The Limits of Cultural Critique Under Capitalism: Or The Seduction and Failure of Cultural Critique

Cultural critique under capitalism faces a paradox. It can reveal how capital exploits and sanitises opposition, yet it often halts at Marxist analysis. The Frankfurt School identified the industrialisation of culture with sharp insight, and Baudrillard analysed the spread of sign-value with notable brilliance. However, both eventually withdrew from class struggle, falling into pessimism, nihilism, or a focus on the simulacrum’s metaphysics. While their descriptions are insightful, their political outcomes can be harmful.

The CUPRA ad campaign—a shiny interpretation of “street culture” aimed at selling a €26,000 electric vehicle—serves as a prime example for exploring this contradiction. It shows how cultural critique can shed light on capitalism’s ideological workings while also exposing the limitations of viewing culture as separate from production. The ad’s boldness, its cynical awareness, and its portrayal of “rebellion” as a buyable lifestyle make sense when examined through the ideas of Adorno, Horkheimer, Debord, and Baudrillard. However, the campaign’s most profound contradiction isn’t in its imagery. Still, in the social relationships it omits: the workers at Martorell who assemble the car, the union officials overseeing them, and the gentrification of Barcelona’s neighbourhoods, which the campaign’s aesthetic exploits.

The Frankfurt School

The Frankfurt School’s concept of the culture industry remains one of the most detailed analyses of how culture is produced under monopoly capitalism. Adorno and Horkheimer recognized that culture had become industrialized, standardized, and turned into a commodity; that false uniqueness concealed the uniformity of mass-produced items; and that the idea of personal expression served as a tool for ideological control. However, their cultural theory was inherently biased politically. It was based on the idea that the working class had been fully integrated into capitalism, with its revolutionary capacity depleted. The notion of a “totally administered society” was not an insight but a conclusion based on the failures of the 1930s and the betrayals by Stalinism. The culture industry concept was created to explain why the working class no longer pursued revolutionary change — not to explore capitalism’s inherent contradictions.

This is the Frankfurt School’s critical flaw. Their descriptive insights are compelling because they remain detached from the political outcomes they aim to support. While their analysis of commodified culture can be adopted, the political implications cannot. The CUPRA campaign exemplifies this well. The ad’s false rebellion, its industrial-like aesthetic of “authenticity,” and its simplification of lived struggle into stylish consumption all align with the Frankfurt School’s framework. However, the political conclusion Adorno might make — that resistance is pointless, that the working class is co-opted, and that critique is the sole form of negativity left — is contradicted by the very production conditions the ad hides.

Baudrillard: When Cultural Critique Becomes Liquidation

If the Frankfurt School embodies the more pessimistic side of Western Marxism, Baudrillard represents its end. His early work on consumer society offers insightful observations on advertising, identity fetishism, and the spread of sign-value. However, the turning point comes with The Mirror of Production (1975), where Baudrillard sharply rejects Marxism, calls use-value and exchange-value outdated categories, and argues that signs have replaced production as society’s main organising principle. This shift is not just a theoretical development; it is a direct challenge.

Baudrillard’s focus on consumption rather than production highlights the political decline of a petty-bourgeois class that abandoned revolutionary efforts after 1968. His disdain for the masses — “they know they are nothing and they have no desire to know” — conveys despair rather than understanding. His later adoption of nihilism, simulacrum, and the vanishing of reality symbolises intellectual capitulation and political surrender.

Stefan Steinberg’s WSWS obituary accurately traced Baudrillard’s trajectory, portraying his work as the ideological voice of a generation that confused its own demoralisation with a sense of inevitable history. Baudrillard’s observation — that advertising promotes identity over utility — remains relevant. The CUPRA campaign doesn’t merely sell a car; it promotes a lifestyle, an attitude, and a deliberately crafted rebellious identity. However, Baudrillard’s conclusion that class analysis is irrelevant is challenged by the very existence of the workers who assemble the cars. While the description can be borrowed, the underlying framework should be rejected. The limit of cultural critique is its tendency to treat culture as autonomous from production.

The CUPRA campaign’s omission of the material base is deliberate and central to its ideological message. CUPRA, a brand owned by SEAT and Volkswagen Group, has experienced notable workforce cuts—such as 686 layoffs in 2005 after strikes—and has faced wage reductions and deteriorating working conditions amid the EV transition. Union negotiations, exemplified by UGT at Ford Valencia in 2022, have led to some concessions. These unseen workers are the backbone behind the campaign—whose labour produces the items that marketing depicts as rebellious. Their exploitation sustains the illusion of individual freedom that the advertisement champions.

The Raval neighbourhood in Barcelona, chosen as the campaign’s visual backdrop, has experienced swift gentrification. Working-class and immigrant communities are being pushed out to make room for the demographic CUPRA aims to attract. The “street culture” highlighted in the ad is gradually being erased from the streets it professes to honour.

The core fact remains: a worker in Martorell is assembling the car. She knows the sign-value doesn’t deceive her; she understands her wages and the car’s selling price. The difference between these figures highlights exploitation. The disconnect between the ad’s illusion and actual production isn’t a complex puzzle but a clear class contradiction. Such contradictions are ultimately addressed through struggle, not just critique.

The CUPRA campaign’s focus on “self-expression” and “creating your own way” embodies neoliberal notions of the entrepreneurial self—viewing each individual as a brand and every life as a startup, with structural constraints seen as personal shortcomings. Marx and Engels countered this in The German Ideology, stating that bourgeois freedom is simply about individual independence separated from social relations. They argued that true freedom is a collective, conscious control over the conditions of life. While CUPRA offers the fantasy, Marxism exposes the reality.

Cultural critique can expose contradictions, reveal ideological operations, and illuminate the mechanisms of commodification. But it cannot explain the social relations that produce those mechanisms. It cannot account for exploitation, surplus value, or the role of the union bureaucracy. It cannot identify the agent of historical change. And it cannot provide a political strategy. The CUPRA campaign is a perfect specimen of late capitalist advertising because it makes its own contradictions visible. It sells rebellion while suppressing the conditions that produce rebellion. It sells authenticity while erasing the workers whose labour makes the commodity possible. It sells cynicism as a lifestyle while relying on the very social relations it denies.

The scope of cultural critique is limited by the tendency to see culture as separate from production. The Frankfurt School recognised the symptoms but failed to address the root causes. Baudrillard outlined the problems but declared the organism dead. The Situationists revealed the mechanism yet mistook exposure for genuine politics.

Marxism, however, offers a comprehensive method to integrate cultural phenomena within the broader framework of capitalist social relations. It uniquely identifies the working class as the agent capable of resolving the contradictions that cultural critique merely describes. Only Marxism firmly asserts that the real has not disappeared—though it is masked by ideology, it still underpins the terrain on which history unfolds.

