The Social History of Eviction and the Political Bankruptcy of Reformism

Eviction as a Window into the Class Nature of Society

The eviction of seventy households—including pensioners, disabled residents, and low-income families—from a working-class estate, as detailed in Jessica Fields’ book Eviction: A Social History of Rent, exemplifies a broader pattern in British capitalism. It highlights that heritage rights do not take precedence over property rights, and community bonds do not outweigh financial interests. These two statements clearly summarise the core rationale behind eviction policies and their role in the political economy.

This article doesn’t merely recount families’ suffering. Instead, it places that suffering within the broader context of capitalist urban growth, the decline of Labourism, and Engels’ ideas in The Housing Question. Evictions serve as a lens through which the working class can examine the system they oppose and identify the political steps necessary to dismantle it.

The Social History of Rent: From Industrial Slums to Financialised Landlordism

In 1872, Engels challenged the Proudhonists, who believed that rent-to-buy schemes could resolve the housing crisis. He emphasised that the housing shortage is not merely due to poor policies but is an inherent aspect of capitalism. Capitalism requires concentrating labour in cities, which inflates land prices, results in overcrowding, and causes periodic population displacement. The bourgeoisie “resolves” these issues by demolishing working-class housing and relocating workers outward. The destruction of council estates exemplifies this ongoing process.

Following the Second World War, municipal housing initiatives somewhat diluted Engels’ idea. However, these were not socialist endeavours; rather, they were concessions obtained by a militant working class during the expansion of capitalism. Housing remained a commodity, as councils built homes without challenging private land ownership. The core contradiction remained, only shifting to different aspects.

After 2008, the conflict intensified dramatically. Housing became a global financial asset, attracting heavy investments from private equity firms, REITs, offshore entities, and pension funds. Landlords shifted from individual owners to financial institutions, turning rent into a securitised income. Evictions began to serve as a means of capital growth.

Councils like the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) are subject to this trend. While the extent of malice within councils like RBKC is uncertain, they are now integrated into a global system of financialised landlordism. The council’s plans to demolish estates and replace them with developments for the private rental market are not merely local issues but reflect a broader, historic global pattern.

Financialised Landlordism: The Globalisation of Rent and the New Mechanisms of Capital Accumulation

Evictions from council estates reflect more than just the actions of a social landlord. They signify a new phase in capitalism’s evolution: financialised landlordism, where housing shifts from being mainly a home to serving as a financial asset, facilitating the flow and increase of capital.

Tracking the evolution of financialised landlordism from the 1970s crisis through the neoliberal counter-revolution, the decline of social democracy, and the post-2008 transformation of global capitalism reveals that eviction, demolition, and displacement are not anomalies but essential tools for capital accumulation in this era. The post-war economic boom depended on industrial production, rising wages, and regulated finance. However, by the late 1960s, this model faced a crisis: profit margins dropped, inflation surged, and labor unrest increased, prompting capital to seek new ways to accumulate wealth. The neoliberal shift dismantled the post-war regulatory system—liberalising finance, increasing capital mobility, weakening the welfare state, and opening housing, once protected by municipal regulation, to market forces.

The Thatcher government’s “Right to Buy” was more than just a policy; it represented a fundamental shift. It shifted millions of homes from public to private ownership, established a new petty-bourgeois class of homeowners, reduced municipal housing stock, and set the stage for land commodification. Labour governments continued this trend, with councils demolishing estates and transferring properties to housing associations increasingly connected to financial markets.

The collapse of Lehman Brothers sparked a worldwide crisis of excess capital. Trillions of dollars were sought for secure, profitable investments, with housing emerging as a preferred asset due to its stable returns, physical collateral, rising land values, and state-backed rent enforcement. Private equity firms, REITs, sovereign wealth funds, and pension funds all invested heavily in residential real estate. As a result, landlords shifted from individual property owners to financial institutions. Companies such as Pemberstone participated in this global trend.

Financialised landlordism goes beyond just “big landlords.” It involves specific accumulation mechanisms: rent is no longer just payment for land use but is securitised, bundled, sold to investors, and used as collateral, integrating housing into global financial markets. The tenant becomes a revenue source, and the home becomes a bond.

Eviction is not a flaw in the system; rather, it serves as a tool for capital accumulation. It enables landlords to clear “underperforming” tenants, redevelop land for greater profits, turn low-yield housing into high-yield assets, and discipline tenants through precarity. Evictions from social housing are part of this process and not exceptions; they reflect the system functioning as intended.

Demolition of estates is not about destruction; it’s about creating value. It allows for densification, luxury redevelopment, conversion of social housing into private properties, extraction of planning gains, and increases in land values. However, this process often displaces the working class, allowing capital to intensify the exploitation of urban space.

Financialised landlordism relies heavily on debt, with tenants accumulating rent arrears, landlords handling leveraged buyouts, councils participating in PFI schemes, and housing associations issuing bonds. Debt interconnects all parties within the financial market system, which depends on state support such as enforcement of eviction laws, policing authority, planning policies, tax incentives, deregulation, and eviction powers related to immigration. Labour’s role includes expanding Section 8 eviction powers, implementing the digital possession process, and applying Ground 7B regulations.

This is not a deviation; it represents the state performing its typical function. The state is inherently not neutral but acts as the guarantor of rent extraction. Financialised landlordism is supported by an ideological framework that masks its class interests.

Regeneration frequently conceals demolition and displacement, portraying capital growth as progress, modernisation, and renewal. The term ‘affordable housing’ is misleading, as it refers to market-rate rents rather than a social right, thereby embedding working-class housing in financial markets. Consultation often seems superficial, merely legitimising predetermined decisions and turning democratic language into bureaucratic procedures. The idea of mixed communities is a euphemism for social cleansing, replacing working-class residents with wealthier populations to boost land values.

The Emotional Power and Political Weakness of Local Campaigns

The main contradiction in localist housing campaigns is that, despite stirring strong emotions, they lack a clear strategy. While community, heritage, and shared suffering foster solidarity, these feelings do not translate into political power. They remain in the moral sphere, appealing to a system that lacks consciousness. Local campaigns are easily bypassed as councils “consult,” “engage,’ and “listen,” only to proceed with demolition or evictions. The moral appeal becomes part of bureaucratic formalities, reducing the campaign to a mere mention in planning documents. This underscores the ideological link between localism and Labourism.

Localism is inherently ideological and not politically neutral. It aligns with Labourism, which claims to protect community and heritage but ultimately serves financial interests. As mentioned, Labour councillors “deploy police to bar residents from town hall meetings.” Local campaigns often appeal to the same institutions that are evicting residents—the Dialectical Critique: Localism as Economism. Localist housing initiatives resemble trade-union economism by tackling symptoms rather than addressing the root social relations. They stay at a pre-class-conscious stage of struggle and cannot move beyond reformism without breaking away from Labourism’s political framework.

Labour isn’t genuinely a workers’ party but rather a bourgeois party supporting capitalism. Its aim is to manage capitalism’s contradictions, not eliminate them. This isn’t a flaw; it’s central to who it is. Labour’s Post-2024 Housing Strategy reveals increased Section 8 eviction powers and easier digital procedures for possessions. Ground 7B evictions over immigration led Labour MPs to be booed at the 2026 housing rally. This isn’t a failure to forget history but a reaffirmation of property rights.

The New Left Review, Verso Books, and the Ideology of Housing Reformism

The New Left Review (NLR) and Verso Books position themselves as prominent voices of radical thought in Britain. Over time, they have regularly published books, essays, and monographs on issues such as housing, urbanism, gentrification, and “neoliberalism.” Their contributors—such as Stuart Hodkinson, Anne Power, John Boughton, Loretta Lees, and Danny Dorling—are committed to portraying tenant struggles with sincerity and in detail.

However, documentation does not equate to politics. The stance of the NLR/Verso environment is more of a refined, scholarly Labourism than a genuinely radical position. It emphasises capitalism’s violence but suggests solutions like “better policy,” “more democratic planning,” and “politicians listening to historical narratives.” This part of the article contends that the NLR/Verso housing discourse is not only inadequate but also an ideological barrier hindering the development of revolutionary consciousness.  

Founded in 1960, the New Left Review emerged from the merger of The New Reasoner and Universities and Left Review. It faced a fundamental contradiction: while it opposed Stalinist bureaucratic authoritarianism and Labourism’s parliamentary gradualism, it did not endorse a Marxist revolutionary platform. Instead, it presented itself as a “radical” intellectual journal that critiques capitalism from within the bourgeois democratic framework.

This inherent contradiction has influenced its political perspective since then. Starting from the 1970s, scholars linked to NLR became key analysts of Britain’s housing issues, producing detailed ethnographies of council estates, examining “regeneration” projects, critiquing gentrification, documenting the history of social housing, and proposing policies for “democratic planning.” Although these works are often rich in empirical detail, they generally remain politically passive, describing capitalism’s violence without explicitly pointing to its fundamental cause: private ownership of land and housing.

Verso Books: The Publishing House of Academic Reformism

Verso Books describes itself as a “radical publishing” house. Nonetheless, it operates more like the literary wing of the academic left, a community that has long documented social crises without directly challenging Labourism.

Their housing titles, such as Safe as Houses, Estate Regeneration and Its Discontents, Municipal Dreams, The New Urban Crisis, and Eviction: The Social History of Rent, exhibit three key ideological traits: 1. They view housing mainly as a policy issue rather than a class struggle, describing it as a “crisis,” “failure,” or “challenge,” but not as an intrinsic aspect of capitalism. 2. They focus on politicians instead of the working class, assuming policymakers can be convinced to counter capitalist interests. 3. They minimise Labour’s role, criticising Conservative governments while often depicting Labour as a potential reformer—even though Labour-led councils have historically been responsible for mass evictions, estate demolitions, and social cleansing.

The NLR/Verso milieu is not politically neutral; it is structurally linked to universities, research grants, policy institutes, Labour councils, think tanks, and NGOs. Its authors rely on these institutions, which also oversee eviction processes. Consequently, they cannot promote revolutionary politics without risking their careers. Their reformism is grounded in material realities, not just ideology.

Verso housing books frequently promote ideas like “stronger regulation,” “community involvement,” “democratic planning,” “ethical regeneration,” and “fairer development models.” These notions are illusions, presuming that the capitalist state can be reformed to oppose capitalism.

Verso authors romanticise community campaigns, highlighting successes such as Focus E15, Newham mothers, West Hendon, and local fights. However, they never address the political reality: these campaigns failed because they relied solely on moral appeals. “Community does not defeat the rate of return.” Regarding “Heritage,” Verso books often reference estate histories, community dignity, and working-class culture, but heritage lacks legal weight against property rights. It remains sentiment, not a strategic tool.

Engels dispelled reformist illusions in 1872, highlighting that housing shortages stem from systemic issues. He stated that eviction serves as a means of capital accumulation and emphasised that reform alone cannot eliminate the commodity nature of housing. The only solution, according to him, is the abolition of private land ownership to resolve the housing problem.

The NLR/Verso milieu has overlooked this analysis for fifty years. They reference Engels but ignore his insights, considering his revolutionary conclusions as mere historical curiosities rather than urgent political calls. The book’s call is for politicians to heed the stories of history… But which politicians?”

The NLR/Verso environment provides no route to victory as its political approach is a dead end. The working class cannot secure housing through heritage, community efforts, moral appeals, Labour councils, academic research, or policy changes. The fight for housing is a fight against the capitalist class… transforming housing from a commodity into a social right.”

On the 250th Anniversary of 1776: A Polemical Defence of the American Revolution Against Racialist Falsification

But where, say some, is the King of America? I’ll tell you, friend, he reigns above, and doth not make havoc of humanity like the Royal Brute of Great Britain. Yet that we may not appear to be defective even in earthly honours, let a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the Charter; let it be brought forth, placed on the Divine Law, the Word of God; let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know, that so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America the law is king. 

The Writings of Thomas Paine, Vol. I (1774-1779)

“Associate yourself with men of good quality, if you esteem your own reputation; for ’tis better to be alone than in bad company.”

