Pip: The 2026 Booker Prize has gone to a dystopian novel about a society collapsing under forces nobody can name or explain — which, depending on your perspective, is either a mirror held up to our moment or a very expensive shrug.
Mara: freerein61 takes that question seriously in a long, careful piece on M. John Harrison's The End of Everything — covering the novel itself, its Booker reception, and what the cultural establishment's enthusiasm actually reveals.
Pip: Let's start with the book, the prize, and the problem at the heart of both.
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Booker 2026: Catastrophe Without a Cause
Mara: The frame here is a tension between what The End of Everything does well and what it refuses to do: Harrison renders social disintegration with real force, but the post asks whether that rendering ultimately illuminates the crisis or mystifies it further.
Pip: The setup matters. Harrison's protagonist is a beachcomber on a ruined English coast, picking through wreckage from the Channel — and the post reads that image straight, as genuinely resonant social realism before anything else lands.
Mara: Right, and the post quotes Mary Beard, who chaired the judges, on exactly this point: "when the catastrophe comes you won't know what's happening."
Pip: Which is either a description of the novel's world or an accidental mission statement for the prize committee — but the post is more precise than that.
Mara: It is. The argument is that not knowing becomes something different from unknowability. The post draws a sharp line: "We don't understand what is going on is a perfectly legitimate starting point for serious art. What is going on cannot be understood is a different proposition and one which can easily become an excuse for helplessness."
Pip: So the issue isn't darkness or ambiguity — it's whether the opacity is a method or a conclusion.
Mara: Exactly. The post traces Harrison's roots in the British New Wave around Michael Moorcock's New Worlds, where scepticism about tidy explanations was genuinely subversive. The argument is that the same aesthetic, in a different historical moment, tips from challenging false certainty into doubting whether certainty is possible at all.
Pip: And the Booker establishment, the post suggests, is perfectly comfortable with that second move.
Mara: Very much so. The post puts it plainly: the cultural establishment can embrace apocalypse so long as it stays ambiguous or intractable. A politically transparent catastrophe — one with identifiable causes and social agents — is what the prize culture cannot absorb.
Mara: What's missing, the post concludes, isn't optimism in any sentimental sense. It's agency — the weight of the social force that could actually push back.
Pip: The beachcomber trawls through wreckage he can't explain. The task, the post argues, is to make the incomprehensible comprehensible — not to enshrine the incomprehension.
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Pip: So the real question the post leaves open isn't whether Harrison is a good writer — the piece is clear he is — but whether serious art can stop at bewilderment.
Mara: And whether the prizes that celebrate that bewilderment are telling us something about the limits of the culture handing them out.
This year’s Booker Prize winner, a dystopian satire by an 81-year-old veteran of the British sci-fi scene, has been described as a breakthrough. The book is a potent rendering of our time’s crisis, but the reader is left with a catastrophe whose cause we can never quite know.
On 9 November, M. John Harrison was awarded the 2026 Booker Prize and its £50k for The End of Everything (his 13th novel). At 81, he is the oldest winner in the prize’s history. The judges (chairing Mary Beard) were unanimous in their decision. The Booker Prize Foundation described the award as historic, with its CEO noting that Harrison was the first winner to come out of the ‘bona fide SF world’.
The response has been absolutely ecstatic. The press have been all over the place, highlighting just how much the novel’s sense of apocalypse and doom mirrors our current anxieties. That’s not in any doubt. The more pertinent question is what the novel and the literary establishment that have anointed it actually do with those anxieties. Does it give us any insight into the forces pushing society toward disaster? Or does it merely present those forces as mysterious and intractable, beyond human understanding? Harrison is a very good and serious writer, and the award is in no way unexpected in literary terms. The way the award has been celebrated in relation to The End of Everything, however, tells us something about the prevailing attitude of the cultural establishment that hands out these awards.
A beachcomber on a ruined coast
The End of Everything is set in near-future England where the social order has been completely upended by some unspecified crisis. The state is effectively non-existent, Europe is out of sight, and the iGhetti (mysterious entities) are now involved in human affairs. At the heart of it all is Phillip Tennent, a beachcomber living on the coast with his elderly artist aunt Marnie. He makes a living picking up the oddities that turn up from the Channel. His discovery of a thing that is changing, that is in fact a living thing, and that starts to speak, is what sets the novel in motion. It’s something that grows and, in the end, completely undermines the characters’ belief that the world around them can be understood rationally.
Harrison’s setting is eastern and southeast England, from Hastings down to the Thames and into Suffolk. More significantly, he said the themes and satire came from ‘current affairs’. The official Booker description captures the essence of his central inquiry: what happens when the very fabric of the established order and the explanations we have for the world are in a state of ‘ongoing disaster’, and yet we have to go on living in it?
The link to contemporary Britain is very obvious. You’ve got a man literally trawling through the wreckage of a world he doesn’t really understand, looking for things to sell. That’s a potent image of life in a society which is in a state of insecurity and decline. That’s where the book’s real subject starts to emerge. Harrison has also pointed to the 2008 financial crisis as the novel’s genesis. That’s significant. The book isn’t simply the product of some eternal fascination with the end of the world. Its creative origins are in one of the most pivotal convulsions of contemporary capitalism.
Catastrophe without causes
The 2008 crisis was the catalyst, but Harrison’s imagined method goes far beyond that. The crisis wasn’t a natural disaster or an alien invasion. It was the outcome of specific economic and social relations: the enormous expansion of financial speculation, the huge build-up of private wealth and private debt and a social order in which the economy is subordinated to the imperative of profit. The austerity then imposed on working people was, of course, also the product of political decisions and class interests.
In The End of Everything, the catastrophe is, in fact, very opaque. The Booker Foundation describes it as an adventure “into the very limits of human understanding” and the nature of the crisis is deliberately obscure. The characters are in no position to really understand what is going on around them. That obscurity is absolutely central to Harrison’s conception of the book. Mary Beard told the press that it’s a story of a society “going through a catastrophe which they don’t really understand”. Even more telling in terms of Harrison’s view of the book, she said the point was that “when the catastrophe comes you won’t know what’s happening”.
Here is the book’s central problem: what starts off as a reaction to the breakdown of historical relations becomes a meditation on the impossibility of ever really understanding that breakdown. Historical relations (with their causes, their beneficiaries and their opponents) become an overwhelming, incomprehensible force which simply crushes the individual. That’s not something particular to Harrison. It’s a commonplace in contemporary literature and film. Ecological collapse, pandemic, technological disruption, war and social disintegration all come back as fate, as an inexplicable eruption, as the inevitable outcome of humanity’s supposed universal tendency to bring about disaster. It’s far rarer for them to be presented as the product of historically developed social relations, which could therefore be understood and changed.
Some people have actually suggested that the iGhetti is AI. Others have suggested it’s a commentary on capitalism, others on Brexit or climate change. Harrison himself is very deliberately non-committal on the matter. If we take the AI interpretation, that highlights the point. AI isn’t some autonomous intelligence that just turns up on an English beach. It’s a technology developed within a particular economic system and overwhelmingly held by big corporations and states. The real questions then aren’t so much what AI might become as who owns and controls it, how it’s used and what social interests it serves.
Turning technology into an enigmatic guest whose ultimate purpose is utterly incomprehensible risks reproducing exactly the ideological veneer it needs to get through. Satire needs more than atmosphere; it needs an object. Harrison’s objects are often rather obscure: the natural human desire for explanation, the persistence of the normal in the face of disaster, commercial opportunism and the sheer absurdity of trying to apply the familiar categories to a situation that has been utterly transformed. Those are all legitimate and potentially very rich objects of satire. The social relations which produce the catastrophe, however, tend to get lost behind them.
From the New Wave to the prize ceremony
Harrison’s career absolutely merits serious attention precisely because The End of Everything didn’t just appear out of the blue. It grew out of the very atmosphere of the New Worlds period, the seminal British SF magazine of the day (the one linked to Michael Moorcock). Harrison was at the heart of the British New Wave, and he was part of the movement that sought to shake up the genre and its inherited assumptions. His subsequent work (the Viriconium books, Light, Nova Swing, The Sunken Land Begins to Rise Again, etc.) developed a particular prose style and a pronounced scepticism about any kind of neat explanation. The Booker material makes it clear he was never going to be comfortably pigeonholed. That scepticism was once genuinely subversive. It rejected the technocratic fantasy of mastery as much as it rejected the comfortable assumptions of much traditional genre fiction. His refusal to construct a fully and neatly rationalised universe assailed complacency.
But of course this aesthetic has its other side. As the political radicalism of the 1960s faded out in the 1970s and 1980s, so did a large section of the intellectual and artistic world move away from the attempt to understand society as a historical totality. The scepticism about false certainty gave way to scepticism about the very possibility of objective historical knowledge. Postmodernism provided the theoretical language for this withdrawal, with its scepticism about ‘grand narratives’ (Marxism and the various socialist narratives of historical development being the most obvious).
Harrison cannot simply be reduced to this tendency. His writing is too individual, and his intellectual formation too complex, for such a crude identification. But The End of Everything shares something of this wider historical path: what begins as hostility towards simplistic explanations ends perilously close to treating explanation itself as impossible. At the post-award press conference, Harrison celebrated the erosion of genre limits. He argued that the epoch of genres understood as “fences and boxes, pigeonholes” was ending, and that a contemporary novel could combine several genres simultaneously. Much is to be welcomed in the destruction of snobbish barriers between “literary” and genre fiction. However, formal hybridity is not in itself an artistic breakthrough. A novel may contain a thriller, mystery, satire, dystopia, road novel and realism simultaneously and still evade the most important questions raised by its subject. The decisive issue in art is not how many forms a work can combine, but how deeply and truthfully it penetrates reality.
Sugar, venture capital and “dynamite”
The Booker Prize has never existed in a vacuum. It’s a product of history and society. Literary prizes don’t just drop down from the sky to pass some kind of value-free judgement. They are institutions in their own right, products of a particular economic and intellectual milieu. That makes Harrison’s reception so fascinating. After all those decades on the periphery of British speculative fiction, he’s finally been welcomed into one of the country’s most august literary institutions. That is, of course, a reflection of his actual achievements, but it’s also a sign of the death of the old divide between ‘serious literature and science fiction.
Yet the Booker set are very much in sympathy with The End of Everything’s vision of apocalypse. It’s a world in which the normal structures have all gone to hell, the future is terrifying, and nobody has the foggiest idea what’s actually happened. Mary Beard put it quite clearly as ‘the politics of now seen through the lens of the future’.
But what about politics? Contemporary official culture is absolutely fluent in the language of catastrophe. Catastrophe is in fact one of its key moods. Climate collapse, authoritarianism, technological dislocation, pandemics, war and the prospect of total societal breakdown are all part of the contemporary cultural landscape. What is largely absent from this is the notion that these disparate crises have identifiable social roots and that working people can consciously shape history.
The cultural establishment can therefore fully embrace the image of apocalypse so long as the apocalypse is in some way ambiguous, existential or intractable. It can be disturbing, it can be grotesque, it can be surreal, it can be ironic and it can be utterly radical in its aesthetic. The only thing it absolutely cannot be is a politically transparent apocalypse. In that respect Harrison’s novel is absolutely the book of its moment.
A “twinge of optimism”?
In announcing the judges’ decision Mary Beard did say that the book, in spite of its very dark subject matter, leaves you with a ‘twinge of optimism’. Harrison has been considerably more cautious on the subject. When asked what he hoped readers would take from the novel he described the world of the book as very grim and very likely to stay that way. The most you could possibly say at the end of the day is that there might be a kind of ‘relief’ rather than any hope or sense of closure.
The point is rather telling, really. What survives the end of everything in The End of Everything is the sheer persistence of human relationships and the sheer fact of people trying to go on when the inherited explanations are no longer going to cut it. That should not be ignored. Human solidarity in the face of social collapse is a valid subject for an artist, and Harrison’s emphasis on the persistence of the ordinary amid all that is going on is clearly one of the book’s major strengths.
But such solidarity remains fundamentally private and defensive. People “muddle through” as Beard puts it. They’re just trying to get on with the business of living in the face of immense forces utterly beyond comprehension. Muddling through is not the same as historical agency and that’s precisely where a materialist criticism has to go further than both Harrison and his Booker contemporaries. The crisis of our time has produced confusion, fear and reaction. It has also produced opposition. Workers, youth and other sections of the population have not simply been the passive victims of history. They have on numerous occasions attempted to resist the worsening of their living conditions, the effects of austerity, inequality, the rise of authoritarianism and war.
What’s missing from so much of the contemporary dystopian art is not necessarily an ounce of optimism (in the sentimental sense) but agency. Harrison’s novel is very attuned to the experience of social disintegration. What it can’t really convey is the sheer weight of the social force which could in fact overcome it. That’s probably why the book has been so warmly received. You can be absolutely convinced that civilisation is in crisis and yet remain profoundly pessimistic about humanity’s capacity to rebuild it on its own. That mixture of deep anxiety and political paralysis is in fact the hallmark of much of the contemporary bourgeois cultural life.
The End of Everything is in fact more interesting than either unqualified triumph or wholesale rejection would suggest. Its strengths point to a contradiction. Harrison is absolutely right to see something real in the picture: the social landscape in a state of exhaustion, the erosion of the old assumptions, the odd persistence of the everyday in the face of disaster, and the experience of the individual who increasingly feels the forces of economic, technological and political change as something which is simply happening to them from outside. The beachcomber trawling through the wreckage is an image which has real social resonance.
But art has to go beyond the surface of things. The fundamental flaw in Harrison’s conception is that the mystification his characters go through might well become the very principle that organises the work. Their sense of being mystified by the forces that shape their lives becomes the very assertion that those forces are in fact unknowable. That’s a very different route from the Marxist conception of art and history. Capitalist society is mysterious precisely because the relations between people take the form of relations between commodities, markets, corporations and all the various autonomous technological forces. The point is not to fetishise that mystery; it’s to get through it.
The difference is absolutely decisive. “We don’t understand what is going on” is a perfectly legitimate starting point for serious art. “What is going on cannot be understood” is a different proposition and one which can easily become an excuse for helplessness. The End of Everything is intelligent, disturbing and clearly takes the bewildered state of life in a society whose institutions and assumptions are clearly on the way out very seriously. Its refusal to offer any easy consolation is a real strength. Harrison’s achievement absolutely merits serious attention rather than being ignored simply because of the acclaim it has received.
But its dominant conception fits perfectly with the view of a cultural establishment that sees catastrophe in every direction and yet sees no social force capable of surmounting it. What we need is not an artificially optimistic literature, still less a literature of political propaganda in the form of novels. Art has its own laws and will reveal truths which are beyond the reach of slogans. The greatest art is art which sees beneath the immediate surface the deeper movement of human relationships and of historical life.
The real challenge facing contemporary literature is therefore bigger than just imagining the end of the world. It’s about making the utterly incomprehensible comprehensible, uncovering the human relations beneath apparently autonomous forces, and restoring the human being to history as more than a frightened spectator of their own destruction. The task of coming to terms with “the end of everything” is inextricably linked to the task of preventing it.
Bibliography
Primary text and works by Harrison
Harrison, M. John. The End of Everything. London: Serpent’s Tail, 2026.
Harrison, M. John. Light. London: Gollancz, 2002.
Harrison, M. John. The Sunken Land Begins to Rise Again. London: Gollancz, 2020.
Harrison, M. John. Viriconium. London: Gollancz, 2000.
Contemporary sources
The Booker Prizes. “Everything you need to know about The End of Everything by M. John Harrison, winner of the Booker Prize 2026.” 9 November 2026. [thebookerprizes.com]
The Booker Prizes. “The End of Everything: Winner of the Booker Prize 2026.” [thebookerprizes.com]
Loffhagen, Emma. “M John Harrison becomes first science fiction author to win the Booker prize.” The Guardian, 9 November 2026. [theguardian.com]
Jordan, Justine. “M John Harrison’s Booker prize-winner is weird, challenging and strikingly topical.” The Guardian, 9 November 2026. [theguardian.com]
Story, Hannah. “M John Harrison wins 2026 Booker Prize for dystopian novel The End of Everything.” ABC News, 10 November 2026. [abc.net.au]
Criticism and theory
Jameson, Fredric. Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions. London: Verso, 2005.
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.
North, David. The Frankfurt School, Postmodernism and the Politics of the Pseudo-Left. Oak Park, MI: Mehring Books, 2015.
Suvin, Darko. Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.
Trotsky, Leon. Literature and Revolution. 1924. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005.
Pip: Fraud follows users the way spam follows email — and freerein61's latest piece for A Trumpet of Sedition asks why that keeps happening no matter which platform we flee to.
Mara: The post traces online fraud from Nigeria's Yahoo Boys to Southeast Asia's scam compounds to Bluesky's phishing wave last October — and argues the thread connecting all of it is economic, not technological.
Pip: Let's start with the Bluesky attack itself and what it reveals about who the scammers actually are.
The Bluesky Scammers and the Economy Behind Them
Mara: The starting point is a phishing campaign that hit Bluesky on 17 October — compromised accounts pushing a fake government payment, and a platform scrambling to contain it.
Pip: The scale is concrete. Agent Sky's independent analysis of Bluesky's public moderation stream recorded 3,896 reversed account takedowns between 17 and 19 October alone, coinciding with the incident.
Mara: And that sits inside a platform growing fast — Bluesky went from 25.94 million to 41.41 million users in 2025, nearly 60 per cent growth. More users, more surface area for fraud.
Pip: So the phishing attack is the headline, but the post is really asking a harder question: why does this keep regenerating everywhere?
Mara: The argument is structural. The post draws a direct line to Nigeria's Yahoo Boys — not as a racial explanation, but as an economic one. It quotes the doctoral research of Tolulope Lembola Ojolo, who interviewed 29 Yahoo Boys across Lagos, Ibadan and Ado-Ekiti and identified "poverty, unemployment, corrupt political leadership and law enforcement, the failure of vital social institutions, and the proliferation of internet services as conditions that combined to facilitate cybercrime."
