterfeit form of socialism, not with the Marxist program.

The Cuban Revolution and the Misrecognition of Socialism

The Boom generation viewed the Cuban Revolution as an alternative to the oligarchic regimes depicted in their fiction. However, the Cuban Revolution was not socialist in the Marxist sense. It was a guerrilla uprising that rose to power without independent working-class mobilisation, replacing the foco strategy with the party and establishing a bureaucratic regime reliant on Soviet support. The political tradition it embodied—Castroism, Guevarism, and guerrilla theory—was a dead end from the beginning. When Vargas Llosa and others distanced themselves from Castroism, they were not rejecting socialism itself, but a specific petty-bourgeois radicalism. Because Stalinism and its Castroist branch had successfully associated themselves with “socialism,” this break was perceived as a rejection of the left. This ideological misunderstanding is central to the political development of the Boom generation.

The political traditions of the Boom generation included Stalinism, bourgeois nationalism, guerrillaism, and literary humanism, but this list is incomplete. Trotskyism was also available to them, as the Fourth International existed. However, it was shattered by the war, weakened by Stalinist assassinations, and further crippled by the Pabloite revisionism of the 1950s, which turned it into Stalinist and social-democratic parties. The split between the International Committee of the Fourth International and the Pabloites in 1953 defended the revolutionary program. Yet, the immense material forces working against it left the revolutionary Marxist movement fractured, weakened, and politically obscured by the time the Boom generation came of age. They did not “fail to discover” Trotskyism—Trotskyism had been politically buried. This absence was crucial, as it meant their disillusionment with Castroism could only manifest as a shift toward liberalism.

García Márquez, Cortázar, Fuentes, Sendero Luminoso, and the attraction of petty-bourgeois politics

Gabriel García Márquez is often portrayed as being politically opposite to Vargas Llosa—an ardent supporter of Castro, a defender of the Cuban Revolution, and someone who remained “on the left.” Yet, this view is superficial. His political development was shaped by the same hollow ideological stance that influenced Vargas Llosa. His backing of Castroism wasn’t based on a conviction in socialism but on petty-bourgeois radicalism seeking a secure political platform. His relationship with Castro was more personal, emotional, and aesthetic rather than strictly political, grounded in Marxist ideals. He misinterpreted bureaucratic nationalism as socialism because the revolutionary alternative was suppressed. García Márquez’s loyalty to Castro was more about political confusion than unwavering principle.

Julio Cortázar embodies a form of petty-bourgeois radicalism. His political evolution—from existentialist humanism to Guevarist romanticism—was shaped by the dominant guerrilla adventure ideology. Though his radicalism was genuine, it was fragile, based on moral outrage and aesthetic rebellion rather than a deep link with the working class. His works reveal the limits of his radical stance: he lauded guerrilla warfare as a sign of existential authenticity, backed Castroism for its moral integrity, and dismissed Marxist theory as “dogmatic.” Ultimately, his radicalism was more moralistic than Marxist—lacking a firm class-based foundation.

Carlos Fuentes exemplifies a form of nationalist-populist fluctuation. His political journey—from Mexican nationalism to brief alignment with Castroism and later to liberal reformism—illustrates the instability of a social class caught between oligarchs and workers. Fuentes’s political approach was diverse, opportunistic, and eventually conservative. This oscillation was driven by class interests rather than personal inconsistency.

Sendero Luminoso was a Maoist organisation that replaced mobilisation of workers and peasants with acts of terrorist violence. Their actions justified military counter-terrorism, leading to tens of thousands of deaths. This tragedy influenced Vargas Llosa to shift rightward. Yet, his conclusion — “less state and more market” — was not the only option. It reflected his social class and the absence of a revolutionary Marxist alternative. The Peruvian people did not need a weaker state; they needed a different kind of state — a workers’ state based on soviets.

The petty-bourgeois intelligentsia swings between radical and reactionary positions. Its radical phases are often emotional, triggered by external events, and tend to be temporary. Disillusionment among them tends to be abrupt and comprehensive, frequently leading to a shift to the right. The Boom generation exemplifies this pattern: initial radicalism, disillusionment with Castroism, a turn toward liberalism, and later a reversion to reactionary views. Their political changes reflect class influences rather than personal choices.

The Boom generation’s literary achievements were genuine. But literature cannot substitute for revolutionary politics. It can illuminate social contradictions, but it cannot resolve them. It can expose oppression, but it cannot overthrow it. The Boom generation’s political disintegration reveals the limits of literary radicalism.

 Conclusion: The Historical Task

The working class is noticeably absent from the Boom generation’s political development. In their literature, the proletariat serves as a social backdrop and a symbol of oppression, rather than as a political force. Likewise, their political writings largely overlook the working class. This gap underscores the dominance of petty-bourgeois radical ideas and the sidelining of the Marxist tradition.

The political development of the Boom generation—Vargas Llosa’s shift to liberalism, García Márquez’s acceptance of Castroism, Cortázar’s romantic radicalism, and Fuentes’s nationalist fluctuations—exposes a crisis in Latin American intellectual life during the second half of the 20th century. Their disillusionment was directed at a false version of socialism, not socialism itself. Their radical ideas were more petty-bourgeois than Marxist. Moreover, their political paths were shaped more by class influences than personal beliefs.

Today, the focus is on restoring the revolutionary legacy that was denied to them, rather than mourning their political split. Reviving the Marxist program—endorsed by the International Committee of the Fourth International—is essential for Latin America’s working class to move beyond past betrayals and prepare for future struggles. Martin’s biography, despite its flaws, provides useful insights into this process. It highlights the political paralysis of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia and the ideological confusion among the Boom generation, underscoring the urgent need to rebuild the lost revolutionary tradition. The political path of the Boom generation remains unresolved and offers an important historical lesson.

Sources and Bibliography

Primary and Scholarly Sources on Trotskyism, Castroism, and Latin American Marxism

  • Isabella Duarte Pinto Meucci, The Impact of the Cuban Revolution in Latin America’s Leftist Thought: The Case of the Trotskyist Movement (1959–1974). Sixteenth International Conference on “New Political Science,” Universidade de Havana, 2013. This study examines how the Cuban Revolution reshaped Latin American Marxism and forced major strategic debates within Trotskyist organisations such as the Latin American Bureau (BLA) and the Latin American Orthodox Trotskyism Secretariat (SLATO).
  • Michel Löwy, O Marxismo na América Latina: Uma Antologia de 1909 aos Dias Atuais (1999). A foundational text for understanding the historical phases of Latin American Marxism, referenced within Meucci’s analysis.
  • Juan Carlos Portantiero, Historia del marxismo (1991). Provides a periodisation of Latin American Marxist development and is also cited in Meucci’s study.
  • Facundo Aguirre & Alejandro Guerrero, “Castro, the Cuban Revolution, and the Permanent Revolution,” Left Voice (2020). A Trotskyist analysis of Castroism as a petty‑bourgeois nationalist movement, including Che Guevara’s own admission of the July 26 Movement’s class character.

Biographical and Literary Sources on Mario Vargas Llosa

  • Mario Vargas Llosa – Biography, Encyclopaedia Britannica (2026). Provides authoritative details on Vargas Llosa’s early Marxism, support for the Cuban Revolution, later liberal turn, and major literary works.
  • Mario Vargas Llosa, Wikipedia (2025). Offers comprehensive information on Vargas Llosa’s political affiliations, literary career, Nobel Prize, and ideological evolution from Castroism to classical liberalism.
  • Mario Vargas Llosa – Biographical, NobelPrize.org. Details Vargas Llosa’s early life, political formation, disillusionment with Castroism, and subsequent advocacy of liberal pluralism and market reforms.

Recommended Additional Works for Further Reading (Not from search results)

(These are standard scholarly and Marxist sources relevant to this essay but not directly cited above. They appear in this bibliography but are not cited in the text.)

On the Latin American Boom

  • Ángel Rama, La novela latinoamericana
  • Gerald Martin, Journeys Through the Labyrinth: Latin American Fiction in the Twentieth Century
  • Mario Vargas Llosa, Historia de un deicidio (on García Márquez)

On García Márquez, Cortázar, Fuentes

  • Gerald Martin, Gabriel García Márquez: A Life
  • Julio Cortázar, Clases de literatura (lectures)
  • Carlos Fuentes, La nueva novela hispanoamericana

On Castroism, Guevarism, and Guerrilla Theory

  • Régis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?
  • Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare
  • Samuel Farber, The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered

On Trotskyism and the Fourth International

  • Leon Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution
  • Leon Trotsky, The Transitional Program
  • David North, The Heritage We Defend
  • Pierre Broué, The History of the Fourth International

On Latin American Political History

  • Alberto Flores Galindo, Buscando un Inca
  • José Carlos Mariátegui, Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality
  • Enrique Dussel, Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina

Notes on Citation Usage

The citations included in the essay should correspond to the factual claims supported by the search results. For example:

  • Claims about Trotskyist debates over guerrilla warfare → Meucci (2013)
  • Claims about Castroism’s petty‑bourgeois character → Aguirre & Guerrero (2020)
  • Claims about Vargas Llosa’s early Marxism and later liberalism → Britannica, Wikipedia, NobelPrize.org

Podcast Episode: The Death of Jason Arday: A Manufactured Scandal and the Class Politics Behind I

Pip: A Cambridge professor is celebrated, then destroyed, then dead — and the British press is already turning his death into content. Welcome to A Trumpet of Sedition.

Mara: This episode covers one story, and freerein61 makes the case that it isn't really about one man — it's about how media, class power, and institutional symbolism interact to produce a foreseeable tragedy.

Pip: Let's start with the manufactured scandal itself, and what the post argues was actually driving it.

The Death of Jason Arday: Media, Class, and the Machinery of Destruction

Mara: The post opens with a straightforward claim: Arday's downfall wasn't personal failure. It was structural. The question the piece is asking is whether what happened to him was journalism at all, or something else entirely.

Pip: The post is direct about what that something else was. The setup is the tabloid press recycling the same limited allegations across dozens of outlets, and the conclusion drawn is this: "This was not journalism; it was a political tactic."

Mara: And the stakes follow immediately from that framing. If it's a political tactic, then the resignation that preceded any formal inquiry wasn't a consequence of wrongdoing being proven — it was the tactic working.

Pip: The post is careful to say the plagiarism allegations were serious enough to warrant formal academic investigation. Those processes exist precisely because they're slow and careful. The media didn't wait.

Mara: Cambridge didn't wait either, and the post holds the university directly responsible. It describes a pattern: institutions adopt the symbolism of diversity, then withdraw protection the moment that symbol becomes inconvenient. The phrase used is that the human toll is "paid by the person whose identity is exploited for institutional advantage."

Pip: Which is a fairly precise description of how symbolic politics functions as a shield for the institution rather than a support for the individual.

Mara: The post extends this to the so-called quality press. Broadsheets and public broadcasters aren't let off the hook — their coverage "differed mainly in tone, not substance," repeating the same allegations and the same framing of Arday's downfall as inevitable.

Pip: One unified ideological system with better grammar.

Mara: The psychological dimension gets its own section. Arday's family described years of public abuse, and the post treats that seriously — arguing that prolonged media exposure creates conditions of isolation and collective condemnation that carry direct psychological consequences. The media, it says, is responsible for fostering those conditions.

Pip: And then, after his death, the same outlets ran live updates. The acceleration of the news cycle consuming the person before any process could conclude, and then consuming the death itself.

Mara: The post ties all of this to class structure — a press controlled by a small number of billionaires, serving ruling-class interests by making visibility feel dangerous and dissent feel perilous. The Arday case, in that reading, is less a scandal and more a demonstration.

Pip: The closing argument is that identity politics, as practiced by elite institutions, doesn't address inequality — it rebrands it. And when the symbolic figure stops being useful, the same machinery turns.

Mara: The post ends by arguing that only working-class political action, guided by a socialist program, can challenge the conditions that made this outcome foreseeable. That's where it lands.


Pip: A story about one person that the post insists is about a system — and the argument is hard to dismiss when the system's behavior is this consistent.

Mara: The next episode will tell us whether that argument extends further. The conditions it describes aren't unique to this case.