George Washington

“The workingmen of Europe feel sure that… it fell to the lot of Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, to lead his country through the matchless struggle for the rescue of an enchained race and the reconstruction of a social world.”

Karl Marx

“We hold the power to start the world anew. No similar situation has occurred since Noah’s days until now. A new world’s birth is imminent, and a population, possibly as large as all of Europe, is about to gain their share of freedom”

Thomas Paine-

oll.libertyfund.org/titles/paine-the-writings-of-thomas-paine-vol-i-1774-1779#

History as a Battlefield

The upcoming 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence has starkly exposed a deep crisis in the United States’ historical awareness. At a time when democratic rights face unprecedented threats, the political elite and its media outlets have shown what the World Socialist Web Site accurately describes as “disinterest and even hostility… toward the bourgeois democratic traditions of the United States.’¹ The ruling class, mired in oligarchic decay, recoils from the revolutionary origins of its own state because those origins expose the illegitimacy of its present‑day authoritarian turn.

In this context, the WSWS hosted a significant international webinar titled “The American Revolution and Its Place in History: From the War Against Monarchy to ‘No Kings.’” Featuring prominent historians such as James Oakes, Sean Wilentz, Richard Carwardine, Adam Hochschild, and Thomas Mackaman, it represented the most in-depth scholarly discussion of the Revolution during this anniversary year. Its importance extends beyond academic clarification, reflecting the ongoing political debate over the significance of 1776.

The core question is whether the American Revolution was a groundbreaking democratic shift in world history or, as the 1619 Project and its academic allies claim, a reactionary revolt aimed at preserving slavery. This answer shapes both our understanding of history and our approach to current fights against dictatorship.

The Revolutionary Character of 1776

The Declaration of Independence remains one of the most consequential documents in world history. As David North emphasised, it “indicted the existing social and political order and called for its overthrow in the most sweeping and universal terms.”² Its proclamation that “all men are created equal” established a new standard of political legitimacy, one that transcended the limitations of its time and pointed toward future struggles for emancipation.

James Oakes underscored this universalism, noting that the Declaration “establishes an entirely new revolutionary standard by which every social movement from that point on is evaluated.”³ The Revolution shattered the ancien régime’s world of inherited rank and ascribed status. Richard Carwardine described 1776 as the formal end of a social order in which one’s place was fixed by birth.⁴

This was not a provincial tax revolt. It was the first great bourgeois‑democratic revolution of the modern era, whose reverberations were felt across the Atlantic world. As Sean Wilentz observed, “you can’t understand any of the other revolutions without understanding the American Revolution.”⁵ The upheaval in North America helped detonate the French Revolution, inspired abolitionist networks in Britain, and later shaped the international working‑class movement.

The Two Revolutions: Against Monarchy and Against Slavery

The Revolution’s internal contradictions—between universal equality and the persistence of slavery—did not negate its revolutionary character. Rather, they generated a second, deeper revolution culminating in the Civil War. Wilentz emphasised that the struggle against slavery was not external to 1776 but inherent within it.⁶

Karl Marx grasped this dialectic with unmatched clarity. Writing for the International Working Men’s Association, he recognised that the Civil War represented the completion of the bourgeois‑democratic revolution begun in 1776.⁷ The working class in Britain, influenced by Marx and Engels, sided with the Union against the Confederacy, despite the economic hardships caused by the cotton famine.

The WSWS webinar traced this international thread: abolitionist diagrams circulated from London to Philadelphia; Lafayette carried the spirit of 1776 to Paris; British workers mourned Lincoln’s assassination.⁸ The Revolution’s universalist content proved irrepressible.

The Presentist Falsification of History

The greatest threat to the Revolution today stems from racialist narratives promoted by the New York Times’ 1619 Project and Gerald Horne’s The Counter-Revolution of 1776. These works suggest that the Revolution aimed to preserve slavery, argue that 1776 was not truly a revolution, or even describe it as a counter-revolution.

Thomas Mackaman demolished this fabrication: “In its time, nobody, including its enemies, thought it was anything but a revolution.”⁹ The claim that the Revolution was a pro‑slavery conspiracy is a grotesque anachronism, a projection of contemporary racial politics onto the eighteenth century.

Both Mackaman and Wilentz identified the method of these narratives as “presentism” and “anachronism.”¹⁰ They reduce history to moral denunciation, stripping events of their material context and class dynamics. David North exposed the underlying ideology as a “petty‑bourgeois view of history” that substitutes race for class and rests on a “perverted zoological conception” of human society.¹¹

Oakes drew the logical conclusion: the universalist principle of equality is “seriously antithetical to identity politics,” which fragments society into antagonistic racial blocs.¹² The 1619 Project’s racial essentialism is not a radical critique of America’s past but a reactionary repudiation of Enlightenment rationality.

The 1619 Project did not develop in isolation. It reflects the worldview of a ruling class that has become increasingly distrustful of its revolutionary democratic roots. As the WSWS notes, the political elite shows “disinterest and indeed hostility… to the bourgeois democratic traditions of the United States itself.” In this context, the New York Times’ 1619 Project serves a clear political purpose: it disconnects the working class from the universalist, Enlightenment-inspired principles of 1776. Instead, it promotes a racial mythology that hampers collective action.

The central claim of the Project—that the United States was founded as a slavocracy, that 1619 is the actual founding year, and that the Revolution was fought primarily to defend slavery—is not just mistaken; it distorts history through flawed methods that conflict with rigorous scholarship. It replaces class with race, moralism with materialism, and judges the past through a modern lens.

The 1619 Project isn’t a historical account but a moral story crafted to support current political objectives. As Thomas Mackaman and Sean Wilentz pointed out in the WSWS webinar, it employs ‘presentism’ and ‘anachronism’ by judging the past through today’s standards, reducing complex historical events to moral judgments about individuals. Presentism isn’t just a flawed method; it fundamentally rejects genuine historical analysis by blurring the line between past and present, preventing understanding of historical figures within their own context. David North highlighted that this approach replaces explanation with moral condemnation and lacks true explanatory power.

The racial essentialism underlying the Project.

The 1619 Project is based on what North correctly calls a “perverted zoological conception” of human society. It views race as a timeless, unchangeable factor that determines human behaviour. This isn’t radical thinking; it’s a step backwards to pre-Enlightenment ideas. It dismisses the idea that human reason is universal and that people can overcome inherited social roles.

The Project criticises the Declaration of Independence because its claim that “all men are created equal” clashes with its racial worldview. As Oakes notes, the universalist idea of equality directly conflicts with identity politics. Consequently, the 1619 Project seeks to challenge the validity of the Enlightenment itself.  

The Revolution was not fought to defend slavery

The Project claims that colonists rebelled to defend slavery from British abolition, but this is clearly false. There is no evidence—none—that fears of abolition drove the Revolution. As Mackaman noted earlier, “In its time, nobody, including its enemies, thought it was anything but a revolution.” The British Empire didn’t abolish slavery until 1833, fifty-seven years after the Declaration. The Somerset decision of 1772 applied only to England and Wales, not to the colonies. The idea that it threatened colonial slavery is a myth.

The Revolution sparked ideological forces that made slavery increasingly difficult to sustain. The earliest abolition societies appeared in the 1770s and 1780s. Northern states began to enact gradual emancipation. The Declaration’s universal principles directly influenced the antislavery movement. Wilentz repeated his point that “you can’t understand any of the other revolutions without understanding the American Revolution.” The 1619 Project, however, isolates the Revolution from the Atlantic world, overlooking its crucial role in the French and Haitian Revolutions and the global push for democracy.

The Continuity of Democratic Struggle

Far from being a dead letter, the Declaration’s principles have animated every major democratic movement in American history. Oakes noted that labour radicals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries “repeatedly invoked the Declaration of Independence,” as did abolitionists and suffragists before them.¹³

Adam Hochschild demonstrated the contemporary relevance of the Declaration’s indictment of George III. Its charges—military power over civil authority, the transportation of people “beyond seas” for “pretended offences”—read, he observed, as if they “were written this morning.”¹⁴The continuity is unmistakable: the struggle for democratic rights is inseparable from the revolutionary legacy of 1776.

The Present Crisis and the Necessity of Historical Consciousness

The United States is undergoing a profound crisis of bourgeois democracy. Trump’s open embrace of dictatorial methods, his attempt to overturn the 2020 election, and his use of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 for mass deportations all testify to the breakdown of constitutional norms.¹⁵The Supreme Court’s reactionary rulings, the impunity of the January 6 conspirators, and the draconian sentences imposed on anti‑ICE protesters reveal a ruling class that has repudiated even the pretence of democratic rights.¹⁶

In this context, the fight over the meaning of 1776 is not academic. It is a struggle over political consciousness. As North concluded, “the political consciousness and perspective required for the future” cannot be supplied by any faction of the ruling class.¹⁷ The defence of democratic rights falls to the international working class, whose interests align with the universalist principles first articulated in 1776.

Conclusion: Toward 2036 and Beyond

North ventured a prediction: “The America and the world of 2036 will look vastly different from the world of today.”¹⁸ This is not utopian speculation but a sober assessment of the contradictions tearing apart global capitalism. The revolutionary potential of the international working class, the globalised character of modern society, and the intensifying social opposition all point toward profound transformations.

To realise this potential, the working class must reclaim the revolutionary heritage of 1776—not as nationalist mythology, but as part of the world‑historical struggle for human emancipation. The fight for socialism requires a fight for historical truth.

The WSWS webinar stands as a major contribution to that struggle. Its analysis must be studied, disseminated, and armed with Marxist clarity. The meaning of 1776 is not settled in the past; it is being fought over in the present, and its outcome will shape the future.

Footnotes

  1. On the eve of the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, 1.
  2. Ibid., 2.
  3. Ibid., 4.
  4. Ibid., 5.
  5. Ibid., 3.
  6. Ibid., 5.
  7. Karl Marx, The Civil War in the United States (New York: International Publishers, 1937).
  8. On the eve…, 3–4.
  9. Ibid., 6.
  10. Ibid., 6.
  11. Ibid., 7.
  12. Ibid., 7.
  13. Ibid., 4.
  14. Ibid., 8.
  15. Ibid., 2.
  16. Ibid., 8.
  17. Ibid., 9.
  18. Ibid., 9.

Endnotes

The Writings of Thomas Paine, (1774-1779) oll.libertyfund.org/titles/paine-the-writings-of-thomas-paine-vol-i-1774-1779

Podcast Episode: What Though the Field Be Lost: Christopher Kempf, the Civil War, and the Ideolog

Pip: The Civil War ended a hundred and sixty years ago, and American poetry is still standing in the rubble deciding whether to have feelings about it.

Mara: That's the territory freerein61 is mapping in this episode — Christopher Kempf's Civil War collection, the ideology of ambivalence, and what it costs when poetry aestheticises contradiction instead of analysing it.

Pip: Let's start with the collection itself and the argument the introduction makes about where Kempf's work lands.

What Though the Field Be Lost: Poetry, Class, and the Limits of Ambivalence

Mara: The introduction frames Kempf's collection as a historically serious work that is nonetheless constrained — not by craft, but by ideology. The argument is that Kempf senses the Civil War's revolutionary significance but cannot fully articulate it.

Pip: And the diagnosis is precise. The post identifies the ideological framework doing the constraining: race, region, identity, and what it calls the elevation of ambivalence as a moral and aesthetic ideal — the liberal-academic world's preferred lens.

Mara: The post puts it directly: "Kempf perceives the Civil War as a revolutionary break and senses the lingering contradictions it left unresolved," but "adopts a stance of cultivated uncertainty, as if the poet's role is to observe contradictions rather than resolve or comprehend them."

Pip: So ambivalence isn't a stylistic quirk here — it's doing political work. It lets the poet acknowledge complexity without being obligated to analyse it.

Mara: That's exactly the charge. The post describes ambivalence as ideological containment: a posture available to a petty-bourgeois intelligentsia that feels the pressures building beneath but lacks the theoretical tools to understand what they mean. The working class appears in Kempf's poems — hot dogs, AutoZone, homecoming queens — but as cultural spectacle, not as historical agency.