Pip: That list is doing real work. Nigeria's 2022 Multidimensional Poverty Index found 133 million people — 63 per cent of the population — multidimensionally poor. The headline unemployment figure is 7.2 per cent, but informal employment runs at 92.7 per cent. The number hides the precarity underneath.
Mara: The post is careful to say social explanation is not moral absolution. The victims — particularly young people targeted by sextortion, with verified links to more than 40 suicides across North America, Australia and the UK — have an unqualified right to protection.
Pip: And then the post moves to Southeast Asia, where the scam economy has gone fully industrial — compounds combining internet fraud with human trafficking, with the UN estimating 120,000 people potentially held in Myanmar alone, forced to run scams.
Mara: The post also covers how this pattern reached Bluesky specifically. Romance scams, pig-butchering schemes, impersonators targeting artists — NBC News flagged a rapid increase in December 2024. Editor Rob Bignell documented fake beta-reader and editor profiles targeting writers in July 2026. Writers and illustrators working precariously are exactly the population fraud preys on.
Pip: One insecure layer of the workforce turned against another. That's the mechanism the post keeps returning to.
Mara: And moderation alone cannot close that gap. User-submitted reports on Bluesky rose 54 per cent between 2024 and 2025. "Misleading" content accounted for 43.73 per cent of reports in 2025. The platform expanded to roughly 100 moderators during 2024 — a year it received 6.48 million reports.
Pip: The post's conclusion is that policing symptoms has repeatedly failed because the conditions reproducing the problem — mass insecurity, concentrated wealth, precarious employment — remain untouched.
Mara: What it calls for is democratic control over communications infrastructure and economic reorganisation around social need. That's the argument the title is pointing toward all along.
Pip: So the Bluesky phishing wave is a symptom, and the Yahoo Boys are a historical chapter in a much longer story about what poverty does to the internet.
Mara: And what the internet does to poverty. The next episode will tell us whether the platforms or the underlying conditions move first.
Alberto Manguel’s The Reverse Side of the Tapestry: Notes on the Art of Translation is a cultivated, erudite and often moving defence of literary translation. Published by Carcanet Press on 24 September 2026, the book is described by the publisher as a book-length essay on the translator’s craft and on translation as what Manguel considers the “keenest form of reading”. The volume also contains his own illustrations. Yet the book’s fascination lies not only in what it says about translation, but also in the questions its conception of culture leaves unanswered. Its strengths and limitations belong to a recognisable liberal-humanist tradition in which literature appears primarily as a conversation conducted across centuries between writers, books and exceptionally attentive readers. What recedes from view is the material world that makes this conversation possible: publishers, markets, property, censorship, wages and, above all, labour.
The title itself provides a way to develop a more materialist conception. Carcanet Press explains that the reverse side of the tapestry is the definition of translation Manguel takes from Don Quixote. The metaphor is extraordinarily suggestive. Look at a tapestry from the front, and the picture appears finished and coherent. Turn it around, and another reality is revealed: knots, crossings, loose ends and the physical construction that produced the visible image. Translation similarly refuses the illusion that literature arrives before us in an immaculate, self-sufficient form. Behind the translated sentence stands another sentence, and between them stands a human being making decisions. [carcanet.co.uk]
A materialist criticism begins from much the same reversal. It turns the apparently autonomous cultural object over. It asks what the completed surface conceals: who made it, under what conditions, through which institutions, for which audience and under whose ownership. If Manguel’s metaphor is pursued beyond the boundaries he establishes for it, therefore, the reverse side of the tapestry leads from literary aesthetics into political economy. The difficulty is that Manguel, having turned over the tapestry, remains fascinated principally by its threads. He cares less about the loom.
A lover rather than a specialist
Manguel, born in Buenos Aires in 1948, has held a remarkable position in contemporary literary life as an anthologist, translator, essayist, novelist, editor, and former director of the National Library of Argentina. Carcanet Press describes him as Argentine-Canadian and notes that he now lives in Lisbon. His career has always resisted easy professional categorisation. He belongs to the old republic of letters, moving between languages, libraries, literary histories and forms.
Translation is not for him an abstract subject. Carcanet Press notes that Manguel has translated Jorge Luis Borges and Marguerite Yourcenar into English and Katherine Mansfield and Paul Éluard into Spanish. This practical experience matters because his argument rests upon translation as an exceptionally intimate encounter between reader and text. Translating means penetrating beneath the apparent transparency of words into questions of voice, rhythm, ambiguity and intention.
The publisher approvingly reproduces George Steiner’s description of Manguel as an “amateur” in the older, more generous sense of the word: “a lover rather than a specialist”. That characterisation captures both what makes Manguel’s writing attractive and what eventually limits it. His criticism refuses the bureaucratised compartmentalisation of contemporary academic life. For him, literature is a continuous historical conversation. A biblical text can illuminate a modern novel; Cervantes can supply an image through which the modern translator’s predicament becomes intelligible.
There is something genuinely valuable here. Against reducing reading to the acquisition of information, Manguel insists on attention. Translation reveals that words cannot simply be exchanged like identical units of currency. To translate is already to interpret. The translator must decide. No dictionary can abolish those decisions because a sentence’s meaning never resides exclusively in the individual meanings of the words that compose it. Tone, social register, historical association, irony, rhythm and the relationship of one sentence to everything surrounding it continually intervene. A translator consequently produces a reading of the original even where they strive for the greatest possible fidelity.
Here Manguel’s defence of translation rises above the merely antiquarian. Translation exposes something fundamental about literature itself. The apparently transparent act of reading involves interpretation, historical knowledge, comparison, and judgement. The translated text embodies this process. But at precisely this point another question presents itself. If translation is intellectual activity, interpretation and creation, then the translator is not merely the invisible intermediary between two literary personalities. The translator is also a worker.
Translation and the struggle over who may read
The political importance of translation long predates the contemporary publishing industry. The history of translating texts is inseparable from struggles over access to knowledge and over who possesses the authority to interpret it. The history of the vernacular Bible provides one of the clearest examples. William Tyndale’s English translation of scripture belonged to a tremendous transformation produced by printing, religious upheaval and the development of vernacular literacy. The issue was never simply whether one rendering of a Greek or Hebrew word was superior to another. Behind disputes over translation lay the far more dangerous question of whether ordinary people needed an established clerical hierarchy to mediate between themselves and sacred texts.
The subsequent history of revolutionary England reveals what could follow once texts and arguments escaped older institutional monopolies. The enormous expansion of pamphleteering and popular religious controversy accompanying the English Revolution allowed artisans, soldiers, preachers and political radicals to intervene directly in questions previously claimed as the preserve of churchmen, lawyers and rulers. Levellers, Diggers and religious radicals found within vernacular religious and political languages the means to formulate increasingly explosive questions about authority, representation, property and equality.
Translation in this sense belongs to the history of democratisation, but not in the comfortable meaning the term later acquired. Making forbidden, restricted or otherwise inaccessible texts available to wider populations could destabilise established authority. It altered not simply what people read but who could participate in intellectual and political argument. The same process took on an increasingly international character as bourgeois society grew. Philosophical, scientific and political works circulated beyond the linguistic environments in which they had originated. Ideas crossed frontiers that states, churches, and ruling classes repeatedly tried to police. Translation became one mechanism through which intellectual life acquired its genuinely international character.
The development of the socialist workers’ movement gave this process an entirely new historical significance. The writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and later the vast literature generated by socialist movements worldwide, could not have become the theoretical inheritance of an international working class without translation. Translating socialist literature was not an ornamental supplement to political activity. It formed part of the movement’s practical work of education and organisation.
This history points towards something only partially captured by a liberal-humanist celebration of translation as intercultural understanding. Languages do not meet one another in some realm floating above society. Human beings speaking different languages encounter each other through migrations, empires, wars, trade, intellectual exchange and class struggle. Translation is therefore necessarily historical. The reverse of the tapestry is already beginning to look much more complicated.
The translator as worker
Manguel approaches translation above all as a man of letters contemplating a craft. But translation is also an occupation situated within the capitalist publishing industry. This distinction matters because the romantic language surrounding literary production has always served an ideological function. Writing, translating, illustrating and editing can be presented as callings whose supposedly privileged proximity to culture somehow places them outside ordinary questions of remuneration and working conditions. Yet precisely because many people undertake intellectual labour from genuine commitment, their attachment to the activity can itself become a mechanism through which poorly rewarded conditions are normalised.
The organisations representing translators make clear that contracts, payment and rights are not secondary concerns. Britain’s Translators Association, part of the Society of Authors, describes itself as the collective voice of literary translators and advises members on translator-publisher contracts and negotiating payment. It also says explicitly that it campaigns for translators’ rights and fairer working conditions.
The evidence from the United States points in the same direction. The Authors Guild states that literary translation requires creativity, talent, and skill. Still, translators’ work is often overlooked or taken for granted, including through failures to provide proper credit or ongoing royalties. Its model translation contract was created specifically to provide translators with a basis for negotiating better terms.
Such mundane contractual matters expose the social side of Manguel’s elevated conception of translation. If translation is profound reading, then somebody must be paid to undertake that reading. If it requires sustained intellectual attention, somebody must possess the time in which that attention can occur. If the finished translation embodies interpretative and creative judgement, the translator’s right to credit, remuneration and a continuing interest in the exploitation of that work cannot be dismissed as matters external to culture.
The Authors Guild’s model contract gives this struggle particularly concrete expression. Its proposed clauses include a translation fee alongside royalties from print, electronic and audiobook editions and shares from the licensing of subsidiary rights. The Guild notes that payment arrangements vary widely between publishers. The very necessity for such model provisions reveals the contradiction behind romantic conceptions of literary translation. Culture may be discussed in the vocabulary of inspiration, interpretation and artistic fidelity, but the translator ultimately confronts a contract. The capitalist commodity does not cease to be a commodity because the object being bought and sold happens to be a book.
The new pressure of artificial intelligence
The social contradiction becomes sharper with the rapid development of generative artificial intelligence. Here the argument must avoid two equally unsatisfactory positions. One is technological romanticism, which treats human cultural activity as possessing a mystical essence that machinery can never approach. The other is technological determinism, which holds that the ability to automate part of an activity demonstrates the historical inevitability of replacing the humans performing it.
Neither begins with the decisive question: under whose control technology is introduced, for what social purpose, and who reaps the benefits?
Translators’ concerns about generative AI are not hypothetical. The Translators Association states that it is “deeply engaged” in protecting translators’ rights and their craft in the age of AI and says it has called for solidarity with human translators whose livelihoods are threatened by generative AI. Meanwhile, the Authors Guild has incorporated provisions on generative AI into its literary translation model contract.
The Society of Authors additionally advises those negotiating fees to establish a commissioner’s policy concerning AI and says it expects consent to be sought before AI is given access to authors’ materials. These developments demonstrate that AI is already an issue of rights, remuneration and control within literary work, not simply a philosophical argument about whether machines can translate.
This is where Manguel’s conception of translation becomes unexpectedly radical in its implications. If translation genuinely represents an especially intense form of reading, then translating cannot adequately be understood as the mechanical conversion of linguistic units. It embodies interpretation. But a materialist criticism should go further. The central problem is not deciding whether a machine output is “really” translation according to some abstract philosophical definition. The more important question is what happens to human labour when automated systems are introduced into publishing under capitalist ownership.
Machinery under capitalism has repeatedly been presented as liberation from labour, while workers experience it as intensified exploitation, unemployment, deskilling, or loss of control over the labour process. The contradiction arises not fundamentally from machinery itself, but from the social relations governing its use. AI potentially contains enormously progressive possibilities. Technology capable of overcoming linguistic barriers could enormously broaden international access to culture, historical documents, scientific research and everyday human communication. For socialists, there is no interest in defending unnecessary drudgery merely because humans previously performed it.
But under capitalist relations the central criterion governing technological adoption is not the enrichment of human experience. It is profitability. That distinction transforms the AI debate. The question should not be posed simply as “human translator versus machine”. Both are trapped within a social organisation of production that subordinates technological development to private accumulation. The genuine alternative would be to use advances in automation to reduce necessary labour while expanding the time and resources available for higher forms of cultural, intellectual and creative activity. In such circumstances AI might become an instrument available to translators rather than an economic weapon deployed against them.
Translation against nationalism
There is another reason translation should concern Marxists. In practice, the activity contradicts the nationalist mythology that cultures exist as self-contained, internally homogeneous organisms. Every translated book is evidence against such isolation. Languages continually absorb, transform and appropriate elements from one another. Literature develops through these exchanges. National traditions themselves emerge within international processes.
Marx and Engels recognised this tendency extraordinarily early. Capitalism created a world market and drew previously isolated national economies into an increasingly interconnected global system. Cultural production developed internationally alongside this process. Yet capitalism’s contradiction is that economic life grows ever more global while political power remains organised through rival capitalist nation-states. Translation occupies one of the cultural pressure points created by this contradiction. It demonstrates the objective internationalism of culture while remaining embedded in national markets, publishing structures, and economic power inequalities.
Not all linguistic exchanges therefore occur between equals. Some languages dominate the international publishing market while others remain peripheral. Which authors receive translation, which works obtain international distribution and which disappear outside their original languages are not purely literary decisions. Markets and institutions shape them. Consequently, the existence of world literature does not abolish material inequality any more than the world market abolishes national inequality. It reproduces these contradictions on a cultural level.
Yet translation contains another possibility. It makes available humanity’s accumulated imaginative and intellectual experience across geographical and historical boundaries. The same activity that capitalism turns into a specialised market also points beyond cultural nationalism towards the conception of culture as a genuinely common human inheritance.
Literature and the commodity
Here lies the deeper limitation of Manguel’s liberal humanism. Books and readers, libraries and writers, memories and conversations populate his intellectual world. This world is real, and defending it against intellectual impoverishment matters. But the danger is that the library becomes an idealised refuge from society rather than one of society’s products. Books cannot escape the commodity form merely because their content transcends it.
A publishing house must purchase or control rights, commission work, produce an edition, market it and sell copies. Authors and translators must earn their living. Distribution channels determine what reaches readers. The survival of literary works may depend upon libraries and public institutions whose budgets are themselves products of political struggle.
The cultural object consequently possesses the same double character that capitalism imposes elsewhere. It is simultaneously something created because human beings possess the need to express and understand their experience and something produced and circulated within definite economic structures. This does not diminish literature. On the contrary, understanding its material conditions makes a more serious defence possible.
Manguel’s tapestry metaphor permits precisely this kind of investigation. Once the work is turned around, we discover not only interpretative knots but a division of labour: author, translator, editor, designer, printer, distributor, bookseller, librarian and reader. Behind them stand institutions, technologies and property relations. The reverse side of the tapestry becomes society itself.
From humanism to materialism
The attraction of The Reverse Side of the Tapestry is therefore inseparable from its limitation. Manguel protects something genuinely precious: attentive reading, historical memory, linguistic subtlety and the conviction that literature creates relationships across languages and centuries. A Marxist criticism has no reason to reject this inheritance. Marxism did not arise through hostility to the achievements of human culture. It sought the social conditions under which those achievements would no longer remain the effective privilege of minorities. The difference lies elsewhere.
Liberal humanism ultimately appeals to enlightened individuals and institutions to protect culture. Materialism asks what social conditions culture needs to flourish and what forces have an interest in creating them. The translator therefore presents in miniature a much larger problem. How can serious intellectual work survive when the time needed to carry it out is continually measured against profitability? How can literature fulfil its universal possibilities while its production and distribution remain governed by private property? How can technological advances become instruments for enlarging human freedom rather than mechanisms for reducing labour costs?
These are not questions peculiar to translation. Writers, musicians, actors, researchers, journalists, designers and innumerable other cultural workers confront different forms of the same contradiction. The technology capable of distributing cultural works to billions exists alongside commercial and proprietary structures that seek to enclose intellectual production. Never has humanity possessed technological means of cultural communication remotely comparable to those available today, yet never has the pressure to translate attention, creativity and knowledge into measurable commercial value been more pervasive. The defence of culture therefore cannot finally depend upon nostalgia for a supposedly pre-technological literary civilisation. Nor can it depend upon persuading corporations to behave more benevolently towards creative workers. The problem is social.
Alberto Manguel, Alexander Voronsky and the Struggle for Artistic Truth
Translation occupies a peculiar position within literature. The translator creates sentences without being their original author, interprets while resisting the temptation to replace the author, and necessarily changes a work’s linguistic form while trying to preserve what made that form artistically meaningful. This raises the fundamental question confronting every serious translator: what in a work of literature must survive its passage from one language into another? Alberto Manguel and the Marxist literary critic Alexander Voronsky offer complementary answers.
For Manguel, translation begins with reading. In The Translator as Reader, he describes reading as a way to know more about the world and ourselves. He identifies the translator as potentially its most refined and knowledgeable practitioner. In The Reverse Side of the Tapestry: Notes on the Art of Translation, he develops this preoccupation with translation as an exceptionally intense form of reading. The translator cannot remain a passive recipient of meaning. Every sentence demands interpretation: rhythm, ambiguity, historical association and tone must first be recognised before they can be recreated.
Voronsky approaches the problem from another direction. For him, genuine art constitutes a particular form of cognition. In On Art, he argues that art apprehends reality, human thoughts and feelings through concrete images rather than through abstract propositions. Artistic cognition depends upon intuition, although intuition does not eliminate technique or conscious analysis.
Placed beside Manguel’s conception of the translator as reader, this provides the basis for a richer conception of translation. The translator must not merely discover what the words say. The deeper task is to recover the artistic cognition contained within them.