The CUPRA campaign is not merely an advertisement. It is a window into the ideological operations of contemporary capitalism— and a reminder that cultural critique reaches its limit precisely where Marxism begins.

A Chronicle of Forms, Not Forces: Petitioning and Class Struggle in the English Revolution

Brodie Waddell’s recent History Today essay provides a valuable catalogue of petitioning in early modern England, showcasing thorough archival research—tracking signatures, reconstructing subscription networks, and analysing how Elizabethan Puritan tactics were later adopted by apprentices, washerwomen, and Leveller activists. This kind of empirical social history work is essential. However, framing petitioning as a “technology of collective voice’ introduces a formalism that strips political meaning from revolutionary history, resulting in a focus on structural forms rather than the underlying forces.

Petitioning did not simply evolve from elite subscription campaigns into mass mobilisation. Instead, antagonistic social groups captured, repurposed, and fought over it, driven by interests that were not only different but fundamentally opposed. The gap between the Elizabethan gentry’s push for more Church reform and the Levellers’ call for near-universal male suffrage marks not a smooth progression of civic practice but a rupture: the rise of a plebeian political movement challenging the limits of a gentry-led revolution. Framing this as a steady development of “petitioning habits” overlooks the class conflict within the parliamentary camp—an aspect thoroughly examined by historians like Christopher Hill, Brian Manning, and Ann Hughes.

Waddell’s evidence repeatedly hints at this conflict without naming it directly. The 1629 Chester “poor householders” invoking “the general good” against “private profit” were not just early users of civic technology; they were expressing an emerging class language that would become more explicit in the 1640s. The washerwomen protesting Charles I’s soap monopoly weren’t expanding “public voice” but resisting a royal economic attack on their livelihoods. The bold claim—quoted but not examined—that Leveller organisers could have mobilised “a hundred thousand hands” for their 1648 petition if Cromwell’s agents hadn’t obstructed them isn’t just a minor detail.

This clearly shows that the independent elites strengthening their power following the regicide were deliberately suppressing mass petitions from the plebeian left. This illustrates the class-based character of the post-1649 settlement, not just a statistical aspect of petitioning history. To grasp petitioning during the English Revolution, we should go beyond the liberal-pluralist idea of rising “voice” and view petitioning as a disputed social dynamic. In this arena, different class forces vied to steer the revolution’s direction.

Gentry Petitioning: Pressure Without Transformation

The Root and Branch petition of 1640, which gathered 15,000 signatures, is often seen as a sign of emerging mass politics. However, its class background is clear. Property reformers—merchants, clergy, and the parliamentary gentry—organised it to influence the Crown toward ecclesiastical and constitutional changes. Petitioning here was primarily a way to mobilise respectable public opinion, not to challenge existing property structures. It served as a tool for a political effort to reshape the state while maintaining the social hierarchy. This context is what Waddell considers the baseline: orderly lists of signatures, processed through parish systems, expressing grievances that did not threaten the core of propertied society.

By the early 1640s, different social groups had taken over petitioning. Artisans, apprentices, watermen, porters, and small producers used petitions to voice local grievances about monopolies, prices, military impressment, and corruption. Their language—”general good” versus “private profit”—reflected emerging class tensions, not civic virtue. This shift didn’t represent a broader “voice” but rather the political emergence of groups previously shut out of formal politics. The revolutionary crisis broke down the usual barriers that kept the poor, women, and the unpropertied outside public affairs. Petitioning then became a tool for those whose interests conflicted with the parliamentary gentry.

The Levellers turned petitioning into a powerful tool for mass democracy. Their campaigns from 1647 to 49 — calling for legal reform, religious freedom, freeing political prisoners, and almost universal male suffrage — marked a significant advancement. Petitioning shifted from a pressure tactic within the parliamentary coalition to a direct challenge to the parliamentary leadership.

The scale of Leveller petitioning was unparalleled, with tens of thousands of signatures collected from London wards, army regiments, and provincial towns. The claim that “a hundred thousand hands” might have been gathered in 1648, had Cromwell’s agents not intervened, shows the extent of popular mobilisation and the fear it instilled among the ruling class. Waddell reduces this to simply “mass petitioning,” but in reality, it signifies the rise of a revolutionary democratic movement that challenged property limits.

Once the Independent grandees consolidated power after the regicide, petitioning became a battleground of counter-revolution. The same authorities that had promoted petitions against the Crown swiftly turned to suppress those threatening their authority. Leveller organisers were detained; petitioners were scattered; women petitioners faced violence, imprisonment, and in some cases, death. The harsh crackdown on the August 1643 women’s petitioners—initially depicted by Waddell as unfortunate crowd violence—actually reveals how rapidly the parliamentary state was willing to deploy force against popular mobilisation that went beyond its limits. Petitioning was tolerated only when it aligned with property interests.

The essay’s conclusion—linking 17th-century petitions, abolitionism, Chartism, suffragism, and the 2019 Brexit e-petition—highlights the depoliticising trend of this genre. It shifts from a history of revolution, counter-revolution, and class struggle to a narrative focused on civic technology. The five million signatures of the Chartists are presented in the same continuum as a modern online petition against trade policies, stripping away the political stakes that separated a movement advocating for working-class voting rights from a 21st-century clicktivist act.

This illustrates Whig history dressed as social history: authentic archival efforts to recover popular agency are overshadowed by a story of an expanding “voice,” which perceives the state as a neutral stage gradually inviting more participants, rather than an instrument of class domination that needed to be challenged through revolution.

A serious examination of Civil War-era petitioning must confront the question raised by Waddell’s own evidence: whose interests did this “collective voice” serve, and against whom was it directed? Moreover, who moved to suppress it when it threatened to transcend the boundaries set by the parliamentary gentry? Petitioning during the English Revolution was not a developing civic practice leading toward modern democracy. Instead, it functioned as a battleground where the lower classes temporarily gained control of political communication, only to face repression when their demands challenged the interests of property-holders.

Brodie Waddell stands at the centre of today’s post‑revisionist social history: archivally rich, methodologically sophisticated, and politically cautious. As a leading figure at Birkbeck and an ex officio representative for Cultural & Social History, he helps set the tone for a generation of scholarship that foregrounds “ordinary people” while avoiding the class‑analytic frameworks that once defined radical Civil War historiography.

His work on petitioning, parish politics, and popular protest exemplifies the dominant trend: history from below without class. Waddell recovers voices, practices, and local interactions, but frames them through communication, identity, and “political participation,” rather than through the structural antagonisms that shaped those practices. Where Hill or Manning would ask what class forces produced these forms, Waddell asks how people “made their voices heard.”

The result is a liberal‑pluralist narrative of expanding civic inclusion — a story of participation rather than transformation. Petitioning becomes a technology of communication, not a weapon in a struggle between plebeian democrats and parliamentary grandees. Conflict is catalogued but depoliticised; revolution is rendered as a sequence of practices rather than a clash of forces.