Pip: Observed with affection and mild anthropological amusement. Which is a long way from solidarity.

Mara: The Confederate monument section sharpens this. Kempf's reference to the "splendour" of such a monument is read not as a minor lapse but as a structural consequence of viewing the Civil War through cultural heritage rather than class conflict. When the war becomes a collision of identities, even reactionary ones acquire a kind of legitimacy.

Mara: The interview with the WSWS is where the post finds its most striking evidence. Kempf states there that "virtually every corporation has much to gain from promoting narrow, sectarian strife" — a remark the post calls more politically direct than anything in the poetry itself.

Pip: The interview out-radicalises the book it's supposed to be promoting.

Mara: The post frames that gap as the central problem. Kempf can see the class dynamics clearly enough to name them in conversation. His poetic method — rooted in juxtaposition, suggestion, and cultivated uncertainty — stops him from stating them on the page. The criticism's task, the post argues, is not to fault him for that but to situate it: as a symptom of a broader intellectual crisis, a social layer that senses the approach of major events and cannot yet find the framework to meet them.

Pip: The field isn't lost — but the map is still being drawn.


Mara: The stakes the post keeps returning to are historical clarity — understanding the Civil War as class struggle, not cultural inheritance, and what that demands of artists working in a moment of escalating crisis.

Pip: Ambivalence as a holding pattern. Next time, we find out what breaks it.

What Though the Field Be Lost: Christopher Kempf, the Civil War, and the Ideology of Ambivalence Introduction: Poetry at the End of the American Cycle

Christopher Kempf’s What Though the Field Be Lost appears at a moment of profound crisis in American society. Staggering levels of social inequality ravage the United States, a political system in advanced decay, and a ruling class increasingly reliant on authoritarian methods to maintain its dominance. Under such conditions, the Civil War — the “Second American Revolution” — inevitably returns as a point of reference. It is the last moment in US history when the contradictions of the social order were resolved through revolutionary means. Any serious artistic engagement with the present must therefore confront the legacy of that conflict not as a cultural inheritance but as a historical process driven by class forces.

Kempf’s collection highlights the ideological deadlock facing modern American intellectuals. It is driven by a sincere desire to explore the past and its ongoing impact today. The work dismisses the superficial confessional trends common in American poetry, focusing instead on history, landscape, and the enduring material traces of the Civil War within the American consciousness. However, it is ultimately limited by the ideological frameworks—such as race, region, identity, and the elevation of “ambivalence” as a moral and aesthetic ideal—that shape how the liberal-academic world interprets reality.

The poem explores key questions of American history, though it stops short of fully addressing them. Kempf perceives the Civil War as a revolutionary break and senses the lingering contradictions it left unresolved. He also intuitively understands that today’s American capitalism crisis stems from the same class conflicts that ignited in 1861. However, he struggles to realise these ideas fully, instead adopting a stance of cultivated uncertainty, as if the poet’s role is to observe contradictions rather than resolve or comprehend them.

This ambivalence is fundamentally a social issue rather than an artistic one. It illustrates the stance of a segment of petty-bourgeois intelligentsia that exists anxiously between the working class and the ruling class, feeling the mounting pressures beneath but lacking the political and theoretical tools to understand their true meaning. Kempf’s poetry reflects this tension clearly: it hints at the revolutionary aspects of American history but stays grounded in culturalist ideas that hide that history’s true significance.

In this framework, the Civil War is seen not as a revolutionary clash between conflicting social systems but as a symbolic space where issues of identity, memory, and national belonging are explored. The working class is depicted not as an active historical force but as a cultural symbol — sometimes sentimentalised, sometimes ridiculed, admired for its “decency” yet often viewed humorously, as if its presence were an anthropological oddity rather than the cornerstone of modern society.

Kempf’s approach has limitations that go beyond aesthetics; they are political. As the American ruling class currently uses reactionary tactics—such as censorship, rewriting history, and fuelling racial and gender divisions—the artist’s role is to clarify the historical forces, not to aestheticise ambiguity. The Civil War was fundamentally a class struggle over the future of a social order, not merely an issue of identity politics. To relate its revolutionary fervour to today, one must pinpoint modern parallels, such as widening inequality, labour exploitation, and the global capitalism crisis.

Kempf’s poetry, despite its intelligence and craftsmanship, ultimately doesn’t make this leap. It stays confined within the ideological limits of the present, unable to see the past as a guide for the future. Therefore, criticism’s role isn’t just to evaluate the poems but to situate them within the larger crisis of American intellectual life—one caused by the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia’s failure to break free from the ideological frameworks that benefit the ruling class.

The Civil War as Historical Problem — Class, Revolution, and the Limits of Cultural Memory

The American Civil War holds a distinctive place in global history. It was more than just a regional conflict or a tragic internal rupture; it represented a revolutionary clash between two incompatible social systems: the industrialising capitalist North and the slave-dependent, semi-feudal South. The abolition of slavery—considered the largest expropriation of private property in the Western Hemisphere before the Russian Revolution—was not merely a consequence of the war but its core historical significance. To truly understand the Civil War, one must recognise it as a class struggle fought across the continent, with its outcome shaping the future of American capitalism for over a century.

However, prevailing ideological perspectives in modern American culture make this understanding nearly inaccessible. The Civil War is often viewed primarily through the lens of identity: as a clash among racial groups, regional cultures, or conflicting national narratives. This shift towards culturalist interpretation is intentional, serving the interests of the ruling class. It aims to hide the revolutionary roots of American history and to prevent the working class from realising its own historical power.

Kempf’s poetry, despite its historical interest, remains confined within a specific ideological framework. His portrayal of the Civil War is filtered through the lens of modern liberal concepts such as race, region, memory, and the obsession with “national identity.” These ideas are not just inadequate; they distort the true history of the conflict by turning a revolutionary war into a symbolic stage for cultural expression, emphasising ambiguity over social analysis.

Kempf’s portrayal of Confederate memory reveals an aesthetic focus on the monument’s “splendour,” which is not merely a mistake but a natural outcome of viewing the Civil War as part of cultural heritage instead of a class struggle. When the war is seen as a conflict of identities, even reactionary ones gain a degree of legitimacy. Consequently, the Confederate cause is depicted as a tragic regional pride rather than a defence of human bondage. The monument is thus seen as an object of beauty rather than a symbol of violent reaction. A Marxist cannot adopt this perspective. The Civil War was a clash between social systems, not cultures. The Confederacy epitomised the most reactionary class in American history: a slaveholding oligarchy whose economic goals were opposed to modern societal progress. Approaching its symbols with ambivalence conceals the underlying class struggle and blurs the distinction between revolutionary change and reactionary forces. 

Kempf’s poetry reveals a broader issue in how Americans perceive their history. The Civil War is fading from its specific origins and instead serves as a symbol of national trauma, division, and contemporary anxieties. This isn’t merely a misunderstanding; it is a political error. Detaching the Civil War from its class issues erases the working class’s revolutionary legacy. It conceals that America’s major advances—such as ending slavery, expanding democratic rights, and asserting federal authority—were achieved through mass struggles, not just cultural debates.

Kempf’s work engages with this process, even as it aims to resist it. His poems include historical fragments, archival remnants, and traces of the past. Yet these elements do not provide a clear, dialectical view of history shaped by class struggles. Instead, they remain in an aestheticised ambiguity, suggesting that the poet is cautious about making definitive claims about the material he references.

This passage explains the ideological role of “ambivalence” in modern American literature. It enables artists to acknowledge historical complexity without confronting its political consequences. Instead of interpreting contradictions, poets act as curators of them. Essentially, it represents a form of ideological stagnation—the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia’s failure to recognise the revolutionary significance of history when such awareness is critically needed.

The Civil War calls for clarity, requiring an understanding of history as a conflict among social forces rather than merely a collection of cultural identities. Kempf’s poetry, despite its intelligence and craftsmanship, ultimately falls short of this requirement. It mirrors the crisis of a social class that feels the looming Great Events but lacks the necessary theoretical and political tools to understand them fully.

The Ideology of Ambivalence — Petty-Bourgeois Paralysis in Contemporary American Poetry

In Christopher Kempf’s poetic universe, ambivalence functions as more than just a stylistic choice; it is the central ideological principle. It shapes the way history is perceived, informs the poet’s attitude toward the world, and offers a means of transforming urgent social issues into aesthetic concerns. To understand “What Though the Field Be Lost,” one must view ambivalence not merely as an artistic trait but as a mirror of a broader social problem: the stagnation of the contemporary American petty-bourgeois intellectual class amidst rising class conflicts.

Ambivalence as a Social Position, Not an Aesthetic Insight

Contemporary American poets, especially in academia, hold a conflicted social position. They encounter economic insecurity, become more proletarianised, and face pressures akin to those of the working class. Yet they remain ideologically connected to liberal institutions such as universities, foundations, and cultural organisations, which are strongly dedicated to maintaining the existing social order.

Ambivalence stems from this contradiction, illustrating a class segment that senses the system’s instability but cannot imagine an alternative. It embodies the worldview of a social layer that experiences the pressures of capitalism but lacks the political insight to oppose it. Here, ambivalence indicates ideological fatigue rather than sophistication.

Kempf’s poetry effectively depicts this condition. His poems contain numerous historical fragments, political echoes, and social snapshots. Yet, these components never fully coalesce into a coherent view of the world. Instead, they remain in a state of unresolved tension, suggesting the poet is cautious about drawing his insights to their logical end.

The Aestheticisation of Contradiction

Ambivalence allows the poet to treat contradiction as an aesthetic theme instead of a historical process. The Civil War is portrayed as a collage of conflicting narratives; the working class is represented through cultural symbols; and the current crisis is shown as a series of “echoes” or “parallels,” rather than as a reflection of deepening class conflicts.

This aestheticisation of conflict serves to disarm political engagement by transforming the poet’s role from a historian’s interpreter to a curator of fragments. It suggests complexity without the obligation to analyse, indicating a withdrawal from active comprehension of the world. The WSWS review rightly notes that Kempf’s poems “juxtapose” instead of explaining, “hint” instead of fully expressing, and “suggest” rather than present definitive conclusions. This is not about poor craftsmanship but about perspective. The poet’s ambivalence is not a quest for truth; it is a means to avoid the effort of discovering it.

The Working Class as Cultural Object

Kempf’s portrayal of the American working class exemplifies ambivalence. His mentions of hot dogs, AutoZone, homecoming queens, and small-town rituals do not show solidarity, but rather an outsider’s view. These references reflect a poet who watches the working class with affection and amusement, as if examining a cultural spectacle instead of engaging with a social group.

This perspective mirrors the wider liberal-academic view, which sees the working class not as active agents in history but as a cultural concept. Instead of being recognised as subjects shaping history, they are depicted as objects of representation. Their struggles, hopes, and contradictions are often aestheticised rather than genuinely comprehended.

Kempf’s ambivalence toward the working class reflects a class position rather than a personal trait. It represents a social stratum that is materially near the working class but ideologically disconnected from it. This group perceives the potential for working-class unity but struggles to see it as a feasible political reality.

Ambivalence as Ideological Containment

Ambivalence in contemporary American poetry serves a conservative role. It stops poets from making conclusions that could threaten the current social system. Instead, it turns political issues into artistic expressions. This way, poets can recognise social contradictions without the need to clarify or resolve them.

In this context, ambivalence benefits the ruling class by maintaining the intelligentsia’s ideological confusion, hindering their ability to develop a clear critique of capitalism. It also conceals the revolutionary legacy of the Civil War with layers of cultural complexity. Additionally, it obstructs the working class from seeing itself as part of history.

The Confederate Question — Aestheticising Reaction in an Age of Resurgent Authoritarianism

The most politically sensitive part of ‘What Though the Field Be Lost’ is Kempf’s handling of Confederate memory. This section highlights the ideological limits of his uncertain approach and clearly shows the gap between historical materialism and today’s liberal cultural perspectives. The Civil War is more than just another historical event; it is the pivotal moment in shaping the modern American state. Addressing its reactionary aspect — the slaveholders’ rebellion — with an aesthetic hesitation is not a neutral artistic decision. It represents a political statement, whether intentionally or not.