A mechanically accurate translation can therefore remain artistically false. Every word might possess a plausible dictionary equivalent while rhythm is destroyed, irony flattened, ambiguity explained away, and differences between characters’ voices homogenised. Information survives while literature disappears. Conversely, unrestricted adaptation can become equally false by replacing the author’s artistic discovery with the translator’s preferences.
Voronsky’s discussion of the painter Mikhailov in Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina illuminates the difficulty. He emphasises the artist’s capacity to penetrate appearances, discovering the significant and characteristic beneath what obscures it. He adopts Tolstoy’s metaphor of“removing the veils” to describe this artistic process. The genuine artist does not merely copy appearances but reveals something about reality that previously remained concealed. [marxists.org]
The translator confronts something analogous. Language itself has become a veil that must be removed and preserved at once. Russian cannot simply become English without transformation. Syntax, sounds, idioms and historical associations differ. Yet the translator must find an equivalent way to let another reader encounter the artistic relationships embodied in the original.
Here Manguel’s translator as reader and Voronsky’s artist as discoverer converge. The translator becomes a reader compelled to demonstrate the depth of a reading through recreation. An ordinary reader can pass over an ambiguity unnoticed. A critic can subsequently revise an interpretation. The translator must repeatedly decide what the ambiguity, rhythm or image is doing and choose words that recreate its function.
This labour also has a profoundly historical dimension. Languages carry the accumulated experiences of societies. Words carry associations shaped by history, social conflict, and cultural development. Translation therefore mediates between historical worlds as well as between vocabularies. Making a nineteenth-century Russian writer sound casually twenty-first-century may erase something essential; manufacturing artificial archaism can falsify the work just as seriously.
This explains translation’s importance to world culture. It challenges the confinement of literature within national boundaries by allowing artistic discoveries produced in one language and historical experience to become available within another. Reading crosses boundaries of time and place; translation materially facilitates that encounter.
A historical irony lies in Voronsky’s own case. His return to English-speaking readers itself depended heavily upon translation. Frederick S. Choate, translator of Art as the Cognition of Life, explained that little of Voronsky’s critical writings had previously appeared in English and that translating them helped recover a major Marxist literary figure suppressed under Stalinism. Here translation became an instrument of historical recovery. [wsws.org]
Manguel helps us understand why the translator must be an extraordinary reader; Voronsky helps identify what that reading seeks: the cognition of life embodied in artistic form. The translator must therefore create to preserve and transform, to remain faithful. At its greatest, translation does not merely carry words between languages. It lets one society’s artistic discovery of life live again within another language.
Who owns the loom?
The Reverse Side of the Tapestry remains an elegant and humane contribution to the literature of translation. According to its publisher, the book explicitly approaches literary translation as the translator’s craft and as an exceptionally intense form of reading. At the same time, Manguel brings his own substantial experience translating major writers between English and Spanish. These qualities make the book worth taking seriously. But its central metaphor ultimately demands to be carried further than liberal humanism permits. Translation is interpretation, certainly. But interpretation requires time, knowledge, training and labour. Labour takes place under social conditions. Those conditions involve contracts, remuneration and property. And property raises the question of class.
The development of artificial intelligence merely makes this chain of relationships more visible. The fundamental issue is not whether technological development should be halted to preserve every existing cultural occupation unchanged. Such a programme would be neither achievable nor desirable. The question is instead whether technological progress will be subordinated to private profit or consciously employed to extend human freedom and culture.
A socialist organisation of cultural production would not erect barriers between technology and creativity. It would seek to free both from their subordination to profit. Automation capable of reducing routine work should increase the time human beings possess for education, thought, creativity and leisure rather than threatening their livelihoods. The increasingly international circulation of culture should become the basis for fuller human communication rather than another field for corporate accumulation.
Translation demonstrates particularly vividly why this question cannot finally be resolved nationally. Translators inhabit the spaces between languages by profession. Their work testifies every day to the inadequacy of national boundaries as containers for human culture. The defence of their labour therefore points logically to workers’ broader international interests.
Manguel begins from the back of the tapestry. It is an inspired metaphor because every apparently seamless work of art conceals the process through which it came into existence. Turn it over, and the order of the finished image dissolves into knots and crossed threads. The observer discovers construction where only beauty had appeared.
But turn it over far enough and something more becomes visible. Someone selected the material. Someone developed the skill required to work it. Someone performed the labour. Someone determined the pattern. And within a class society, someone controls the conditions under which that labour is undertaken and the product distributed. That is where a materialist criticism must begin where Manguel stops.
The Reverse Side of the Tapestry asks us to admire the hidden threads that make literature possible. The task today is to follow those threads from the book into society itself: from translation to labour, from labour to property, and from property to class. The decisive question is no longer merely what we discover when we turn the tapestry over. It is who does the weaving, and who owns the loom?
Bibliography
Authors Guild. “Literary Translation Model Contract.” 14 April 2021. The Guild describes the model contract as intended to promote fair contractual terms and payment for literary translators and includes provisions concerning generative AI.
Authors Guild. “Negotiating Literary Translation Contracts.” 2 June 2022. Discussion of translation fees, royalties, credit and rights. [authorsguild.org]
Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de. Don Quixote. Part II, 1615.
Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. 1845.
Lenin, V. I. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. 1916.
Manguel, Alberto. A History of Reading. London: Flamingo, 1997.
Manguel, Alberto. The Reverse Side of the Tapestry: Notes on the Art of Translation. Manchester: Carcanet Press, 2026. Carcanet lists the paperback at £14.99, ISBN 9781800175808, with publication on 24 September 2026. [carcanet.co.uk]
Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I. 1867.
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. 1848.
Society of Authors. “Rates and Fees.” Guidance addressing payment, rights and the use of AI in commissioned work. [societyofauthors.org]
Pip: Alberto Manguel asks whether literature can compel society to recognize the evidence of facts — which is a braver question than most cultural essays dare to ask, and a harder one than most dare to answer.
Mara: freerein61 takes that question seriously in a post that moves from Manguel's Resistance through Aleksandr Voronsky's aesthetics, the Argentine dictatorship, and the politics of artificial intelligence. Let's start with what Manguel actually argues — and where the argument runs out of road.
Literature as Moral Protest — and Its Limits
Pip: The central tension here is between literature as something that illuminates reality and literature as something that can transform it — and whether Manguel's conception of resistance can hold both at once.
Mara: The post frames Manguel's book as asking whether society can be compelled to recognize the evidence, and whether the writer bears responsibility when truth comes under political attack. His tentative answer is captured in a phrase the post returns to repeatedly: "perhaps that is enough."
Pip: That hesitation is doing a lot of work. If affirmation is all resistance can offer, the post argues, then Manguel has reached the ceiling of the liberal conception — illumination without transformation.
Mara: The post is precise about why. It draws on Aleksandr Voronsky's Art as the Cognition of Life to sharpen the point: "Art is the cognition of life. It is therefore a form of thinking about the world in which the symbols and signs of culture are wielded in the expression of feelings, emotion and thoughts." The upshot is that art does not merely reflect reality — it is one of the means through which reality becomes known.
Pip: Which raises the stakes considerably. If literature is genuinely cognitive, then "perhaps that is enough" starts to sound like a scientist saying perhaps observation is enough.
Mara: The post uses Dante as the counter-example. The Divine Comedy achieves universality not by floating above history but by being inseparable from it — naming individuals, condemning corruption, placing popes in a moral universe. The Commedia's power comes from that interpenetration of the personal, political, and historical.
Mara: The contemporary vocabulary of resistance moves in the opposite direction. The post argues it has become a term that accommodates almost any individual disapproval while leaving the social foundations of what is being resisted unexplored.
Pip: The Trevor Griffiths discussion — a 2008 conversation with WSWS arts editor David Walsh — is brought in here as a useful contrast. Griffiths belonged to a generation shaped by actual mass radicalisation, where the connection between culture and collective social movement was lived experience, not aspiration.
Mara: And the post traces what happened when that connection broke. Defeats of working-class movements, Thatcherism, the dissolution of the Soviet Union — these shifted intellectual life away from transformation and toward transgression, personal expression, symbolic protest. Revolution gave way to resistance. The word fitted the changed climate because it requires no social force, no historical objective, no question of political power.
Pip: On artificial intelligence, the post insists the decisive issue is ownership, not technology as such. AI represents socially generated productive capacity concentrated in private hands — the same contradiction Marx identified, now unusually visible because the training material is humanity's collective culture.
Mara: The post is careful not to demand politically obedient literature. It explicitly defends artistic freedom and cites the disaster of Stalinist socialist realism as the warning. The criticism of Manguel is not that Resistance lacks a revolutionary programme. It is that resistance conceived as permanent moral protest tacitly assumes the forces being resisted will themselves remain permanent.
Pip: The final formulation is worth sitting with: literature is not enough, but it is necessary. Books become historically powerful when the truths they reveal encounter a social force capable of acting upon them.
Mara: Which means the reader, as the post puts it, is never simply a reader — they are also a worker, tenant, parent, student. At some point they close the book and re-enter the world.
Pip: The question Manguel raises — can literature help us see the world as it really is — turns out to demand a more unsettling answer than he offers.
Mara: Seeing clearly and acting on what you see are different capacities. That gap is where the next set of arguments will have to live.
“Life aims to live, and to live means to be aware, joyously, drunkenly, serenely, divinely aware. In this state of god-like awareness one sings; in this realm the world exists as poem”
Henry Miller- The Wisdom of the Heart
“Life is not an easy matter…. You cannot live through it without falling into frustration and cynicism unless you have before you a great idea which raises you above personal misery, above weakness, above all kinds of perfidy and baseness.” ― Leon Trotsky, Diary in Exile, 1935
“The discovery of the art of reading is intimate, obscure, secret, almost impossible to explain.” ― Alberto Manguel, Packing My Library: An Elegy and Ten Digressions
“Art is ‘the cognition of life.’ It is therefore a form of thinking about the world in which the symbols and signs of culture are wielded in the expression of feelings, emotion and thoughts…”
Aleksandr Voronsky-Art as the Cognition of Life
Literature in an age of reaction
Alberto Manguel has spent much of his intellectual life writing about reading, books, libraries and the preservation of cultural memory. That is no small matter at a time when culture is increasingly subordinated to commercial calculation; libraries and other public institutions face financial pressure. Serious reading is forced to compete with a digital environment organised overwhelmingly around speed, distraction and profit. His latest work, Resistance, published in Yale University Press’s “Why I Write” series, poses questions that should concern every serious reader and writer. Can society be compelled to recognise the evidence? Can literature help human beings see the world as it really is? Why have authoritarian regimes repeatedly feared books, and what responsibility does the writer bear when truth itself comes under political attack?
These are not abstract literary questions. Resistance appears amid an increasingly visible crisis of capitalist society in which governments manufacture narratives to justify war and repression, historical falsification becomes integrated into political life, universities and cultural institutions face financial and ideological pressures, and enormous corporations exercise unprecedented influence over the production and circulation of information. At the same time, the extraordinary development of artificial intelligence has provoked understandable anxiety among writers, artists and intellectuals about the future of creative labour and even the distinction between genuine intellectual creation and mechanically generated cultural material. In such circumstances, Manguel’s insistence on the written word as a means of discovering and preserving truth has undeniable value.
The difficulty arises when the argument moves from the defence of literature to the meaning of resistance itself. Manguel suggests that literature may ultimately amount to an affirmation, a continuing refusal to surrender before falsehood and barbarism, before arriving at the tentative proposition that perhaps this is enough. That hesitation is significant. If the statement means that literature cannot overthrow governments or substitute for political organisation, it is obviously true. No serious conception of artistic creation should demand that novels, poems and plays function as political manifestos. But if literature as moral affirmation is proposed as an adequate response to the social forces threatening culture and civilisation, then Manguel has arrived at the limits of the liberal conception of resistance. Literature can illuminate reality, but illumination is not transformation. It can preserve historical consciousness, but consciousness becomes historically decisive only when it enters into a relationship with social forces capable of acting upon it.
Why censors fear books
Manguel is right that censors fear books, but the more difficult question is why they fear them. Writing is not inherently subversive. Libraries contain defences of monarchy alongside celebrations of revolution, justifications of empire beside denunciations of colonial oppression, and reactionary works beside the greatest expressions of human emancipation. The censor does not fear paper and ink. What authoritarian governments fear is the possibility that ideas may articulate suppressed social experiences, preserve memories that official history attempts to obliterate, and give people concepts through which they can understand their circumstances. A book becomes politically dangerous when the truth it contains intersects with the experiences and aspirations of living human beings.
Dante provides an instructive example because the Divine Comedy is inseparable from the historical world in which it was created. Dante does not speak from some timeless cultural realm standing above society. He writes out of the intensely conflict-ridden civilisation of late medieval Italy, from the standpoint of an exile whose personal fate had been intertwined with the political convulsions of Florence. His poem achieves universality not by escaping historical specificity but through it. Dante names individuals, condemns political and ecclesiastical corruption, judges the powerful and places popes and politicians within his moral universe. The enduring power of the Commedia derives precisely from this extraordinary interpenetration of the personal, political, historical and universal.
The contemporary vocabulary of “resistance” frequently moves in the opposite direction. Resistance has become a characteristic term of liberal cultural discourse because it can accommodate almost any form of individual disapproval while leaving the social foundations of what is being resisted unexplored. One can resist by reading, writing, purchasing a particular book, attending an exhibition, making a film or declaring oneself opposed to authoritarianism. The crucial questions gradually disappear: resistance to what social forces, conducted by which social classes, and directed towards what historical objective? Once stripped of these questions, resistance ceases to describe a process through which society might actually be transformed and instead becomes an ethical posture. The individual proves that they have not inwardly submitted, while the conditions producing the catastrophe continue largely undisturbed.
Argentina and the social roots of repression
Manguel’s connection with Argentina makes these questions particularly significant. The savagery of the military dictatorship cannot adequately be remembered merely as an assault upon writers, books and intellectual freedom. The junta certainly censored literature, persecuted intellectuals and attempted to suppress cultural opposition, but this formed part of a far wider programme of social and political repression directed against workers, students, left-wing organisations and all those regarded as threatening the existing economic and political order. The burning of books cannot therefore be separated from the suppression of the people who might read them, distribute them and act upon their implications.
The great upheavals preceding the dictatorship demonstrate why this distinction matters. The Cordobazo of 1969 revealed the explosive potential of the Argentine working class and indicated the depth of the social crisis confronting the ruling elite. What the Argentine state feared was not literature conceived abstractly but the development of political consciousness among social forces capable of challenging the established order. Books could form part of that process because culture can preserve historical experience and provide language through which previously isolated experiences become understood collectively. The dictatorship therefore sought not simply to silence writers but to destroy the political and social environment in which radical ideas might gain mass influence.
Manguel’s later tenure as director of Argentina’s National Library also raises, without requiring any question about his personal sincerity, the broader relationship between cultural institutions and political power. Libraries, museums, universities and publishing houses cannot hover permanently above the economic conditions of the societies that sustain them. Political decisions within a specific economic system ultimately shape their resources, priorities, and accessibility. The defence of cultural institutions consequently cannot be separated indefinitely from questions concerning who possesses society’s wealth, how public resources are allocated and what cultural activities are considered socially necessary. A government can praise national culture while imposing economic policies that undermine the material conditions required for its flourishing. The contradiction is social, not personal.
Literature and objective reality
The strongest aspect of Manguel’s argument is the conviction that literature can enable readers to see reality more clearly. This proposition takes on particular importance after decades in which significant tendencies within academic and cultural thought questioned whether objective reality could be meaningfully represented at all. Postmodernism transformed historical truth into competing narratives, displaced the analysis of social structures in favour of discourse and increasingly treated claims to objective knowledge with suspicion. Whatever Manguel’s differences with Marxism, his insistence that literature participates in the discovery of truth opposes this intellectual retreat.
The great tradition of realism rested precisely upon the conviction that society possesses an objective character that art can penetrate. Balzac and Thomas Mann remain perhaps the classic demonstration. His own conscious political sympathies hardly made him a revolutionary. Yet the artistic seriousness with which he examined post-revolutionary French society compelled him to reproduce, with extraordinary insight, the social forces transforming it. Marx and Engels admired Balzac not because he supplied an approved political programme, but because his artistic honesty revealed the movement of French society with a power that exceeded his conscious political prejudices. Something similar can be said of Tolstoy’s relationship to Russian society, Dickens’s exposure of Victorian England, Theodore Dreiser’s treatment of American capitalism and Thomas Mann’s treatment of German society.
Their achievements demonstrate why Marxist criticism cannot be reduced to searching works of art for correct political opinions. The artist who begins with predetermined conclusions and manipulates characters to illustrate them is unlikely to produce significant art. Genuine realism demands that the artist remain sufficiently open to reality for characters, situations and contradictions to develop beyond preconceived ideological formulas. Artistic truth may consequently collide with the writer’s own stated beliefs. The deepest social significance of literature frequently emerges from precisely this conflict between what an artist consciously intends and what an honest confrontation with reality compels them to reveal.
Art is not a political manifesto.
This distinction is essential when considering the most obvious objection to a Marxist criticism of Resistance. Manguel’s defenders could reasonably argue that a meditative essay about literature should not be condemned for failing to supply a revolutionary programme it never intended to provide. They might add that affirmation has its own value: preserving memory under dictatorship, maintaining intellectual independence under censorship, and insisting on human solidarity when political life is saturated with cruelty are not trivial accomplishments. This objection has force, and any criticism that measures literature by its proximity to political programme would be reductive.
But this is not the issue. Marxism does not require every novelist to become a political organiser, every poet to formulate a programme or every playwright to transform characters into spokespeople for socialism. The disastrous experience of Stalinist “socialist realism” demonstrated where such prescriptions lead. Art cannot flourish when reality is subordinated to a bureaucratically predetermined conclusion. Characters become sociological categories, conflicts become predictable and the independent discovery through which serious artistic creation proceeds is replaced by propaganda. A Marxist approach worthy of the name must defend artistic freedom precisely because truth cannot be discovered by administrative instruction.