In short: Waddell is the exemplary historian of a depoliticised social‑history moment — invaluable for evidence, limited in explanation, and firmly within the consensus that has displaced class analysis from the study of the English Revolution.

Sources and Bibliography: Brodie Waddell

Books

  • God, Duty and Community in English Economic Life, 1660–1720, Boydell Press, 2012.
  • The Power of Petitioning in Early Modern Britain (co‑authored with Jason Peacey), UCL Press, 2024.
  • Petitions and Petitioning in Europe and North America: From the Late Medieval Period to the Present, Oxford University Press, 2024. (Co‑authored with Huzzey, Janse, Miller, Oddens, Waddell)

Major Journal Articles

  • “The Popular Politics of Local Petitioning in Early Modern England” Journal of British Studies (2024).
  • “Work and Identity in Early Modern England” (with Mark Hailwood) Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (2023).
  • “The Economic Crisis of the 1690s in England” The Historical Journal 66:2 (2023).
  • “The Rise of the Parish Welfare State in England, c.1600–1800” Past & Present (2021).
  • “The Evil May Day Riot of 1517 and the Popular Politics of Anti‑Immigrant Hostility in Early Modern London” Historical Research (2021).
  • “Verses of My Owne Making”: Literacy, Work, and Social Identity in Early Modern England, Journal of Social History (2020).
  • “Writing History from Below: Chronicling and Record‑Keeping in Early Modern England” History Workshop Journal (2018).
  • “The Politics of Economic Distress in the Aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, 1689–1702” English Historical Review (2015).
  • “Governing England Through the Manor Courts, 1550–1850” The Historical Journal (2012).
  • “Economic Immorality and Social Reformation in English Popular Preaching, 1585–1625” Cultural and Social History (2008).

Book Chapters

  • “Economic Life” In Understanding Early Modern Primary Sources (2016).

Edited Collections & Collaborative Works

  • The Future of History from Below: An Online Symposium (with Mark Hailwood) The Many‑Headed Monster (2013).
  • Plebeian Cultures in Early Modern England: Thirty‑Five Years After E.P. Thompson (with Mark Hailwood), Social History 34:4 (2009).
  • Introduction: Petitions and Petitioning in Historical Perspective (Huzzey, Janse, Miller, Oddens, Waddell…) in Petitions and Petitioning in Europe and North America (2024).

Archival & Digital Scholarship

  • The Power of Petitioning in Seventeenth‑Century England (AHRC project, 2019–21). Project outputs include datasets of 3,800+ manuscript petitions.

Five Youths Killed in Athy Collision: A Tragedy Rooted in Social Crisis and Decades of Austerity

Five teenagers died in a high-speed crash in Athy, County Kildare, causing widespread shock across Ireland. The loss of young lives and the severe injuries to a local family have left a deep human impact—families torn apart and a community in mourning. The usual response from politicians and the media has been to issue condemnations, advocate for stricter penalties, and call for increased police powers. This tragedy is often depicted as a matter of “individual responsibility,” “criminality,” and “youth disorder.”

This narrative is more than just superficial; it is ideological. It masks the social origins of the catastrophe and justifies expanding the state’s repressive forces. A true scientific, Marxist analysis shows that this event is not an anomaly but a clear manifestation of the ongoing social crisis caused by decades of austerity, inequality, and neglect of working-class youth.

Athy and the social landscape of Irish capitalism

Athy exemplifies the experience of many working-class towns across Ireland, Britain, and Europe. Over the years, deindustrialisation has eroded stable jobs, giving way to insecure service-sector roles and ongoing underemployment. Austerity policies—carried out by governments from Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour, and now Sinn Féin—have severely reduced youth programs, cultural venues, mental health services, and community infrastructure.

In 2010, the WSWS cautioned that the economic crisis was severely affecting broad layers of workers, especially the most vulnerable—children, elders, low-income earners, and those with insecure housing. Since then, these impacts have only worsened. Today’s working-class youth confront collapsing public housing, underfunded schools, growing poverty, limited access to sports, arts, and cultural activities, no secure jobs, and no political representation advocating for their interests. Under such circumstances, feelings of alienation are widespread. The phenomenon of “Lucky Dip”—car thefts recorded and shared on social media—is not about moral failure but a social indicator. It reflects the despair of a generation for whom capitalism offers no future, stability, or meaningful societal role. The ruling elite criminalizes the fallout of its own neglect.

The political establishment demands repression, not reform

Hours after the tragedy, politicians and media figures called for new criminal laws, stricter penalties, and additional Garda officers. Proposing a specific offence for wrong-way driving reflects a broader trend: the state often responds to social decay with repression. This pattern is not unique to Ireland; many advanced capitalist nations have also increased police powers, imposed harsher sentences, militarized domestic policing, expanded youth surveillance, and demonized working-class communities in response to rising inequality and social despair. The Socialist Equality Party, commenting on the 2005 Macquarie Fields tragedy in Australia, highlighted this link: “There is a deep-going connection between the trampling of democratic rights at home and the prosecution of war abroad.”

Under conditions of widening inequality and declining legitimacy, the ruling class increasingly relies on coercion rather than consent. The “law and order” agenda is not about safety. It is about managing the social consequences of austerity while preparing the state for future unrest.

None of these measures addresses the root causes of youth alienation. They intensify the cycle: poverty produces despair; despair produces destructive behaviour; the state responds with criminalisation; criminalisation deepens poverty and despair.

The funeral: grief, solidarity, and political vacuum

The funeral of 15-year-old Joe Carthy, featuring a gold coffin, a horse-drawn carriage, and T-shirts with his image, was a powerful display of grief, loyalty, and defiance. It symbolized a community that feels under attack, believing the boys were victims of social conditions and rejecting the official story of criminality. However, this grief lacks a clear political focus. It’s a shared emotion without collective purpose. While the anger is genuine, the community lacks an organized way to express its understanding. The substantial Garda presence — including checkpoints, riot units ready, and surveillance — indicates that the state perceives the political significance of such grief better than the community itself. The ruling class fears that mourning might turn into resistance.

The pseudo‑left and trade unions: guardians of capitalist stability

The lack of political leadership among the working class is crucial. Sinn Féin, Labour, and the various Stalinist and social-democratic groups do not provide an alternative. They have long ceased fighting against austerity; instead, they manage capitalism and fail to oppose it. The trade unions act as industrial police, quelling protests and supporting state policies. None of these forces offers working-class youth a vision beyond voting for a capitalist party. Consequently, a political void has formed, turning tragedies like Athy into personal tragedies rather than social crises that demand collective action.