The Confederate Monument as an Aesthetic Object

Kempf’s mention of the “splendour” of a Confederate monument is more than a minor detail. It encapsulates the book’s overall ideological framework. The monument is presented not simply as an emblem of a reactionary social order but as an aesthetic reflection, a remnant of a tragic history whose significance is complex, layered, and open to various interpretations.

This is exactly the core issue. The Confederate cause was clear-cut. It was neither tragic nor merely a cultural expression of regional identity. Instead, it was the organised political and military defence of a slaveholding oligarchy whose economic interests were inherently opposed to modern societal progress. Approaching its symbols with ambiguity masks the class nature of the conflict and blurs the distinction between revolution and counter-revolution.

The beautification of reactionary ideas is always risky politically, especially now when authoritarianism is resurging worldwide. The ruling class, facing worsening social issues, often resorts to distorting history, restoring reactionary symbols, and promoting nationalist myths. In this environment, the poet’s role isn’t to make ambiguity look beautiful but to make the historical significance of the past clear.

The Liberal-Academic Reframing of the Civil War

Kempf’s approach to Confederate memory exemplifies a wider trend within the liberal academic sphere: the transformation of the Civil War from a conflict of revolutionary class struggle into a cultural narrative centred on identity, memory, and regional pride. This reframing serves a particular ideological purpose. It enables the ruling elite to diminish the revolutionary roots of the Civil War by separating it from its material, economic foundations. When the Civil War is viewed as a clash of identities, all identities — including reactionary ones — are given some degree of legitimacy. 

The rebellion of slaveholders is seen as a “perspective,” a “narrative,” or a “memory.” Confederate monuments then become sites of cultural significance rather than symbols of a social order rooted in human slavery. This perspective is not about historical accuracy but about ideological control.

The Class Content of the Confederate Cause

From a Marxist viewpoint, the Confederacy was the most reactionary social class in U.S. history. The slaveholding elite aimed not to defend a “way of life” but to uphold a property system that forcibly repressed millions. Their defeat was a vital step in the development of modern American capitalism and the expansion of democratic rights. Romanticising Confederate symbols conceals the revolutionary importance of the Civil War, portraying reactionary elements as mere cultural symbols rather than organised resistance by a ruling class resisting progress.

Ambivalence as a Form of Historical Neutralisation

Kempf’s mixed feelings about Confederate memory are not a flaw but a core aspect of his approach. This ambivalence enables him to view reactionary symbols as aesthetic objects rather than as displays of class dominance. As a result, the Confederate monument becomes a space for reflection instead of a symbol of the violent social system it signifies.

This is not harmless. In a time when authoritarianism is resurging—reactionary forces openly use Confederate imagery, the ruling class revives symbols of past oppression, and historical falsehoods serve political control—the aesthetic presentation of reaction unintentionally aids in confusing the public’s understanding of ideology. The poet who treats the Confederate monument with ambivalence is not impartial; instead, he contributes to a larger cultural trend that normalises, sanitises, and erases the historical significance of reaction.

The Importance of Clear Historical Perspective

Understanding the Civil War requires focusing on its social forces rather than viewing it solely as a conflict of cultural identities. The Confederate cause was mainly reactionary, as shown by its symbols and monuments. Ignoring this viewpoint obscures the class dynamics involved and hinders the working class from truly grasping its history. Kempf’s poetry, while insightful and skillfully written, ultimately misses this point. It mirrors the ideological stalemate of a social class that predicts major events but fails to understand the underlying historical forces.

Kempf’s Interview — Latent Class Insight and the Limits of Liberal Consciousness

Kempf’s interview with the WSWS is the most insightful document on What Though the Field Be Lost, revealing the gap between the poet’s latent political awareness and the ideological limits that influence his artistic approach. In the interview, Kempf offers insights that nearly align with a Marxist critique of modern American society. However, these insights are largely missing from the poetry itself. Thus, the interview acts as a kind of critical commentary on the book — showcasing what the poet understands but avoids expressing. [1]

The Poet Speaks More Clearly Than the Poems

Kempf acknowledges the social themes in his work, highlighting realities his poems only hint at. He points out that graduate students, whom he describes as experiencing “precarious labour,” share similar class interests with “Trump voters” in the rural Midwest. This is a notable admission because it contradicts the widespread belief that these groups are culturally incompatible. Instead, it reveals that beneath political differences lies a shared material condition: exploitation by capital.

This point is fundamental and underpins any serious socialist analysis of modern America. However, in the poetry, this understanding is only implicit, expressed through contrasts and echoes instead of a clear perspective. The poems acknowledge the cultural divide but fail to reveal the underlying class unity. The interview shows that Kempf is aware of this unity—it just can’t see it as a political force.

The Poet’s Critique of Corporate Identity Politics

Kempf’s observation that “virtually every corporation has much to gain from promoting narrow, sectarian strife” stands out even more. This insight surpasses the rest of the book in political depth, framing identity politics not as an accidental cultural trend but as a deliberate instrument of class control — a way for the ruling class to divide the working class and hinder its awareness of shared interests.

This analysis is exactly what the WSWS presents, an insight that poetry, despite its intelligence, never fully captures. Kempf’s acknowledgement of the corporate roots of identity politics indicates he could offer a more radical critique than his poetry reveals. However, he remains bound by the liberal-academic environment, which emphasises identity as the main lens for social analysis. This creates a clear disconnect: the poet’s political insight surpasses the ideological boundaries of his artistic approach.

The Liberal Fetish of “Ambivalence” as a Barrier to Clarity

Kempf justifies his poetic ambivalence as an intentional artistic choice. He believes that poetry doesn’t instruct directly but instead uses juxtaposition to provoke thought about parallels, incongruities, or echoes across history. This perspective is common among contemporary American writers, reflecting a generation of poets who are wary of clarity, tend to steer clear of political commitments, and regard ambiguity as a sign of artistic refinement.

However, this defence fails on closer examination. Ambivalence is not a way to uncover truth; it serves to avoid it. It allows the poet to recognise social contradictions without analysing them, thereby turning political issues into aesthetic concerns. Essentially, it acts as a form of ideological containment— preventing the poet’s insights from becoming threatening.

Kempf’s interview shows he can be clear. He understands modern American class dynamics and the influence of corporations in fostering division. He also recognises the potential for unity among workers. However, his poetic style, rooted in liberal ambivalence, stops him from stating these insights plainly.

The Unspoken Tension: A Poet on the Threshold of Marxism

The interview reveals a tension permeating the entire project: Kempf is on the verge of adopting a Marxist perspective on American history, but is still unable to do so fully. He recognises the Civil War’s revolutionary significance and identifies class struggles in modern society. Although instinctively aware, he also recognises that identity-politics categories do not sufficiently explain the current crisis.

However, he stays confined to the ideological frameworks of the liberal-academic environment. He is unable to see the working class as an active force in history. He cannot envision the potential for revolutionary change. Additionally, he struggles to move beyond the aestheticisation of ambivalence.

The result is a poetry that is historically curious but politically paralysed — a poetry that gestures toward revolution but retreats into ambiguity.

The Task of Criticism

Marxist criticism aims to contextualise Kempf’s work within the broader crisis of American intellectual life rather than criticise him for failing to produce socialist poetry. His ambivalence is understood as a social issue, indicative of the paralysis of petty-bourgeois intelligentsia who sense major events approaching but lack the theoretical and political tools to understand them.

The interview points in a different direction—one based on class analysis, historical understanding, and recognition of the working class as the key force in modern society. However, this alternative approach is not yet reflected in his poetry.

The article discusses how Kempf struggles to link the Civil War’s legacy to today’s issues. The unresolved tension in “What Though the Field Be Lost” only becomes evident when connected to the current American capitalism crisis. For Kempf, the Civil War is not just history but a key perspective on America’s ongoing divisions. Yet pressing modern problems like the decline of democratic institutions, rising inequality, and the resurgence of authoritarianism demand a clearer historical understanding—something Kempf’s uncertain approach does not entirely provide.

The Civil War as a Mirror of the Present

The Civil War marked the final time in American history when revolutionary methods resolved the contradictions within the social order. It was a conflict centred not on cultural identity but on the future of the social system itself. The abolition of slavery was a crucial prerequisite for the rise of modern American capitalism. As Marx described, it was a “bourgeois revolution” led by the most progressive elements of the ruling class and backed by the widespread mobilisation of both the working class and the enslaved people.

Today, the United States faces a new yet equally significant crisis. The contradictions of capitalism—such as globalised production, financialisation, extreme inequality, and political decline—have escalated to the point where traditional governance structures can no longer contain them. In response, the ruling class employs authoritarian tactics, engages in historical distortion, and fosters racial and gender divisions. Meanwhile, the working class, though fragmented and confused, remains objectively the sole force capable of addressing the crisis.

At such a moment, the Civil War acts as a mirror, reflecting the revolutionary potential of the working class, emphasising the need to challenge reactionary forces, and showing that deep social conflicts cannot be resolved through cultural negotiation. Kempf perceives this clearly. His poems echo the past within the present, capturing the “presentness of the past” and the strange persistence of Civil War memory in modern American life. However, he cannot explicitly express this link, as doing so would mean abandoning the ideological frameworks of identity and ambivalence that underpin his work.

The Liberal-Academic Horizon as a Barrier to Historical Understanding. Kempf’s poetry is limited not by aesthetics but by ideology. He views the Civil War mainly through familiar liberal categories like race, region, identity, and memory. These are not impartial; they serve as ideological tools the ruling class uses to interpret social conflict in cultural terms, concealing its economic roots. To truly see the Civil War as a class struggle, one must recognise the class nature of the current crisis. This involves understanding that the working class, rather than cultural identity groups, is the key force today and abandoning the dominant ideological frameworks in academia in favour of a historical materialist approach.

Kempf is unable to make this leap because it would directly conflict with the institutions shaping his worldview. The liberal-academic environment treats identity as the primary analytical category and regards class as either secondary or suspect. It promotes ambivalence and mistrusts clarity, encouraging the aestheticisation of contradiction while discouraging political engagement. Kempf’s poetry embodies these restrictions: it is historically intriguing but politically reserved. It hints at class struggle but focuses on cultural aspects, sensing the Civil War’s revolutionary potential yet failing to express it.

The Revolutionary Legacy of the Civil War and the Fear of Its Implications

Viewing the Civil War as a revolutionary event means acknowledging the potential for revolution today. This hidden fear underscores Kempf’s analysis. The Civil War was not merely a tragic conflict of identities but a violent break that dismantled the old social order and established a new one. During this period, the working class and the oppressed significantly influenced the course of history.

Recognising this suggests that the current crisis might demand a significant rupture. It acknowledges that the contradictions within modern capitalism cannot be resolved through cultural debates or aesthetic indifference. Instead, it emphasises that the working class, rather than the liberal intelligentsia, drives historical change. Kempf’s poetry hints at this possibility but never fully confronts it. The Civil War is depicted as a haunting memory or a symbolic landscape — never as a framework for understanding today. While the poems sense the arrival of major events, they remain immobile in the presence of these events.

Conclusion — Toward a Marxist Aesthetics of the American Past

The contradictions at the heart of What Though the Field Be Lost are not merely the contradictions of a single poet. They are the contradictions of an entire social layer — the American petty-bourgeois intelligentsia — confronting a historical moment that exceeds its ideological capacities. Kempf’s work is therefore valuable not only for what it says, but for what it cannot say; not only for its insights, but for its silences; not only for its historical curiosity, but for the ideological limits that shape it.

Kempf’s collection title, taken from Milton — “What though the field be lost?” — reveals more than the poet might expect. The field is not truly lost. The revolutionary legacy of American history endures. The working class continues to be the key driver of historical change. The contradictions within modern capitalism highlight the need for revolutionary transformation.

What is required is clarity — the clarity that ambivalence cannot provide, the clarity that historical materialism demands, the clarity that the present crisis makes unavoidable.