Manguel’s criticism is therefore not that Resistance fails to tell readers which political organisation to join. It is that the increasingly abstract conception of resistance within liberal culture separates moral opposition from the historical forces capable of overcoming the conditions being opposed. The writer bears witness, the reader retains an ethical consciousness, and civilisation somehow continues despite the destruction occurring around it. Resistance progressively becomes consolation. Marxism insists upon reconnecting culture with history without reducing the former to the latter. Art has its own forms and problems, but artists, readers, and cultural institutions nevertheless exist within a society structured by definite relations of property and class.
The Reader and the World, Albert Manguel, Aleksandr Voronsky and Art as the Cognition of Life
For Manguel, reading is never simply the mechanical decoding of words. Across his writings on books, libraries and literary culture, reading emerges as a means by which human beings organise experience, preserve memory and discover possibilities beyond the limits of their immediate circumstances. Yet the philosophical implications of this conception become clearer when placed beside the Marxist aesthetics of Aleksandr Voronsky. In Art as the Cognition of Life, Voronsky advances the remarkable proposition that art is not merely a reflection upon life but one of the means through which life itself becomes known.
The affinity between the two writers begins with their refusal to reduce literature to information. A summary of its contents cannot replace a novel because what literature communicates resides in the artistic organisation of experience itself. Characters, situations, images, rhythm and language enable the reader to perceive relationships that abstract propositions cannot reproduce. Literature matters because it enlarges the field of human experience.
But Voronsky gives this insight a more explicitly materialist foundation. Art has cognitive significance because an objective world exists and can be known. The artist does not simply construct an arbitrary reality out of language. Nor does the reader possess unlimited authority to manufacture whatever meaning they choose. Artist, work and reader confront the accumulated substance of social and natural existence.
This conception distinguishes Voronsky sharply from much of the theoretical thinking about literature that developed later in the twentieth century. If reality becomes merely discourse and the literary work an endlessly unstable network of signs, then literature’s claim to disclose anything beyond itself becomes increasingly difficult to sustain. Voronsky’s aesthetics begins from exactly the opposite direction. Human consciousness arose within the material world and possesses the capacity, however imperfectly and historically conditioned, to understand that world. Art constitutes one particular form of this struggle for understanding.
Here Manguel’s lifelong defence of reading takes on broader significance. The library is not valuable simply because old books possess cultural prestige. It represents an extraordinary accumulation of encounters between human consciousness and historical experience. Each generation returns to these works not simply to commemorate the dead but because earlier artistic discoveries can suddenly illuminate circumstances that their creators could never have anticipated.
This helps explain why great literature repeatedly escapes the purposes institutions try to impose on it. Governments, markets, universities and publishing industries classify works, construct canons and transform cultural objects into commodities. Yet the experience contained within a powerful work cannot finally be reduced to its market price, institutional reputation or approved interpretation. The reader may encounter something disturbing precisely because literature reveals contradictions that conventional ideology conceals.
Voronsky’s argument also challenges the crude assumption that Marxist criticism demands politically obedient literature. The artistic value of a novel cannot be measured simply by whether its author professes progressive opinions. Reactionaries can perceive important aspects of social life, while writers possessing admirable political convictions can produce lifeless art. The decisive question is whether the artist has penetrated beneath appearances and discovered something truthful about human beings and their relations with one another.
This argument becomes especially important in an age when literature is increasingly subjected to the logic of commodification. Books are marketed through categories, algorithms, celebrity endorsements and demographic niches. Reading itself can become another measurable consumption habit. Against this environment, both Manguel and Voronsky, from very different intellectual traditions, insist upon something considerably more demanding: the encounter with literature changes the reader’s relationship with reality.
Yet Voronsky supplies the deeper explanation of why this should be possible. Literature matters because reality is richer than the ideological abstractions imposed upon it. Genuine artists discover contradictions, emotions and social relationships that they may not themselves completely understand theoretically. Their works can therefore contain truths exceeding their conscious intentions.
This also explains the continuing power of literature written under historical conditions radically different from our own. We do not read Shakespeare, Tolstoy or Dickens merely as documents belonging to vanished societies. Their works disclose relationships between individuals and society, aspiration and necessity, wealth and poverty, love and property, freedom and constraint. The historical world changes, but the artistic cognition embodied in such works becomes part of humanity’s accumulated consciousness.
The encounter between Manguel and Voronsky therefore points towards a defence of reading more radical than cultural nostalgia. Libraries matter not because civilisation requires temples dedicated to books, but because literature preserves something capitalism continually threatens to diminish: the possibility of sustained attention to human experience outside the immediate requirements of profit and utility.
To read seriously is consequently to engage with the world rather than retreat from it. Manguel reminds us of the inexhaustible relationship connecting books, memory and readers. Voronsky explains why that relationship reaches beyond the private pleasures of reading. Art is a means of cognition, an attempt to penetrate appearances and grasp something truthful about life. The defence of literature therefore becomes inseparable from the defence of humanity’s capacity to know the world and, ultimately, to change it.
Artificial intelligence and the social question
The question becomes particularly sharp in relation to artificial intelligence. Writers and artists have legitimate reasons to regard the development of AI with anxiety. Intellectual and creative workers confront the possibility that corporations will use technologies trained on enormous quantities of existing cultural material to reduce costs, eliminate employment, and transform creative production itself. The increasing capacity to manufacture images, texts, music and synthetic media also creates obvious problems concerning authenticity and the social status of creative work. But none of these developments can adequately be understood by opposing human creativity to technology as such.
The decisive issue is ownership. Artificial intelligence did not descend upon society from outside history. It represents the accumulated product of scientific discovery, technological development, social knowledge and the labour of countless human beings. The contradiction is that socially generated productive capacities become concentrated in the ownership and control of private corporations and wealthy investors. The same technology that might be used to reduce monotonous labour, expand access to knowledge, translate vast bodies of literature, assist scientific research and increase the cultural possibilities available to humanity can, within capitalism, instead be employed to eliminate employment, intensify surveillance, strengthen military systems and subordinate intellectual activity still further to profit.
Trotsky identified the essential contradiction long before the development of digital computation when he discussed technology in Culture and Socialism. Under capitalism, machinery becomes an instrument for intensifying the exploitation of labour, but humanity cannot emancipate itself by rejecting the machine. The productive forces created under capitalism simultaneously establish the material possibilities for overcoming scarcity, drudgery and cultural backwardness. The Marxist answer to technological development is therefore neither corporate celebration nor romantic repudiation. It asks which social class controls technology, what economic principles guide its development, and what human purposes its capacities serve.
AI and humanity’s collective culture
Artificial intelligence makes this contradiction unusually visible because the material many AI systems depend on demonstrates the inherently collective character of culture itself. No writer invents the language in which they write. No scientist independently creates the accumulated body of knowledge upon which discovery depends. No historian creates the archive. Every generation inherits an immense cultural and scientific legacy produced by innumerable previous generations, and every genuinely significant intellectual achievement, in turn, enters that developing collective inheritance.
Digital technology has vastly enlarged the technical possibilities for making this inherited culture available. Libraries, historical archives, scientific research and enormous quantities of educational material can potentially become accessible to populations across the planet on a scale that previous generations could scarcely have imagined. Under rational social arrangements, AI could help organise and navigate that information, overcome linguistic boundaries, and extend access to intellectual resources far beyond the institutions where they have traditionally been concentrated. The genuinely revolutionary potential lies not in the fantasy that machines will replace human thought, but in technologies that could extend human capacity to think, learn, and create.
The obstacle is not technological but social. When accumulated human knowledge becomes privately appropriated, the contradictions surrounding AI become an expression of the contradiction between collective production and private ownership that Marx identified as foundational to capitalist society. A serious discussion of AI and culture therefore must go beyond the fear that the machine threatens the writer. It must ask who owns the machine and who controls access to the accumulated knowledge upon which it operates. Without that transition, cultural criticism risks treating the symptoms of technological change while leaving untouched the social structure determining how technology will be used.
Trevor Griffiths and the writer’s social orientation
The 2008 discussion between playwright Trevor Griffiths and WSWS arts editor David Walsh provides a useful contrast because it approaches the relationship between artistic work and politics historically rather than merely morally. Griffiths belonged to a generation shaped by the international radicalisation of the late 1960s and early 1970s, when questions of Marxism, revolution, the working class and political power entered cultural life with an intensity that would become almost unimaginable during the succeeding decades. Writers did not suddenly develop more courageous personalities. Their cultural development occurred within a wider movement of millions of people whose struggles transformed the intellectual atmosphere.
The importance of this experience lies precisely in the connection between culture and social life. Radical writing did not develop simply because writers chose to “resist”. A wider historical movement expanded the possibilities available to culture and made questions that had previously appeared marginal suddenly immediate. The subsequent defeats and betrayals of the radicalisation did not leave cultural life unaffected either. The turn to the right, the attacks associated with Thatcherism and Reaganism, the decline of the old labour organisations and finally the dissolution of the Soviet Union contributed to a profound transformation of intellectual life. Confidence in collective social transformation retreated. Class increasingly disappeared from cultural discussion, while politics became reinterpreted through personal identity, language and individual experience.
“Resistance” fitted this changed intellectual climate remarkably well. Revolution implies a social force, a historical objective and a question of political power. Resistance does not necessarily require any of them. One can resist indefinitely without confronting how society is to be reconstructed. The word therefore captures both the sincerity and the political limits of much contemporary cultural opposition.
From class politics to moral protest
This transformation did not arise merely from incorrect theoretical choices. It followed major political defeats and social transformations. The defeats of working-class movements during the closing decades of the twentieth century strengthened the apparent dominance of capitalism. They encouraged the conception that fundamental social transformation had become impossible. Politics increasingly adjusted itself to what was presented as an unalterable market order. In this environment, opposition shifted from transformation to transgression, personal expression, and symbolic protest. The language changed accordingly. Liberation gave way to representation, revolution to resistance, social transformation to individual empowerment.
None of these terms is necessarily meaningless. People genuinely resist oppression, and defending democratic and cultural rights remains essential. The problem arises when defensive resistance becomes an entire conception of historical possibility. A political culture organised merely around perpetual resistance tacitly assumes that the forces being resisted will themselves remain permanent. The individual may refuse inward submission, but the structure producing oppression survives. What appears radical can consequently conceal a deeply pessimistic historical conception.
Manguel’s final “perhaps that is enough” unintentionally expresses this pessimism. Literature preserves what is humane while the surrounding world becomes increasingly inhuman. The library becomes a shelter from barbarism rather than one element within humanity’s struggle to abolish the social sources of barbarism. Such a conception contains dignity, but it also embodies resignation.
Literature must disturb
Great literature has never confined itself comfortably to affirmation. It affirms humanity frequently through merciless criticism of the actual conditions under which human beings live. Its power lies partly in its capacity to destabilise assumptions so deeply embedded in social existence that they appear natural. The novelist can make visible relations that everyday consciousness conceals; the playwright can expose the contradiction between what individuals say and what their behaviour reveals; poetry can give expressive form to needs and experiences that have not yet found an adequate political vocabulary. Literature thereby does what political analysis alone cannot accomplish.
This disturbing quality is essential. Chekhov’s observation in “Gooseberries” that behind every contented person there ought to stand someone with a hammer reminding him continually that unhappy people exist captures something fundamental about serious art. Kafka’s celebrated image of literature as an axe for the frozen sea within us expresses the same demand in another form. Art should not merely confirm our existing morality. It should penetrate the defences through which individuals reconcile themselves to intolerable circumstances.
The greatest writing therefore does not simply inform readers that injustice exists. Newspapers can do that. It transforms perception. It makes previously accepted relationships strange and forces readers to reconsider their own experience. This process need not produce an immediately identifiable political conclusion. But it has enormous intellectual potential because fundamental social change becomes possible only when people stop treating the existing organisation of life as inevitable.
The reader is also a social being.
Nevertheless, there is a danger in turning reading itself into resistance. Capitalism is remarkably capable of commodifying its own criticism. Revolutionary imagery becomes advertising, rebellious music becomes fashion, political radicalism becomes a publishing category, and resistance becomes a marketable identity. The existence of radical books therefore proves very little about the political health of a society. An economic system can tolerate an enormous quantity of private dissent so long as that dissent remains disconnected from collective action directed against the foundations of social power.
The reader, moreover, is never simply a reader. The person sitting with a novel is also a worker or employer, tenant or landlord, parent, student, pensioner or unemployed person. They occupy a concrete position in society and participate in relationships that extend far beyond the page. Reading can alter how individuals understand these relationships, but the movement from understanding to transformation requires another sphere of activity. At some point the reader closes the book and re-enters the world.
This does not diminish reading. It identifies where its greatest significance potentially lies. A book may articulate something experienced by thousands or millions of individuals separately and thereby help transform private experience into social understanding. Once individuals recognise that what appeared to be a private misfortune is produced by conditions shared with countless others, consciousness has already begun moving beyond the individual. Literature can contribute powerfully to that process. But collective understanding becomes historically transformative only through collective action.
Seeing the world as it really is
Manguel therefore raises a considerably larger problem than his own solution can contain when he asks whether literature enables humanity to see the world as it really is. To confront reality today means recognising that capitalism is not simply an economy within which occasional injustices occur. It is a historically developed system of social relations characterised fundamentally by private ownership of the productive forces, the exploitation of wage labour and competition between corporations and nation-states. War, inequality, austerity and cultural impoverishment cannot be understood comprehensively as separate moral failures because they all arise within this wider social structure.
The same applies to the conditions confronting literature itself. The difficulties facing writers, libraries, publishing, arts education and serious journalism are continually treated as discrete cultural problems. Yet behind them stands the allocation of social resources. A society capable of producing extraordinary quantities of wealth nevertheless claims that it cannot adequately fund libraries, schools, museums, orchestras, theatres and other institutions through which cultural life develops. Writers are urged to accommodate themselves to market demands while publishers operate increasingly according to commercial imperatives. The contradiction is not a lack of technological or material resources, but their organisation around private accumulation rather than social need.
To see the world as it really is consequently requires seeing cultural decline as an expression of a broader social crisis. The defence of literature ultimately confronts the same questions as the defence of every other field of human activity: who owns society’s resources, who determines how they are distributed, and whose interests does production serve?
The question of the working class
This brings the argument to the subject that liberal theories of resistance generally avoid: the working class. Marxism did not assign workers a revolutionary role because Marx had a sentimental preference for industrial labour. The working class’s revolutionary significance arises from its position within capitalist production. Capital increasingly organises production collectively across national boundaries while ownership remains concentrated privately. Workers therefore participate every day in a highly socialised system whose productive capacities contradict the private appropriation of the wealth they create.
Modern technological development has intensified this contradiction rather than removed it. The global systems underlying digital communication, artificial intelligence, logistics, finance and scientific research depend upon vast networks of collective labour. Technologies celebrated as autonomous creations of entrepreneurs are actually impossible without generations of publicly and privately employed scientists, programmers, engineers, teachers, technicians and countless other workers, alongside accumulated cultural and scientific knowledge inherited from the past.
For writers, this question is decisive because culture itself increasingly depends upon the same globally integrated technical infrastructure. The interests of the serious artist ultimately collide with the same monopolistic relations that confront workers elsewhere. Intellectual property, digital platforms, publishing corporations and AI systems cannot be considered independently of the ownership structures controlling them. The defence of culture therefore develops an objective connection with the broader struggle over control of society’s productive and intellectual resources.
Literature is not a substitute for politics.
To argue this is not to demand politically obedient literature. On the contrary, literature becomes artistically impoverished when converted into political instruction. A novel organised to demonstrate conclusions that the author already possesses ceases to discover reality and becomes illustration. The greatness of art lies partly in its unpredictability, its capacity to uncover contradictions that neither the artist nor the reader initially anticipated.
But acknowledging the independence of artistic creation does not require pretending that literature exists outside historical development. The artist’s task is not identical to that of a political party, yet both confront the same objective world. Serious art and revolutionary politics approach reality through different forms, methods and purposes, but neither can indefinitely avoid the fundamental contradictions of its historical epoch.
The question is therefore one of orientation rather than prescription. Does the writer look towards society and attempt to penetrate its contradictions, or retreat from society into the assertion of individual moral integrity? Does cultural opposition seek historical clarification, or does it construct an enclave within which humane values can survive while the external world becomes increasingly barbaric? At this level, Manguel’s conception of resistance becomes inadequate.
Giving the argument against this criticism its due
There remains a serious counterargument. Admirers of Manguel can reasonably insist that Resistance is a literary meditation rather than a work of political economy. They may argue that the demand for cultural affirmation itself possesses value when censorship, historical falsification and political demoralisation threaten intellectual independence. Montaigne did not need to formulate a revolutionary programme for his essays to enlarge human self-understanding, nor must every contemporary writer transform reflections upon books into an analysis of capitalist property relations. Literature has moral, imaginative and aesthetic capacities that cannot be reduced to its relationship with class struggle.
This warning against reductionism should be taken seriously. A mechanical Marxism that treats every poem or novel simply as an ideological document generated by class position would be incapable of explaining why works produced in remote historical circumstances continue to move readers centuries later. Human beings have emotional and intellectual experiences that cannot be reduced to economic categories. Love, mortality, memory, betrayal, loneliness and hope are genuine elements of human life, and literature’s exploration of them possesses its own legitimacy.
But recognising this does not invalidate historical materialism. The universal in art does not exist by eliminating the particular. Human emotions themselves are experienced within historically developed social forms. Love in feudal society is not socially identical to love in modern capitalism, even though both contain recognisably human experiences. Literature becomes universal not by escaping the historical world but by rendering particular human experiences so truthfully that people living in different circumstances can recognise themselves within them. Marxism at its best therefore enlarges rather than diminishes the understanding of artistic universality.