The Marxist conclusion: abolish the conditions that produce tragedy

The five boys in the car and the family they hit are not on opposite sides; rather, they are all victims of the same social order — one that inherently leads to alienation, despair, and social disintegration. The solution does not lie in increasing police presence, prisons, or criminal offenses. Instead, it requires a socialist transformation of society: restructuring the economy to prioritize human needs over private profits. This entails full employment at a living wage, high-quality public housing, free university education, cultural and recreational facilities for youth, large-scale investment in social infrastructure, and the eradication of poverty and inequality.

Such a program requires a political break from all parties of Irish capitalism. The working class must build its own revolutionary leadership, grounded in socialist internationalism and committed to unifying workers and youth across national lines.

The Athy tragedy is a warning. It reveals the human cost of a decaying society. The only way to prevent future catastrophes is to abolish the conditions that produce them.

The Method Is the Evasion: Liberal Journalism and the Manufactured Crisis of Intimacy

The Guardian’s recent concern over a supposed “kissing recession” among young people is more than just a shallow cultural critique. It exposes bourgeois demoralisation—the ruling class sensing the social order’s breakdown but unable to confront its causes without self-accusation. The article’s approach, tone, and findings are deliberate and serve ideological purposes. They aestheticise, psychologise, and ultimately depoliticise the crisis, turning it into a psychological or aesthetic issue rather than a political one. What seems to be a compassionate portrayal of youth anxiety is actually a political move designed to prevent a deep analysis of the social factors that caused this crisis. The Guardian’s approach is to evade such examination.

The Liberal Method: Personalisation as Political Containment

Contemporary liberal journalism often replaces historical and economic analysis with personal biography and psychological language. The Guardian’s article exemplifies this shift, showcasing a selective collection of anxious youth, each depicted as a psychological issue: “risk-averse,” “traumatised,” “lacking confidence.” Readers are encouraged to empathise and feel a vague sadness, but not to grasp underlying causes. This is not merely a stylistic choice; it reflects a class-based approach.

By focusing on individual psychology, solutions like therapy, self-care, and resilience-building become the only options. Structural issues—such as austerity, precarity, the erosion of community, and the atomization caused by decades of neoliberal policies—are ignored. The therapeutic language doesn’t enhance social analysis; it replaces it, serving as an ideological tool for the bourgeoisie to avoid facing the outcomes of their policies. The Guardian’s role seems to be to prevent readers from recognising that the crisis of intimacy is fundamentally a crisis of capitalism.

The Guardian’s article mentions “social atrophy” but does not specify its tangible causes. The elimination of “third spaces”—such as youth centres, libraries, community halls, parks, and informal gathering spots—was not merely cultural change. It was a targeted class policy. As documented by the WSWS, UK local government spending on youth services was cut by over a third from 2011 to 2016, removing more than £60 million, closing over 350 youth centres, and cutting 41,000 youth service positions. The Tory-Liberal Democrat coalition enacted these reductions, set in motion by previous Labour governments, serving the interests of finance capital while councils favoured developer tax breaks and corporate subsidies.

What was lost wasn’t just physical “places to hang out” but also the infrastructure supporting unsupervised, face-to-face social interactions—essential for developing social skills that enable intimacy. The capacity to meet, flirt, argue, reconcile, and form relationships outside market logic was systematically dismantled. In this void, dating apps emerged: algorithm-driven platforms that profit from the loneliness capitalism engenders. Ironically, capitalism erodes the free social spaces where people meet, then monetises the resulting loneliness by selling digital profiles based on data, attention, and advertising. This process transforms alienation into a profitable commodity.

The Guardian portrays the pandemic as a natural event that ‘interrupted’ youth development, but this is misleading. In reality, the response to the pandemic was driven by class interests. Governments globally directed trillions of dollars to corporations and financial markets via measures like the CARES Act, while neglecting young people, leaving them to face isolation, unemployment, and mental health crises. The WSWS had already reported a sharp increase in youth mental health issues well before COVID-19, noting that suicide rates among Americans aged 10–24 rose by 56 per cent from 2007 to 2017—an era marked by austerity, job insecurity, and the disintegration of community life. The pandemic hastened existing trends driven by capitalist restructuring. Schools reopened not primarily for children’s well-being but to sustain economic productivity. Young people were pressured to give up their education, friendships, and social growth—all to safeguard asset prices and corporate profits. Viewing this solely as an individual misfortune instead of a class-based injustice is an act of ideological violence.

What the Guardian Cannot Name: Alienation

The Guardian’s social theorist mentions “social atrophy” but avoids naming it, as doing so would require addressing its root cause. The actual term is alienation—the process in which humans become estranged from each other and their social essence, stemming from a mode of production that turns every human relationship into a relation between objects. Alienation isn’t a simple mood; it’s the fundamental condition of life under capitalism: human abilities are turned into commodities, survival needs shape personality, intimacy becomes a gamble, and social interactions are influenced by money and algorithms.

The “kissing recession” isn’t just a cultural phenomenon; it reflects a society where the market infiltrates every aspect of life. However, Marx’s insight—distinguishing Marxism from Frankfurt School pessimism—is that alienation breeds its own opposition. The same generation that reports loneliness and anxiety also supports socialism, led teachers’ strikes, formed the core of UAW and UPS actions, and is entering politics under conditions blocking reform. Alienation isn’t inevitable; it is the foundation for revolutionary awareness.

The Guardian’s Despair Is the Bourgeoisie’s Despair

The Guardian’s article does not diagnose youth; instead, it reveals a bourgeois sense of helplessness. It admits something is wrong, yet its approach prevents action. It is a resignation wrapped in empathy. The ruling class feels the social order is crumbling. It cannot explain the crisis without admitting fault, nor describe suffering without risking revolutionary ideas. Acknowledging structural causes would threaten its legitimacy. Therefore, it resorts to biography, psychology, and therapeutic clichés — akin to hiding behind a curtain.

Marxists aim to restore the social wholeness that liberal journalism suppresses, illustrating how the crisis of intimacy stems from capitalism, and identifying the class most harmed by this system as the one capable of overthrowing it. The breakdown of communal life was intentionally engineered, not inevitable, and since it was engineered, it can be dismantled. Abolishing private property in the means of production isn’t just a slogan; it’s essential for restoring genuine intimacy, solidarity, and collective life. Only a socialist restructuring can recreate the spaces, time, and social relations necessary for humans to meet as equals. Capitalism has commodified even the kiss, and it falls to the working class to reclaim a world where genuine connection is possible again.

Six Decades On The Divided Self: R.D. Laing’s Anatomy of Alienation

R.D. Laing’s The Divided Self (1960) is one of the most compelling works from postwar British psychiatry, notable for challenging the usual detachment between clinician and patient. Written when Laing was in his twenties, it aimed to make the inner experiences of schizoid and schizophrenic individuals understandable — not as mere symptoms to be classified or suppressed, but as rational responses to intolerable situations. Six decades later, the strengths and limitations of Laing’s approach become clearer. The book is more than a clinical study; it reflects the broader intellectual confusion of the postwar era — a time when the defeat of the working class and the rise of bourgeois subjectivism led many, including Laing, to turn away from historical analysis and toward existentialism, phenomenology, and mysticism.