Kempf’s poetry, for all its limitations, is a symptom of a society on the brink of transformation. It registers the tremors beneath the surface. It senses the approach of great events. It reveals, in its very hesitations, the ideological crisis of a social layer confronted with the return of history. The task now is to move beyond ambivalence — to grasp the field not as lost, but as the terrain upon which the future will be fought.

 Notes

What Though the Field Be Lost: Poet Christopher Kempf’s historical view of contemporary America-Erik Schreiber-www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/07/29/kemp-j29.html


[1] An interview with poet Christopher Kempf, author of What Though the Field Be Lost-www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/08/18/kemp-a18.html

Heather Cox Richardson’s How the South Won the Civil War- How Liberalism Rewrites History to Save Itself

Introduction: Liberal Mythmaking in an Age of Crisis

Heather Cox Richardson’s How the South Won the Civil War (2020) isn’t traditional history but a political commentary disguised as history. Its aim isn’t to clarify the past but to defend the legitimacy of American liberalism during a crisis. The main idea—that the slaveholding South’s “ideology” spread westward and culminated in Donald Trump—serves as a moral story for a confused middle class, reassuring them that the Democratic Party still protects “democracy.”

Richardson’s narrative is a “concentrated expression of the political and historiographical dead end of American liberalism.”¹ This narrative depicts a world where ideas are detached from material realities, class conflict vanishes, and the Democratic Party takes centre stage in American history. However, this is not genuine history; it is a form of ideological self-comfort.

The Civil War as a Bourgeois Revolution

The American Civil War stands as the most significant revolutionary event in U.S. history. Contrary to liberal historiography’s portrayal as a moral struggle between “democracy” and “oligarchy” or a tragic clash of opposing American ideals, it was fundamentally a bourgeois revolution. This upheaval was fueled by the deep-seated contradiction between the South’s slave-based plantation economy and the North’s fast-growing industrial capitalism.

The abolition of slavery was essential to the full development of American capitalism. The Union’s victory dismantled the political influence of the enslaved person owning class, seized control of the plantation aristocracy, and freed four million enslaved individuals. This marked the Second American Revolution, finishing what the first had started: establishing a unified national market and removing pre-capitalist barriers to bourgeois progress. However, like all bourgeois revolutions, it contained inherent contradictions that the bourgeoisie itself could not resolve.

Reconstruction: The High Point of the Democratic Revolution

Reconstruction stood as the most radical democratic effort in American history. During a short-lived phase, Radical Republicans, freedmen, and impoverished Southern whites united to reshape the South around universal male suffrage, public education, civil rights, and the political advancement of formerly enslaved people.

This moment marked the peak of the Second American Revolution’s democratic potential. There was a brief window for a complete transformation of Southern society, including the redistribution of land and the establishment of a biracial democracy focused on labour interests. However, this opportunity was never realised, as the bourgeoisie backed away from the consequences of their own revolution.

The Bourgeoisie Feared the Working Class More Than the Planter Class

Once slavery was abolished and the national market secured, Northern capital no longer needed the freedmen as political allies. What it feared was the emergence of a politically conscious, unified working class—Black and white—whose demands would extend beyond democratic rights to social and economic equality.

The bourgeoisie recognised that the democratic mobilisation unleashed in the South could merge with the rising labour movement in the North. The Great Railroad Strike of 1877 confirmed these fears. Faced with the prospect of a broader class challenge, the bourgeoisie chose to abandon Reconstruction and reconcile with the Southern elite.

The Agrarian Question Was Never Resolved

Reconstruction failed to initiate the agrarian revolution that could have dismantled the economic dominance of former slaveholders. Without redistributing land, political rights remained fragile, leaving freedmen economically reliant on their former masters. This shortcoming was deliberate; the bourgeoisie could not endorse challenging property structures that sustained the reactionary class’s power.

The Democratic Revolution Threatened to Become a Social Revolution

Trotsky’s concept of permanent revolution explains why Reconstruction failed. The bourgeoisie initiates the democratic revolution but cannot finish it because doing so would endanger capitalist property by mobilising the masses. Only the working class has the capacity to complete the revolution. In the 1860s and 1870s, in America, the working class was not ready to take on this role due to a lack of organisation, political independence, and class awareness. Consequently, the revolution remained incomplete.

IV. The Counterrevolution of 1877 and the Consolidation of Jim Crow

The end of Reconstruction was not due to “Northern fatigue,” “racism,” or Southern ideology’s persistence. Instead, it was a counterrevolution led by the bourgeoisie to maintain capitalist dominance.

The Compromise of 1877, which ended federal military presence in the South, coincided with the violent suppression of the Great Railroad Strike. These events were interconnected, representing different aspects of the same class struggle. The bourgeoisie suppressed both the democratic hopes of freedmen and the rising militancy of industrial workers. Consequently, this led to the establishment of the Jim Crow system: Black voter disenfranchisement, the restoration of planter dominance, racial terror, and a strict racial caste hierarchy. This outcome was not a Southern “victory” but a betrayal of the democratic revolution by the Northern bourgeoisie.

The Legacy of the Second American Revolution

The abolition of slavery was irrevocable, but Reconstruction’s failure left the democratic revolution unfinished. Its repercussions influenced American society for over a century: the working class remained racially divided, the South turned into a centre of reactionary politics, and the ideal of multiracial democracy was postponed. Additionally, the capitalist state solidified racial hierarchy as a means of class dominance. The unresolved issues from Reconstruction resurfaced throughout American history—from the Populist movement to the CIO, the civil rights era, and ongoing challenges to American democracy.

The Book’s Foundational Falsehood: The South Did Not Win the Civil War

Richardson’s title serves as a provocation, yet it is historically inaccurate. The South did not achieve victory in the Civil War—neither militarily, politically, nor socially. The slave system was dismantled; the planter aristocracy was broken; and four million enslaved individuals were freed. As the document highlights, these represent “world-historic achievements of the Second American Revolution.”²

Richardson’s trick is to reinterpret “winning” as the subsequent betrayal of Reconstruction. However, this was not a victory for Confederate “ideology.” Instead, it was a shift in class alliances within the Northern bourgeoisie, which, after fulfilling its goals of unifying the nation and dismantling the slave power, chose to forsake the freedmen. It then reconciled with former enslavers to secure capitalist stability in the South.

This was not a triumph of ideas but a victory of property relations. The bourgeoisie pulled back from the revolutionary consequences of Radical Reconstruction because it endangered private property rights and empowered the rising labour movement.³Richardson’s ideological framing—“democracy vs oligarchy”—is a liberal mystification that dissolves the material foundations of the conflict into a moral drama.

 Ideology Without Class: The Liberal Flight from Materialism

Richardson’s story centres on a long-standing conflict between “democracy” and “oligarchy,” but these terms are not purely historical categories; rather, they serve as moral labels. This framing obscures the reality that the Civil War was fundamentally a conflict between two economic systems: chattel slavery, based on plantation agriculture, and free labour, driven by industrial capitalism.

The critique rightly observes that Richardson “substitutes a clash of ideas for a struggle between classes.”⁴ This exemplifies contemporary liberal historiography, which struggles to recognise the importance of class without compromising its political core. By equating the planter class with the modern Republican right as manifestations of a single “ideology,” Richardson neglects the significant changes in American capitalism over the past 150 years. Her approach shifts from detailed analysis to a moral narrative.

The Erasure of the Working Class

Perhaps the most critical flaw in Richardson’s book is its almost complete neglect of the working class. The significant labour struggles of the late 19th century—the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, the Haymarket Riot, the Homestead Strike, and the Pullman Strike—are either overlooked or treated merely as background. Richardson suggests that ‘History is made by elites,’ with the working class only depicted as a passive object of elite kindness or manipulation. This isn’t an accidental omission but a reflection of a class stance: the petty-bourgeois liberal intelligentsia cannot see the working class as an independent historical actor. Its political viewpoint is confined to swinging between “good” and “bad” elites.

The New Deal, in Richardson’s account, becomes a triumph of enlightened leadership rather than a ruling‑class concession extracted under the pressure of mass strikes and the growing influence of socialist ideas.⁶ This is liberal mythology, not history.

The Democratic Party as the Hero of History

Richardson’s narrative clearly aims to reframe the Democratic Party as the enduring protector of democracy. Achieving this requires ignoring a substantial amount of history. Historically, the Democratic Party was associated with slavery, Jim Crow laws, internment of Japanese Americans, initiating the Cold War, and escalating the Vietnam War. Its so-called “progressive” reforms were actually concessions gained through mass activism, which were then reversed once the pressure diminished.⁷

Yet Richardson groups Lincoln, FDR, LBJ, and contemporary Democrats together as part of a single “democratic tradition.” This is more about political branding than analysis. As the critique points out, this framing “serves a clear political purpose: to channel opposition to Trump and the right into support for the Democratic Party.”⁸

Trump as Symptom, Not Confederate Resurrection

Richardson sees Trump as the reincarnation of the Confederate oligarchy, but this oversimplifies the American crisis. Trump isn’t a modern Jefferson Davis; he’s the result of decades of deindustrialisation, loss of stable jobs, working-class hardship, endless imperialist conflicts, and political disintegration. As noted, “Trump is not Jefferson Davis reborn. He is a product of decades of capitalist decay.”⁹ By personalising and moralising Trumpism, Richardson obscures the structural crisis of American capitalism and the bankruptcy of both major parties.

Conclusion: Liberalism’s Desperate Search for a Usable Past

How the South Won the Civil War is more of a political narrative than a serious historical work. It aims to reassure liberal readers that history supports their views, portrays the Democratic Party as the guardian of “democracy,” and considers Trumpism an anomaly rather than a sign of systemic failure. As the critique notes, the book’s popularity reflects the political deadlock of that social class, which desperately seeks a past that can justify remaining loyal to a party aligned with Wall Street and warfare.”¹⁰

Historical materialism points in the opposite direction: toward the necessity of the working class taking power in its own name.

Footnotes

  1. “The book’s thesis can be critically assessed… concentrated expression of the political and historiographical dead end of American liberalism.”
  2. “These were world‑historic achievements of the Second American Revolution.”
  3. “The failure of Reconstruction was the failure of the bourgeoisie to carry through the democratic revolution to its conclusion…”
  4. “Richardson’s framework… substitutes a clash of ideas for a struggle between classes.”
  5. “In Richardson’s narrative, history is made by elites.”
  6. “When the New Deal arrives, it is presented as a victory of enlightened leadership…”
  7. “Its ‘progressive’ reforms have always been concessions wrung from it by mass struggle from below…”
  8. “Richardson’s framing serves a clear political purpose: to channel opposition to Trump… into support for the Democratic Party.”
  9. “Trump is not Jefferson Davis reborn. He is a product of decades of capitalist decay.”
  10. “The book’s popularity… is a measure of the political impasse of that social layer…”

Red Card: The 2026 World Cup, Sportswashing, and the FIFA Greed Machine

Introduction: A Book That Documents Much and Explains Little

Jules Boykoff’s Red Card comes at a time when the 2026 World Cup has already revealed the profound corruption within global capitalism. Hosted by the United States, Mexico, and Canada, the tournament has become a platform for militarisation, xenophobia, financial greed, and the overt display of American dominance. Therefore, Boykoff’s book is especially relevant. It provides a comprehensive list of abuses, including FIFA’s internal corruption and the blatant profiteering by the host countries.

However, the book’s political structure—highlighted right in its title—is fundamentally flawed. “Sportswashing” is not a neutral analytical category but an ideological tool. It originates in Western liberalism to criticise the misconduct of rival nations while concealing the far greater crimes of imperialist powers. Boykoff’s dependence on this framework, combined with Dave Zirin’s role as the introducer, guarantees that “Red Card” remains confined within the pseudo-left sphere from which it originates.

The book highlights symptoms of capitalist decay and exposes corruption, yet it hides its root causes. While condemning abuses and lamenting exploitation, it does not address class rule or imperialism, offering no revolutionary alternative. Essentially, it is a critique that ultimately supports the very system it criticises.