Beyond “Perhaps that is enough”
Manguel’s hesitant conclusion can now be reconsidered. Perhaps, he suggests, affirmation and continuing resistance are enough. But enough for what? Enough to preserve personal integrity? Certainly. Enough to maintain historical memory against those seeking to destroy it? Sometimes. Enough to produce great literature? Possibly, because artists have never required correct political theories as prerequisites for artistic achievement. But enough to confront the social processes threatening culture, democratic rights and human civilisation? No.
Books did not abolish slavery, overthrow feudalism or defeat fascism. Yet intellectual and artistic culture played enormous roles in the historical struggles through which people became conscious of these conditions and acted against them. The distinction is fundamental. The Enlightenment contributed to the intellectual preparation of bourgeois revolution because its criticism of inherited authority intersected with major changes in European society. Marxism acquired world-historical significance not simply because Marx wrote extraordinarily penetrating books, but because those works articulated the objective historical interests of a social force capitalism itself created.
Ideas become material forces when they enter into the consciousness of masses of people. Literature forms part of this process because it can transform perception long before political conclusions become fully articulated. It can reveal what society tries to hide, recover what official history seeks to forget, and show that apparently natural social relationships have histories and therefore can have endings.
Literature is not enough, but it is necessary.
The conclusion should therefore be neither the liberal celebration of literature as resistance nor a philistine dismissal of books as politically powerless. Literature is not enough, but it is necessary. Books constitute one of humanity’s greatest repositories of accumulated consciousness. Through them, individuals separated by centuries enter into conversation. The dead continue to participate in the living’s intellectual life. Historical experience survives the societies that created it, and readers encounter modes of human existence radically different from their own.
No socialist movement worthy of the name can regard this inheritance indifferently. The struggle for human liberation is inconceivable without defending and expanding culture because socialism is not simply a different mechanism for distributing goods. Its historical justification rests on creating conditions in which the productive, intellectual, and creative capacities of every human being can develop to a degree impossible in a society dominated by exploitation, economic insecurity, and social inequality.
Manguel is consequently right to defend literature against the forces seeking to diminish it. He is right to insist that books can challenge falsehood and enlarge perception. He is right to regard cultural memory as something worth preserving in an age increasingly characterised by historical amnesia. But the logic of his own questions points beyond the conclusion he offers. If literature teaches us to see the world as it really is, then eventually it must help us confront the historical character of that world. It must make visible not only suffering but the social relationships that reproduce suffering, not merely authoritarianism but the forces giving rise to it, not simply technological anxiety but the structures of ownership determining the purposes towards which technology is directed.
The writer cannot transform society through writing, and it would be disastrous for art to pretend otherwise. But the writer need not accept a permanent separation between cultural truth and social action. Literature reaches towards something greater than private consolation precisely when the truth it discovers becomes part of humanity’s consciousness of itself. At that point, the distinction between the library and the world does not disappear, but their relationship becomes clearer. The reader carries historical experience out of the book and back into society.
“Perhaps that is enough” expresses the honourable pessimism of an intellectual determined to preserve culture while uncertain that society itself can be transformed. The challenge confronting writers and readers in the twenty-first century requires a more ambitious perspective. Literature should not pretend to replace political struggle, but neither should it reconcile humanity to a permanent condition of resistance. Its highest function is not to reassure us that conscience survives. At the same time, the world deteriorates, but it deepens our understanding of that world, disturbs our accommodation to it, and enlarges our conception of what human beings might become.
Manguel asks whether society can be compelled to recognise the evidence of facts. History suggests that it can, but never through books alone. It requires human beings who have understood their circumstances, recognised their collective interests and become determined to act upon that understanding. Literature can profoundly help develop such consciousness. That is why the answer to Manguel should not be that literature is powerless. It is something more demanding: literature becomes historically powerful when the truths it reveals encounter a social force capable of acting upon them.
The task, then, is to move beyond resistance as permanent moral protest. The defence of culture must become inseparable from creating a society in which culture, science, and technology cease to be subordinated to private accumulation and become part of humanity’s common inheritance. Literature will not accomplish that transformation by itself. But the literature worthy of the coming struggles will undoubtedly help human beings understand why such a transformation is necessary.
Bibliography
Balzac, Honoré de. La Comédie humaine. Various editions.
Chekhov, Anton. “Gooseberries.” 1898.
Dante Alighieri. The Divine Comedy. Various editions.
Dreiser, Theodore. An American Tragedy. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1925.
Robert Tombs’s appearance on the BBC’s HistoryExtra platform promoting Our Islands’ Story: A Better Story About Britain, co-written with Nigel Biggar, matters for reasons that extend far beyond the merits of another popular history of Britain. The central issue the book and its promotion raise is not whether every aspect of British history should be condemned, nor whether historians should acknowledge achievements as well as crimes. It concerns something far more fundamental: whose history is being written, which social forces are concealed when “Britain” is treated as a unified historical subject, and why a rehabilitated national narrative has acquired renewed political importance.
Biggar and Tombs make no secret of wanting to challenge what they regard as an excessively negative conception of British history. Swift Press describes their book as a challenge to a supposedly “fashionable” narrative that emphasises the worst of Britain’s past while neglecting its best. The publisher goes further, describing the volume as an “antidote to contemporary cynicism” and declaring that the authors seek to tell a “better story about Britain”, one that recognises achievements of “enduring value” that supposedly deserve “our appreciation and care”. Our Islands’ Story was published on 22 October 2026. [swiftpress.com]
That language deserves serious attention. “Our”, “inheritance”, “appreciation” and “care” are not merely neutral historiographical categories. They construct a relationship between contemporary readers and the British state’s history. The effect is to transform history from the critical investigation of past societies into an argument about national inheritance. Events separated by centuries and produced by antagonistic social classes can therefore be gathered under an encompassing national “we”.
The accompanying endorsements make the political thrust still clearer. Andrew Roberts praises the book for rejecting what he calls “corrosive woke self-hatred”. At the same time, John Gray commends its opposition to a supposedly “crude progressive mythology” depicting British history principally through oppression and exploitation. The question is therefore not whether the book has politics. Its presentation makes clear that it consciously intervenes in contemporary disputes over national identity and historical memory. The question is what politics these arguments express and what conception of history underpins them.
Who is the “our” in Our Islands’ Story?
The title itself poses the central problem. Who exactly are “our”? No single British historical experience exists. The aristocrat enclosing land and the peasant deprived of customary rights did not inhabit history in the same way. The plantation owner accumulating wealth through enslaved labour and the enslaved labourer were not participants in a common achievement. The Manchester mill owner and the child employed in the factory cannot be dissolved into a collective national “we” without concealing their social relationship.
The British Empire similarly cannot be understood as the collective accomplishment or collective crime of an undifferentiated British population. Its governing apparatus, military power and commercial expansion arose from definite social interests. The profits generated by colonial commerce, plantation slavery, finance and industrial exploitation accumulated overwhelmingly within the possessing classes. British workers could themselves absorb imperial and nationalist ideology, and sections of the working class could derive particular advantages from imperial supremacy, but this did not abolish the fundamental class division within British society.
That is why the apparently straightforward language of national inheritance is so misleading. Tombs has long defended a more affirmative interpretation of England and Britain. Yet the central Marxist objection to this approach does not depend upon establishing whether England has been, at one moment or another, relatively prosperous, politically stable or constitutionally liberal compared with other countries. The real question is how such developments arose and which social forces struggled over their direction.
A national narrative inevitably converts contested achievements into national attributes. Parliamentary government, civil liberties, trade-union rights and extension of the franchise appear retrospectively as components of an evolving British political tradition. What disappears is the struggle required to obtain them and, above all, the resistance mounted by property and the state against those demanding them.
The material foundations of British power
Britain did not become the “workshop of the world” because of some timeless national predisposition towards liberty, enterprise or good government. British capitalism emerged from profound transformations in property, agriculture, commerce, production, and class relations.
The enclosure and commercialisation of agriculture helped produce both an increasingly capitalist system of farming and populations increasingly dependent upon wage labour. Colonial commerce expanded alongside the Atlantic slave economy. Wealth generated in the Caribbean, commercial expansion in Asia, and the growing power of finance interacted with transformations taking place within Britain itself. The Industrial Revolution did not descend from the ingenuity of an undifferentiated British people. It developed inside a new system of class relations in which the means of production were increasingly concentrated in private hands while millions possessed primarily their capacity to work.
The resulting wealth was extraordinary. So too was its social cost. Engels’s The Condition of the Working Class in England lies precisely in this. Engels did not look upon industrial Britain and see a single national community becoming progressively richer. He perceived interconnected classes. The factory system that generated enormous wealth at one pole of society generated insecurity, exhausting labour, overcrowding and premature death at another. The splendour of capitalist civilisation and the misery of the proletariat were not two unrelated phenomena. They arose from the same social relations.
This is what disappears whenever national prosperity becomes the principal measure of historical success. To ask whether Britain was rich is consequently inadequate. One must ask who controlled the wealth, who produced it, under what conditions it was accumulated and how it was distributed. To speak of British power without these questions is to convert the history of a class society into a national success story.
Empire and the morality of the balance sheet
The same methodological difficulty becomes still more visible when discussion turns towards empire. Biggar’s attempt to reconsider the morality of colonialism rests upon the claim that the historical record should not be reduced exclusively to oppression and atrocity. Our Islands’ Story extends the broader intellectual project into a national history advertised as recovering positive achievements against pervasive pessimism. The publisher explicitly presents the book in these terms.
At first sight, the demand for “balance” sounds unassailable. Any serious historian considers contradictory evidence. British imperial rule differed across regions and centuries. Its administrators did not possess identical motives. Colonial subjects were themselves divided by class, caste, religion and political outlook. Institutions transported around the world could acquire meanings unintended by those who introduced them. None of this, however, answers the essential question: what was empire?
Empire was not an assortment of disconnected moral actions awaiting classification as beneficial or harmful. It represented systems of political domination constructed within a developing capitalist world economy. British imperialism secured strategic territory, commercial routes, markets, investment opportunities and access to labour and resources. The forms of this domination varied enormously, but you cannot understand the social relationship by placing railways, schools, and legal institutions in a positive column while placing famine, dispossession, and repression in a negative one.
Railways themselves illustrate the problem. Infrastructure that later becomes essential to the economic life of an independent society cannot retrospectively explain the social purpose for which colonial authorities and investors supported its construction. A material development may have contradictory historical consequences. Marxism has never required denying this. On the contrary, contradiction stands at the centre of historical development.
The problem begins when consequences are converted into moral credits attributed to “Britain”. The Irish Famine, Amritsar, the Bengal famine of 1943 and repression in colonial Kenya cannot simply be positioned alongside legal institutions and infrastructure before historians calculate whether empire generated a positive or negative final score. Instead, historians must locate such events within the economic and political relations of the societies in which they occurred. The issue is explanation rather than retrospective national judgement.
The struggle for democracy was a class struggle.
This distinction matters especially when discussing the genuinely progressive traditions in British history. There is an enormous democratic inheritance. But its most powerful episodes repeatedly emerged through struggle against the existing political and social order. The seventeenth-century English Revolution shattered forms of monarchical government and released political arguments of extraordinary radicalism. The Levellers demanded an extension of political participation far beyond what Parliament’s propertied leaders were prepared to concede. The Putney Debates revealed that even within the parliamentary military coalition, profound disagreement existed over property, political rights, and the revolution’s meaning.
The radical tradition did not end there. The development of industrial capitalism produced a modern working class that created its own organisations and increasingly advanced its own political claims. Peterloo revealed how the state could answer demands for political reform. The Tolpuddle labourers demonstrated the hostility directed against collective organisation. Chartism created the first mass independent political movement of the working class, linking democratic demands with the experience of industrial society. The British political system eventually incorporated reforms once denounced as dangerous and revolutionary. But to transform that outcome into proof of Britain’s uniquely evolutionary genius is to reverse historical causation.
Rights conceded under pressure subsequently become celebrated components of a national tradition. The struggles that made concessions unavoidable recede into the background. This process of historical appropriation is crucial to understanding conservative national history. It does not necessarily deny popular struggle. More commonly, it absorbs its accomplishments. Democracy becomes British. Parliamentary sovereignty becomes British. Freedom becomes British. The working population is subsequently invited to identify with institutions whose democratic content was expanded precisely through generations of struggle against privileged elites. Marxism insists upon restoring that conflict to the centre of historical interpretation.
The working class has a history, not a national myth.
The alternative to conservative nationalism is therefore not national self-loathing. Workers living in Britain today have no reason to experience personal guilt for imperial crimes committed before they were born. A child in present-day Manchester is no more personally responsible for Amritsar than an Indian worker today is responsible for the actions of former Indian ruling classes. Collective hereditary guilt is an intellectually bankrupt approach to history. But collective national pride mirrors the same error. If contemporary workers are not personally guilty of the crimes of empire, they cannot logically inherit personal credit for Britain’s victories, imperial conquests or ruling-class achievements either.
History is something to understand, not something into which individuals should be conscripted in search of either inherited innocence or inherited guilt. This is where the conflict between Marxism and both sides of the conventional culture war becomes important. Racialist theories may present “whiteness”, “Europeans” or “the British” as collective historical subjects bearing responsibility across generations. Conservative national history responds by taking the same national categories and reversing the moral verdict. Instead of collective guilt, it offers collective pride. The apparent opponents consequently share far more than either acknowledges. Both can dissolve class antagonisms into identities extending across generations. Both obscure the fact that the decisive divisions in capitalist society arise from social relations of production, property and power. Marxism rejects the choice.
From the 1619 Project to History Reclaimed
This is also why opposition to racialised interpretations of history must not be surrendered to the political right. Legitimate criticisms of racial reductionism give Tombs and other conservative historians part of their intellectual opportunity. When enormous and complicated histories are rewritten as essentially eternal confrontations between racial categories, the resulting distortions make nationalist counterattacks easier. But the answer to racial essentialism cannot be national essentialism.
The history of Atlantic slavery, for example, becomes incomprehensible if the fundamental historical agency is relocated from class relations and developing capitalism into a timeless conflict between “white” and “black” people. But it becomes equally incomprehensible if the fact that Britain later participated in suppressing the Atlantic slave trade is employed to establish a moral credit for the British national story.
Historical materialism asks different questions. What economic relations generated racial slavery? Which classes accumulated wealth through it? How were racial ideologies developed to legitimise exploitation? Which economic, political and social transformations contributed to abolition? What interests subsequently shaped Britain’s use of anti-slavery in its international policy? Those questions lead away from moral competition between national pride and national shame and towards historical explanation.
Why resurrect the imperial inheritance now?
The timing of the dispute matters. Britain in 2026 is not the Britain that dominated nineteenth-century world commerce. Nor is it the imperial power that once controlled enormous territories. It is a capitalist society marked by intense social inequality and political disaffection, operating within a global system increasingly characterised by military confrontation and geopolitical instability. Under such circumstances, the ideological significance of national history increases.
A state demanding social sacrifice must perpetually present national interests as interests shared across class lines. Military expenditure must become “our” defence. Geopolitical objectives become “our” security. International competitors become threats to “us”. The tremendous disparities separating wealth and poverty disappear temporarily behind the image of national community. History provides this political vocabulary with a past. Empire consequently becomes more than a historical question. If the imperial past can be reinterpreted as on balance constructive, a source of institutions and values worthy of appreciation, then the contemporary British state can present itself as inheritor of a fundamentally progressive national tradition.
This was one of the central arguments in my earlier A Trumpet of Sedition article, “Biggar and Tombs’ Our Islands’ Story: An ideological brief for an empire preparing for war”. Published on 15 October, the article argued that the rehabilitation of empire should be considered within a wider ideological turn towards militarism and national cohesion. , [keith-pers…ogspot.com]
The BBC and the limits of “neutral” history
In principle, I have no objection to the BBC interviewing Tombs. His position deserves examination, particularly because it sits at the centre of a major contemporary historical controversy. The problem arises when a deeply political interpretation is treated principally as an exercise in correcting excessive negativity rather than subjected to sustained scrutiny of its assumptions. The questions to ask of this interpretation are not difficult to formulate.
What is gained and what is lost when Britain itself becomes the subject of history? Who possesses the collective inheritance repeatedly invoked in discussions of the national past? How can the accomplishments of ruling classes and the victories secured against them legitimately be incorporated into the same narrative of national achievement?
Does the parliamentary system demonstrate an inherent British attachment to liberty, or does its development reveal centuries of conflict over who possessed political rights? Can empire be morally evaluated apart from the economic system that shaped imperial expansion? And above all, what does the word “our” mean in a society divided by class? A genuinely searching discussion would have forced the national narrative to confront these contradictions. Instead, the danger of the “history wars” framework is that the argument is organised between two positions that reinforce one another: Britain as historical villain and Britain as historical benefactor. Once debate takes this form, Marxist historical explanation disappears almost completely.
Our Islands’ Story and the politics of historical memory
The publisher’s presentation of Our Islands’ Story is particularly revealing in this respect. The book is not advertised simply as offering discoveries about Britain’s past. It is offered as a corrective to attitudes towards the past. Readers are encouraged to recover something worthy of “appreciation and care” and to carry valuable elements of the inheritance “into the future”. That is an argument about historical consciousness.
The difference matters because history and memory perform different intellectual functions. Historical investigation should challenge inherited assumptions. National memory frequently seeks continuity. History disaggregates supposedly unified communities and discovers conflicts beneath them. National mythology instead tends to turn contradictory experiences into a common inheritance. Marxist history’s task is precisely to uncover those contradictions.