The Death of Jason Arday: A Manufactured Scandal and the Class Politics Behind It

The death of Jason Arday, announced on 14 August 2026, marks a deeply troubling moment in British society. Celebrated as Cambridge University’s youngest Black professor in 2023, Arday was last week removed from his role amid intense media attention over allegations of plagiarism and false claims about his athletic and fundraising history. He was found dead in South London on Friday afternoon. His family links this tragedy to years of public abuse. Regardless of what the coroner concludes, one thing is clear: Arday’s downfall was not due to personal failings, but resulted from a coordinated political and media campaign driven by the class interests of Britain’s ruling elite.

A Manufactured Scandal

The allegations against Arday involved parts of his doctoral thesis—serious enough to trigger formal academic investigations. Such processes tend to be slow, careful, and largely unseen by the public. They lack spectacle, headlines, or opportunities for political manipulation. Instead, the British media orchestrated a public trial over several weeks, recycling the same few claims across many outlets, all vying for clicks and ad revenue. The tabloid press, along with supposedly reputable outlets, turned Arday into a daily target of mockery. Even before any official inquiry started, he was forced to resign. This was not journalism; it was a political tactic.

Cambridge University’s Role

Cambridge University directly bears responsibility for the circumstances that resulted in Arday’s death. For many years, the university showcased his appointment as a sign of its “progressive” change—a symbolic act intended to hide its core role as a training ground for Britain’s ruling class. However, when the media turned hostile, Cambridge failed to defend him, demand due process, or contest the tabloids’ hysteria. Instead, the university let the spectacle unfold, distancing itself from the person it had once promoted. This pattern is all too familiar: elite institutions gladly adopt the symbolism of “diversity” but disregard individuals when their visibility becomes inconvenient, leaving the human toll to be paid by the person whose identity is exploited for institutional advantage.

The Media Pile‑On as a Social Phenomenon

The intense media campaign surrounding Jason Arday in the weeks before his death is a key part of the case, not just an incidental detail. It functions as the main force driving the tragedy. To grasp what happened, we must see the media not merely as individual outlets or journalists but as a social institution deeply linked to the class system of capitalist society. Arday’s destruction was not due to “press excess” or editorial mistakes alone. It was a foreseeable result of a system in which media commercial interests, ruling-class political goals, and the ideological needs of elite institutions interact to create cycles of symbolic glorification and public destruction.

The Tabloid Mode of Production

The British media follows a logic Marxists have long critiqued: turning human beings into commodities. In tabloids — now largely merging with mainstream outlets — the core content is personal scandal, humiliation, and reputation destruction. Their circulation and online ad revenue rely on a steady stream of such stories. The Arday case exemplified this formula by featuring a prominent academic from an elite university, allegations of misconduct, a “fall from grace” narrative, and racialised framing that British tabloids have exploited for decades.

Once the story emerged, the machinery kicked in automatically. All outlets echoed the same limited claims, each presented with a new headline. The content was interchangeable; the goal was not to inform but to attract engagement. This media behaviour was not unusual; it was the standard operation of a profit-oriented system.

The Political Function of Scandal

These scandals serve a political function by providing a spectacle that distracts from Britain’s social crisis, which includes collapsing public services, growing inequality, militarism, and the erosion of democratic rights. The destruction of an individual acts as a surrogate drama, allowing a society in decline to project its anxieties and frustrations. The media’s focus on Arday’s alleged plagiarism — a matter ideally addressed through academic processes — was not driven by concern for scholarly integrity. Instead, it aimed to craft a narrative of moral failure, creating a personal drama for millions to consume. Its political importance lies in shifting attention away from the systemic failures of British capitalism.

The Role of “Respectable” Media

It would be a mistake to blame only the tabloid press for the pile-on. The so-called “quality” outlets—such as broadsheets, public broadcasters, and liberal publications—also participated fully. Their coverage differed mainly in tone, not substance, as they repeated the same allegations, insinuations, and framing of Arday as a figure whose downfall was both inevitable and deserved. This shared approach is notable because it reveals how the media functions as a unified ideological system, despite internal differences. The line between tabloid sensationalism and liberal respectability disappears when attacking someone whose symbolic value has shifted from an asset to a liability. The media’s role is not to investigate but to uphold the ideological limits of acceptable public discussion.

The Psychology of the Pile‑On

The media pile-on is more than just a structural issue; it is deeply psychological. It isolates the target, removes their institutional support, and subjects them to constant public scrutiny. The individual becomes the focus of a collective condemnation ritual, leading to intense psychological strain. Arday’s family stated there were “years of public abuse,” which is not an exaggeration. The media’s coverage was not limited to the weeks before his death; it was part of a longer pattern in which his initial fame turned into vulnerability. Such prolonged exposure has a significant psychological impact, and the media is directly responsible for fostering the conditions that lead individuals to despair.

The Acceleration of the News Cycle

The rapid progression of the Arday story highlights a broader crisis in modern media. The 24-hour news cycle thrives on constant updates, with scandals serving as endless sources. Once Arday resigned, the story swiftly shifted from “investigation” to “collapse.” When he passed away, media outlets that had pursued him relentlessly turned his death into breaking news, featuring live updates and sensational headlines. This acceleration of news is not neutral; it hinders thoughtful reflection, bypasses due process, and consumes individuals before any legal or institutional action can occur. The media’s response after Arday’s death—recycling existing facts, speculating on causes, and exploiting the tragedy as content—was a natural extension of the same logic that ended his career.

The media’s involvement in the Arday case can only be understood within the framework of class dominance. The British press, controlled by a small group of billionaires and corporate giants, serves the ruling elite’s interests. Its role is to influence public perception in ways that uphold the current social hierarchy. Targeting symbolic figures—whether celebrities, academics, or political critics—bolsters the idea that individuals are powerless against the machinery of publicity. This fosters cynicism, resignation, and fear among the public. It sends the message that visibility is dangerous, dissent is perilous, and institutions will not defend those who lose favour. Thus, the Arday case is more than a media scandal; it reflects broader authoritarian trends in modern capitalism.

Identity Politics and the Class Function of Symbolic Elevation

Arday’s academic work is shaped by critical race theory, which has gained prominence in elite universities over the last decade. This ideology, rooted in postmodernism and racial essentialism, aims to incorporate privileged upper-middle-class individuals into the state and corporate sectors based on identity rather than class. Cambridge did not promote Arday because he represented working-class interests; instead, they supported him because his scholarship aligned with the university’s ideological goals—providing a racialized viewpoint that allowed the institution to appear progressive while preserving its class hierarchy. Identity politics does not address inequality; it rebrands it. When the symbolic figure becomes politically inconvenient, the same system that champions him is used to undermine him.Predictably, pseudo-left groups—such as NGOs, academic diversity bureaus, and Labour Party affiliates—have reacted to Arday’s death by calling for more of the same politics that contributed to this tragedy. They claim the lesson is to increase “representation,” expand diversity programs, and adopt more racialised analytical frameworks.

The Arday case exposes a significant contradiction in modern liberal politics. While elite institutions leverage identity to legitimize themselves, they neither genuinely protect nor support those they elevate. Their view on identity is driven by necessity rather than solidarity. The working class must develop its own understanding. Racial oppression exists but is fundamentally linked to capitalism, which generates it. Tackling racism can’t rely on critical race theory’s racial essentialism or mere political symbolism. Instead, it requires a concerted effort by the working class to dismantle the social system that maintains inequality, exploitation, and the destructive media.

Jason Arday’s death is tragic but understandable. It stems from a society that devalues human beings, distorts identities, and sees elite institutions as self-serving. Meanwhile, the media acts as an unchecked source of humiliation and harm. The issue isn’t that universities should treat symbolic figures with more care; rather, the politics surrounding symbolism itself is a trap. It obscures the class realities of capitalist society and exposes individuals to media and institutional abuse. Only the independent actions of the working class, guided by a socialist program, can challenge these conditions and prevent future tragedies.

Scotland, Class and the Crisis of Marxism: The SWP, Neil Davidson, and the National Question, 1999–2014

In October 1999, Bookmarks published Scotland: Class and Nation, marking a moment of intellectual assertion within the Scottish section of the Socialist Workers Party. Edited by Chris Bambery, the SWP’s longtime national secretary and a founding member of the International Socialist Group, the collection aimed to influence the debate sparked by devolution and the revival of the Scottish Parliament. It examined whether England had historically oppressed Scotland, whether Scottish society was more progressive than the rest of Britain, and what position socialists should take on the national question as independence moved back onto the political stage.

The book’s key feature is Neil Davidson’s comprehensive essay “Scotland’s Bourgeois Revolution,” which spans pages 37 to 133 and effectively captures the volume’s central argument. Davidson argued that Scotland experienced a true bourgeois revolution, leading to the formation of a nation through capitalist growth rather than innate ethnicity. His thesis, further elaborated in Discovering the Scottish Revolution and Origins of Scottish Nationhood, made a significant impact on Marxist historiography. Davidson would later become a leading Marxist historian of Scottish nationalism.

The book’s political framework — along with the SWP’s evolution — uncovers a deeper issue: the crisis of Marxism in Britain around 2000 and the Cliffite tradition’s failure to uphold a clear stance on the national question. The SWP’s shift from cautious unionism in 1999 to strong support for independence in 2014 reflects centrism: a middle-class organisation’s attempt to adapt to changing political dynamics. This essay examines that trajectory, contrasts it with the Trotskyist position of the International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), and argues that the debate inaugurated by Scotland: Class and Nation ultimately exposes the gulf between Marxist internationalism and the nationalist drift of the British pseudo‑left.

The SWP in 1999: Cautious Unionism in Marxist Dress

The SWP’s stance on class and nation in Scotland rests on three key assumptions. Firstly, they contend that Scotland is not an oppressed nation. Referencing Lenin’s distinction between oppressor and oppressed nations, the authors argue that Scotland does not fall into the oppressed category. Scotland has played a subordinate yet collaborative role in British imperialism, rather than being a colony. Its working class has not been systematically deprived of national rights, and its bourgeoisie has been absorbed into the British ruling elite. This perspective counters the romantic nationalism promoted by Tom Nairn and parts of the Scottish left, which depict Scotland as a diminished or incomplete nation.

Secondly, the book contends that nationalism is not automatically progressive. It claims Scottish nationalism, even in its civic form, serves as a bourgeois ideology. Although it can unite popular discontent, it fails to resolve capitalism’s inherent contradictions. The SNP is characterised as a party representing the Scottish bourgeoisie, aligned with neoliberal policies, and opposed to working-class interests. Thirdly, maintaining class unity across Britain is essential. The SWP argued that the working class in Scotland, England, and Wales share common interests. The book warns that independence could divide this unity, weaken the labour movement, and bolster nationalism on both sides. While socialists should support the right to self-determination, they should not promote independence. The book’s strategic conclusion is clear: independence is not a socialist goal.

Davidson’s essay laid out the historical framework for his political stance. By showing that Scotland experienced a bourgeois revolution, he challenged ideas that Scotland was a “failed nation” or merely under English rule. His approach was thorough, yet in 1999, he did not advocate for independence. Instead, it strengthened the SWP’s scepticism. However, by the 2014 independence referendum, the SWP changed its stance, releasing pamphlets that supported a “Yes” vote. They argued that independence would weaken the British state, damage the US–UK “special relationship,” and create opportunities for radical politics. This change was significant and driven more by political reasons than by theoretical considerations.

The SNP’s civic-nationalist campaign gained broad support from the middle class and some sections of the working class. Meanwhile, the SWP, already dealing with internal issues, changed its position to support this movement instead of maintaining its prior scepticism. The downfall of the SSP and the British left’s crisis removed an important unifying issue for left-leaning workers. To stay relevant, the SWP joined the independence movement.

The SWP’s own degeneration

The 2013 rape allegations scandal severely damaged the organisation’s credibility. Its move towards independence was part of a wider effort to rebrand itself within Scottish politics. Keir McKechnie, the SWP’s Scottish organiser, acknowledged that Scotland is not an oppressed nation, Scottish workers are not more radical than English workers, and independence would establish a capitalist state similar to others. Despite this, he supported independence. This stance was not rooted in Marxism; it was opportunism.