Against the psychiatric establishment

The book’s main critique is evident from the beginning: it challenges the standard practice of British and American psychiatry, which viewed psychotic patients merely as collections of symptoms without considering their personal life histories or “existential positions.’ Laing, heavily influenced by the phenomenological tradition—spanning Husserl, Heidegger, and especially Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis—argued that psychiatry should strive to understand the world as the patient experiences it, aiming to ‘grasp the patient’s own existential position.” At the time, this was a notably radical stance, opposing both the view that mental suffering results solely from organic issues and the deterministic Freudian model based on fixed instinctual stages.

Laing’s key clinical idea— “ontological insecurity”—describes a state in which a person lacks a stable sense of reality, autonomy, and continuity. The schizoid mechanism of withdrawal, involving the creation of a “false self” that interacts with the world while the true self stays hidden, is not seen as random pathology but as a logical, if devastating, defence against overwhelming relationships. The case histories of individuals like “Julie” and “David” are thoughtfully and skillfully written, making the internal coherence of their experiences clear—something often missing in clinical notes of the time, which tend to view these experiences as mere disorder. This humanising approach is Laing’s lasting contribution, yet it also highlights the limits of what his existential perspective could fully understand.

The family as a site of harm — and the limits of phenomenology

Laing’s most disruptive contribution—and its influence on the anti-psychiatry movement linked to Cooper, Foucault, and Szasz—was his assertion that these patterns originate in actual family relationships. He emphasised that communication patterns, especially those that systematically invalidate a child’s perceptions, are at the root. This was a significant step forward from traditional psychiatric views because it identified pathology within authentic social interactions rather than attributing it to a presumed biochemical defect.

But here the decisive theoretical gap opens. The family… tends to appear as a closed interpersonal system, to be understood through the categories of existential phenomenology.

This is exactly the issue. Laing sees the family as a source of psychic harm. Still, he considers it a self-sufficient system driven by existential concepts like “being-for-others,” “bad faith,” and “ontological insecurity.” What’s lacking is a detailed explanation of how the particular pressures of capitalist society influence the modern family and lead to its pathology.

A Marxist perspective argues that the family is not an isolated personal space but serves to reproduce labour power, influenced by capitalist production needs. The “systematic invalidation” of children’s perceptions, as Laing describes, is not merely a failed communication method but an expression of a societal demand: children are conditioned to accept a life of alienation and a world where their actions are perceived as external, alien forces.

Laing’s existential vocabulary, precisely because it abstracts from these contradictions, can diagnose alienation with great sensitivity but cannot explain why it takes the specific forms it does, or why it became so pervasive in mid‑twentieth‑century life.

The postwar intellectual milieu: a shared retreat from history

The conceptual deadlock in The Divided Self reflects wider postwar intellectual trends. The Frankfurt School—of which Fromm was a part—shifted focus from engaging the working class politically to critiquing culture and psychology. Adorno and Horkheimer forsook the proletariat in favour of a pessimistic view of history; Marcuse aimed for revolutionary change through students and marginalised groups; and Fromm’s Freudo-Marxism attributed the root of capitalist society’s problems to distorted human needs instead of class conflict.

Laing’s existentialism marked a different kind of withdrawal. While the Frankfurt School embraced cultural pessimism, Laing looked inward, emphasising inner experience through a mystical perspective. Both approaches reflect the same core reality: postwar intellectuals becoming disconnected from the working class. The disappointment of the revolutionary wave after the Russian Revolution, the rise of Stalinism, and the integration of social-democratic parties into capitalism distanced the intelligentsia from active class struggle. Consequently, they turned inward towards subjectivity, phenomenology, structuralism, and eventually mysticism. Laing’s later works—such as The Politics of Experience, Knots, and his interest in Eastern spirituality—are not personal quirks but the logical result of a framework that recognised alienation but failed to grasp its material roots.

Laing Among the Postwar Radicals

R.D. Laing’s The Divided Self arose from the same postwar intellectual upheaval that influenced Sartre, Marcuse, Foucault, Fanon, and Goffman. This period was characterised less by new theories than by the deep disorientation caused by the working class’s defeats and the rise of bourgeois subjectivism. Laing is clearly part of this group, though his path more sharply illustrates its limits. Sartre supplied Laing with fundamental concepts such as the importance of lived experience, the drama of being-for-others, and the self-caught

between authenticity and bad faith. However, Sartre’s own retreat from Marxism following the failure of the French left in the 1940s foreshadowed Laing’s later drift. Both tried to combine existential phenomenology with social critique, yet ultimately found themselves stuck in a vocabulary that could vividly describe alienation but struggled to explain its historical roots.

Marcuse, a member of the Frankfurt School, presented an alternative perspective on retreat. He combined Freud and Marx to identify the psychological toll of advanced capitalism but shifted the focus away from the working class as the primary revolutionary subject. Instead, he looked to students, minorities, and marginalised groups as agents of change. Laing’s anti-psychiatry, which romanticised madness as a form of authenticity, echoed Marcuse’s emphasis on psychological rebellion over class struggle as a path to liberation.

Foucault and Goffman, despite their different methods, both shared Laing’s mistrust of institutional power. Foucault’s archaeological approach to madness and Goffman’s study of “total institutions” revealed the violence inherent in psychiatric confinement. However, they failed to explain why capitalist society tends to produce mental illness on a widespread scale. Their critiques focused on discourse and institutional practices but lacked a theory of class exploitation. Although Laing’s phenomenology humanised the issue, it faced the same fundamental limitation.

Fanon is somewhat of an exception. His analysis of colonial violence recognised that psychic disintegration is socially constructed—a subjective outcome of observable domination. Still, Fanon’s insightful work primarily targeted national liberation efforts rather than offering a Marxist critique of global capitalism. Laing’s emphasis on mysticism represented another response to the same historical impasse.

Overall, these figures illustrate how the postwar intelligentsia tried to comprehend alienation after the collapse of revolutionary Marxism as an active force. Laing’s perspective — which stresses that psychosis has social meaning — remains influential. Yet, his inability to situate the “divided self” within the fractured society that produces it exposes the limits of the postwar radical range. Without a materialist view of capitalist social relations, critiques of alienation become more critiques of personal experience, and the quest for liberation centres on authenticity. Laing is part of this range not as an outsider, but as its most telling example.

Laing’s later work increasingly romanticised psychosis as a kind of privileged inner journey. Viewing psychosis as authentic means abandoning efforts to understand it as a response to social conditions causing suffering. It replaces a mystical appreciation of symptoms with an analysis of the illness itself. This was the main shortcoming of the anti-psychiatry movement. While Foucault’s history of madness and Goffman’s institutional sociology revealed the violence of psychiatric authority, neither explained why capitalism generates mental illness on a widespread scale. Without a theory of class exploitation, critique remains passive rather than revolutionary.