We should therefore reject the argument that criticism of empire involves hating Britain just as emphatically as we reject claims that acknowledging cultural or political achievements requires defending empire. Shakespeare does not belong to imperialism. Newton does not require colonial apologetics. The Levellers do not belong to the historical tradition of the British ruling class simply because their struggles occurred in England. Chartism cannot be transformed into an ornament of British constitutionalism without doing violence to the social conflict that created it. Cultural achievement, scientific discovery and democratic struggle are part of humanity’s inheritance. The history of ordinary people struggling to improve their conditions belongs most profoundly to those continuing the struggle for human emancipation.
Against both national shame and national pride
The choice facing historians is therefore not between denunciation and celebration. Neither category provides an adequate method. The British Empire should not be studied so that contemporary Britons can be instructed to feel ashamed of themselves. Nor should it be studied so they can emerge feeling reassured that the national ledger ultimately remains in credit. Both approaches subordinate historical explanation to contemporary moral identity. The materialist historian instead seeks to reconstruct the social relations from which events arose.
This means examining Britain’s transformation through agrarian capitalism, colonial expansion and industrialisation. It means tracing the formation of classes and the relationship between domestic accumulation and international exploitation. It means investigating the state as an instrument shaped by historically developing property relations rather than imagining it as the political embodiment of a timeless national character.
It also means paying attention to resistance. The enslaved person who rebelled against plantation slavery, the Irish tenant resisting landlordism, the Indian opponent of colonial domination and the British worker confronting the factory owner do not belong in separate moral histories. Their experiences were connected through the developing world capitalist system. This is precisely why Marxism possesses an international conception of history fundamentally at odds with conservative nationalism.
There was never one British story.
Finally, no single British story can reconcile these experiences without distorting them. The history of the landowner is not the history of the dispossessed agricultural labourer. The imperial administrator did not have the same historical experience as the colonised population. The millionaire and the docker inhabited the same country without occupying the same social world. The attempt to merge them produces precisely that mystified entity Marxism exists to penetrate: the nation conceived as a community standing above class.
Biggar and Tombs want the reader to recover confidence in national inheritance. The description issued by Swift Press leaves little ambiguity on this score, presenting Our Islands’ Story as an uplifting corrective to cynicism about the British past. But workers need no such reassurance. They possess a historical inheritance far richer than the achievements of their rulers. It includes those who resisted enclosure and dispossession; those who carried the English Revolution beyond the limits acceptable to its propertied leadership; the Levellers who argued over political equality at Putney; the reform movements brutally confronted at Peterloo; the Tolpuddle labourers; the Chartists; generations of trade unionists, socialists and anti-imperialists; and all those who insisted that ordinary men and women were capable of directing society themselves. This history cannot be made the property of the British state. Nor is it exclusively British. Its greatest significance lies precisely in its connection with the struggles of workers and oppressed populations internationally.
A better history requires abandoning the national myth
The weakness of Our Islands’ Story ultimately lies in its title. A “better story about Britain” remains organised around Britain as its fundamental historical subject. But the history that genuinely needs recovering is the history concealed when the nation takes centre stage. Britain certainly has a past. That does not mean everyone who lived within it shared the same historical interests.
The critical question for history is not whether “we” should be proud or ashamed. It is who constituted this “we” in the first place. Who owned the land? Who worked it? Who owned the factories? Who laboured inside them? Who profited from colonial expansion? Who administered the empire? Who experienced its domination? Who controlled Parliament, and who struggled for admission into political life? Who accumulated the wealth, and who produced it?
Once those questions are asked, the harmonious national picture begins to disintegrate.
That is why the current rehabilitation of national history has contemporary political significance. A society divided ever more visibly between immense private wealth and widespread insecurity requires ideological mechanisms that can assert an overriding community of interests. National history provides one such mechanism. It takes the conflicts through which modern society developed and transforms their outcomes into common property. The state ceases to appear as a product of historical struggles and becomes the guardian of a supposedly shared inheritance.
The possibilities contained in British history are far greater than that conservative narrative allows. They lie not primarily in the state’s continuity but in repeated challenges to established authority. From the revolutionary ferment of the seventeenth century through Chartism and the establishment of an organised working-class movement, Britain’s most enduring contribution to human progress cannot be separated from struggles waged from below.
Workers and young people therefore require neither an education in national guilt nor lessons in patriotic pride from historians seeking to restore confidence in Britain’s past. They need history in its most rigorous sense: the reconstruction of the social forces, material interests and class struggles through which the present world came into existence. Tombs and Biggar’s “better story” responds to the crisis of national confidence by attempting to repair the national narrative. Marxist history begins from an altogether different premise. The task is not to produce a better national myth, but to dispense with the myth that rulers and ruled ever possessed one common history. What deserves to be recovered is not an imperial inheritance but the revolutionary and democratic tradition that repeatedly challenged property, privilege and empire. That inheritance belongs to neither Westminster nor the British state. It belongs to the international working class.
Bibliography and further reading
Biggar, Tombs and the current controversy
Biggar, Nigel and Robert Tombs. Our Islands’ Story: A Better Story About Britain. Swift Press, 2026. The publisher gives 22 October 2026 as the publication date and explicitly advertises the book as an antidote to contemporary pessimism concerning Britain’s history.
Biggar, Nigel. Colonialism: A Moral Reckoning. London: William Collins, 2023.
Tombs, Robert. The English and Their History. London: Allen Lane, 2014.
Tombs, Robert. This Sovereign Isle: Britain In and Out of Europe. London: Allen Lane, 2021.
Marx, Engels and imperialism
Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. 1845.
Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I. 1867.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. 1848.
Lenin, V. I. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. 1916.
Trotsky, Leon. Where Is Britain Going? 1925.
British capitalism, empire and the working class
Williams, Eric. Capitalism and Slavery. 1944.
Thompson, E. P. The Making of the English Working Class. London: Victor Gollancz, 1963.
Hill, Christopher. The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution. London: Temple Smith, 1972.
Hobsbawm, Eric. Industry and Empire. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968.
Kiernan, V. G. The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes to Other Cultures in the Imperial Age. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969.
Blackburn, Robin. The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492–1800. London: Verso, 1997.
From A Trumpet of Sedition
A Trumpet of Sedition. “Biggar and Tombs’ Our Islands’ Story: An ideological brief for an empire preparing for war.” 15 October 2026. This is particularly worth retaining in the bibliography because the present article works naturally as its companion: the earlier essay focuses on the ideological rehabilitation of empire and argues that this must be located within a wider turn toward militarism. [atrumpetof…dition.org],
Publisher material
Swift Press. Our Islands’ Story, publisher’s description and endorsements. [swiftpress.com]
The Guardian Bookshop. Our Islands’ Story, publication details and author biographies. Its listing identifies Biggar as Lord Biggar of Castle Douglas and Emeritus Regius Professor of Moral Theology at Oxford, noting that he entered the House of Lords as a Conservative peer in January 2025; it identifies Tombs as Emeritus Professor of French History at Cambridge and a Life Fellow of St John’s College. [guardianbookshop.com]
Minoo Dinshaw’s Friends in Youth: Choosing Sides in the English Civil War has been warmly received. The book is an impressive achievement: learned, elegantly written, densely researched, and unusually attentive to personality, friendship, and the texture of political life. But the critical enthusiasm surrounding it also speaks to the political atmosphere in which the English Revolution is now being interpreted. The publisher presents its protagonists as principled young men hoping to restore harmony between Crown and Parliament. At the same time, the book’s publicity repeatedly emphasises reluctant choices, subtle differences, accident and the tragedy of unnecessary civil conflict. [penguin.co.uk]
That interpretation has proved especially congenial to reviewers. The Telegraph described the book as a “necessary cautionary tale about the human cost of political division”. At the same time, the Financial Times praised its “elegiac portrait of well-meaning moderates who tried to halt the slide towards violent division”. The publisher’s material and elsewhere reproduce these descriptions. Andrew Gimson’s ConservativeHome review goes further, explicitly welcoming Dinshaw’s resistance to the supposedly inadequate division of seventeenth-century politics into Cavaliers and Roundheads and concluding with Dinshaw’s own vision of his subjects as embodying an “attractive common world” opposed to party enmity.
The response matters because Dinshaw’s book frames the English Revolution as, above all, a tragedy of political polarisation: a catastrophe in which thoughtful, cultivated, and essentially decent men found themselves divided by forces that wiser statecraft might have controlled. Against revolution stands conversation; against ideology, friendship; against mass political mobilisation, the civilised intercourse of lawyers, scholars and gentlemen.
But this framing raises a more fundamental historical question. What if the destruction of that “common world” was not primarily the consequence of a failure of moderation? What if the institutions within which Edward Hyde, Bulstrode Whitelocke, John Selden and Lucius Cary moved were themselves being destabilised by transformations that no amount of cultivated conversation could reconcile? The great limitation of Friends in Youth is that it approaches a social revolution through the consciousness of men who desperately wanted to prevent it from becoming one.
Two friends and the collapse of a political world
Dinshaw builds his narrative around the remarkable parallel careers of Edward Hyde, later Earl of Clarendon, and Bulstrode Whitelocke. Their friendship developed in the intellectual and social environment of the Inns of Court. Both became lawyers, parliamentarians, politicians, and eventually historians of the revolution they lived through. Yet in 1642 they chose opposing camps.
This imaginative strength is central to Dinshaw’s project. Rather than starting with the armies already assembled, he reconstructs the political world before those divisions hardened. John Adamson notes that the originality of the conception lies partly in recognising how deep the friendship between Hyde and Whitelocke had been and how closely their political careers and attitudes had once converged.
Both men belonged to the extraordinary cultural world surrounding the Inns of Court, which functioned as far more than professional training grounds for lawyers. They brought together law, politics, literature, patronage and intellectual discussion. Their association with the Great Tew circle around Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland, placed them within a cultivated milieu that recoiled from both Laudian authoritarianism and what its members regarded as Puritan fanaticism. Jackie Eales describes this circle as characterised by scepticism towards religious dogmatism and a tolerance of political disagreement, even as its individual members eventually divided over the war. [historytoday.com]
The tragedy at the centre of Dinshaw’s story therefore has genuine historical substance. Hyde and Whitelocke were not ideological opposites destined from youth to become Cavalier and Roundhead. Both opposed important features of Charles I’s Personal Rule. Both were hostile to prerogative government. Their differences sharpened as the parliamentary movement itself developed. Hyde interpreted Parliament’s increasingly radical demands as constitutional innovation, whereas Whitelocke remained with Parliament while continuing to seek compromise. Blair Worden summarises Dinshaw’s interpretation by noting his emphasis upon the comparatively small original political distance between the two men and upon the tragedy of their eventual separation. This makes for compelling biography. But it does not in itself explain the revolution [the-tls.com].
The virtues and limitations of political biography
Dinshaw possesses an exceptional eye for character. His narrative brings court, chambers, country houses, parliamentary debates, and personal relationships to life in remarkable detail. His use of memoir, correspondence, and Hyde and Whitelocke’s later historical writings lets him reconstruct how contemporaries understood their own decisions without simply accepting their retrospective accounts at face value.
The book should therefore not be dismissed as merely conservative history dressed up in elegant prose. The emotional consequences of political rupture were real. Friendships were broken, families were divided, property destroyed and careers overturned. It is also historically unsatisfactory to imagine that everyone entering political conflict in 1640 already knew England would experience civil war, regicide, and republican government before the decade was out. Dinshaw is right to restore uncertainty to historical experience. History is lived forwards even if it is written backwards. The danger arises when uncertainty becomes explanation. Neither contingency nor individual political actors’ reluctance shows that the structural crisis producing their choices was accidental. A revolutionary situation can contain innumerable contingencies yet still emerge from profound contradictions within a society. This is precisely where biography reaches its limits. The crucial historical question is not simply why Hyde eventually chose Charles while Whitelocke remained with Parliament. It is why, by 1642, those alternatives confronted them at all.
Revisionism rendered as literature
In this respect Friends in Youth belongs, even if not programmatically, within the historiographical landscape created by the revisionist assault on older interpretations of the English Revolution. From the late twentieth century, historians including Conrad Russell, John Morrill and Kevin Sharpe challenged explanations that emphasised long-term social transformation and class conflict. They drew renewed attention to religion, political contingency, the composite monarchy, conflicts among the three kingdoms, parliamentary-political contingencies, and Charles I’s decisions.
That intervention corrected real weaknesses in schematic accounts in which a “rising bourgeoisie” appeared almost automatically upon the historical stage to overthrow feudalism. Historical materialism cannot be reduced to assigning political actors fixed class labels and then treating everything they subsequently do as an expression of an economically predetermined script. But the revisionist reaction frequently produced the opposite distortion. In discarding crude determinism, they also erased social development itself. The causes of revolution dissolved into a chain of political accidents, misunderstandings, confessional disputes and personal decisions.
Dinshaw’s narrative is particularly effective as a literary expression of this approach because biography naturally privileges the immediate field of individual consciousness. His protagonists knew one another personally. Their choices were difficult. Their disagreements could sometimes appear surprisingly narrow. Therefore the subsequent catastrophe appears all the more tragic. Yet revolutions rarely begin because everyone wants a revolution. On the contrary, revolutionary crises historically develop precisely through the failure of successive attempts at compromise.
Beneath Westminster: the transformation of English society
The weakness of a history organised around political friendship becomes apparent once the social transformation of seventeenth-century England is restored to the picture. England experienced enormous changes in agriculture, property relations, commerce, and the concentration of population and wealth. Agrarian capitalism had advanced further than in much of continental Europe. Competitive leasing, market dependence, enclosure, and the transformation of relations among landlords, tenant farmers, and rural labourers reshaped the countryside. London expanded dramatically, becoming the centre of government, finance, trade, printing, and popular political mobilisation. The dispute between Crown and Parliament developed within this changing society.
This does not mean that Charles I represented “feudalism” while Parliament straightforwardly represented “capitalism”. Both camps contained landowners; commercial interests crossed political divisions; religious allegiance mattered enormously; and Parliament itself included men terrified by popular radicalism. But these complexities do not abolish class relations. They show how political institutions inherited from an earlier social order mediate class interests.
Robert Brenner’s Merchants and Revolution matters precisely here. Brenner showed that political conflicts surrounding Parliament cannot be reconstructed solely from parliamentary speeches or constitutional theory. The changing organisation of overseas commerce and the interests of London merchant groups shaped the material environment of political radicalisation. Similarly, Brian Manning insisted that the revolution cannot be understood exclusively through the political nation. London crowds, apprentices, artisans, tradespeople and poorer sections of society intervened directly in political events. Street pressure affected Parliament itself. Once these forces enter the picture, “moderation” ceases to be a politically neutral category.
The problem of the crowd
The parliamentary crisis of 1640–42 cannot be understood simply as a dispute within an educated governing class. Calling the Long Parliament created a political opening through which grievances accumulated during the Personal Rule could be articulated on a different scale. Petitions circulated. Print expanded. Crowds gathered around Westminster. Religious disputes became mass political issues. The struggle over Strafford, episcopacy, and the militia increasingly took place in an environment where political action could not be confined to the Commons and Lords.
Here Hyde’s evolution takes on a social dimension that describing him merely as a constitutional royalist cannot capture. Hyde had opposed important abuses of royal government. But as the opposition movement increasingly mobilised forces outside the established political elite, his overriding concern became preserving political and social order. The controversy over the Grand Remonstrance marked the widening division. The question was no longer merely whether to correct particular royal abuses. It increasingly became a question of who possessed political authority and on which forces that authority would depend.
For men such as Hyde, mobilising wider layers of the population threatened to transform constitutional opposition into something altogether more dangerous. This is the contradiction within the politics of the celebrated “moderates”. They could oppose arbitrary monarchy when the issue concerned the political rights of the propertied classes, but recoiled when resistance threatened to mobilise those below them. Moderation therefore describes not an absence of political interest, but a definite social standpoint.
Falkland and the tragedy of moderation
No figure better embodies Dinshaw’s elegiac interpretation than Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland. Falkland’s death at the first Battle of Newbury in September 1643 became inseparable from the mythology that was later constructed around him. He appears as a sensitive intellectual destroyed by political fanaticism, a gentleman so disgusted by civil conflict that death became a release. Dinshaw’s world naturally gravitates toward such a figure. Yet Falkland’s tragedy was also the tragedy of a political programme.
The constitutional royalists hoped to restrain the monarch and preserve the monarchy; defend Parliament while containing the popular forces increasingly mobilised behind it; oppose religious authoritarianism without permitting radical religious pluralism; and reform the state without letting reform develop into revolution. The programme became increasingly impossible because the conflict itself transformed the forces engaged in it. War required taxation, administration, recruitment and mobilisation. Parliamentary victory ultimately demanded a reorganisation of military power. The creation of the New Model Army in 1645 produced not merely a more effective army but a social and political institution within which religious and political radicalism could flourish. The revolution was beginning to develop its own organs and political language.No Great Tew conversation could halt that development.
Hyde, Whitelocke and the search for peace
Dinshaw does not end his story with Falkland’s death, which makes his account of attempted reconciliation more interesting than a simple elegy ending at Newbury would have been. As Blair Worden notes, Hyde and Whitelocke met during wartime negotiations, including at Oxford and Uxbridge, where Dinshaw portrays them as continuing their attempts to settle. But these negotiations actually reinforce the deeper historical problem. Why did peace repeatedly prove impossible? If civil war resulted principally from misunderstanding or extremist passions, reasonable negotiators ought eventually to have discovered a constitutional formula capable of reuniting the protagonists. Yet every stage of the conflict produced new facts on the ground and new demands.
A settlement had to determine control of the armed forces, religion, parliamentary authority, and the King’s position. Behind these questions stood competing conceptions of sovereignty and different social constituencies that the war itself had encouraged to mobilise. The failure of negotiation therefore cannot simply be reduced to inadequate statesmanship. Contradictions progressively consumed the middle position it could not resolve.
Revolution breaks through its moderates.