The 2026 World Cup: A Case Study in Imperialist Barbarism

Boykoff’s Red Card honestly details the authoritarian measures surrounding the 2026 tournament. The information is striking: ICE agents at every stadium, transforming venues into extensions of the US deportation system. Dynamic pricing has skyrocketed ticket costs — starting at $10,990, with one reportedly listed at $2.3 million. Iran’s team was prevented from spending a night on US soil, a petty act of geopolitical spite. The Haitian team’s Vertières symbol was forcibly removed, erasing the only successful slave revolution in history. Somali referees were detained and expelled, held for eleven hours without reason. Meanwhile, a “FIFA Peace Prize” was awarded to Donald Trump, a grotesque distortion of reality.

These incidents are part of a consistent pattern: turning a global sporting event into a tool for state repression and imperialist propaganda. The 2026 World Cup is not just commercialised; it has become militarised. It is not only corrupt; it exhibits outright authoritarian tendencies. Boykoff documents these facts but doesn’t explain.

The Ideology of “Sportswashing”

Red Card’s main flaw lies in its dependence on the idea of “sportswashing.” This term, widely promoted by Western NGOs, academics, and media, claims that authoritarian regimes use sports to improve their image. It has been frequently used against Qatar (2022), Russia (2018), China (2008), and Saudi Arabia’s LIV Golf project. However, the 2026 World Cup reveals the shortcomings of this ideological approach.

 Few terms have spread as quickly across the academic, NGO, and media worlds as “sportswashing.” It’s regularly used: Qatar “sportswashed” the 2022 World Cup; Russia “sportswashed” the 2018 tournament; Saudi Arabia “sportswashed” its LIV Golf project; China “sportswashed” the 2008 Olympics. The underlying message remains consistent: authoritarian regimes leverage sport to clean up their images.

This idea is not merely insufficient; it is ideologically toxic. It hides the true forces behind global power, sustains Western imperialism’s moral claims, and distracts from the capitalist system that has turned sports into a multimillion-dollar tool for exploitation and propaganda. “Sportswashing” isn’t just a descriptive term; it’s a strategic political tool.

The Liberal Origin of the Concept

The term did not originate in Marxist theory but rather in Western think tanks, human-rights NGOs, and media aligned with US foreign policy interests. It belongs to the same ideological toolkit as terms like “authoritarianism,” “rogue states,” “malign influence,” “hybrid warfare,” and “democratic values.” These are not neutral labels; they serve as geopolitical signals that justify the actions of imperialist powers and portray their opponents as threats.

The brutality is not concealed; it is flaunted. The Haitian team is ordered to remove the symbol of the only successful slave revolution in history. The Iranian team is barred from sleeping on US soil. ICE agents patrol stadiums. Ticket prices reach $2.3 million. A Somali referee is detained and expelled.

The phrase ‘what is being washed’ is misleading; nothing is actually being cleaned. The violence is the actual focus. The idea falls apart because it was never meant to analyse imperialism, only to conceal it. In section IV, the double standard becomes clear: Qatar and Russia are labelled sportswashes, but the US isn’t. Western media in 2022 held Qatar accountable for migrant worker deaths to criticise a geopolitical rival. Meanwhile, U.S. actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen—costing hundreds of thousands to millions of lives—were not called ‘sportswashing’ or ‘human rights abuses’ related to sports. This double standard shows how the concept is used selectively to serve Western foreign policy goals.

The Class Function of the Concept

“Sportswashing” is not just hypocritical; it serves a specific ideological purpose. It individualizes systemic issues by shifting the blame for corruption onto “bad regimes,” ignoring the broader global capitalist system. It moralizes politics by replacing analysis of class relations with a focus on virtue and vice. It diverts attention from imperialism, with US and allied crimes hidden behind moral condemnation aimed at rivals. It obscures the involvement of Western corporations—such as Nike, Adidas, Coca-Cola, Visa, Fox, Comcast, and JP Morgan—that are the real profiteers. Lastly, it depoliticizes the working class. In essence, “sportswashing” functions as a bourgeois mystification.

The Pseudo‑Left’s Embrace of the Concept

The pseudo-left, including figures like Dave Zirin, Jacobin writers, and the academic “sports activism” community, has eagerly adopted the term. This is no coincidence. The pseudo-left tends to dismiss class analysis in favor of identity politics, aligns with the Democratic Party’s foreign policy goals, moralizes politics rather than analyzes it, and replaces revolutionary strategies with activism. “Sportswashing” seamlessly fits into this ideological framework, enabling the pseudo-left to appear radical while supporting the geopolitical narratives of the US government.

The United States Is Not “Washing” Anything

The US is not hiding its crimes behind the World Cup; instead, it is using the event to promote them. The genocide in Gaza is openly defended rather than concealed. The offensive against Iran is being escalated rather than softened. The militarization of the US–Mexico border is celebrated openly instead of being disguised. The shift toward authoritarianism is being normalized rather than mitigated. What is the supposed ‘washing’? The brutality is not hidden; it is displayed proudly.

“Sportswashing” Is a Tool of Imperialist Hypocrisy

As WSWS writers like Peter Schwarz have highlighted, the Western media’s criticism of Qatar’s migrant worker policies was never genuinely about human rights. These outlets remained silent on the over a million deaths caused by US-led wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The term “sportswashing” is used as a geopolitical weapon rather than a sincere ethical critique. Boykoff adopts this perspective uncritically, which causes him to overlook a key point: the core issue isn’t authoritarianism, but imperialism; not corruption, but capitalism.

Dave Zirin and the Politics of the Pseudo‑Left

Having Dave Zirin, the sports editor of The Nation, as the introducer highlights a political stance. Zirin symbolises the American pseudo-left: he is radical in speech but reformist in action, and his politics are aligned with the Democratic Party. While he condemns racism, exploitation, and corruption, he does not see the working class as the revolutionary force that can end these issues. His approach favours ongoing protest rather than socialist change.

Zirin’s framework considers racism and sexism as independent systems, separate from capitalist social relations. This approach enables him to criticize injustice without questioning the underlying economic structures that cause it. Zirin supported Bernie Sanders, whose role was to direct working-class frustration within the Democratic Party. However, his critique of sports capitalism does not advocate for the working class to disconnect from the Democrats and form an independent political movement. Boykoff’s book, introduced by Zirin, shares these limitations.

What the Book Cannot Say: The Marxist Explanation

A truly groundbreaking analysis of the 2026 World Cup must begin with these fundamental assumptions: 1. Sport as a Social Product of the Working Class: Football is not merely a bourgeois invention but a collective cultural creation of the working class, later exploited by capital. 2. FIFA as a Tool for Global Finance Capital: FIFA’s corruption is not just individual misconduct but results from its structural connections to media monopolies, financial institutions, corporate sponsors, and the geopolitical interests of major imperialist countries. 3. The 2026 World Cup as a Political Event: It highlights the intertwining of sport with political agendas, state repression, the use of mega-events to normalize militarization, the subordination of culture to capital, and the ideological mobilization of nationalism to divide workers. These insights fall outside the conceptual scope of Boykoff and Zirin.

Conclusion: A Book That Reveals the Crisis but Conceals Its Cause

Red Card presents a contradictory stance. It passionately condemns the barbarity of the 2026 World Cup but fails to propose solutions. Its liberal perspective doesn’t address imperialism’s realities and instead directs anger toward reformist dead-ends. While highlighting corruption, it neglects to critique the capitalist system that sustains it. Overall, Red Card isn’t a radical critique; it underscores the ideological limits of the pseudo-left. The working class’s goal isn’t to reform FIFA or combat sportswashing but to overthrow capitalism, which has turned every facet of life, including sports, into a space of exploitation, repression, and profit.

A “Masterclass in Scholarship” or an Ideological Retreat? John Morrill’s Cromwell Edition and the Politics of Historical Revisionism

The publication of John Morrill’s new edition of The Letters, Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell has been greeted with a remarkable unanimity of praise from the historical profession. Such consensus is itself a political fact. As the uploaded document insists, this edition “deserves to be examined not merely as an editorial achievement but in terms of its political and historiographical implications,” and the “universal acclaim from the historical profession should itself be interrogated.”¹ The task of Marxist historiography is not to echo academic fashion but to expose the class forces that shape it. Morrill’s edition is not a neutral scholarly improvement upon Thomas Carlyle’s 1845 text; it is an intervention in a decades‑long ideological struggle over the meaning of the English Revolution.

Carlyle’s Edition and the Revolutionary Tradition

Thomas Carlyle’s 1845 edition of Cromwell’s writings was a landmark in nineteenth‑century historiography. Despite his limitations—his “great man” theory and his later reactionary turn—Carlyle possessed the intellectual courage to recognise Cromwell as a revolutionary figure. Marx praised Carlyle for having “taken the literary field against the bourgeoisie at a time when its views, tastes and ideas held the whole of official English literature totally in thrall,” citing “his apology for Cromwell” as one of his most significant interventions.²

Carlyle understood, however imperfectly, that the English Civil War was not a constitutional misunderstanding but, in the words of the uploaded document, “a world-historical convulsion in which a class seized power through the execution of a king.”³ This insight—partial, distorted, but nonetheless real—explains why Marx and Engels valued Carlyle’s work. They recognised in the English Revolution the first great bourgeois revolution, the event that cleared the ground for capitalist development and inaugurated the modern epoch.

Carlyle’s edition was flawed, as the document acknowledges: “his transcriptions were not always reliable, his selection was idiosyncratic, his commentary was infused with his own increasingly authoritarian worldview.”⁴ But these were the flaws of a bourgeois radical struggling to articulate the class dynamics of a revolution whose full meaning only Marxism could later reveal.

The Rise of Revisionism and Morrill’s Role

John Morrill is not a neutral editor. He is a leading figure of the revisionist school that has dominated English Civil War historiography since the 1970s. This tendency—associated with Conrad Russell and others—denies that the 1640s constituted a bourgeois revolution. It rejects the notion of a rising bourgeoisie, dismisses the class character of the conflict, and reinterprets the revolution as a contingent political or religious crisis.

The revisionists insist that “there was no bourgeois revolution because there was no rising bourgeoisie and that people from all social classes can be found on either side of the struggle.”⁵ Even Cromwell, they argue, was not a revolutionary but “a representative of the declining gentry.”⁶

This is the intellectual framework within which Morrill has worked for decades. His edition is therefore, as the document states, “not a politically innocent replacement of a ‘flawed’ Victorian text with a ‘scientific’ modern one. It is an intervention in a long-running class struggle within historiography.”⁷

What Revisionism Seeks to Erase

The revisionist school does not correct Carlyle’s limitations from a more advanced standpoint. It retreats from them. It denies that the English Revolution was a revolution at all.

Against this retreat, Christopher Hill’s Marxist historiography stands as a towering achievement. Hill demonstrated in God’s Englishman that Cromwell was a revolutionary leader of the bourgeoisie: a man who purged Parliament until it reflected the needs of his class, built the New Model Army as an instrument of revolutionary power, and suppressed the Levellers when they threatened to push the revolution beyond the limits of capitalist development. Hill’s position was that Cromwell “must be understood as a revolutionary leader of the bourgeoisie… who suppressed the Levellers when the plebeian elements threatened to push the revolution beyond the limits required for capitalist society.”⁸

Hill’s work followed Trotsky’s analysis in Where Is Britain Going?, which identified two revolutionary traditions in British history—Cromwell and Chartism—both of which were systematically denied by the Whig myth of gradualism. Revisionism, for all its claims to sophistication, represents a return to this Whig outlook: the comforting fiction that Britain has been uniquely blessed with peaceful, incremental change. As the document notes, Simon Schama proudly declares himself “a born-again Whig.”⁹

The Political Meaning of Today’s Acclaim

The universal praise for Morrill’s edition is not a matter of scholarly merit alone. It reflects the political trajectory of the bourgeoisie itself. The class that once celebrated Cromwell as its revolutionary ancestor now finds that ancestry embarrassing. Having long since abandoned all progressive historical tasks, the bourgeoisie prefers to pretend that revolution never happened.

The bourgeoisie now insists that “the execution of Charles I was a regrettable incident, that the Levellers were irrelevant extremists, and that the whole unpleasant episode could have been avoided if only people had been more reasonable.”¹⁰This ideological sanitisation is not accidental. It serves contemporary political needs. A ruling class that fears revolution must deny that revolutions have ever been necessary, progressive, or successful.