The social origins of mental illness

A materialist perspective starts from the understanding that mental illness is a social disease, arising from the specific alienations caused by capitalist society. The widespread mental suffering is not due to faulty family communication or biochemical issues. Instead, it results from: social atomization; reducing human relationships to monetary exchanges; extending working hours and increasing labour intensity; dehumanising sexuality; and destroying collective life and political agency. These are not merely “environmental factors” but are direct outcomes of the capitalist mode of production, which presents the individual as an alien force, separates him from the products of his labour, and turns social relations into relations between things. Laing’s existential framework could not achieve this analysis.

None of this should overshadow what The Divided Self achieved. Laing challenged a psychiatric system focused on custodial care, electroshock, and a purely descriptive classification, asserting that the experiences of the mentally ill were meaningful and needed understanding rather than just management. He also linked family dynamics to the causes of mental illness, bringing a humanising perspective to a discipline that desperately required it. However, today’s readers must recognise both the impressive clinical and literary success of Laing’s phenomenological portrayal of schizoid and schizophrenic experiences and acknowledge the theoretical dead end inherent in its existentialist framework.

The book raises the question of how the “divided self” relates to the divided society that creates it, but it cannot answer it. The key division is not internal — between “true” and “false” selves — but between the individual and a social environment that appears as an alien force. This gap cannot be bridged through phenomenological insight alone; it requires transforming social relations. This involves dismantling a system where people face the outcomes of their collective labour as adversarial, and building a society where, as Marx stated, “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.” Laing could identify alienation but not explain its origins or remedies. That challenge lies outside existential phenomenology, belonging instead to historical materialism and the revolutionary overhaul of society.

Sources and Bibliography

Primary Works

R.D. Laing

  • Laing, R.D. The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness. London: Tavistock, 1960.
  • Laing, R.D. The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967.
  • Laing, R.D. Knots. London: Tavistock, 1970.

Jean-Paul Sartre

  • Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.
  • Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existential Psychoanalysis. In Essays in Existentialism. New York: Citadel, 1965.

Herbert Marcuse

  • Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.
  • Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.

Michel Foucault

  • Foucault, Michel. Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Pantheon, 1965.
  • Foucault, Michel. The Birth of the Clinic. New York: Pantheon, 1973.

Frantz Fanon

  • Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. Trans. Charles Lam Markmann. New York: Grove Press, 1967.
  • Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Trans. Constance Farrington. New York: Grove Press, 1963.

Erving Goffman

  • Goffman, Erving. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. New York: Anchor Books, 1961.
  • Goffman, Erving. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

Secondary Works and Contextual Studies

Marxist and ICFI Analyses

  • North, David. The Frankfurt School, Postmodernism and the Politics of the Pseudo-Left. Mehring Books, 2015.
  • Walsh, David. “Mental Illness and the American Dream.” World Socialist Web Site, 2000.
  • Steiner, Nick. Marxism and the Dialectic of Alienation. London: Palgrave, 2012.

On Postwar Intellectual History

  • Jacoby, Russell. The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe. New York: Basic Books, 1987.
  • Jay, Martin. The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973.
  • Elliott, Anthony. Subjectivity in the Postwar World: Laing, Sartre, and the Crisis of the Self. Cambridge: Polity, 2014.

On Anti‑Psychiatry and Critical Psychiatry

  • Mullan, Bob. Mad to Be Normal: Conversations with R.D. Laing. London: Free Association Books, 1995.
  • Crossley, Nick. Contesting Psychiatry: Social Movements in Mental Health. London: Routledge, 2006.
  • Showalter, Elaine. The Female Malady: Women, Madness, and English Culture, 1830–1980. New York: Pantheon, 1985.

On Fanon, Colonialism, and the Psychology of Oppression

  • Bulhan, Hussein Abdilahi. Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression. New York: Plenum Press, 1985.
  • Gordon, Lewis R. Fanon and the Crisis of European Man. New York: Routledge, 1995.

On Foucault and Institutional Power

  • Dreyfus, Hubert, and Paul Rabinow. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
  • Porter, Roy. Madness: A Brief History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Archival and Historical Context

  • British Psychological Society Archives, London.
  • Tavistock Institute Papers, Wellcome Collection.
  • World Socialist Web Site (WSWS) archives on psychiatry, social conditions, and postwar intellectual history.

The Autobiography of Rudolf Höss: Bureaucracy, Counter‑Revolution, and the Making of a Functionary of Extermination

Primo Levi and the Problem of Reading Höss

Few documents in history evoke such intense horror as Rudolf Höss’s memoir, written in a Kraków prison cell just weeks before his execution in April 1947. It isn’t literary or a moral confession. Instead, it is the self-portrait of a man responsible for leading the murder of over a million people, who, facing the gallows, recounts his actions with a detached, procedural tone akin to a factory manager reviewing production data.

Primo Levi, who wrote the introduction for the English edition, immediately recognised that the book’s importance lies precisely in its repulsiveness. He emphasised that the memoir is “filled with evil,” lacking literary value, and that reading it is a challenging experience. However, he also believed it was essential — not because of its moral emptiness but because of it. Höss’s memoir documents extermination from within the machinery of genocide, compelling the reader to face fascist violence directly, without the filtering effects of remorse, reflection, or human warmth.

Levi’s insight was twofold. First, he saw that Höss’s flat, bureaucratic tone isn’t a flaw but central to the document’s core. It reflects how a man who viewed mass murder as a technical and logistical problem approached his work—focused on innovation, efficiency, and discipline. Second, Levi realised that the memoir’s power comes from its absence of human emotion. It functions as a negative instruction manual, offering a stark look at how industrialised killing is portrayed by its perpetrator.

Levi’s firsthand experience in Auschwitz provided him with a unique perspective. He viewed the system from the perspective of a prisoner doomed to a slow death through forced labour, starvation, and dehumanisation. In contrast, Höss saw it from a top-down position, as the mastermind behind its daily operations. Levi’s introduction juxtaposes these contrasting viewpoints. He dismisses Höss’s attempt at introspection or portraying tragedy; he rejects calling it a confession. Instead, Levi presents it as a manifestation of bureaucratic evil, serving as a crucial insight into how genocide can occur within a modern capitalist framework.

This framing also pre-empts—and subtly critiques—future claims to generalise Höss’s behaviour through the concept of the “banality of evil.” Levi argues that Höss was not ordinary or banal. He was a particular type of official moulded by a specific historical crisis. His memoir doesn’t showcase universal human weakness but highlights the social forces that influenced the SS members: counter-revolutionary violence, racial ideology, bureaucratic rationality, and German capitalism’s fall into fascism.