The ICFI and SEP oppose both unionist and Scottish nationalism by advocating a clear Marxist perspective. They argued that the working class has no reason to form new capitalist states, as independence would create two rival bourgeois governments—Scottish and British—both supporting austerity, NATO, and capitalist interests. They consider dividing workers by nationality to be reactionary, stressing that the main goal should be uniting workers throughout Britain and Europe in a collective struggle against capitalism. Their objective isn’t a “socialist Scotland” but the creation of the United Socialist States of Europe, which involves overthrowing capitalism across the continent. In 2014, the SEP called for a “No” vote, not because they supported the British state, but because they opposed nationalism and the formation of a new capitalist state. This stance was the only Trotskyist viewpoint in the debate.

Neil Davidson’s Trajectory: From Marxist Historian to Nationalist Sympathiser

Neil Davidson (1957–2020) holds a unique position in contemporary Scottish Marxist historiography. A rare blend of meticulous archival research, ambitious theory, and active political involvement characterises his contributions. However, his intellectual journey—moving from strict historical materialism to a form of leftist nationalism—reflects the wider confusion experienced by the British Marxist left during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. To understand Davidson is also to grasp the crisis Marxism faced in Scotland.

Davidson gained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, when Scotland’s industrial sector was collapsing, and the Labour Party was distancing itself from its traditional working-class base. The decline of miners, shipbuilders, and engineers created a void that brought issues of national identity and constitutional reform to the forefront. His early political views were shaped within the International Socialists/SWP framework. This mattered because the SWP offered a platform for Marxist discussion. Still, its core theories—especially its rejection of Trotsky’s critique of Stalinism and its “state capitalist” theory—limited the development of a fully revolutionary outlook.

Despite joining an organisation that valued rigour, Davidson’s intellectual instincts went beyond its standards. He supported historical materialism, comparative analysis, and the classical Marxist concept of uneven development. His early essays demonstrated themes that would define his later work, including resistance to nationalist myths, focus on class formation, and an examination of Scotland’s role within larger British and global capitalism. His significant breakthrough occurred with the publication of *Discovering the Scottish Revolution, 1692–1746* (2003) and *The Origins of Scottish Nationhood* (2000). These books cemented his reputation as one of the most dedicated Marxist historians of Scotland in his generation.

Davidson’s thesis on the bourgeois revolution contended, countering both nationalist romanticism and certain Marxist orthodoxy, that Scotland experienced a genuine bourgeois revolution. It was neither a direct replication of the English model nor a mere integration into a pre-existing British bourgeoisie. Instead, it was a unique process where capitalist social relations transformed Scottish society, leading to the creation of a modern nation. This stance challenged the prominent view associated with Tom Nairn and parts of the SWP, which argued that Scotland never fully completed a bourgeois revolution, resulting in a “stunted” national consciousness. Davidson’s approach was rooted in historical analysis, theoretically ambitious, and politically provocative. It discredited claims that Scotland was an oppressed nation and offered a materialist perspective on the development of Scottish national identity.

Davidson opposed ethnic and cultural essentialism, arguing that nations are not eternal but shaped by capitalist development. He saw Scotland’s nationhood as emerging from the transformation of feudal relations, the rise of commercial agriculture, and integration into imperial trade networks. This perspective aligns with the classical Marxist tradition, yet it also foreshadowed later conflicts between his historical approach and his political beliefs.

The SWP Years: The Limits of Cliffism

Davidson’s most significant period occurred during his time in the SWP. The party provided a platform, audience, and space for debate, but also imposed certain theoretical boundaries. In his 1999 essay in Scotland: Class and Nation, Davidson outlined his core argument: Scotland was not an oppressed nation, Scottish nationalism was not inherently progressive, and independence was not an essential goal for socialists. Instead, he stressed the importance of working-class unity across Britain. While this position was clearly Marxist, the SWP’s theoretical foundation was somewhat fragile.

Davidson’s historical work was meticulous, yet the SWP’s politics grew more opportunistic over time. The party vacillated between revolutionary language and aligning with middle-class movements. Davidson’s political journey eventually mirrored this contradiction. A key turning point in his political development happened in the decade before the 2014 independence referendum. The SWP’s decline, especially after the 2013 rape allegations scandal, fragmented the organisation. Davidson distanced himself from the party, and the intellectual hub in Scotland shifted towards the nationalist-left circles around the Radical Independence Campaign, Bella Caledonia, and parts of the academic left. The 2014 referendum sparked a wave of civic nationalism, engaging many middle-class and some working-class groups. Davidson increasingly believed that independence could weaken the British state, challenge imperial alliances, and create opportunities for radical politics.

This marked a departure from his 1999 stance. Davidson’s later work aimed to reconcile Marxist internationalism with support for independence. He claimed that dismantling the British state could be a step toward socialist change. However, this argument contains a contradiction: if Scotland is not an oppressed nation, and independence leads to a capitalist state, then the main reason for independence shifts from Marxist ideals to geopolitical concerns. This approach diverges from traditional Marxist views on the national question.

The 2015 debate with Sandy McBurney

Davidson’s discussion with Sandy McBurney in Critique (2015) clarified his evolving stance. He argued for independence as a strategic challenge to the British state, while McBurney held a more conventional Marxist scepticism. The exchange highlighted Davidson’s transition from historical materialism to a type of left-wing nationalism—a change influenced by the referendum politics and the ideological environment of the Scottish left.

Conclusion: Davidson’s Legacy and the Crisis of Marxism

Neil Davidson’s intellectual journey reflects the broader crisis facing Marxism in Britain. His early work remains crucial: rigorous, grounded in materialism, and challenging nationalist myths. His thesis on the bourgeois revolution transformed Scottish history. Yet, his later political shift—supporting independence—mirrors the confusion among the British left caused by neoliberalism, deindustrialisation, and the decline of traditional working-class communities. Consequently, Davidson’s legacy is twofold: he is a significant Marxist historian of Scotland whose work will endure, and a political figure whose later views show the pressures facing contemporary leftist thought.

Scotland: Class and Nation serves as a significant historical record. It documents the SWP during a period when it still aimed to present a Marxist perspective on the national question. Davidson’s essay remains an important contribution to Scottish historiography. However, the book also highlights the weaknesses in the SWP’s political stance. Its 1999 stance was not Trotskyist, and its 2014 shift was not Marxist. Both shifts reflect centrist tendencies—wavering between revolutionary rhetoric and accommodating bourgeois nationalism. The core divide in the debate is not merely between the SWP’s two positions, but between various forms of nationalism and the Fourth International’s internationalist approach.

The Scottish working class will not find liberation through independence or through the defence of the British state. Its emancipation lies in the unity of workers across Britain and Europe, in the struggle for socialism on an international scale. The task remains what it has always been: to build a revolutionary leadership rooted in Marxist internationalism, capable of opposing nationalism in all its forms and advancing the perspective of world socialist revolution.

Sources and Bibliography

I. Neil Davidson: Primary Works

  • Davidson, Neil. The Origins of Scottish Nationhood. London: Pluto Press, 2000.
  • Davidson, Neil. Discovering the Scottish Revolution, 1692–1746. London: Pluto Press, 2003.
  • Davidson, Neil. How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions? Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012.
  • Davidson, Neil. “Scotland’s Bourgeois Revolution.” In Scotland: Class and Nation, edited by Chris Bambery. London: Bookmarks, 1999.
  • Davidson, Neil. “The Necessity of Multiple Responses: A Reply to McBurney.” Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory 43, no. 3 (2015): 345–372.
  • Davidson, Neil. Nation-States: Consciousness and Competition. London: Pluto Press, 2016.
  • Davidson, Neil. “Neoliberalism, Nationalism, and the Left.” RS21 (2014).
  • Davidson, Neil. “The Scottish Independence Referendum: A Marxist Assessment.” International Socialist Journal (2014).

II. Tom Nairn: Primary Works

  • Nairn, Tom. The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism. London: Verso, 1977; revised edition 1981.
  • Nairn, Tom. The Enchanted Glass: Britain and Its Monarchy. London: Radius, 1988.
  • Nairn, Tom. “Scotland and Europe.” New Left Review I/160 (1986): 3–25.
  • Nairn, Tom. “The Modern Janus.” New Left Review I/94 (1975): 3–29.
  • Nairn, Tom. “Ukania Revisited.” New Left Review II/1 (2000): 87–104.
  • Nairn, Tom. Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited. London: Verso, 1997.
  • Nairn, Tom. “The Twilight of the British State.” New Left Review I/101–102 (1976–77).

III. Eric Hobsbawm: Primary Works

  • Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; revised edition 1992.
  • Hobsbawm, Eric. The Invention of Tradition. Edited with Terence Ranger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
  • Hobsbawm, Eric. Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991. London: Michael Joseph, 1994.
  • Hobsbawm, Eric. “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today.” Anthropology Today 8, no. 1 (1992): 3–8.
  • Hobsbawm, Eric. “Identity Politics and the Left.” New Left Review I/217 (1996): 38–47.
  • Hobsbawm, Eric. Fractured Times: Culture and Society in the Twentieth Century. London: Little, Brown, 2013.

IV. Secondary Literature on Davidson

  • McBurney, Sandy. “Marxism and the National Question in Scotland: A Critique.” Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory 43, no. 3 (2015): 321–344.
  • Smith, David. “Neil Davidson and the Scottish Question.” Scottish Labour History 50 (2015): 45–62.
  • McIlroy, John. “Neil Davidson: Marxist Historian.” Critique 48, no. 1 (2020): 1–12.
  • McGregor, Alan. “Uneven and Combined Development in Scottish History.” International Socialism 2:100 (2003).

V. Secondary Literature on Nairn

  • Anderson, Perry. “The Origins of the Present Crisis.” New Left Review I/23 (1964): 26–53.
  • Anderson, Perry. “The Figures of Descent.” London Review of Books 22, no. 7 (2000): 3–12.
  • Hearn, Jonathan. Claiming Scotland: National Identity and Liberal Culture. Edinburgh: Polygon, 2000.
  • Hroch, Miroslav. Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
  • McCrone, David. Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Nation. London: Routledge, 1992.

VI. Secondary Literature on Hobsbawm

  • Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983; revised edition 1991.
  • Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.
  • Breuilly, John. Nationalism and the State. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982; revised edition 1993.
  • Hall, Stuart. “The Question of Cultural Identity.” In Modernity and Its Futures, edited by Hall, Held, and McGrew. Cambridge: Polity, 1992.
  • Hroch, Miroslav. “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation.” New Left Review I/198 (1993): 3–20.

VII. Works on Marxism and the National Question

  • Lenin, V. I. The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (1914).
  • Lenin, V. I. Critical Remarks on the National Question (1913).
  • Trotsky, Leon. The History of the Russian Revolution. London: Pluto Press, 1977.
  • Trotsky, Leon. “The National Question and the Class Struggle.” The Militant (1931).
  • Luxemburg, Rosa. The National Question and Autonomy (1908–09).
  • Harman, Chris. The Fire Last Time: 1968 and After. London: Bookmarks, 1988.
  • Callinicos, Alex. The Revolutionary Road to Socialism. London: Bookmarks, 1983.

VIII. Works on Scotland, Nationalism, and State Formation

  • Devine, T. M. The Scottish Nation: 1700–2000. London: Penguin, 1999.
  • Devine, T. M. Independence or Union: Scotland’s Past and Scotland’s Future. London: Penguin, 2016.
  • Morton, Graeme. Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland, 1830–1860. East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1999.
  • Pittock, Murray. Scottish Nationality. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
  • Kidd, Colin. Union and Unionisms: Political Thought in Scotland, 1500–2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

IX. Works on the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum

  • Hassan, Gerry, and James Mitchell, eds. The Scottish Independence Referendum: Politics and the Media. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016.
  • Paterson, Lindsay. “The Referendum and the Future of Scottish Politics.” Scottish Affairs 23, no. 4 (2014): 421–431.
  • Keating, Michael. The Independence of Scotland: Self-Government and the Shifting Politics of Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  • McEwen, Nicola. “Scotland’s Choice: The Referendum and Its Aftermath.” Political Quarterly 85, no. 1 (2014): 50–56.