Hence, the “unanimity of the acclaim” for Morrill’s edition. It “conforms to what the contemporary historical profession wants to believe about the seventeenth century and about revolution in general.”¹¹ A genuinely critical edition—one that illuminated rather than obscured the class forces at work—would not receive such praise.

The Working Class and the Revolutionary Heritage

The working class has every interest in understanding the English Revolution for what it was: the first in the series of bourgeois revolutions that created the conditions for modern capitalism and, in doing so, brought into being the proletariat itself.

The revolutionary traditions of the bourgeoisie—however historically limited—belong not to today’s anaemic liberalism but to the international working class. As the document concludes, these traditions “belong to the heritage of the international working class – not to the anaemic, phlegmatic liberalism that now disowns them.”¹²

To defend the revolutionary content of the English Civil War is therefore not an antiquarian exercise. It is part of the broader struggle to arm the working class with an understanding of the historical processes that shaped the modern world—and to expose the ideological falsifications through which the bourgeoisie seeks to obscure its own past and the revolutionary future that confronts it.

Notes

  1.  “This is a significant publication… the universal acclaim from the historical profession should itself be interrogated.”
  2. Ibid.: Marx praised Carlyle for “having taken the literary field against the bourgeoisie… citing specifically ‘his apology for Cromwell’.”
  3. Ibid.: Carlyle recognised the Civil War as “a world-historical convulsion in which a class seized power through the execution of a king.”
  4. Ibid.: “His transcriptions were not always reliable… his commentary was infused with his own increasingly authoritarian worldview.”
  5. Ibid.: “There was no bourgeois revolution because there was no rising bourgeoisie…”
  6. Ibid.: “Even Cromwell… can better be understood as a representative of the declining gentry.”
  7. Ibid.: Morrill’s edition “is an intervention in a long-running class struggle within historiography.”
  8. Ibid.: Cromwell “must be understood as a revolutionary leader of the bourgeoisie… who suppressed the Levellers…”
  9. Ibid.: “Simon Schama… happily declares himself ‘a born-again Whig.’”
  10. Ibid.: The bourgeoisie now claims “the execution of Charles I was a regrettable incident…”
  11. Ibid.: Morrill’s edition “conforms to what the contemporary historical profession wants to believe…”
  12. Ibid.: “The revolutionary traditions of the bourgeoisie… belong to the heritage of the international working class.”

Carlo Ginzburg (1939–2026): An Obituary of a Historian of the Fragment in an Age of Retreat¹

Carlo Ginzburg, who died on June 17th  2026, at the age of 87, was one of the most influential historians of the late twentieth century—a scholar whose work, especially The Cheese and the Worms, became emblematic of the micro historical turn that reshaped large sectors of the historical profession from the 1970s onward.² His death marks the passing of a figure whose intellectual trajectory expressed, in concentrated form, the political and theoretical disorientation of an entire generation of European intellectuals confronted with the defeats of the working class and the collapse of the revolutionary movements of the post‑1968 period.³

Ginzburg was an exceptionally knowledgeable historian, known for his precise philology and archival skills. However, despite his brilliance, his work was fundamentally limited by a significant theoretical shortcoming: he distanced himself from the analysis of social totality, class relations, and the laws governing historical progress.⁴ His body of work serves as a testament to the intellectual impact of the prolonged decline of the workers’ movement, the fading of Marxism in academia, and the growth of culturalist approaches that prioritized fragments over entire systems, anecdotes over structures, and the idea of the “exceptional normal” over the actual processes of class struggle.⁵

A Scholar Formed in the Ruins of the Italian Left

Born in Turin in 1939 to the literary critic Leone Ginzburg and the novelist Natalia Ginzburg, Carlo Ginzburg grew up in a milieu shaped by anti‑fascist resistance and the cultural ferment of postwar Italy.⁶ His intellectual development occurred not during the revolutionary surge of the late 1960s but afterwards, as that movement waned. The autunno caldo of 1969, along with the factory councils and mass strikes that challenged Italian capitalism, was succeeded by the fragmentation of the extra-parliamentary left, the infiltration of terrorism by some intelligentsia, and an overall sense of demoralization within the radical circles.⁷

It was in this context—of retreat, exhaustion, and the abandonment of revolutionary politics—that microhistory emerged as a self‑consciously anti‑totalizing method.⁸ Ginzburg wasn’t a direct participant in these conflicts, but his intellectual focus was influenced by the same circumstances. His shift away from topics like class, modes of production, and the analysis of capitalist development toward the local, the unusual, and the culturally unique was intentional. It reflected the ideology of a generation that had become disillusioned with the prospects of revolutionary change.⁹

The Cheese and the Worms: Achievement and Limitation

Ginzburg’s most celebrated work, The Cheese and the Worms (1976), reconstructed the mental universe of Menocchio, a sixteenth‑century Friulian miller executed by the Inquisition.¹⁰ Through painstaking analysis of trial records, Ginzburg demonstrated that this semi‑literate peasant possessed a strikingly original cosmology, drawing on scraps of printed books, oral traditions, and his own material experience.¹¹

This was a real achievement. Against the Annales School’s depersonalised serial history—what Guy Bois called “a history without people”—Ginzburg insisted that the consciousness of the oppressed was recoverable, complex, and worthy of study.¹² Yet the very category at the heart of the book—“popular culture”—revealed the idealist foundation of Ginzburg’s method.¹³ Popular culture was defined not by class position or the relations of production but by its opposition to “elite” culture.¹⁴

Menocchio’s cosmology—his vision of the world emerging from chaos “just as cheese is made from milk, and worms appear in it”—was rooted in his daily labour as a miller.¹⁵ But Ginzburg’s framework could not account for this material determination. Culture, in his hands, became autonomous, self‑generating, governed by internal dynamics of transmission and reinterpretation.¹⁶

Microhistory and the Flight from Totality

Ginzburg’s microhistory was premised on the intensive study of the “exceptional normal”—the anomalous case that illuminates broader structures.¹⁷ But as a programmatic orientation, microhistory systematically avoided the analysis of the totality of social relations.¹⁸ It substituted the fragment for the whole.

Marxism does not reject the study of individuals or local contexts. The Eighteenth Brumaire is a masterful analysis of individual actors—Louis Bonaparte, the party leaders, the lumpen conspirators—. Still, these individuals are understood as representatives of class forces acting within a determinate historical conjuncture.¹⁹ Ginzburg’s method, by contrast, provided no basis for moving from the village miller to the feudal mode of production, from the Inquisition trial to the role of the Church in the class struggles of early modern Europe.²⁰

The “Evidential Paradigm”: A Retreat from Scientific Method

In “Clues: Roots of an Evidential Paradigm” (1979), Ginzburg proposed an epistemology based on the hunter’s tracking of traces—the conjectural reconstruction of reality from insignificant details.²¹ He counterposed this to the “Galilean” paradigm of experimental, mathematical science.²²

From a Marxist standpoint, this represented a retreat from the aspiration to scientific knowledge of society.²³ The “evidential paradigm” elevated the fragmentary, the intuitive, and the conjectural into a methodological principle.²⁴

Ginzburg and Gramsci: A Culturalist Appropriation

Ginzburg engaged with Marxism primarily through the cultural writings of Antonio Gramsci.²⁵ But his use of Gramsci was selective and culturalist. He extracted insights into hegemony while discarding the revolutionary political framework within which those insights were developed.²⁶

Gramsci’s concept of hegemony was not a cultural‑studies toolkit; it was a theory of bourgeois rule and proletarian revolution.²⁷ Ginzburg’s Gramsci was a Gramsci without the October Revolution, without the factory councils, without the Communist Party.²⁸

Legacy: A Historian of the Fragment in an Age of Defeat

Carlo Ginzburg leaves behind a body of work that is often brilliant in its particulars, rich in empirical detail, and animated by a genuine commitment to recovering the voices of the oppressed.²⁹ But his work does not provide an alternative to historical materialism.³⁰ It provides, at best, empirical material that can only be adequately understood through the Marxist method he declined to embrace.³¹

Microhistory can tell us what Menocchio thought; it cannot explain why he thought it, why he was burned for it, or why the society that burned him was destined to be overthrown by the class whose labour sustained it.³² Those questions require a theory of history grounded in the mode of production, class struggle, and the laws of social development.³³

ENDNOTES

  1. For a biographical overview, see Carlo Ginzburg, Il filo e le tracce (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2006).
  2. Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth‑Century Miller, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
  3. Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism (London: HarperCollins, 1996).
  4. Perry Anderson, “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci,” New Left Review I/100 (1976).
  5. Geoff Eley, A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 2005).
  6. Natalia Ginzburg, Family Lexicon, trans. Jenny McPhee (New York: NYRB Classics, 2017).
  7. Robert Lumley, States of Emergency: Cultures of Revolt in Italy from 1968 to 1978 (London: Verso, 1990).
  8. Giovanni Levi, “On Microhistory,” in New Perspectives on Historical Writing, ed. Peter Burke (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).
  9. Eley, A Crooked Line.
  10. Ginzburg, Cheese and the Worms.
  11. Ibid.
  12. Guy Bois, The Crisis of Feudalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
  13. Eley, A Crooked Line.
  14. Levi, “On Microhistory.”
  15. Ginzburg, Cheese and the Worms, 4.
  16. Ibid.
  17. Carlo Ginzburg, “Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know About It,” Critical Inquiry 20, no. 1 (1993).
  18. Ibid.
  19. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852).
  20. Bois, Crisis of Feudalism.
  21. Carlo Ginzburg, “Clues: Roots of an Evidential Paradigm,” Theory and Society 7, no. 3 (1979).
  22. Ibid.
  23. Alex Callinicos, Making History (Leiden: Brill, 2004).
  24. Ginzburg, “Clues.”
  25. Carlo Ginzburg, “Some Queries Addressed to Myself,” in Threads and Traces (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).
  26. Anderson, “Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci.”
  27. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. Hoare and Nowell‑Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971).
  28. Ibid.
  29. Ginzburg, Threads and Traces.
  30. Callinicos, Making History.
  31. Ibid.
  32. Ginzburg, Cheese and the Worms.
  33. Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire.

A Marxist Critique of Robin Blackburn’s An Unfinished Revolution: Karl Marx and Abraham Lincoln

Robin Blackburn’s An Unfinished Revolution: Karl Marx and Abraham Lincoln offers a significant addition to the study of Marx’s role in the American Civil War. It includes Marx’s journalism, his letters to Engels, and the International Workingmen’s Association’s messages to Lincoln. However, as the review suggests, Blackburn’s political and methodological approach—shaped by the decline of the academic left and its distancing from revolutionary Marxism—limits the interpretations. While the book sheds light on many aspects, it ultimately does not fully capture the revolutionary importance of the history it describes.

Blackburn’s observations are accurate. He rightly highlights that Marx’s engagement with the Civil War was core to his political work in the 1860s, not just a side interest. As the review states, Marx closely tracked military campaigns, contributed extensively to the New York Daily Tribune and the Vienna Presse, and coordinated widespread working-class resistance in Britain against Palmerston’s pro-Confederate interventionist policies.”¹ Blackburn also notes Marx’s respect for Lincoln as a bourgeois revolutionary who, faced with circumstances, went beyond his class boundaries. Marx’s 1865 tribute—cited in the assessment—praises Lincoln as “one of the rare men who succeed in becoming great, without ceasing to be good.”²—was not diplomatic rhetoric but a political judgment grounded in historical necessity.