Expanding Levi’s insight involves understanding the memoir’s paradox: a text lacking moral content yet requiring moral consideration. It compels readers to view the extermination process as its perpetrators envisioned it — not as metaphysical evil, but as a technical operation integrated into the administrative routines of a modern state. Levi’s introduction, in its full historical context, functions not just as a preface but as a methodological guide: warning against sentimentality, rejecting psychological mythmaking, and emphasising that the memoir’s significance lies in its cold, bureaucratic precision. This perspective should shape how the entire document is interpreted.

The Making of a Functionary: Biography as Social Pathway

When faced with such a text, the temptation is to see Höss either as an inexplicable monster or as an ordinary bureaucrat whose evil was merely “banal.” However, both views overlook the core historical question. The focus should not be on what Höss was “like,” but rather on how a particular social context led to the emergence of a specific type of killer.

Höss’s personal account, when compared with the documentary record, provides the foundation for that explanation, although he never states it explicitly. Born in 1900 into a strict Catholic, nationalist middle-class family, he volunteered for the German army at sixteen and served in the Middle East during World War I. His experiences with defeat and revolution radicalised him against the revolutionary forces. In 1920, he joined the Freikorps, paramilitary groups composed of demobilised officers that the Weimar government and German bourgeoisie used to suppress workers’ uprisings in the Baltic, Ruhr, and central Germany.

This environment was pivotal, combining anti-Bolshevism, racial antisemitism, and the veneration of a betrayed generation into a unified worldview. In 1922, Höss first met Hitler. In 1923, on Bormann’s orders, he took part in the killing of a man suspected of informing the French occupying forces. He spent five years in prison.

This is not just incidental biography; it illustrates how the counter-revolutionary violence from 1918–23 directly fed into the machinery of the Third Reich. Höss joined the SS in 1934, worked at Dachau and Sachsenhausen, and in May 1940 became the inaugural commandant of Auschwitz. There, he expanded and managed the largest extermination centre in the German system, introducing widespread use of Zyklon-B and continuously seeking greater efficiency in the killing process. A 1944 SS report praised him as a “true pioneer” in the field.

Höss was not a sadist in the vulgar sense. His memoir depicts him—and quite plausibly—as a diligent administrator who discovered his calling in organising death. This makes the document particularly important historically, as it details how the brutal violence of the Freikorps was rationalised, bureaucratized, and turned into an industrial process amid the collapse of German capitalism into fascism. Leon Trotsky, in 1933, described fascism as the process by which “capitalist society is puking up the undigested barbarism” that a healthy social development would have eliminated. Höss’s memoir, whether intentionally or not, serves as a case study of this physiological process.

The Industrialisation of Mass Murder

Höss’s memoir is striking for its cold tone. He writes as a manager, not a fanatic. The descriptions of transports, gas chamber construction, crematoria, Zyklon-B use, and the administrative “improvements’ after his 1943 promotion are detailed and precise. Historians confirm his technical and administrative claims are generally accurate, which makes the true horror lie in the understated tone rather than exaggeration.

This excerpt illustrates the bureaucratic ideology of the SS embodied in Höss. His claim to be a simple tool—merely following orders, seeking only a peaceful farming life—reflects not a psychological abnormality but the core self-image of the SS: viewing themselves as functionaries who see their agency as absorbed into the state machinery. The memoir serves as more than just an account of genocide; it reveals how fascism saw itself. The industrial scale of murder necessitated a cadre trained in counter-revolutionary violence, a bureaucratic system capable of rationalising such violence, a state dedicated to racial extermination, and a social crisis that merged all three into one overarching project. Höss’s memoir thus functions as the administrative voice of this entire undertaking.

The Memoir as Ideological Artefact

The Commandant of Auschwitz is most vulnerable, and its limitations need clear acknowledgement in Höss’s narrative of his motives and accountability. He controversially portrays himself as a soldier compelled back into action against his own judgment, deflecting blame upward to Himmler and Hitler, and depicting himself as a tool rather than a decision-maker. His time as a prisoner with other senior officials at Nuremberg in 1946 provided ample chances to perfect this rhetorical approach.

This is the same evasion that later commentary on Nazism, from Hannah Arendt’s formula of the “banality of evil” onward, has too often converted into a general theory rather than treating as a self‑serving defence to be tested against the facts. It is not banality, still less some universal human capacity for evil, that explains Höss. It is the concrete conjuncture of German imperialism’s crisis after 1918, the defeated revolution, the deliberate cultivation of counter‑revolutionary paramilitarism by the German state and capital, and the specific social layers—demobilised officers, déclassé nationalists, functionaries seeking order and advancement—from which the SS drew its cadre.

Against the “Banality of Evil”: Why Hannah Arendt Misread Fascism

Few ideas have strayed further from their original context and contributed more to obscuring the true history of fascism than Hannah Arendt’s concept of the “banality of evil.” First presented in Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), the phrase has become a moral shorthand, suggesting that genocide results from ordinary individuals following orders—bureaucrats committing horrific crimes not driven by ideology but by thoughtlessness, conformity, or career ambitions. This comforting notion has gained widespread acceptance, which is precisely why it is problematic.

Arendt’s core empirical claim—that Eichmann was merely a superficial clerk lacking ideological insight—has been thoroughly discredited. The historical evidence demonstrates Eichmann’s dedication to Nazism, his racial extremist beliefs, and his active role in developing the Final Solution. Posthumously discovered writings show he enthusiastically supported exterminationist antisemitism and viewed himself as part of a revolutionary effort to reshape Europe racially. Arendt mistook Eichmann’s courtroom antics for genuine psychological insight, wrongly equating a legal tactic for self-preservation with his true mental state.

However, the fundamental issue is theoretical. Arendt extended Eichmann’s self-portrayal into a broad theory of modern evil. In doing so, she reduced the particularities of fascism to an abstract moral concept. The “banality of evil” idea regards genocide as stemming from ordinary human flaws rather than the specific social dynamics that created the Nazi hierarchy: the German capitalism crisis post-1918, the defeat of the workers’ movement, the rise of counter-revolutionary paramilitaries, and the bureaucratic logic of a state committed to racial extermination. It shifts blame from historical forces to psychological ones, and from class conflict to individual morality.

This is why the phrase has gained widespread popularity in liberal discourse. It enables the Holocaust to be remembered while avoiding critique of the political and economic structures that enabled it. It shifts the focus from fascism as a collapse of social order to a lesson about individual morality. By universalizing responsibility, it also conceals the actual agents and institutions responsible for genocide.

Rudolf Höss’s memoir, ‘Commandant of Auschwitz,’ serves as a clear counterexample to Arendt’s thesis. Höss was not ordinary or banal; he was a product of a specific historical crisis. As a Freikorps veteran, a racial ideologue, and a bureaucratic innovator of mass murder, he found his calling in extermination. His life exemplifies the social pathway where the violence of 1918–23 was rationalised, professionalised, and turned into an industrial process. Labelling him as “banal” misrepresents both the man and the system that shaped him.