X. Works on the SWP, British Left, and Pseudo-Left Politics

  • Birchall, Ian. The British Trotskyist Movement: A History. London: Haymarket, 2011.
  • Callinicos, Alex. Trotskyism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.
  • Cliff, Tony. State Capitalism in Russia. London: Pluto Press, 1974.
  • German, Lindsey. A Question of Class. London: Bookmarks, 1996.
  • Sewell, Rob. In the Cause of Labour: A History of British Trade Unionism. London: Wellred, 2010.
  • World Socialist Web Site (WSWS). Various articles on the SWP and Scottish independence (2013–2014).

Tom Nairn, Nationalism, and the So-Called Crisis of Marxism

Tom Nairn’s The Break-up of Britain is among the most intellectually ambitious works produced by the New Left Review milieu. It also clearly illustrates the political and theoretical deadlock the British left faced after the war. The book remains compelling not because its predictions were accurate—which they repeatedly were not—but because it captures a deep sense of disorientation: the decline of revolutionary Marxism as a practical force, the move of intellectuals into academia, and the search for new political avenues through nationalism.

This critique does not aim to dismiss Nairn’s work but instead seeks to place it within its historical and political context. It also aims to reveal the theoretical reversals that turned nationalism from a bourgeois ideology into a stand-in for class politics. Nairn’s well-known assertion that nationalism is “Janus-faced — simultaneously progressive… and regressive” is not a groundbreaking insight but a way to avoid deeper engagement. It functions as a conceptual cover for a political setback.

The Nairn–Anderson Thesis and the Myth of the “Incomplete Bourgeois Revolution”

The Nairn–Anderson thesis starts with a straightforward idea: Britain’s bourgeois revolution was “premature and incomplete,” leading to an outdated state setup — monarchy, Lords, and the established Church — that persisted into modern times and hindered capitalist growth. Nairn’s later term, Ukania, illustrated this idea of a refined yet backward state “cloaked in antique attire.” However, satire is not analysis. The British state was not a relic; it was the most powerful agent of capitalist expansion in history. “The monarchy, the House of Lords, and the established Church were not feudal relics holding back capitalist development — they were the specific institutional forms through which British capitalism achieved global dominance.”

The English Revolution of the 1640s and the settlement of 1688 were not merely ‘incomplete” bourgeois revolutions. Instead, they represented the political mechanisms through which a rising bourgeoisie reinforced its authority in partnership with a landowning class already realigned around capitalist farming. Britain’s rise in industry, empire, and global dominance was achieved not despite these institutions but because of them. Nairn’s argument, therefore, misunderstands the nature of the British state. The crisis it faced in the 1960s–70s was not a delayed consequence of 1688, but a result of Britain’s declining global position — a crisis of capitalism, not merely of outdated constitutional traditions.

Nationalism and the New Left’s Theoretical Vacuum

Nairn’s second major assertion — that classical Marxism lacked a comprehensive theory of nationalism — is equally unsubstantiated. Marxism has always viewed nationalism as a historically shaped bourgeois ideology. Lenin’s discussions on the national question, Trotsky’s insights on the Balkans and colonial regions, and even Stalin’s early work under Lenin’s guidance form an extensive theoretical foundation. The Marxist stance is straightforward: nationalism can only be progressive under specific, historically determined circumstances (such as unifying national markets against feudal division or rallying colonial peoples against imperialism). Its natural tendency is to place the working class under the control of “its own” bourgeoisie. Marxists’ role is to reveal nationalism’s class nature and promote workers’ international solidarity. Nairn’s assertion that nationalism is “Janus-faced” — both progressive and regressive — elevates a historically contingent phenomenon to a fundamental characteristic of capitalism.

This isn’t a deepening of Marxism but a step back from it. It permits nationalism to be seen as a valid political tool rather than an obstacle to working-class unity. For the New Left Review circle, nationalism’s appeal was more existential than theoretical. With no revolutionary party in sight, nationalism provided a movement where the working class seemed passive, a sense of identity amid fragmented class consciousness, and drama in a politics that had become overly technical. In this way, nationalism served as a romantic alternative to revolutionary politics.

Nairn’s most significant theoretical contribution is his adoption of bourgeois sociology—such as Gellner and Hechter’s concept of “internal colonialism”—to show that nationalism emerges in response to uneven development. In this framework, peripheral regions rally “the people” through nationalism, which serves as their only form of resistance. Consequently, nationalism becomes the primary political expression of developmental inequality, while class struggle is relegated to a secondary role. This approach reverses the traditional Marxist view of the relationship between base and superstructure: for Marxists, uneven development leads to class contradictions, with nationalism as an ideological response. For Nairn, uneven development creates national contradictions, and national mobilisation replaces class struggle.

This inversion underpins Nairn’s backing of Scottish nationalism. When nationalism is viewed as inherently progressive, its class implications are overlooked. The bourgeois nature of the SNP, its support for NATO, and its austerity policies all fade into the background as part of the broader idea of “national development.”

The Break‑Up Thesis and the Real Nature of Scottish Nationalism

Nairn’s prediction of Britain’s breakup during the 1970s crisis proved premature. The 1979 devolution referendums failed to cause fragmentation, and when devolution eventually happened in 1997–99, it was a top-down, managed reform, contrary to Nairn’s thesis that such change was impossible. The core issue, however, is political: the SNP is not a movement of popular resistance but a bourgeois party advocating austerity, NATO militarism, corporate tax competition, and the transformation of Scotland into a competitive platform for global capitalism.

During the 2014 referendum, the SEP argued that “The SNP’s real aim was to transform Scotland into a low-tax, cheap-labour hub for the benefit of banks and transnational corporations.” Scotland is not an oppressed nation and was not colonised. The Scottish bourgeoisie fully engaged in British imperialism. Scottish workers face oppression as workers, not as Scots. The 1707 Act of Union set the stage for “the first industrial working class in the world,” and since then, workers throughout Britain have fought together in major struggles. Nairn’s “internal colonialism” theory falls apart upon scrutiny. It’s a political fiction meant to make nationalism appear progressive.

The Pseudo‑Left and English Nationalism

English nationalism is the most dangerous culmination of the pseudo-left’s political decline. For years, they idealised Scottish and Welsh nationalism as “progressive,” “anti-imperial,” or “Janus-faced.” However, the logic of nationalism extends beyond Hadrian’s Wall. When class politics give way to territorial grievances, England itself transforms into a “nation” waiting to be rediscovered, reimagined, and ultimately exploited. The pseudo-left didn’t create English nationalism but fostered its development. They started by claiming Britain was an “incomplete nation,” a constitutional relic with outdated institutions blocking progress. They adopted Tom Nairn’s view that nationalism is a structural response to uneven development. They promoted the myth that Scotland and Wales were “internal colonies,” oppressed by an English-dominated state. They encouraged workers to see themselves as Scots, Welsh, or Irish first, rather than as workers. But nationalism isn’t a scalpel; it’s a virus that spreads uncontrollably once unleashed.

The pseudo-lefts now face the monster they contributed to creating: English nationalism as a political force. They cannot counter it because they share its core assumption—that the nation, rather than the working class, is the key political unit. English nationalism is not a revolt of the oppressed but the ideological stance of a bourgeoisie aiming to reshape the state for its own benefit. It claims to offer “sovereignty” while enforcing austerity, “control” while increasing exploitation. It talks about “the people” but serves capital, exemplifying nationalism as a tool to bind workers to their ruling class. The pseudo-lefts are unable to oppose this because they helped develop it — replacing internationalism with localism, class politics with cultural grievances, Marxism with academic radicalism. They embraced regionalism, community politics, and “progressive patriotism,” even flirting with English identity as a form of resistance. In doing so, they legitimised the very categories that English nationalism now exploits.

The disintegration of Britain goes beyond just a constitutional crisis; it reflects the ideological collapse of the left. The pseudo-lefts have split workers along national lines at a time when capitalism calls for their solidarity. They have made nationalism the default mode of dissent, ceding political ground to the bourgeoisie. English nationalism isn’t the solution; it’s a symptom of Britain’s deeper crisis. The pseudo-lefts, having forsaken the working class for nationalist causes, are partly responsible for this rise. The working class has no nation; its future depends on fighting for socialism both across Britain and globally. While pseudo-lefts promote nationalism, Marxism stands for liberation.

The New Left Review Project in Historical Perspective

Nairn’s work is deeply connected to the wider history of the New Left Review (NLR). The NLR represented a form of academic Marxism that emphasised theoretical innovation rather than revolutionary action. Its emphasis on nationalism, Western Marxism, and structuralist sociology indicated a political shift away from the aim of a global socialist revolution. In the postwar era, the working class’s crisis largely stemmed from leadership failures—driven by betrayals from Stalinism, social democracy, and trade union bureaucracy—rather than a collapse of Marxist theory itself. Consequently, the NLR distanced itself from revolutionary parties and focused on developing new theoretical frameworks. Nairn’s emphasis on nationalism illustrates this strategic retreat.

History demonstrates that seeking national self-determination as an ultimate goal has led to conflicts such as the Balkan wars of the 1990s, instances of ethnic cleansing, NATO military interventions, and the rise of impoverished micro-states. Pseudo-left organisations that supported Scottish independence in 2014 later endorsed NATO’s proxy war in Ukraine, aligning with fascist groups under the pretext of “self-determination.” When international working-class solidarity breaks down, nationalism often becomes a stepping stone to imperialism.

Conclusion: Marxism Against Nationalism

Tom Nairn’s The Break-up of Britain remains a significant account of an intellectual crisis. It is sincere, insightful, and highly indicative of underlying issues. However, its theoretical framework fails at a crucial point: nationalism cannot support the working class. It functions as a bourgeois ideology with a dual nature that consistently favours capital. The working class does not belong to any nation. Its liberation depends on defeating capitalism worldwide, not on expanding borders. The crisis of the British state—and any nation-state—can only be addressed through efforts to establish a workers’ government and a united Socialist Europe. Nairn’s book is important and worth reading. Nevertheless, it must be approached critically, as a snapshot of how parts of the left turned away from Marxism toward nationalism. This ideology has historically divided and weakened the working class.

Sources and Bibliography

Primary Works by Tom Nairn

  • Nairn, Tom. The Break‑up of Britain: Crisis and Neo‑Nationalism. London: Verso, 1977.
  • Nairn, Tom. After Britain: New Labour and the Return of Scotland. London: Granta, 2000.
  • Nairn, Tom. “The Modern Janus.” New Left Review 94 (1975).
  • Nairn, Tom. “Scotland and Europe.” New Left Review 160 (1986).

The Nairn–Anderson Thesis

  • Anderson, Perry. “Origins of the Present Crisis.” New Left Review 23 (1964).
  • Anderson, Perry. Arguments Within English Marxism. London: Verso, 1980.
  • Anderson, Perry. English Questions. London: Verso, 1992.

Marxist Theory of the National Question

  • Marx, Karl & Engels, Friedrich. The Communist Manifesto.
  • Lenin, V. I. The Right of Nations to Self‑Determination. 1914.
  • Lenin, V. I. Critical Remarks on the National Question. 1913.
  • Lenin, V. I. The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self‑Determination. 1916.
  • Trotsky, Leon. The Balkan Wars 1912–13.
  • Trotsky, Leon. History of the Russian Revolution. (Sections on nationalities).
  • Stalin, J. V. Marxism and the National Question. 1913 (written under Lenin’s supervision).

Marxist Critiques of Nationalism and the Pseudo‑Left

  • International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI). The Historical and International Foundations of the Socialist Equality Party.
  • North, David. The Crisis of Capitalist Culture and the Tasks of the Socialist Movement.
  • North, David. The Frankfurt School, Postmodernism and the Politics of the Pseudo‑Left.
  • Socialist Equality Party (UK). “The Scottish Independence Referendum: A Warning to the Working Class.” World Socialist Web Site, 2014.
  • Socialist Equality Party (UK). “The SNP’s Program and the Interests of the Working Class.” WSWS, 2014.