Blackburn’s political framework is rooted in his longstanding connection to the New Left Review and its post-Trotskyist origins. The assessment places Blackburn within the tradition of the International Marxist Group and the reunified Fourth International, which split from the International Committee in 1963, leading to a trajectory of political abandonment. This milieu transitioned from Pabloite entryism into the Labour Party to Eurocommunism, support for national-liberation movements, and ultimately to academic postmodernism and identity politics prevalent in today’s pseudo-left. As noted, this development “is not a series of disconnected errors. It flows from the abandonment of the central Marxist principle: the political independence of the working class and the fight for world socialist revolution”.”³

This political lineage influences Blackburn’s view of the American Revolution as an unfinished process. Marx considered the Civil War a bourgeois-democratic revolution that dismantled the slaveholding elite. However, the emancipation of four million enslaved individuals highlighted social issues—land redistribution, political rights, education, and economic independence—that capitalism could not address. The failure of Reconstruction—marked by the withdrawal of federal troops and the reinstatement of white supremacist rule in the South—further exemplifies this ongoing incompleteness.”⁴—expressed the class limits of the bourgeoisie, not the failure of American democracy in the abstract. From this perspective, the unfinished tasks of the Civil War point not toward liberal reform but toward socialist revolution.

Blackburn, however, examines the issue from a left-liberal reformist perspective. The critique suggests that the New Left Review’s shifting politics—ranging from Keynesianism to left-nationalism and academic radicalism—fail to recognize the working class as a crucial revolutionary subject. Consequently, their idea of the “unfinished revolution” stays confined within bourgeois political boundaries. Here, the working class is seen merely as an object of analysis rather than as an active agent shaping history.

The methodological critique is equally decisive. Marx did not approach the Civil War as an intellectual curiosity but as a revolutionary strategist. His journalism was “a political act aimed at clarifying the stakes of the conflict for workers in Europe and America.”⁵ He aimed to analyze the class forces at play and the strategic consequences of their conflict. Blackburn’s research, however, views Marx’s involvement as a moment in intellectual history rather than a blueprint for revolutionary action. This difference in approach highlights the divide between Marxism as a revolutionary practice and the academic Marxism that now largely influences the post-Trotskyist left.

The assessment compares Blackburn’s method with the stance of the International Committee of the Fourth International regarding the 1619 Project. It characterizes the project as a defense of the revolutionary legacy of the Civil War, opposing a racialist misrepresentation. The argument suggests that the 1619 Project replaces “an immutable racial pathology”⁶ with the class dynamics of American history, thereby serving contemporary ruling‑class interests by dividing the working class. This example illustrates what it means to apply Marx’s method to contemporary political struggles: history is not merely to be interpreted but to be used as a guide to revolutionary practice.

The review concludes by asserting that the working class is the rightful successor to the democratic revolutions of 1776 and 1865. These victories—such as equality before the law, the abolition of slavery, and birthright citizenship—are currently under persistent threat from a capitalist oligarchy that is shifting towards authoritarianism. Defending these gains is inherently linked to the struggle for socialism. As David North writes, “The American working class will not arrive at the construction of independent organs of struggle and rule without studying the history of the country in which it lives.”⁷ The unfinished tasks of the Civil War, the assessment argues, cannot be resolved within the framework of the New Left Review or the academic left more broadly.

Blackburn’s book is useful but constrained. It retrieves key historical data but misses its revolutionary significance. A true Marxist approach to the Civil War should start not with academic analysis but with revolutionary planning. Only then can the concept of the “unfinished revolution” be fully understood and realized.

Footnotes

  1. A Marxist Assessment of Robin Blackburn’s An Unfinished Revolution, 1. (“Marx followed the military campaigns in detail, wrote extensively… organised mass working-class opposition…”)
  2. Ibid., 2. (“one of the rare men who succeed in becoming great, without ceasing to be good”)
  3. Ibid., 3. (“is not a series of disconnected errors… abandonment of the central Marxist principle…”)
  4. Ibid., 4. (“the withdrawal of federal troops, the restoration of white supremacist rule in the South”)
  5. Ibid., 5. (“a political act aimed at clarifying the stakes of the conflict for workers…”)
  6. Ibid., 6. (“an immutable racial pathology”)
  7. Ibid., 7. (“The American working class will not arrive at the construction of independent organs of struggle…”)

The Impotence of the Pabloite Critique: Tariq Ali and the Politics of Permanent Evasion

The political turmoil in the British Labour Party has once again prompted a wave of commentary from the pseudo-left intelligentsia. Tariq Ali’s recent article “Tweedledee” is particularly revealing; despite its superficial correctness, it ultimately exposes the exhaustion of the Pabloite tradition he has represented for over fifty years. Ali’s article lists accurate observations that ultimately lead nowhere, serving as a display of radical awareness designed to stop the working class from reaching revolutionary insights.[1]

Ali’s critique of Starmer and Burnham is accurate but ultimately ineffective. He is “factually correct on many points,” such as Starmer’s targeting of the left, his backing of austerity and the Gaza conflict, and Burnham’s clear stance on welfare reductions and increased militarism. Ali even admits that Labour’s drop to 18 per cent reflects a broader collapse of social democracy across the continent, driven by “total capitulation to the markets and US policies.” These are significant acknowledgements.

However, these are the admissions of a man who has spent years recording failures without ever helping to create a revolutionary alternative. Ali’s is “the truth of the salon radical,” someone who watches history from a distance and then congratulates himself for seeing the blood on the floor.

A Political Life in Permanent Retreat

Tariq Ali’s political journey does not trace the path of a revolutionary who has strayed or a Marxist corrupted by age. Instead, it reflects a man who remained within the petty-bourgeois radical environment that influenced him, with his career marked by adapting to the forces he once opposed. His recent article, “Tweedledee,” is not an anomaly but a reflection of a lifetime spent avoiding the core issue of modern politics: the need to develop a revolutionary leadership within the working class.

Ali’s political biography recounts a series of retreats, often cloaked in rhetorical flourish and geopolitical analysis. His life has been shaped by Pabloism, the ideology that fragmented the Fourth International into the “broad left,” subordinated Marxism to Stalinism and bourgeois nationalism, and shifted focus from revolutionary strategy to impressionistic commentary on global affairs.

The Early Years: Radicalism Without Strategy

Ali’s early prominence in the late 1960s—through his involvement with the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, media presence, and ties to the International Marxist Group—has been mythologised as proof of revolutionary dedication. However, it actually reflected the political stance of a generation of radicalised students who, while genuinely opposed to imperialism, still maintained a fundamentally petty-bourgeois class perspective.

The IMG, representing the British section of the Pabloite “Fourth International,” already believed that external forces would inevitably pressure Stalinist, social-democratic, and nationalist bureaucracies to adopt revolutionary roles. Ali fully supported this view, which provided a convenient excuse for avoiding the difficult and unglamorous work of building a Marxist party within the working class. According to David Walsh, Ali “passed through the International Marxist Group… as a careerist passes through a fashionable phase,” and his greed and self-interest “developed early on, and just grew.”

The 1970s–80s: From Revolutionary Pretensions to Open Adaptation

The dissolution of the IMG into the Labour Party in 1981 was not a betrayal of its principles but their natural evolution. Pabloism consistently opposed the working class’s struggle for political independence. Ali’s active involvement in this process demonstrated his shift from a radical outsider to a left-wing figure within the Labour structure.

During this time, Ali’s political writing increasingly focused on geopolitical issues. His books on the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and world politics consistently failed to mention the working class as an active force in history. Instead, he highlighted “progressive” bourgeois figures, nationalist leaders, and dissident bureaucrats as the main agents of change.

His 1988 tribute to Boris Yeltsin’s “political courage” stands out as a particularly grotesque example. It is not surprising that Ali could praise the man responsible for dismantling the USSR, looting its social resources, and causing hardship for millions. This attitude epitomises Pabloite politics: the idea that history is shaped by enlightened elites rather than the working class.

The 1990s–2000s: The Global Commentator and the Lesser Evilist

By the 1990s, Ali had established himself as a prominent figure in the global commentariat. He was no longer seen as a revolutionary but rather as a left-leaning analyst providing insights on world events for the liberal intellectuals. During this period, his political responses show a growing alignment with bourgeois politics.

His advisory role with Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party—widely viewed as highly corrupt and reactionary in South Asia—was part of his consistent alignment with “progressive” elites and not a mistake. His 2004 endorsement of John Kerry, motivated by the belief that “a defeat for a warmonger government would be seen as a step forward,” exemplifies decades of justifying lesser-evil tactics. This approach characterises his political strategy: a series of capitulations to bourgeois politics disguised as sophisticated radicalism.

The New Left Review and the Cultivation of Cynicism

Ali’s extensive connection with the New Left Review has played a key role in shaping his political development. The NLR, acting as the intellectual hub for the Pabloite thinkers, has influenced Ali’s outlook, combining literary depth, geopolitical insights, and a cultivated sense of pessimism.

Ali’s writing embodies the NLR’s typical outlook—cynicism masked as realism. His “Tweedledee” article showcases this, offering a confident shrug at Labourism’s crisis. It presents accurate observations but shows no revolutionary intent; it’s “the knowing shrug of the NLR intellectual who has seen it all and believes nothing can be changed.”

This cynicism is not harmless. It functions as a political brake, ensuring that the working class remains trapped within the framework of bourgeois politics. 

The Present: A Spent Force in a New Crisis

The current British political crisis—marked by Starmer’s downfall, Burnham’s rise, and the collapse of social democracy—has revealed the failure of the pseudo-left. Ali’s reply has been to vaguely reference the Greens and the remnants of Corbynism without critically assessing their true influence.

He cannot face the reality that the Greens “actively supplied their voters to Burnham” or that Corbynism “exists in name only” following its systematic demobilisation by Corbyn himself. Recognising this would mean admitting that the pseudo-left has significantly hindered the rise of a revolutionary alternative. Ali is unable to reach revolutionary conclusions because he has spent his entire political career avoiding such insights.

Tariq Ali as a Political Type

Tariq Ali embodies a political archetype: a Pabloite intellectual who favours commentary over strategy, cynicism over Marxism, and adaptation over fight. His political journey—from an IMG radical to NLR leader, from a Yeltsin supporter to a Corbyn sympathiser—reflects a tradition that has repeatedly betrayed the working class. The pseudo-left is not an ally for revolution but an obstacle. Ali’s career exemplifies this pattern.

The Pabloite Method: Cynicism as a Worldview

Ali’s political ineffectiveness is rooted in his methodological approach rather than personal failings. It stems from the Pabloite tradition he came from and remains connected to through the New Left Review, which he recommends at the end of his article. Pabloism has shifted away from the Marxist view of the working class as the revolutionary agent. Instead, it favours geopolitical speculation, petty-bourgeois radicalism, and a cultivated cynicism that dismisses revolutionary strategy as naive.

Pabloism replaces class analysis with geopolitical commentary, replaces revolutionary strategy with world-weary cynicism, and favours literary sophistication over the diligent work of building a party. Ali’s label, “Tweedledee,” is more than just a dismissive joke; it symbolises the attitude of an NLR intellectual who believes they have seen everything and that nothing can change. It suggests that all parties are identical, outcomes are fixed, and resistance is pointless. This attitude is not Marxism but resignation disguised as insight.

Ali admits that the Corbyn supporters “disgraced themselves by rejoining the Parliamentary Labour Party,” but he still sees them as the foundation for creating something new. This isn’t analysis; it’s avoidance. Asking why Corbynism didn’t succeed means confronting the influence of the trade-union bureaucracy, the Labour left, and the pseudo-left intellectuals—including Ali himself—that prevented an independent working-class movement from forming. And that’s a question Ali cannot pose, because he has no answer.

The Real Question: What Is to Be Done?

Labour’s crisis isn’t about personalities or shifting policies. It reveals a fundamental truth: Labour, as the WSWS states, is “a political tool of the corporate and financial elite—body and soul.” Burnham isn’t just a lesser evil; he’s a candidate representing continuity who will deepen the attack on workers. The Corbyn supporters and the trade-union leadership have been key in silencing opposition and maintaining Labour’s authority.

The pseudo-left—spanning from the New Left Review and the Greens to the Corbynite faction—acts not as a genuine alternative but as an obstacle. Its purpose is to articulate the crisis within bourgeois politics in increasingly elaborate terms, all the while preventing the working class from reaching revolutionary conclusions. The working class doesn’t require more superficial commentary like Tweedledum-and-Tweedledee; it needs its own political party.


[1] Tweedledee Tariq Ali 19 June 2026-newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/tweedledee