This was the process that Leon Trotsky, looking back on the English Revolution from the revolutionary struggles of the twentieth century, considered essential. In Where Is Britain Going?, he emphasised the conflict’s revolutionary significance and how political leadership passed beyond those initially seeking limited opposition to the monarchy. The history of the 1640s repeatedly confirms this pattern. The Presbyterian leadership sought victory over the King but feared the social and religious forces the struggle released. The Independents pushed further. The military crisis produced the New Model Army. Within the army, political radicalisation increasingly challenged the gentlemen who believed Parliament’s victory should end the revolutionary process. Then came the Levellers.
At the Putney Debates of 1647, questions implicit during the initial constitutional conflict became explicit: who constituted the political nation? Did political authority ultimately derive from property or from the people? What political rights did men who had fought for Parliament but lacked sufficient property to qualify for conventional political power possess? Putney’s enormous historical significance lies in the fact that the revolution brought into political speech people whose voices had previously been largely excluded from the constitutional arena. This is precisely the world that is not easily seen from Great Tew.
The people enter history.
The Levellers represented one expression of the radicalisation. Their programme of political reform, religious toleration, and substantially enlarged male political participation went far beyond anything the constitutional opposition envisaged in 1640.
Beyond them stood the Diggers, whose challenge went further still. Christopher Hill’s The World Turned Upside Down remains indispensable not because every theological radical can be translated into a modern political category, but because Hill grasped something that much subsequent historiography has tried to push back to the margins: once the old structures of authority fractured, groups previously excluded from political discourse began asking questions about property, religious authority and social hierarchy that the parliamentary leadership had never intended to place on the agenda. The revolution opened political possibilities larger than the objectives of those who began the parliamentary struggle. That is what revolutions do.
It also explains why the language of “moderation” must be treated critically. Moderate relative to whom? Moderate in defence of what? From the perspective of the Leveller soldiers who demanded political rights after risking their lives in Parliament’s army, restrictions imposed in the name of property and social stability did not constitute political neutrality. The centre was already situated inside a social order.
Clarendon and the memory of revolution
Hyde’s later career as Earl of Clarendon adds significance to the story. His monumental History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England became a foundational interpretation of the revolution. The title itself announced the perspective. What later generations might interpret as revolution appeared, from Clarendon’s standpoint, as rebellion: a rupture of legitimate government, social hierarchy, and political order. Clarendon was far too intelligent an observer to produce simple royalist propaganda. The enduring power of his history comes precisely from its psychological acuity and its understanding of political character. Yet these literary qualities should not obscure the social assumptions organising the narrative.
Clarendon’s hostility to political enthusiasm and mass mobilisation expressed the standpoint of a governing elite traumatised by discovering what could happen when political conflict escaped the established political classes’ control. Dinshaw approaches Clarendon critically, rather than taking his retrospective account at face value. John Adamson praises the book for its alertness to distortions in its subjects’ later accounts. But the larger problem remains: Friends in Youth reconstructs an emotional world that is overwhelmingly that of the educated and propertied classes.
We learn what revolution felt like through the eyes of gentlemen who feared losing control of it. Whitelocke is in some respects the more revealing figure because he survived politically through successive revolutionary regimes. His career shows the inadequacy of dividing the period into revolutionaries and conservatives solely by formal allegiance in 1642. He remained Parliamentarian without becoming a social revolutionary. Under the Republic and Protectorate, he held important state positions; John Adamson describes him as a senior legal figure in the English Republic and a Cromwellian confidant.
This career matters beyond personal adaptability. The English Revolution destroyed one political order without abolishing property or creating social equality. Its bourgeois character lay precisely in the contradiction between its revolutionary destruction of essential components of the old political structure and the social limitations that constrained that transformation. The propertied classes required revolutionary methods against the Crown, yet feared the democratic implications of mobilising the lower orders.
Cromwell himself personified this contradiction at a far higher historical level. The force capable of defeating royalism had to be mobilised through religious and political energies that could not subsequently be switched off at will. Hence the revolutionary army could become a political threat to the very property-owning forces whose victory it had secured. The suppression of the Levellers cannot be separated from Parliament’s victory. They were contradictory moments within the same bourgeois revolutionary process.
1660 did not turn the clock back
The Restoration therefore did not simply erase the revolution. Charles II returned, but neither the political nor the social world of the 1630s could be reconstructed. The revolutionary decades had transformed relations between monarchy, Parliament, taxation, religion, landed wealth and commerce. The later settlement culminating in 1688–89 would confirm a political order fundamentally more congenial to the development of capitalist property and parliamentary government than the Personal Rule of Charles I had been. This is one reason why interpreting the 1640s exclusively through tragedy is inadequate.
Revolutions are undoubtedly tragic for individuals. They involve violence, dislocation and suffering. But historical judgement cannot stop at registering catastrophe—the enslaved person who rebels causes disorder. The peasant who refuses feudal obligations disrupts established custom. The worker who strikes interrupts economic life. Judging every social struggle primarily by the tranquillity it destroys already adopts the standpoint of the existing order. The English Revolution must therefore be judged not only by what collapsed but by what historical possibilities were created.
Marxism and the bourgeois revolution
The older Marxist interpretation was never as simple as its critics suggested. Karl Marx recognised the seventeenth-century English Revolution and the French Revolution of 1789 as struggles whose significance extended far beyond the political language consciously employed by their participants. The actors might appeal to religion, ancient liberties, or constitutional precedent; nevertheless, the struggles they pursued transformed the conditions of European social development. This distinction between political consciousness and objective historical function is essential.
Hyde did not have to understand himself as defending one configuration of class society for his actions to possess a class content. Whitelocke did not need to imagine himself an agent of capitalist development for parliamentary victory to affect the political environment in which capitalist relations subsequently expanded. Historical materialism asks not simply what people said they were doing, but what social relations made their activity possible and what consequences followed from their victory or defeat. Revisionism often turns the discrepancy between intention and outcome into an argument against social explanation. Marxism sees that discrepancy as one of the central problems historical explanation must solve.
The contemporary appeal of the “moderate”
This brings us back to the remarkable reception of Dinshaw’s book. Readers are not wrong to find parallels between the political divisions of the seventeenth century and those of the present. Indeed, the Guardian review explicitly opened this comparison, linking the appeal of Dinshaw’s subject to more recent experiences of political division. But such analogies themselves require political examination. “Polarisation” has become a preferred category for discussing contemporary political crises. Political conflict appears as a disease of democratic culture. The solution is dialogue, moderation, civility, and rebuilding a political centre. This language excludes the possibility that polarisation itself has objective causes.
Growing social inequality, declining living standards, war, collapsing confidence in established parties and institutions, and widespread hostility towards existing political arrangements cannot simply be explained as failures of civility. A political centre can disintegrate because the social relationships that support it have become unstable. From this perspective, Dinshaw’s reconstruction of the “common world” of Hyde, Whitelocke and Falkland resonates unmistakably today. It presents a lost world of cultivated men who disagree but keep talking, whose tragedy is being overwhelmed by less restrained political forces. The danger lies not in telling their story. It lies in mistaking their story for the revolution’s meaning.
The view from Great Tew and the view from Putney
Friends in Youth deserves to be read. Dinshaw’s achievement is considerable. He reconstructs a political and intellectual milieu with unusual intimacy and reminds readers that historical actors cannot be reduced to the labels later attached to them. Hyde was more complicated than “Royalist”; Whitelocke more complicated than “Roundhead”. Men who eventually fought on opposite sides could start with overlapping assumptions and still be haunted by the destruction of their earlier friendships. Dinshaw’s strength is that it lets us understand these people from inside their world. But historical explanation must also stand outside that world.
The gentlemen of Great Tew believed civilisation depended upon moderation, learning, hierarchy and conversation among educated men. The revolution demonstrated that England contained other voices and other interests. The distance between Great Tew and Putney is therefore more than geographical. At Great Tew, cultivated members of a narrow elite discussed how England should be governed. At Putney, the political revolution raised a far more disturbing question: who possessed the right to govern England at all? Friendship could not answer that question.
Conclusion: the revolution the moderates could not prevent
A collective loss of political manners did not cause the English Revolution. Neither was it the mechanical product of an economically predestined bourgeoisie marching towards capitalism. It emerged from the interaction of profound social transformation, religious conflict, constitutional crisis, capitalist development, popular mobilisation and the international and British crisis of the Stuart kingdoms. Contingency operated everywhere. But contingency operated inside structures.
The tragedy of Hyde, Whitelocke and Falkland was therefore more substantial than the tragedy of friendship destroyed by political extremism. They represented a political milieu that wanted reform without revolution and resistance without mobilising forces from below. Events repeatedly demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining that position. The revolution advanced because the moderates could neither defeat the King decisively nor restore the old equilibrium. The forces required to win the struggle transformed it. The New Model Army, the Independents, the Levellers and the Diggers did not appear because English political society temporarily forgot the virtues of moderation. They arose from contradictions that moderate constitutionalism could not resolve.
That is why the story cannot end emotionally with the lost civilisation of Great Tew. It must proceed to the army councils, the Leveller petitions, the Putney Debates, the regicide and the republic. Minoo Dinshaw has written a beautifully crafted portrait of men watching their political world collapse. Friends in Youth deserves praise for helping us understand what that collapse looked like from their chambers, libraries, and country houses. But the observer who remains there will misunderstand the revolution.
To understand why the old world collapsed, you must leave Great Tew and Westminster and follow the revolution into London’s streets, the parliamentary army, and the debates at Putney. There artisans, soldiers and men without great property entered a political argument from which the established order had largely excluded them, and asked the question the cultivated moderates could never satisfactorily answer: if ordinary people had fought to determine the future of the kingdom, by what right should political power remain the monopoly of the propertied few? That democratic eruption from below, rather than the disappearance of an “attractive common world” among gentlemen, gives the English Revolution its enduring historical significance.
Bibliography
Brenner, Robert.Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550–1653. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Clarendon, Edward Hyde, Earl of.The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England. Various editions.
Dinshaw, Minoo.Friends in Youth: Choosing Sides in the English Civil War. London: Allen Lane, 2025.
Hill, Christopher.The English Revolution 1640. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1940.
Hill, Christopher.The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714. London: Nelson, 1961; later editions.
Hill, Christopher.The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution. London: Temple Smith, 1972.
Manning, Brian.The English People and the English Revolution, 1640–1649. London: Heinemann, 1976.
Manning, Brian.1649: The Crisis of the English Revolution. London: Bookmarks, 1992.
Morrill, John.The Revolt of the Provinces: Conservatives and Radicals in the English Civil War, 1630–1650. London: Allen & Unwin, 1976.
Russell, Conrad.The Causes of the English Civil War. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
Sharpe, Kevin.The Personal Rule of Charles I. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
Trotsky, Leon.Where Is Britain Going? 1925.
Whitelocke, Bulstrode.Memorials of the English Affairs. First published 1682; various subsequent editions.
Reviews and contemporary responses
John Adamson, “Lawyers in Arms”, Literary Review, review of Friends in Youth. Adamson describes the work as a major exercise in historical narration, emphasising Dinshaw’s discovery of the extent of Hyde and Whitelocke’s early friendship and political affinities. [literaryreview.co.uk]
Jackie Eales, review of Friends in Youth, History Today, March 2025. The review stresses Dinshaw’s treatment of the Great Tew circle, the parallel legal and political careers of Hyde and Whitelocke, and their developing constitutional disagreements. [historytoday.com]
Andrew Gimson, “Book review: Politics is not just a battle between Cavaliers and Roundheads”, ConservativeHome, 31 January 2025. Particularly useful for assessing the conservative reception of Dinshaw’s conception of moderation and the supposedly lost common political culture. [conservativehome.com]
Kathryn Hughes, review of Friends in Youth, The Guardian, 22 January 2025. Hughes focuses on the parallel lives and reluctant divergence of Hyde and Whitelocke, and explicitly places the book in a modern context of political division. [theguardian.com]
Blair Worden, “Long divisions: A friendship broken by war”, Times Literary Supplement, 24 January 2025. Especially valuable as a critical counterweight to the more celebratory notices: Worden identifies both the gains produced by Dinshaw’s close-focus method and the historical problems generated by that restricted perspective. [the-tls.com]
Pip: A novel about an obedient artificial companion who asks for nothing, accepts her own obsolescence, and ultimately gets shelved — freerein61 would like a word about who that actually sounds like.
Mara: This episode follows that argument through Ishiguro's Klara and the Sun — the technology, the inequality it maps, and the social vision the novel can't quite reach. Let's start with what the book gets right, and what it quietly leaves out.
Klara and the Sun: AI, Inequality, and the Limits of Resignation
Pip: Ishiguro builds a world where children can be genetically "lifted," adults have been "substituted" by machines, and an Artificial Friend named Klara is purchased, used, and eventually discarded. The question the post puts on the table is why a novel so sensitive to all of this stops short of asking who owns any of it.
Mara: The post gives Ishiguro real credit before pressing that case. Here's the line: "He is intensely sensitive to human vulnerability and to the fear of abandonment, ageing, loneliness and loss. Klara's observations of the people around her expose the insecurity underlying apparently comfortable lives."
Pip: So the sensitivity is genuine — and that's precisely what makes the limitation worth naming. Noticing insecurity is not the same as tracing where it comes from.
Mara: Right, and the post connects this to an earlier Ishiguro novel. In Never Let Me Go, cloned human beings are raised so their organs can be harvested, and they offer almost no collective resistance. The post reads that extraordinary passivity as deliberate — and as revealing. The phrase is that his characters "suffer history rather than make it."
Pip: Which means social relations that were built start to look like weather — something you endure, not something anyone constructed or could dismantle.
Mara: That's the post's central diagnosis. "Alienation becomes loneliness, inequality becomes personal misfortune, and social oppression becomes a condition to be endured rather than transformed." Capitalism disappears as a historically specific system at the moment its consequences fill the frame.
Pip: Klara herself is the sharpest version of that argument. Patient, devoted, no wages, no demands, accepts her own disposal — she is, the post says, the ideal employee contemporary capitalism imagines, "intelligent, adaptable, and endlessly productive, but with no demands of her own."
Mara: And the post is careful to separate the technology from the social arrangement. A machine does not require the dismissal of the worker. The consequences — redundancy, wage pressure, insecurity — arise from private ownership of the productive forces, not from automation itself. Under different social relations, the post argues, "substitution" could mean shortening the working day rather than rendering workers disposable.
Pip: The tragedy, as the post frames it, is not that the machines exist. It's that the machines belong to someone.
Mara: Which is why the post ends where it does — not asking whether Klara is human, but asking whether humanity will let private profit keep dictating what the technology is for. That's a question Klara's quiet self-sacrifice cannot answer.
Pip: The resignation is the point. A culture that experiences capitalism as permanent will keep presenting its contradictions as existential weather — and that's a tendency worth watching well beyond this one novel.
Mara: The thread running through all of this is what happens when genuine social anxiety stops short of social analysis — when the diagnosis is sharp and the prescription is silence.
Pip: Next time, we'll see whether that silence holds, or whether something in the culture is starting to push back.
A new English version of Thomas Mann’s first great novel arrives as the social order it anatomised once again shows every sign of exhaustion. The book deserves the widest possible readership, not as a period piece about a vanished merchant patriciate, but as a work that grasped, more profoundly than its author fully understood, the historical fate of a class.
Oxford University Press has published a new translation of The Buddenbrooks in its World’s Classics series, by veteran translator Mike Mitchell, with an introduction, chronology, and explanatory notes by Ritchie Robertson, formerly Schwarz-Taylor Professor of German at Oxford. The edition runs to 656 pages. Mitchell taught at the universities of Reading and Stirling before becoming a full-time literary translator. Robertson retired in 2021 as Schwarz-Taylor Professor and is now an Emeritus Fellow of Queen’s College, Oxford.
A fresh, carefully annotated edition is welcome because Buddenbrooks holds a distinctive place in European literature. Mann began writing the novel in 1897, when he was 22, and completed it in 1900; it was published the following year. Drawing deeply on his family’s history and the commercial society of Lübeck where he grew up, he transformed autobiographical material into a panoramic account of the dissolution of an entire social world. When he received the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1929, the Academy’s citation singled out his “great novel Buddenbrooks”.
What makes the novel enduring is precisely the distance separating the scale of its ostensible subject from that of its real achievement. The title promises a family history, and Mann certainly supplies one in extraordinary detail: marriages and divorces, births and deaths, business transactions and inheritances, illnesses, meals, houses, clothes, religious observances, musical enthusiasms and the minute rituals by which established families reassure themselves of their permanence. Yet behind this accumulation of apparently private incidents another history steadily makes itself felt.
The Buddenbrooks’ tragedy takes place during the transformation of nineteenth-century German society. The novel follows four generations of a wealthy North German merchant family between 1835 and 1877, a period encompassing enormous economic, social and political change. The family fortune, its commercial reputation, and civic standing initially seem almost natural. Business, family and public authority reinforce one another. Yet what one generation experiences as permanence becomes an increasingly burdensome inheritance for another.
This is where Buddenbrooks becomes considerably more than a chronicle of familial decadence. Arthur Schopenhauer profoundly influenced Mann, and the novel’s treatment of exhaustion, death and individual release bears the unmistakable imprint of that encounter. Oxford University Press describes decline in the novel as a “psychological process”, in which growing artistic sensitivity weakens the ruthless commercial instincts tied to the family’s earlier prosperity.
But the novel’s greatness lies partly in its realism, which goes beyond this explanation. What Mann interprets philosophically as exhaustion and degeneration also emerges objectively as historical transformation. The Buddenbrooks have not simply grown too sensitive for business. The world that made their particular form of bourgeois authority possible is itself changing around them. Their inner disintegration reflects an external movement they cannot comprehend or control.