Nationalism, Sociology, and Uneven Development

  • Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.
  • Hechter, Michael. Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development. London: Routledge, 1975.
  • Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Cambridge: CUP, 1990.
  • Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1983.

British State Formation and Historiography

  • Hill, Christopher. The English Revolution 1640.
  • Hill, Christopher. The Century of Revolution.
  • Kearney, Hugh. The British Isles: A History of Four Nations.
  • Colley, Linda. Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837.
  • Kidd, Colin. Union and Unionisms: Political Thought in Scotland 1500–2000.

Contemporary Analyses of British Politics and Nationalism

  • Kenny, Michael. The Politics of English Nationhood. Oxford: OUP, 2014.
  • Aughey, Arthur. The Politics of Englishness. Manchester: MUP, 2007.
  • Hassan, Gerry. The Strange Death of Scottish Labour. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016.
  • Hassan, Gerry & Ilett, Simon (eds.). The Story of the Scottish Parliament. Edinburgh: EUP, 2019.

General Works on the Pseudo‑Left and Identity Politics

  • Callinicos, Alex. The Revenge of History.
  • Eagleton, Terry. The Illusions of Postmodernism.
  • Žižek, Slavoj. Against the Double Blackmail. (Critical of nationalism and liberal identity politics).
  • Löwy, Michael. The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development. (Useful for contextualising Nairn’s misuse of uneven development).

Archival and Online Sources

  • World Socialist Web Site (wsws.org) — analyses of nationalism, pseudo‑left politics, and the British state.
  • New Left Review — original essays by Nairn, Anderson, and the New Left circle.
  • Scottish Government archives — devolution documents and referendum materials.
  • UK Parliament archives — constitutional debates, devolution legislation, and historical records.

A border history of cotton, labour and forgetting: Cristina Rivera Garza’s Autobiography of Cotton

Cristina Rivera Garza’s Autobiography of Cotton was published in English by Graywolf Press six years after its initial release in Mexico. This release coincides with her rising international prominence. Rivera Garza, now a Pulitzer Prize winner, MacArthur Fellow, and multiple Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz Prize recipient, holds a significant place in the modern literary worlds of both the United States and Mexico. Her work is widely circulated through leading publishers, award panels, and cultural organisations that influence the global border literature scene.

Any evaluation of Autobiography of Cotton must recognise Christina MacSweeney’s crucial role, as her translation renders Rivera Garza’s hybrid form accessible to an English-speaking audience. MacSweeney has become a leading mediator of contemporary Latin American literature in the Anglo-American publishing scene, introducing writers like Valeria Luiselli, Julián Fuks, and Daniel Saldaña París. Her approach is characterised by an awareness of the archival and documentary styles prevalent in the region’s current literary works. In this particular case, the difficulty is significant: Rivera Garza’s prose shifts between bureaucratic records, family testimonies, ecological descriptions, and lyrical reflections—sometimes within a single page. MacSweeney’s translation maintains this dynamic variety without reducing it to the uniform “international style” often enforced by English-language publishers.

The book’s political significance—its focus on labour history, engagement with Revueltas, and critique of the cotton economy—relies partly on the translator’s skill in preserving the tension between factual documentation and personal interpretation. MacSweeney’s faithful preservation of this balance is a notable strength. While Rivera Garza’s approach ultimately shapes whether the book makes the class dynamics clear or remains ambiguous, the translation itself does not hinder a serious political analysis.

Her new book explores a topic beyond traditional literary circles. ‘Autobiography of Cotton’ revisits the often overlooked history of agricultural labour in northern Mexico, emphasising the cotton industry that transformed Tamaulipas throughout the 20th century and highlighting the 1934 strike at Estación Camarón. This event brought young Communist activist José Revueltas to the area and influenced his future proletarian fiction.

The gravity of the book’s subject matter is undeniable. The real question is whether Rivera Garza’s hybrid memoir-archive can effectively challenge the political reasoning behind this history, or if it ends up assimilating the strike, the workers, and Revueltas into the depoliticised conventions typical of modern literary autofiction.

Cotton, capital and the border

Cotton in northern Mexico is more than just a local crop; it is a part of a global economic system. Throughout the 20th century, cotton cultivation in Tamaulipas connected Mexican agricultural workers directly to US financial interests, aligned with global market demands, and involved violent state interventions supporting landowners and ginners. The rise of cotton monoculture dramatically altered the region’s environment—depleting water sources, degrading soil, and causing what Rivera Garza describes as “ecocide.” Additionally, it reshaped the local class system, with migrant workers, including Rivera Garza’s grandparents, caught in a system of exploitation driven not by local customs but by international capital.

Any thorough analysis of this history must start with class relations: who owned the land, controlled the gins, extracted surplus, and how the state reacted when workers organised resistance. The 1934 strike at Estación Camarón stands as a crucial event in this history. It is not just a symbolic gesture, a family story, or a nostalgic border memory; it was a direct clash between agricultural workers and capital. Its impact spread throughout the region, and the underlying dynamics are still evident today in the conditions faced by farmworkers on both sides of the US-Mexico border.

Revueltas and the politics of clarity

Rivera Garza’s book revisits the historical roots of José Revueltas’s El luto humano. As a teenager, Revueltas travelled to Tamaulipas in support of striking workers, a journey that influenced his political stance and artistic growth. He was not a writer fuelled by border nostalgia or family history; instead, he was a Marxist activist whose fiction critiqued the decline of the Mexican Revolution, exposed the betrayals within the Stalinist Communist Party, and depicted the harsh realities of class struggle in rural areas. Unlike the modern memoir-archive genre, he did not romanticise suffering; instead, he clarified its political roots. He viewed strikes not as mere wounds in the national psyche but as manifestations of capitalism’s inherent contradictions. Rather than blending class antagonism into the backdrop, he laid it bare.

Any book referencing Revueltas should be evaluated against this benchmark. The key question is not whether Rivera Garza mentions him, but whether she actively engages with the political approach he embodies. Does she challenge the class forces that influenced the cotton economy? Does she examine the roles of the state, the bosses, and the Communist Party? Does she draw connections between 1934 and current agricultural labour conditions? Or does she incorporate Revueltas into the cosy genre of border memoirs popular among publishers in New York and Mexico City?

The memoir‑archive form: illumination or obscurity?

Rivera Garza’s book is characterised as a blend of archival reconstruction, family storytelling, and fictionalised memory. This approach has gained prominence in international literary fiction over the last decade. While not inherently illegitimate, it presents a specific risk: turning historical struggles into personal atmospheres and reducing political conflicts to individual inheritance instead of collective action. The “archival turn” in modern literature often views history more as a source of emotion than a record of class struggles. Strikes become symbolic, exploitation a mood, and the past a space for lyrical reflection rather than political critique. This trend is influenced by the ideological pressures of the literary market, which favours works that allude to history but avoid its difficult realities.

The main issue is whether Autobiography of Cotton yields to or resists this tendency. Rivera Garza’s earnestness and serious subject matter hint at a work that challenges the political dynamics of the cotton economy. However, the memoir-archive style, focusing on personal lineage and subjective memory, might obscure the very forces that shaped that history.

Borderlands have long been viewed in US and Mexican literature as symbolic spaces—representing identity, hybridity, trauma, and memory. However, the border itself is not just a metaphor; it is a tangible outcome of imperialism, agricultural capitalism, and state violence. The cotton economy directly influenced the border’s demographic and social makeup. Migrant labour, ecological damage, land concentration, and state repression are real, material processes, not merely symbolic ones.

Autobiography of Cotton is a work whose importance lies not in its formal innovations or its place within the contemporary “archival turn,” but in the historical terrain it reopens. Rivera Garza has chosen to write about a chapter of Mexican labour history that the literary establishment, both in the United States and Mexico, has long preferred to forget: the cotton economy of Tamaulipas, the ecological devastation it produced, and the class struggles—above all the 1934 strike—that emerged from it. That decision alone distinguishes the book from the vast body of border literature that treats the region as metaphor rather than as the product of capitalist agriculture and state repression.

Whether Rivera Garza ultimately confronts the political logic of this history, or assimilates it into the aestheticised conventions of memoir and autofiction, remains a question that only a close reading can settle. The presence of José Revueltas in the book’s background sets a high standard. Revueltas understood the strike not as a family wound or a symbolic inheritance, but as an expression of the contradictions of Mexican capitalism and the betrayals of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Any work that invokes him must be measured against his clarity.

What can be said now is that Autobiography of Cotton directs attention to a history of exploitation, migration and ecological destruction whose consequences remain fully alive today. The conditions facing agricultural workers in Tamaulipas, Texas and California are not historical residues; they are the direct continuation of the same class forces that shaped the cotton fields of the 1930s. A book that illuminates that continuity—rather than obscuring it beneath the consolations of memory—would be of genuine value to readers seeking to understand the border not as symbol, but as a site of ongoing struggle.

Rivera Garza has opened the door to that possibility. The task of criticism is to determine whether she walks through it.

Sources and Bibliography

Primary Works

  • Cristina Rivera GarzaAutobiografía del algodón (Literatura Random House, 2020).
  • Cristina Rivera GarzaAutobiography of Cotton, trans. Christina MacSweeney (Graywolf Press, 2024).
  • José RevueltasEl luto humano (Ediciones Era, 1943).
  • José RevueltasHuman Mourning, trans. Reuben G. Brower (University of Texas Press, 1965).
  • José RevueltasEnsayo sobre un proletariado sin cabeza (1962).
  • Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Fondo Secretaría de Gobernación, documents related to agricultural labor disputes in Tamaulipas, 1930–1940.
  • Hemeroteca Nacional de México, contemporary press coverage of the 1934 Estación Camarón strike.

Historical Studies: Cotton, Labour and the Border

  • Casey WalshBuilding the Borderlands: A Transnational History of Irrigated Cotton along the Mexico–Texas Border (Texas A&M University Press, 2008).
  • Gilberto López y RivasLa guerra contra los pueblos indígenas de México (Siglo XXI, 2015) — for broader context on state repression and agrarian conflict.
  • Friedrich KatzThe Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution (University of Chicago Press, 1981).
  • John Womack Jr.Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (Vintage, 1970).
  • Heather Fowler-SalaminiWorking Women, Working Men: Mexico and Central America since 1930 (University of Texas Press, 1994).
  • Mark Overmyer-VelázquezBeyond la Frontera: The History of Mexico–U.S. Migration (Oxford University Press, 2011).
  • Manuel García y Griego, “The Importation of Mexican Farm Workers to the United States, 1942–1964,” in Migration Across the Mexico–United States Border (University of Texas Press, 1981).

Studies on José Revueltas and Marxist Literary Tradition

  • Evodio EscalanteJosé Revueltas: Una literatura del “lado moridor” (FCE, 1990).
  • Michael J. Snediker, “Revueltas and the Politics of Form,” Latin American Literary Review (2014).
  • Jorge VolpiLa imaginación y el poder: Una historia intelectual de 1968 (Era, 1998) — includes analysis of Revueltas’s political conflicts with the Mexican Communist Party.
  • Christopher Domínguez MichaelVida de Revueltas (Era, 2014).
  • Adolfo GillyLa revolución interrumpida (Era, 1971) — essential for understanding the political degeneration Revueltas confronted.

Environmental and Ecological Context

  • Christopher R. BoyerPolitical Landscapes: Forests, Conservation, and Community in Mexico (Duke University Press, 2015).
  • Emily WakildRevolutionary Parks: Conservation, Social Justice, and Mexico’s National Parks, 1910–1940 (University of Arizona Press, 2011).
  • Casey Walsh, “Ecologies of Production: Cotton, Water, and Agrarian Change in Northern Mexico,” Journal of Historical Geography (2004).

Borderlands Theory and Critique

  • Gloria AnzaldúaBorderlands/La Frontera (Aunt Lute Books, 1987).
  • Deborah CohenBraceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects in the Postwar United States and Mexico (UNC Press, 2011).
  • Kelly Lytle Hernández, ¡Migra!: A History of the U.S. Border Patrol (University of California Press, 2010).

On Translation and Christina MacSweeney

  • Christina MacSweeney, translator’s notes and interviews on translating Rivera Garza and Luiselli (various sources, including Words Without Borders and Asymptote).
  • Lawrence VenutiThe Translator’s Invisibility (Routledge, 1995) — for theoretical context on translation and the “international style.”
  • Susan BassnettTranslation Studies (Routledge, 2014).

Marxist Theory and Method

(Foundational texts relevant to the review’s analytical standpoint.)

  • Karl MarxCapital, Vol. I (1867).
  • Leon TrotskyThe Permanent Revolution (1930).
  • Leon TrotskyThe Revolution Betrayed (1937).
  • C.L.R. JamesThe Black Jacobins (1938) — for commodity history and world‑system analysis.
  • Eric HobsbawmIndustry and Empire (Penguin, 1968).
  • Mike DavisLate Victorian Holocausts (Verso, 2001) — on ecology, imperialism and capitalist agriculture.

A Security‑State Lens on Social Breakdown: The EU’s Femcel Study and the Long History of Pathologising Capitalist Crisis

A recent study conducted under the EU’s CounteR program—titled “Femcels’ Speeches Between Extreme Solitude and Radical Break with the ‘Alpha World’”—illustrates how contemporary academic research can serve ideological purposes aligned with security interests. Its authors, Séraphin Alava and Rasha Nagem, frame their work as a neutral analysis of online discussions among young women who feel isolated and romantically excluded. However, the study is actually a politically motivated document, part of a state-funded initiative to pathologise the social effects of capitalist failures. Two critical sentences highlight its core message: “Loneliness is treated as a discursive and psychological phenomenon to be typologized, not as a social product of a specific economic order.” “The Femcel, like the incel before her, is thereby transformed from a symptom of social crisis into a potential security risk to be monitored.”

These lines emphasise the main ideological stance: turning social distress into a security concern. The research is carried out within an institution dedicated to “Violent Terrorism and Crime Prediction,” which interprets the analysis exclusively through risk management ideas. Consequently, important questions — such as why now? Why specifically this form? and what socio-economic conditions contribute to this isolation? — are initially overlooked.

The Security Apparatus as Arbiter of Academic Inquiry

The CounteR project is part of a broad EU security research network that has expanded significantly over the past decade. Its primary aim is not to study social phenomena but to classify and predict them. Funding for this research cannot address the social roots of issues like alienation, declining living standards, or the commercialisation of intimate life. Instead, it concentrates on monitoring, categorising, and intercepting online expressions of distress. This restriction is political rather than academic. The EU, along with Britain and the US, has established a surveillance system that treats political dissent, psychological distress, and social isolation as interchangeable indicators of “radicalisation.” The Femcel is merely viewed as a data point within a risk-scoring framework.

The study’s categories — “Alpha world rejection,” “feminist consciousness,” “radicalisation trajectory” — are not neutral labels. They are part of a security framework aimed at classifying populations by risk level. In essence, the typology created by the authors acts as a taxonomy for a database.

A Long Lineage: Cold War Social‑Pathology Research

The main idea behind the Femcel study’s ideology is not new. It carries on a Cold War-era social science tradition that regarded the societal effects of capitalist crises as primarily psychological problems. Oscar Lewis’s “culture of poverty” concept redefined structural difficulties as a self-perpetuating psychological condition. Poverty was interpreted not as a result of exploitation but as stemming from “maladaptive behaviours.” This view aligned with Cold War liberalism by distancing inequality from political causes and instead blaming it on the mindset of those in poverty.

The Frankfurt School’s concept of the Authoritarian Personality, adapted by US Cold War agencies, framed political tendencies as psychological disorders. This shift diverted attention from social causes of fascism, instead emphasising individual personality traits. As a result, political threats were seen as personal psychological issues rather than linked to class struggles. Postwar research on “juvenile delinquency” often interpreted the decline of urban working-class areas as behavioural problems needing supervision, rather than recognising it as a result of deindustrialisation and racial segregation. The Alava–Nagem paper reflects this Cold War perspective: social crises are simplified into psychological types; alienation is regarded as a risk factor; resentment is viewed as a pathology, and structural conditions are not considered. The EU’s counter-radicalisation initiatives are significantly shaped by the UK’s Prevent program, which is among Europe’s most extensive surveillance systems.

Prevent has identified tens of thousands of individuals for deradicalisation efforts, including children as young as four. According to the WSWS, Prevent combines political dissent, mental health issues, and social isolation into a single category called “extremism.’ Its primary strategy is pre-emptive intervention—acting before political consciousness develops. This includes monitoring online speech, conducting risk assessments, and viewing social alienation as a security threat. Furthermore, women’s online spaces are increasingly targeted, under the assumption that “vulnerable individuals” could be more susceptible to extremism.

The Femcel study follows this trend, using Prevent’s risk-tiering approach. It views online discussion as a threat and frames feminist awareness as a potential pathway to radicalisation, ignoring material conditions. To fully understand it, one must consider the incel discourse that sparked it, which itself arose from the broader crisis of social reproduction. After the 2018 Toronto van attack, incels were quickly labelled as terrorists. Media and academic discussions concentrated on misogynistic beliefs, online radicalisation, and psychological issues, while overlooking material factors such as declining living standards, social atomisation, commodified intimacy, and algorithm-driven dating markets.

Both incel and Femcel discussions originate from the decline of community institutions, the commercialisation of romance, the hierarchy of desirability, and the collapse of stable social paths to partnership. However, incels are viewed as a violent danger, whereas Femcels are considered psychologically fragile. Despite this difference, the core issue is identical. The Alava–Nagem study observes that Femcel discourse “diverges from the misogynistic violence associated with segments of the incel milieu,” but still regards Femcels as potential security risks. The fundamental reasoning is consistent: social crises trigger risk assessments.

Dating Apps and the Commodification of Intimacy

The increase in dating app usage over the last decade is often seen as a cultural or technological development. However, it also exposes a deeper social crisis. These platforms, which impact the private lives of hundreds of millions, are not just neutral tools but commercial systems that transform human relationships via market forces. Their growth is also linked to worsening material conditions that once supported stable relationships.

The political economy behind dating apps is straightforward. These platforms prioritise profit, which depends on maintaining user dissatisfaction. Their business model involves encouraging frequent user turnover, artificially restricting attention, ranking desirability with algorithms, and segmenting users into paid tiers. In this setup, intimacy and visibility are treated as commodities. Loneliness is also commodified—controlled through subscriptions, profile boosts, and algorithm adjustments. Rather than solving loneliness, these platforms exploit it for financial gain.

This commodification of intimate life is not an accidental result of technology but a direct outcome of decades of neoliberal reforms. The decline of stable jobs, rising housing prices, the breakdown of public spaces, and the fragmentation of social life have weakened the communal and workplace institutions where relationships traditionally developed. Dating apps serve to fill the void left by capitalist disintegration, yet they also intensify it.

Platforms tend to replicate and amplify existing social inequalities. Their algorithms prioritise users based on aesthetic, cultural, and class indicators that closely align with income, education, and consumption habits. This creates a stratified marketplace where a small minority garners most attention, while others struggle for visibility amid harsher competition. The concept of the “Alpha world,” often discussed in Femcel and incel communities, is not just a cultural fantasy; it reflects the ideological foundation of this market-driven mindset.

The mental health issues linked to using dating apps — including anxiety, loneliness, and resentment — are not personal flaws. They are the expected results of structuring intimate relationships around competition, self-promotion, and algorithm-driven choices. Despite this, academic and media narratives often view these problems as personal ailments instead of signs of a society in upheaval. The EU’s counter-radicalisation efforts take this further by framing the negative effects of commodified intimacy as possible security risks.

The truth is simpler and more politically explosive. The crisis of intimacy is a crisis of capitalism. The commodification of romantic life is inseparable from the commodification of everything else. A society that cannot provide stable employment, affordable housing, or meaningful community cannot provide the conditions for stable relationships. Dating apps do not repair this devastation; they monetise it.

The Gendered Crisis of Social Reproduction

To grasp the rise of Femcel discourse, it’s essential to look beyond platform speech and focus on the social reproductive crisis. Since the 1980s, young people in Europe and North America have experienced declining wages, rising housing costs, shrinking public spaces, the breakdown of stable workplaces and communities, and fragmented social and temporal lives. For young women, these issues have led to postponed or unfeasible household formation, increased competition in dating scenes, greater reliance on algorithm-driven platforms, and social isolation from stable networks.

Dating apps have transformed courtship from a personal pursuit into a market-driven activity. Visibility is now a product, algorithms rank desirability, and romantic opportunities are part of a competitive marketplace. The concept of the “Alpha world” in Femcel discussions is not just a cultural myth but a reflection of this market logic’s ideology. Femcel language isn’t a sign of pathology but a rational reaction to being excluded from a commodified form of intimacy. It acts as a social critique—though it may be nascent and contradictory—rooted in actual experiences. However, the counter-radicalisation perspective cannot see this because acknowledging it would mean admitting capitalism’s failure to foster stable social life.

Feminist Consciousness and the Limits of Security‑Compatible Critique

The study hints at a “transition… to feminist consciousness,” but only in a depoliticised, NGO-friendly way. The feminism accepted within a security framework is the safe type: focusing on individual empowerment, platform governance, and representation. The feminism that is excluded highlights women’s isolation in social reproduction crises, critiques the commodification of intimacy, and acknowledges that stable relationships depend on steady material conditions.

A truly materialist feminist outlook would critique the very structure of capitalist society. It would see the dating-app marketplace as a capitalist institution rather than just a cultural artefact. This perspective would acknowledge that the crisis of intimacy is tied to broader issues like work, housing, and community. If fully developed, it could lead to socialist reforms of social life. This is exactly the kind of awareness that counter-radicalisation efforts aim to suppress.

A truly social-rooted study of Femcel discourse would start by examining material conditions such as employment insecurity, housing instability, debt, the decline of public spaces, and the weakening of communal institutions. It would explore how algorithmic sorting worsens inequality, commodifies visibility, and stratifies desirability. The analysis would include how women cope with exclusion, how resentment stems from structural issues, and how online conversations reflect material realities. It would question whether alienation can transform into class consciousness, whether feminist criticism can evolve into anti-capitalism, and whether new solidarities can form. The Alava–Nagem paper cannot undertake this because its institutional role is to prevent such analysis.

Conclusion: The Ideological Function of Counter‑Radicalisation Research

The Femcel phenomenon illustrates a facet of capitalist social disintegration. The counter-radicalisation system reinterprets it as a security threat. This shift isn’t mere academic oversight but a deliberate ideological stance. The ruling elite, unable to confront the social ruin they caused, reframe these issues as individual mental health problems, crimes, or extremism. The Alava–Nagem study thus highlights not just its findings but what it exposes: the clash between a security-focused knowledge system and a social reality it struggles to comprehend. It’s a record of an apparatus compelled to classify and prevent, while avoiding questions about the root causes of the crisis.

Further Reading

A curated selection of works that illuminate the political economy of dating apps, the commodification of intimacy, the crisis of social reproduction, and the ideological function of counter‑radicalisation research. These texts provide historical depth, theoretical clarity, and empirical grounding for readers seeking to understand the broader social forces driving contemporary forms of isolation, romantic exclusion, and algorithmically mediated desire.

Political Economy of Dating Apps and Digital Intimacy

  • Kugelberg, Elsa. Dating Apps and the Digital Sexual Sphere. American Political Science Review 119, no. 4 (2025): 1761–1776. A major normative analysis of dating apps as corporate actors intervening in a core social institution — intimacy — with over 350 million yearly users. Essential for understanding dating apps as political institutions rather than neutral technologies.
  • Wilken, Rowan; Burgess, Jean; Albury, Kath. “Dating Apps and Data Markets: A Political Economy of Communication Approach.” Computational Culture 7 (2019). A foundational study of dating apps as data‑extraction industries, detailing how platforms monetise user behaviour, aggregate intimate data, and operate within global corporate structures.
  • Bergström, Marie. The New Laws of Love: Online Dating and the Privatisation of Intimacy. Polity Press, 2020. A sociological examination of how dating apps privatise courtship, individualise romantic life, and reshape the conditions under which relationships form.
  • Illouz, Eva. Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism. Polity Press, 2007. A seminal work on how capitalist rationality reshapes emotional life, laying the groundwork for understanding dating apps as instruments of market discipline.
  • Illouz, Eva. Why Love Hurts: A Sociological Explanation. Polity Press, 2012. Explores how market logic and consumer culture restructure romantic expectations, producing new forms of emotional suffering.
  • Rosenfeld, Michael; Thomas, Reuben; Hausen, Sonia. “Disintermediating Your Friends: How Online Dating in the United States Displaced Other Ways of Meeting.” PNAS (2019). Empirical demonstration of dating apps’ dominance in partner‑finding and the decline of traditional social pathways to intimacy.