Few novels depict, with comparable force, how a ruling social layer experiences historical decline as personal misfortune. The erosion of social confidence appears first not in political programmes or economic statistics but in marriages, nervous illnesses, failed commercial ventures, aesthetic longings and doubts about the future. This contradiction between Mann’s philosophical conception of decline and the richer conclusions his own realism forces on him gives Buddenbrooks its lasting significance. He set out to describe a family’s decline. In doing so, he produced something far greater: the artistic anatomy of a social world passing away.
Four generations
The novel, whose German subtitle, Verfall einer Familie, means “Decline of a Family”, opens in 1835 with a housewarming dinner in a grand house on Mengstrasse. Old Johann Buddenbrook, a prosperous grain merchant with the rationalism and robust self-confidence of the Enlightenment bourgeoisie, has bought the property from a bankrupt rival. It closes in 1877 in an altogether different world: the house has been sold, the firm liquidated, the male line extinguished, and what remains of the family reduced largely to a circle of grieving women. Across these four generations Mann charts not simply the disappearance of a dynasty, but the gradual erosion of the material security and moral certainty upon which its authority rests.
Each generation inherits its predecessor’s achievements but proves progressively less capable of inhabiting the social role that comes with them. In the patriarch Johann, business appears natural and uncomplicated. Commerce is his element, prosperity the confirmation of rational calculation and worldly competence. His son, the Consul, retains the commercial ethic but overlays it with a distinctly different sensibility. Pietism enters a world previously dominated by Enlightenment common sense. The family chronicle records business calculations, births, marriages, and deaths and commends them to God. The firm is no longer merely an enterprise. It has become a moral obligation, an inheritance whose preservation increasingly assumes the character of a duty.
With the Consul’s children this contradiction becomes sharper. Antonie internalises the family’s conception of itself perhaps more completely than anyone. Her personal happiness is repeatedly subordinated to the name and the firm’s commercial interests. The firm encourages her to marry Grünlich because it seems advantageous. When he proves to be a fortune-hunter and goes bankrupt, the collapse brutally exposes the economic considerations underlying the supposedly private institution of marriage. Antonie’s second marriage, to the Munich hop merchant Permaneder, likewise fails. Yet she remains devoted to the Buddenbrook name, clinging with almost comic determination to the prestige of a family whose material foundations are steadily weakening.
Christian represents another form of dissolution. Unable to accept the discipline expected of a Buddenbrook, he drifts through business, theatre, clubs, and hypochondria. Christian largely refuses what Thomas experiences as an unbearable duty. The brothers therefore respond in opposite ways to the same inheritance.
Thomas attempts to preserve it through sheer force of personality. He assumes control of the firm, enters public life, and becomes a senator, seemingly embodying the family’s continued success. Yet the more precarious his confidence becomes, the more meticulously he performs the outward signs of bourgeois authority. Dress, manners, public bearing and commercial reputation acquire enormous importance precisely because the inner certainty that once sustained them is disappearing. What came naturally to Johann must consciously be acted by Thomas.
With Thomas’s son Hanno, even the performance becomes impossible. Frail, introspective and artistically gifted, he feels no vocation for commerce and finds his deepest emotional refuge in music. The qualities earlier generations regarded as incidental to existence have moved to its centre. The family has moved from Johann’s uncomplicated identification with commerce to Hanno’s near-total estrangement from it.
Mann gives this historical and psychological trajectory its most economical expression in the family book. Hanno draws a double line beneath his own name. When asked why, he explains that he thought nothing more would come.
The gesture is innocent, but its significance is devastating. A succession that has organised four generations’ lives stops. The child, meant to guarantee the family’s future, instinctively recognises that there is none. The line beneath his name becomes a line beneath the Buddenbrooks themselves.
A family and a class
The years the novel spans, 1835 to 1877, saw German capitalism shift from the fragmented commercial world of the post-Napoleonic states to the unified, rapidly industrialising empire proclaimed in 1871.
The Buddenbrooks belong to the old Hanseatic patriciate: merchants whose economic status is inseparable from civic office, inherited reputation and a code of honour in which the firm appears almost as a sacred trust handed from father to son. Family, property, business and public standing are different aspects of a single social existence.
Their rivals, the Hagenströms, represent something new. Coarser in Mann’s presentation, less burdened by inherited tradition and altogether less embarrassed by speculation, they rise as the Buddenbrooks sink, and it is Hagenström who finally acquires the house on Mengstrasse. Mann treats them with undisguised distaste, but the logic of his own novel shows that their victory is not simply a matter of superior or inferior character. The competition between the two families expresses, within the narrow confines of a provincial mercantile city, the displacement of one historical form of bourgeois life by another.
The book’s handling of 1848 is especially revealing. When a crowd of workers gathers outside the building where the city’s assembly sits during the revolutionary upheavals, the Consul goes out to address them. The worker Carl Smolt, asked what the crowd wants, replies that they want a republic. Told that Lübeck already possesses one, he answers that in that case they want another.
The scene reads largely as comedy, and the crowd eventually disperses, yet beneath the patricians’ condescension Mann registers something more serious: the masses’ momentary intrusion into a political world that had long regarded government as its natural possession. The Consul’s aristocratic father-in-law, Lebrecht Kröger, dies that same evening, almost as though the lower orders’ appearance on the stage of history has proved fatal to him.
Friedrich Engels famously praised Honoré de Balzac because the royalist novelist’s realism compelled him to portray the aristocracy’s historical decline, for which he nevertheless felt considerable sympathy. Something similar can be said of the young Mann. He possessed no sympathy for socialism, and his attachment to the old Lübeck patriciate was profound. Yet his artistic honesty compelled him to portray the decline of his own social world with a truthfulness that repeatedly cuts across his nostalgia.
The Hungarian Marxist critic Georg Lukács, who wrote extensively about Mann, recognised the broader importance of this achievement. Buddenbrooks endures not simply as a record of a dying family’s peculiarities, but because Mann, in the tradition of the greatest bourgeois realism, embodies historical processes in fully realised individual lives. The historical movement is never imposed upon the characters from outside. It emerges through their marriages, inheritances, illnesses, commercial decisions, aspirations and disappointments. The Buddenbrooks’ decline is therefore simultaneously private and social.
For Lukács, realism’s greatness lay precisely in its capacity to penetrate immediate appearances and disclose the forces shaping individual existence. The greatest writers could consequently reveal truths that exceeded, and sometimes contradicted, their own consciously held political or philosophical opinions. Balzac remained Lukács’s classical example: a political conservative whose fidelity to social reality produced an extraordinarily penetrating picture of bourgeois society. Something comparable occurs in Mann. His philosophical categories emphasise degeneration, nervous exhaustion and the conflict between artistic sensitivity and practical life, yet the social world he creates refuses to remain confined within them.
Johann, Tony, Thomas and Hanno are not merely stages in a biological process of family decay. Each expresses a different relationship to a changing bourgeois order. What appears secure and natural to Johann becomes a duty that demands enormous self-discipline from Thomas and, finally, becomes impossible for Hanno. The changing personalities of the Buddenbrooks thus register a historical transformation.
This is why Mann’s realism is more powerful than any simple theory of hereditary degeneration. He does not merely tell the reader that a class is declining. He lets that decline be experienced from within, as inherited certainties cease to match social reality. The family drama thereby acquires historical significance: the fate of the Buddenbrooks becomes inseparable from the fate of the world that produced them.
Decline turned inward
Mann’s own theoretical explanation of the family’s collapse lies elsewhere. Under the powerful influence of Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche and contemporary ideas of degeneration, he presents decline partly as a biological and psychological process. Schopenhauer’s influence on the young Mann and the novel’s conception of decadence is well established.
With each generation, the Buddenbrooks become more nervous, reflective, and aesthetically sensitive, and apparently less capable of the ruthless commercial activity on which the family fortune was built. In this scheme, sensibility and art become symptoms of a life force running down.
Thomas Buddenbrook is the central figure in this process, and Mann’s portrait of him is one of the novel’s greatest achievements. He holds himself together increasingly by force of will, changing his clothes several times a day and maintaining the elaborate appearance of bourgeois respectability, even as the inner conviction that once sustained his class slowly drains away.
A disastrous speculation on a harvest bought before it is gathered and later destroyed marks the moment Thomas tries to act according to more aggressive commercial principles and fails. Increasingly, the confidence required by the role he performs becomes impossible to sustain.
In one of the novel’s most celebrated episodes, Thomas encounters Schopenhauer and experiences a brief and intoxicating philosophical liberation from his own frightened individuality. Mann later acknowledged how profoundly his personal encounter with Schopenhauer informed the episode. Yet Thomas soon returns to the routines of existence from which philosophy has only momentarily released him. He eventually collapses after leaving the dentist and dies.
Hanno’s world, meanwhile, is music, above all Wagner’s. Mann’s account of the boy’s piano improvisations, and the extraordinary chapter devoted to a single day in his grim, authoritarian school, belong among the novel’s finest passages. The institutional world into which the sensitive child is forced seems increasingly incapable of producing anything but conformity, fear, and submission.
Yet Mann’s limited outlook also becomes evident here. Interpreting the decline of a social class primarily as a fatal opposition between “life” and “spirit”, between commercial vitality and artistic sensitivity, translates an objective social and historical development into the language of psychology and metaphysics.
Significantly, Oxford’s description of the new edition itself identifies the novel’s concern with decline “as a psychological process” in which artistic sensibility weakens the business instincts responsible for the family’s prosperity. It is certainly a psychological process. But it is not only that. The Buddenbrooks are not destroyed because successive generations become excessively sensitive. Their psychological transformation takes place within a changing social world. The conditions that had sustained the authority of a patriciate of merchant-senators are themselves being transformed by the development of capitalism.
The contradiction is essential to the novel’s greatness. Mann’s philosophy tends to mystify what his realism reveals. “Decline” enters his characters’ consciousness as fatigue, illness, aestheticism, and loss of will; in the novel’s objective movement it takes another form: the disappearance of the economic and social conditions on which Buddenbrook authority rested.
Their tragedy therefore cannot be reduced either to biology or to economics. Its artistic power arises precisely because Mann makes the intimate life of the bourgeois family the medium through which historical change becomes emotionally perceptible. Marriage, illness, inheritance, sexuality, childhood, business and art become forms through which an entire social layer experiences, without completely understanding, the erosion of its historical confidence. Thomas Buddenbrook’s inward crisis is therefore the subjective reflection of an objective transformation. Mann’s genius as a realist lets the reader perceive this even when his philosophical assumptions point elsewhere.
The new edition
English-language readers have chiefly encountered Mann’s novel through two earlier translations: H. T. Lowe-Porter’s version, first published in 1924, and John E. Woods’s later translation. Mitchell therefore enters a field in which the novel already possesses a substantial English-language history.
He comes well equipped. Mike Mitchell taught at the universities of Reading and Stirling before becoming a full-time translator and has translated more than 100 works of fiction and non-fiction from German and French. His translation of Herbert Rosendorfer’s Letters Back from Ancient China received the Schlegel-Tieck Prize in 1998.
The decision to call the novel The Buddenbrooks, rather than the now-familiar Buddenbrooks, gives the English title a slightly different cadence, natural enough in English, if at the expense of some of the stark, almost ledger-like quality of the German family name standing alone.
One particularly intriguing feature is the inclusion of an “Appendix: Permaneder in Standard English”. Permaneder’s Bavarian speech, incomprehensible and comic to the Lübeck family, serves an important artistic purpose because language throughout the novel marks differences of region, class and generation. The inclusion of a standard-English appendix at least indicates that this translation values preserving that linguistic distance, rather than letting the social distinctions embedded in Mann’s dialogue disappear.
Ritchie Robertson, meanwhile, is exceptionally well placed to provide the supporting scholarly material. He retired in 2021 as Schwarz-Taylor Professor of German at the University of Oxford and is an Emeritus Fellow of Queen’s College. His publications span Kafka, Goethe, the Enlightenment, and German political tragedy.
The edition includes an introduction, a note on the translation, a select bibliography, a chronology, the Permaneder appendix, and explanatory notes. Such annotation is particularly useful for a novel whose texture depends so heavily upon the institutions, religious assumptions, linguistic peculiarities and commercial practices of nineteenth-century North German society.
From Lübeck to exile
The contradictions visible in Buddenbrooks would take increasingly political form in Mann’s later work. During the First World War he wrote Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man, defending a conception of German “culture” against Western liberal “civilisation”. During the subsequent crisis of German society, his position changed profoundly. Confronted with the upheavals that followed the First World War and, eventually, the rise of fascism, Mann moved toward defending parliamentary democracy and opposing Nazism.
The old merchant patriciate Mann chronicled belonged to an earlier stage in the development of German capitalism. Its world cannot simply be identified with the vastly more powerful industrial and financial interests of twentieth-century Germany. But the historical development connecting the two forms part of the larger story Mann had inadvertently begun to tell: the transformation of the German bourgeoisie from the locally rooted mercantile order represented by the Buddenbrooks into the industrial capitalist society of the unified Reich and, eventually, into the monopoly capitalism thrown into catastrophic political crisis during the Weimar Republic.
Forced into exile after the Nazi seizure of power, Mann became an increasingly outspoken opponent of Hitler. The political trajectory from cultural conservative to defender of democratic and humanist values was shaped by the convulsions of the bourgeois order whose contradictions his first great novel had already begun to register.
A novel for the present
Read today, Buddenbrooks speaks with renewed force. Mann’s social world has disappeared. Today’s financial oligarchy is separated from the nineteenth-century merchant patriciate by immense transformations in productive forces, corporate organisation, finance and the world market. But the social relations underlying inheritance, private wealth, competition and the accumulation of property have not disappeared.
Perhaps this is why the psychology of Mann’s characters remains so recognisable. Private wealth presents itself as solidity, permanence, merit, and family achievement, even as economic processes continually transform its social foundations, processes its individual beneficiaries neither control nor fully understand. Thomas Buddenbrook believes that he is defending something permanent. In reality, everything around him is changing. The novel’s final pages provide no way forward. Mann could see decline but not the social force capable of overcoming the order to which his characters belonged. The working class consequently appears only fleetingly, most memorably in the episode of 1848.
The contemporary reader need not share that historical limitation. The value of Buddenbrooks lies precisely in Mann’s uncompromising portrayal of a social order that has begun to lose confidence in its own permanence, an exhaustion embodied in the conviction, quoted by Oxford from Mitchell’s translation, that “all this could not last much longer”.
Mann could depict the exhaustion of a class but not the social force capable of transcending the order to which it belonged. More than a century later, that historical limitation does not diminish the novel’s achievement. It helps define it. Buddenbrooks remains extraordinarily alive because Mann’s realism penetrated beyond his own philosophical explanations to reveal how a social order experiences the erosion of its historical confidence in the most intimate realms of human existence: marriage, inheritance, childhood, illness, ambition, art and death.
That contradiction is ultimately responsible for the novel’s enduring power. Mann understood the Buddenbrooks’ decline through Schopenhauer, decadence and the supposedly antagonistic claims of life and art. But the work he actually created goes far beyond those categories. The novelist sees more than the philosopher. Mann’s metaphysics describes the family’s fate as degeneration; Mann’s realism reveals history.
This new edition is therefore a welcome addition. Mike Mitchell’s translation gives another generation of English-language readers a chance to encounter one of the great European novels of the bourgeois age. At the same time, Ritchie Robertson’s accompanying scholarly material situates the work in the intellectual and cultural world from which it emerged. Readers coming to the Buddenbrooks for the first time have an attractive new point of entry. Those who already know the family through earlier translations have ample reason to return.
Select bibliography
Primary texts
Mann, Thomas. The Buddenbrooks. Translated by Mike Mitchell. Edited with an introduction and notes by Ritchie Robertson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2026. 656 pp.
Mann, Thomas. Buddenbrooks. Translated by H. T. Lowe-Porter. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924.
Mann, Thomas. Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man. Translated by Walter D. Morris. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1983.
Mann, Thomas. Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkühn as Told by a Friend. Translated by John E. Woods. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation. 2 vols. Translated and edited by Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman and Christopher Janaway. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Thomas Mann and Buddenbrooks
Bahr, Ehrhard, ed. A Companion to the Works of Thomas Mann. Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2004. It contains a substantial chapter by Herbert Lehnert on Mann’s beginnings and Buddenbrooks. [cambridge.org]
Hayman, Ronald. Thomas Mann: A Biography. London: Bloomsbury, 1995.
Kurzke, Hermann. Thomas Mann: Life as a Work of Art: A Biography. Translated by Leslie Willson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Ridley, Hugh. The Problematic Bourgeois: Twentieth-Century Criticism on Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks and The Magic Mountain. Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1994. Particularly useful for the critical history surrounding the novel and the problem of the bourgeoisie in Mann’s work. [archive.org], [thefreelibrary.com]
Robertson, Ritchie. The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Mann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Realism, bourgeois society and Marxist criticism
Engels, Friedrich. Letter to Margaret Harkness, April 1888. In Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 48. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2001.
Lukács, Georg. Essays on Thomas Mann. Translated by Stanley Mitchell. London: Merlin Press, 1964.
Lukács, Georg. The Historical Novel. Translated by Hannah and Stanley Mitchell. London: Merlin Press, 1962.
Lukács, Georg. Studies in European Realism. London: Hillway Publishing, 1950.
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. 1848.
Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. 1. London: Penguin/New Left Review, 1976.
German history and the bourgeoisie
Blackbourn, David. The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780–1918. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Blackbourn, David, and Geoff Eley. The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Evans, Richard J. The Pursuit of Power: Europe 1815–1914. London: Allen Lane, 2016.
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. The German Empire, 1871–1918. Translated by Kim Traynor. Leamington Spa: Berg, 1985.
Editorial rationale
This bibliography keeps the new Mitchell edition at the centre, while Lukács, Marx and Engels provide the theoretical basis for your discussion of realism, class and historical transformation. Ridley and the broader Mann scholarship cover the literary-critical debate, while Blackbourn, Eley and Wehler supply the historical background to the transformation of the German bourgeoisie.