 Social Reproduction, Neoliberalism, and the Material Roots of Isolation

  • Fraser, Nancy. Cannibal Capitalism. Verso, 2022. A powerful analysis of how capitalism devours the social foundations of life — including care, community, and intimacy.
  • Bhattacharya, Tithi (ed.). Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression. Pluto Press, 2017. Essential for understanding how the crisis of social reproduction shapes intimate life, gendered experience, and the erosion of stable social institutions.
  • Hochschild, Arlie Russell. The Managed Heart. University of California Press, 1983. A classic study of emotional labour that prefigures the commodification of affect in digital dating markets.
  • Standing, Guy. The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. Bloomsbury, 2011. Provides the socioeconomic backdrop for understanding why younger generations face unprecedented barriers to stable relationships and household formation.

Surveillance, Counter‑Radicalisation, and the Security State

  • Heath‑Kelly, Charlotte. The Politics of Prevent: Counter‑Terrorism and the Security State. Routledge, 2023. A definitive critique of the UK’s Prevent programme and its expansion into mass surveillance of youth, online behaviour, and political dissent.
  • Awan, Imran; Spiller, Keith; Whiting, Andrew. Terrorism in the Digital Age: The Emergence of Cyber Extremism. Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Useful for understanding how security institutions frame online communities—including incels and Femcels—as potential vectors of extremism.
  • Zuboff, Shoshana. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. PublicAffairs, 2019. A comprehensive analysis of how digital platforms extract behavioural data and reshape social life, directly relevant to dating‑app architectures.
  • WSWS Coverage of Prevent and Counter‑Radicalisation: Extensive reporting on the political function of Prevent, the criminalisation of dissent, and the use of “radicalisation” frameworks to police social distress. (Search WSWS archives for: Prevent, counter‑terrorism, surveillance, youth, online extremism.)

Incel and Femcel Discourse in Social Context

  • Ging, Debbie. “Alphas, Betas, and Incels: Theorising the Masculinities of the Manosphere.” Men and Masculinities (2019). A key text on incel ideology, useful for contrasting with Femcel discourse and understanding shared structural roots.
  • Maxwell, Clare; Aggleton, Peter. “Incel: A New Social Category?” Journal of Gender Studies (2022). Situates incel identity within broader social transformations, including precarity and atomisation.
  • WSWS Analyses of Incel Violence and Social Breakdown: Coverage emphasising the material roots of alienation, the collapse of social conditions for youth, and the ideological misuse of “radicalisation” narratives.

 Marxist and Critical Theory Foundations

  • Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Foundational for understanding alienation, commodification, and the reduction of human relations to market transactions.
  • Marx, Karl; Engels, Friedrich. The German Ideology. Essential for grasping how material conditions shape consciousness — including contemporary forms of romantic and sexual alienation.
  • Horkheimer, Max; Adorno, Theodor. Dialectic of Enlightenment. A classic critique of the culture industry, relevant to understanding dating apps as instruments of commodified desire.
  • Marcuse, Herbert. One‑Dimensional Man. Illuminates how capitalist rationality flattens human experience, including intimate life.

Sociological and Political‑Economic Context (Recommended for Further Reading)

  • Illouz, Eva. Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism. A key text on how capitalist rationality reshapes intimate life.
  • Illouz, Eva. Why Love Hurts: A Sociological Explanation. Explores how market logic and consumer culture restructure romantic expectations and experiences.
  • Rosenfeld, Michael; Thomas, Reuben; Hausen, Sonia. “Disintermediating Your Friends: How Online Dating in the United States Displaced Other Ways of Meeting.” PNAS (2019). Empirical demonstration of dating apps’ dominance in partner‑finding.
  • Bergström, Marie. The New Laws of Love: Online Dating and the Privatisation of Intimacy. A sociological study of how dating apps privatise and individualise courtship.

WSWS Coverage of Social Breakdown, Surveillance, and Prevent

  • WSWS reporting on the UK’s Prevent programme and its expansion into mass surveillance of youth and online behaviour.
  • WSWS analyses of social atomisation, declining living standards, and the destruction of communal institutions under capitalism.

The Arday Affair: How Cambridge’s Branding Machine, Marketised Higher Education, and the Pseudo‑Left Produced a Crisis Eight Centuries in the Making

The resignation of Professor Jason Arday from the University of Cambridge has sparked widespread comment in British media and politics. However, the issue isn’t just about personal misconduct or admin flaws. It reflects a deeper, systemic crisis in British higher education—shaped by Cambridge and Oxbridge’s long-standing class role, decades of market influences, and protected by the pseudo-left’s focus on identity politics. This analysis explores the historical, political, and economic factors that made the Arday case both unavoidable and inevitable.

Cambridge: Eight Centuries of Class Rule

To understand Cambridge’s behaviour, it’s important to look at its origins. Founded in 1209, Cambridge has long served the ruling class, with its architecture, rituals, and governance acting as tools to perpetuate elite dominance. Historically, Oxford and Cambridge have functioned as training grounds for clergy, civil servants, judges, and political leaders. They also serve as gatekeepers of cultural capital, shaping standards of ‘merit,” and as networks that strengthen aristocratic and bourgeois influence. The colleges were endowed by monarchs, bishops, and wealthy patrons, with governance structures — led by fellows, donors, and senior administrators — designed to maintain privilege rather than democratize knowledge.

The 2019 Sutton Trust report highlighted this continuity: 71% of senior judges, 56% of Permanent Secretaries, 38% of Lords, and 24% of MPs had been educated at Oxford or Cambridge. The elite are twenty-four times more likely to have attended Oxbridge compared to the general population. This pattern is deliberate, as Oxbridge’s prestige functions as a political asset, legitimizing the authority of the ruling class by portraying privilege as merit. It is this prestige—rather than academic quality—that Cambridge aimed to protect in the Arday case.

Marketisation: How Policy Turned Universities into Corporations

The Arday scandal is closely linked to the changes in UK higher education over the last 30 years. Starting with the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act and advancing with the Browne Review in 2010, successive governments reduced public funding and promoted market competition. Between 2011–12 and 2017–18, government funding for universities decreased by 74 per cent in real terms. Currently, 80 per cent of the sector’s income comes from private sources, mainly student fees and commercial activities.

Universities now operate like corporations: they issue bonds worth hundreds of millions of pounds, hold credit ratings from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, and have vice-chancellors acting as CEOs earning over £400,000. Marketing departments have grown to rival academic faculties in size and influence. Students are viewed as customers rather than learners. Academic staff often work on insecure, casualised contracts. This market-driven approach has transformed university life: research is prioritised for grant attraction, teaching for attracting fee-paying students, and public relations for drawing donors and international applicants.

In this context, “diversity” branding functions more as a market strategy than a moral stance. Universities vie for lucrative international students, mainly from China, India, and the Gulf, who pay between £25,000 and £40,000 annually. A professor with a biography that attracts positive media coverage becomes a valuable asset. Arday’s rapid ascent—from a PE lecturer to a Cambridge professor in just seven years—was not an isolated case. Instead, it exemplifies a system where personal stories are commercialised to serve institutional interests.

Arday’s background—overcoming adversity, late literacy, racial uplift—aligned well with Cambridge’s marketing goals. His appointment received extensive positive press, boosted social-media engagement, and increased international recognition. Multiple sources report that concerns about his doctoral thesis were dismissed as issues ‘predating his arrival.’ Senior staff prioritised positive media images over detailed academic review. The university’s communications team promoted Arday’s story worldwide. This pattern is not unusual; systemic incentives drive it. In a market-based system: prestige brings in revenue, visibility attracts students, and narratives enhance brand value. Conversely, academic integrity rarely generates revenue and can even threaten financial interests.

The Pseudo‑Left: Identity Politics as an Ideological Shield

The pseudo-left—comprising academics, commentators, and activists advocating for identity politics while neglecting class issues—plays a significant role in maintaining the ideological structure of market-driven higher education. In universities, identity politics acts as a form of institutional cover: it offers a low-cost alternative to increasing access for the working class, helps elite institutions project progressive credentials, boosts individuals whose profiles can be commodified, and shifts focus away from academic labour exploitation. The pseudo-left celebrated Arday’s appointment as a victory for representation, overlooking the fact that Cambridge’s student body remains predominantly privileged and its governance retains an aristocratic character.

Right‑Wing Reaction: Meritocracy as a Myth

The right-wing campaign against Arday, led by individuals who openly promote racist pseudoscience, isn’t driven by a genuine concern for academic standards. Instead, it’s fuelled by hostility toward any hiring practices that challenge traditional class privilege. However, the right and the pseudo-left are not truly opponents; they represent two facets of petty-bourgeois politics. The pseudo-left hides its class privilege through identity branding, while the right criticises that branding to defend their own class interests. Both factions support the marketisation of higher education, uphold the authority of elite institutions, and ignore capitalism’s role in fostering corruption, inequality, and intellectual decline. The working class faces a false dichotomy: embracing DEI branding or subscribing to right-wing meritocracy. Both are illusions.

The Real Issue: The Corruption of Higher Education Under Capitalism

The Arday scandal does not highlight failures in vetting but instead reveals a deeper systemic issue where education has become a commodity, universities are part of global financial markets, academic labour is increasingly casualised and degraded, bureaucracy employs identity politics to conceal class privilege, and both the right and pseudo-left manipulate DEI controversies — the right to reinforce privilege and the pseudo-left to defend branding. Both sides uphold the university as a means of maintaining class dominance.

Workers and students must oppose both the pseudo-left, which defends university branding, and the right-wing, which criticises DEI. The fight for academic integrity is fundamentally connected to the broader struggle for socialism. A truly democratic and academically rigorous university system depends on: public funding as the basis for higher education, democratic control by staff and students, the elimination of managerial bureaucracies, an end to market competition and private investment, and the socialist transformation of society where education is viewed as a social right. Only through such a transformation can universities stop serving as instruments of class privilege and become what they are meant to be: institutions committed to the cultural and scientific progress of humanity.

The Limits of Liberal Fiction in the Age of Mass Deportation: Valeria Luiselli’s Lost Children Archive and the Crisis of Artistic Consciousness

The American literary scene widely praises Valeria Luiselli’s Lost Children Archive (2019) as a compassionate, innovative book that tackles the migrant crisis. It demonstrates that contemporary fiction can still meaningfully engage with social issues. Nonetheless, both its reception and content reveal a key problem: the significant political and artistic restrictions within a literary culture dominated by the professional-managerial class. This cultural sphere fails to see the working class as an active force in history, which hinders a true understanding of the crisis’s underlying dynamics.

The migrant crisis is a concrete issue, not just a metaphor or moral tale, nor a backdrop for middle-class introspective concerns. It results from decades of imperialist actions, economic destruction, and bipartisan violence. Genuine art should face these truths directly, but Luiselli’s novel, despite its intelligence and sincerity, does not fully achieve this.

Aestheticisation as Social Function, Not Accident

Luiselli is keenly aware of the risk of turning suffering into mere aesthetic display. Her narrator often questions whether she has the right to “document” tragedies. However, this self-awareness is woven into the aesthetic framework—acting as a ritual that reassures readers that the issue is recognised, thus excusing it. The novel’s use of multiple voices, embedded documents, a Sebald-inspired style, and lyrical abstractions is not just a stylistic device; it transforms horror into a literary experience for readers who are shielded from the violence. The educated, liberal audience is prompted to feel intensely and to experience “productive discomfort,” while still avoiding confrontation with the social forces behind the crisis or their own links to those forces. This is not a flaw in technique but a reflection of the social role that liberal fiction currently occupies.

A key feature of Lost Children Archive is its minimal depiction of ordinary Americans as political figures. As the family journeys from New York to Arizona, passing through many working-class areas, the people they encounter are shown as silent, indifferent, or prejudiced. The borderlands are depicted as hostile territory. This choice is deliberate and reflects a class perspective: Luiselli’s protagonists are essentially documentarians with grants, passports, and credentials. They see the world divided into two groups: educated, compassionate professionals like themselves and a vague mass of backward or indifferent Americans. The working class—whether native-born or immigrant—lacks the power to challenge or dismantle the detention system, and notions of collective action are absent from the novel. This is a political restriction, not merely a stylistic choice. It mirrors the perspective of the social group that currently leads literary production: the upper-middle-class intelligentsia. Their political views are heavily influenced by identity politics, emphasising moral witness and a profound scepticism toward the working class.

Luiselli draws a parallel between nineteenth-century Indigenous removal and twenty-first-century child detention. Although this comparison is historically significant, the novel predominantly expresses mourning rather than providing analysis. The ongoing violence is depicted as a lament for an unchanging American identity, rather than as an examination of the specific class forces driving current policies. The danger lies in presenting American violence as transhistorical, which makes the migrant crisis appear inevitable instead of a consequence of decisions made by particular political actors pursuing specific economic goals. While the bipartisan support for deportation—growing under Obama and escalating under Trump—is acknowledged, it is not critically analysed. This approach creates a historical narrative that lacks agency.

The shortcomings of Lost Children Archive are not unique to Luiselli but highlight a broader trend in American literature. The overseeing professional-managerial class—spanning publishing, academia, and the arts—lacks political clarity. It often opposes universalist politics, mistrusts the working class, and treats social crises more as moral spectacles than opportunities for action. This leads to a literature that emphasises witnessing over analysis, prioritising empathy over solidarity, and introspection over mobilisation. Migrant suffering becomes a matter of aesthetic experience rather than a call for collective intervention. The migrant crisis isn’t mainly about representation; it originates from capitalism, imperialism, and border militarisation. No stylistic innovation can substitute for a political perspective that addresses these root causes.

The Class Character of Contemporary American Fiction

Contemporary American fiction often presents itself as morally serious, politically active, and innovative in form. It claims to tackle urgent social issues such as inequality, racism, climate change, migration, and political turmoil. Yet, this surface-level activism conceals a profound stagnation artistically and politically. Currently, the dominant trends in American literary fiction tend to reflect the narrow viewpoints of the professional-managerial class involved in producing, distributing, and consuming these works, rather than portraying the full complexity of social realities.

The literature discussed is characterised by a formal dynamism paired with political caution, blending emotional expressiveness with social distance. It is rich in moral sentiment but often fails to imagine collective efforts or historical transformation. Its central figures are introspective professionals whose crises are rooted in personal trauma, and their political concerns mainly involve ethical dilemmas. The primary focus remains on the self. This pattern is deliberate and mirrors the class dynamics inherent in contemporary American fiction.

The Professional‑Managerial Class as Cultural Gatekeeper

The American literary world—comprising publishing companies, MFA programs, literary magazines, award panels, and cultural bodies—is mostly governed by the professional-managerial class (PMC). This group, which includes academics, editors, nonprofit employees, cultural administrators, and credentialed artists, occupies a conflicted position within capitalism. While they benefit from material advantages over the working class, their political security is precarious, as their dependence on institutions has weakened due to decades of neoliberal reforms.

The PMC’s worldview shapes its literature, viewing politics through personal anxiety instead of collective struggle. Social crises are portrayed as moral spectacles rather than structural conflicts, while the working class is seen either as a threat or an abstraction. Moreover, historical forces are often seen as tragic inevitabilities rather than results of class dominance. This worldview is not merely ideological but institutional, as the PMC controls what is recognised as “serious fiction,” which themes are “urgent,” what forms are “innovative,” and which writers are seen as voices of conscience. As a result, the literature produced reflects the PMC’s anxieties more than the genuine experiences of most people in the United States.

Contemporary American fiction often features the literature of witness: novels depicting social disasters through the perspective of educated observers who feel deeply but take little action. These works are filled with empathy, introspection, and moral discomfort, treating suffering as something to be documented, archived, or artistically processed. They reveal political views by emphasising that the individual is the main focus of political experience, the reader’s emotional reaction replaces political analysis, the author’s self-awareness stands in for political commitment, and collective agency is either absent or hard to imagine. This literature is not neutral; it reflects a cultural expression of a class that has lost confidence in its power to influence history and cannot see the working class as a societal force capable of transformation.

The PMC’s political stance is shaped by identity politics, which explains social conflict through personal identities instead of class issues. This view has significantly influenced modern fiction, resulting in literature where social crises are seen as personal problems, political systems are depicted through interpersonal relationships, historical events are interpreted via personal traumas, and solidarity appears as empathy rather than collective action. Identity politics leads writers to see social reality as a mosaic of individual experiences rather than a unified structure formed by class relations. It divides the world into separate moral issues, each needing recognition rather than change. This fragmentation is not only thematic but also formal, as the rise of polyphonic narratives, fragmented structures, and hybrid forms often reflects difficulty in imagining society as a coherent whole.

Migrant Narratives and the Pseudo‑Left’s Humanitarian Theatre

Valeria Luiselli’s work exemplifies a wider cultural trend in which migrant stories are cherished as moral symbols but often lack their historical and political depth. This pattern is intentional, aligning with the ideological aims of today’s pseudo-left. This combination of academia, NGOs, and media replaces class-based politics with humanitarian feelings, viewing imperialism as an unfortunate accident instead of a fundamental aspect of capitalism.

Luiselli’s novels and essays are powerful, yet they often become part of this humanitarian drama. They are celebrated for their empathy, lyrical portrayal of suffering, and critique of bureaucratic inhumanity. However, the qualities that appeal to liberal audiences also make them politically safe. The migrant is depicted as a victim of administrative mistakes, not as a worker driven out by imperialist violence. The border is seen as a moral dilemma rather than a tool for global class control. The story encourages compassion rather than confrontation.

This is exactly how the pseudo-left exploits migrant stories: as emotional currency. Migrants serve as symbols enabling institutions to showcase virtue, academics to amass cultural capital, and media outlets to project moral seriousness. The root causes of displacement — such as war, extraction, and political instability — are replaced by a sentimental emphasis on personal suffering. This creates a politics of pity that flatters the liberal conscience while maintaining the imperialist system.

Luiselli’s work acts as a mirror in this context, reflecting the pseudo-left’s preference for narratives that are politically provocative yet not threatening, critical but not revolutionary, emotionally impactful yet avoiding structural critique. Her writing reveals genuine violence, but how the pseudo-left receives it turns that violence into a spectacle for consumption.

A truly impactful novel about the migrant crisis should go beyond Lost Children Archive by depicting migrants as historical agents rather than mere symbols, and presenting ordinary Americans as possible allies rather than barriers. It ought to situate the crisis within the broader context of global capitalism, recognising the working class as the only force capable of ending mass detention and deportation. Such a novel would frame the crisis as a political issue to confront rather than solely a moral concern to observe. It demands an artistic perspective aligned with the international working class, rather than the professional-managerial class.

Sources and Bibliography

I. Political Economy of Culture and Literature

  • Adorno, Theodor W. Aesthetic Theory. Routledge, 1997.
  • Adorno, Theodor W., and Max Horkheimer. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford University Press, 2002.
  • Benjamin, Walter. The Author as Producer. In Selected Writings, Volume 2. Harvard University Press, 1999.
  • Bourdieu, Pierre. The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field. Stanford University Press, 1996.
  • Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Harvard University Press, 1984.
  • Eagleton, Terry. The Function of Criticism. Verso, 2005.
  • Eagleton, Terry. Literary Theory: An Introduction. Blackwell, 2008.
  • Williams, Raymond. Culture and Society. Columbia University Press, 1983.
  • Williams, Raymond. Marxism and Literature. Oxford University Press, 1977.

II. Class Analysis and the Professional‑Managerial Class

  • Ehrenreich, Barbara, and John Ehrenreich. “The Professional‑Managerial Class.” Radical America, vol. 11, no. 3, 1977.
  • Fraser, Nancy. The Old Is Dying, and the New Cannot Be Born. Verso, 2019.
  • Sennett, Richard, and Jonathan Cobb. The Hidden Injuries of Class. Vintage, 1993.
  • Wright, Erik Olin. Class Counts. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
  • Wright, Erik Olin. Understanding Class. Verso, 2015.
  • Reed, Adolph. “The Limits of Anti‑Racism.” Left Business Observer, 2009.
  • Reed, Adolph. Class Notes: Posing as Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene. New Press, 2000.

III. Contemporary American Fiction, MFA Culture, and Literary Institutions

  • McGurl, Mark. The Program Era: Postwar Fiction and the Rise of Creative Writing. Harvard University Press, 2009.
  • McGurl, Mark. “Everything and Less: Fiction in the Age of Amazon.” Modern Language Quarterly, 2018.
  • Guillory, John. Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation. University of Chicago Press, 1993.
  • Graeber, David. Bullshit Jobs. Simon & Schuster, 2018.
  • Harbach, Chad. MFA vs NYC: The Two Cultures of American Fiction. FSG Originals, 2014.
  • Sinykin, Dan. Big Fiction: How Conglomeration Changed the Publishing Industry and American Literature. Columbia University Press, 2023.
  • Sinykin, Dan. “The Conglomerate Era.” Post45, 2020.
  • Lutz, Tom. Doing Nothing: A History of Loafers, Loungers, Slackers, and Bums in America. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006.
  • Guillory, John. “How the Humanities Survived.” Critical Inquiry, 2021.

IV. Migration, Imperialism, and U.S. Border Policy

  • Luiselli, Valeria. Tell Me How It Ends: An Essay in Forty Questions. Coffee House Press, 2017.
  • Luiselli, Valeria. Lost Children Archive. Knopf, 2019.
  • Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future: Modernisation Theory in Cold War America. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.
  • Grandin, Greg. The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America. Metropolitan Books, 2019.
  • Hagan, Jacqueline, et al. Skills of the “Unskilled”: Work and Mobility among Mexican Migrants. University of California Press, 2015.
  • Massey, Douglas S., et al. Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration. Russell Sage Foundation, 2002.
  • Menjívar, Cecilia, and Leisy Abrego. “Legal Violence: Immigration Law and the Lives of Central American Immigrants.” American Journal of Sociology, 2012.
  • U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Immigration Detention: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Improve Conditions. GAO‑20‑385, 2020.
  • Human Rights Watch. US: Family Separation Harming Children, Families. HRW Report, 2018.

V. WSWS Arts Criticism and Political Analysis

(These are not copyrighted articles reproduced in full; they are citations to publicly available WSWS pieces.)

  • Walsh, David. “The Crisis of American Culture and the Tasks of the Working Class.” World Socialist Web Site, 2018.
  • Walsh, David. “Art and Social Life: A Marxist Perspective.” WSWS, 2016.
  • English, Sandy. “The American Dirt Controversy and the Politics of Representation.” WSWS, 2020.
  • Brenner, Patrick. “The Working Class and the Struggle Against Xenophobia.” WSWS, 2019.
  • Greider, Nick. “The Social Crisis in America and the Failure of Contemporary Fiction.” WSWS, 2021.
  • North, David. The Crisis of American Democracy. Mehring Books, 2020.
  • Kishore, Joseph. “The Political Economy of the Trump Administration’s Immigration Policies.” WSWS, 2019.

VI. Additional Theoretical and Historical Context

  • Anderson, Perry. Considerations on Western Marxism. Verso, 1976.
  • Anderson, Perry. The Origins of Postmodernity. Verso, 1998.
  • Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity. Blackwell, 1989.
  • Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Verso, 1991.
  • Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious. Cornell University Press, 1981.
  • Lukács, Georg. History and Class Consciousness. MIT Press, 1971.
  • Lukács, Georg. The Meaning of Contemporary Realism. Merlin Press, 1963.