Arendt’s framework serves an ideological role by depoliticizing fascism. It promotes sentimental interpretations of genocide and hinders the necessary historical analysis to prevent future occurrences. Not only is this approach insufficient, but it also hampers political understanding. To truly grasp fascism, one must reject the banality thesis and engage directly with the concrete social forces behind the extermination apparatus. Anything less amounts to evasion. A memoir that leaves out this analysis does not disprove it; it only highlights the need to supplement the account from outside the text.

Why the Document Must Still Be Read

None of this reduces the book’s importance as a primary source. Its royalties were appropriately donated to a fund for Auschwitz survivors. Its unflinching account of the camp’s physical operation remains crucial for anyone wanting to understand not just the idea of “evil,” but the actual system that enabled an advanced capitalist state to organize industrial mass murder. The relevance today is clear. The political manipulation of Holocaust memory—whether by trivializing fascism in popular culture, depoliticizing genocide in liberal discourse, or using historical suffering to justify current militarism—necessitates critical reading. Höss’s memoir serves as a warning about the social conditions that could produce such a figure again: conditions rooted not in human nature itself, but in the recurring crises of the capitalist system.

Bibliography and sources

Jason Arday: A Case Study in Academic Witch‑Hunting and Institutional Cowardice

The death of Jason Arday, discovered at his London residence on August 14, cannot be separated from the eleven-day media frenzy that preceded it, nor from the long-standing political backlash that this frenzy reflects. What gets overlooked amid the flood of commentary—whether from those trying to defend Nathan Cofnas or from those reducing the incident to a morality tale about racism—is the influence of the institutions involved: Cambridge University, the media which produced 188 stories in nine days, and the political environment that has made the revival of hereditarian pseudoscience acceptable again in reputable academic fields. This is not a story about two individuals. It is a story about a system.

The Function of “Race Realism”

Cofnas’s intellectual initiative is rooted in a longstanding tradition. The resurgence of the hereditarian argument—asserting that genetics account for group differences in intelligence—has a troubling history. Its roots trace back to Francis Galton’s eugenics movement, the racialist propaganda of the Pioneer Fund, and the post-World War II revival of biological determinism through behavioural genetics. Leading figures today—such as Richard Lynn, Emil Kirkegaard, Heiner Rindermann, Charles Murray, and Cofnas himself—are not isolated individuals, but part of an interconnected ideological network.

Nathan Cofnas holds a unique place in modern academia: he is a trained philosopher whose career is closely linked to the resurgence of hereditarian “race realism,” an ideology with a long-standing tradition of offering pseudo-scientific support for social inequality. His journey—from Columbia to Cambridge, Oxford, and ultimately Ghent—reflects not genuine intellectual curiosity but the re-emergence of biological determinism as a respected mainstream academic viewpoint.

Cofnas argues that racial differences in intelligence are largely genetic, echoing historical eugenics and the Pioneer Fund. She claims this defends ‘science’ from political meddling, but in truth, it advances a political agenda. Hereditarian ideas historically justify inequality by framing historical injustices like colonialism and segregation as biological fate. Cofnas’s assertion that Black academics would have ‘approach[ed] zero per cent ‘ at top universities under meritocracy is not a scientific claim but an ideological stance.

Hereditarianism has historically functioned to justify inequality as natural rather than created. It acts as a reactionary ideological tool, used whenever capitalism faces crisis and needs pseudoscientific backing for social stratification. The appointment of a Ghent University scholar claiming that Black academics would “disappear from almost all high-profile positions” under a meritocratic system reflects not academic freedom but the decline — or lack — of institutional barriers against pseudoscientific race theories in European academia. This is not the protection of unpopular opinion. It is the mainstreaming of a body of thought whose historical function has been to prepare the ideological ground for attacks on the working class.

His rise has been enabled by institutions that accept race science as a valid area of research. Cambridge awarded him a prestigious fellowship, and Ghent University hired him despite his public support for genetic racial hierarchy. These choices show not academic bravery but the weakening of any ethical boundary against pseudoscience when it aligns with the broader right-wing movement for “academic freedom,” aiming to restore reactionary ideas under the guise of intellectual diversity.

The controversy involving Jason Arday brought Cofnas’s work into the spotlight. His blog post accusing Arday of plagiarism in his PhD thesis sparked a massive media frenzy—188 articles in just nine days—that ended with Arday’s resignation and death. Cofnas briefly became a symbol: to his supporters, a martyr for truth; to critics, a promoter of racial hostility. However, focusing on his personality masks a larger issue. Cofnas is not an anomaly but a sign of a political environment where hereditarian ideas have found renewed institutional backing, and universities, driven more by reputational risk than core principles, vacillate between tolerance and rejection based on public pressure.

Nathan Cofnas matters not because his ideas are new — they are not — but because their reappearance in respectable academic settings signals a broader social reaction. His career marks the return of an ideology that has historically prepared the ground for exclusion, repression, and worse. To understand Cofnas is to understand the conditions that allow such ideas to flourish: a university system hollowed out by market logic, a media apparatus eager for spectacle, and a political order increasingly receptive to biological explanations for social crisis. In that sense, Cofnas is less a philosopher than a weather vane. His prominence tells us not where science is going, but where society is drifting.

Cambridge’s Cowardice — and Its Class Function

Cofnas’s defenders argue that Cambridge allowed alleged plagiarism by Arday but expelled Cofnas for his opinions. However, this overlooks a broader issue: Cambridge’s actions were driven by institutional risk rather than principles. When Cofnas risked damaging the university’s reputation, the university quietly pushed him out. Similarly, when Arday became a liability, the university quickly distanced itself, removing web pages and ending investigations after his resignation. Cambridge did not protect either individual; it prioritised its own reputation.

This is not an inconsistency; it illustrates the consistent logic of the modern university, shaped by reputation and market interests. The university usually does not protect academic freedom or individuals—whether they face right-wing hostility or student protests—if defending them would cost it. Calling this ‘cowardice’ moralises the issue, but the reality is structural. The modern university operates as a corporation within the capitalist state, with research priorities, admissions, and intellectual culture shaped by capital accumulation and imperialist goals. Its treatment of individuals shifts based on the changing needs of class dominance.

The Press as an Instrument, Not a Check

The story is about how an academic integrity issue turned into a nine-day, 188-article spectacle. While multiple outlets backed some allegations of plagiarism, the extensive coverage went beyond reporting and became a form of public humiliation. This included marathon claims, personal details, and relentless daily coverage. This illustrates the typical modern media pile-on: it usually ignores the human at its centre and becomes hostile when political goals are involved. The same outlets that discredited Arday defended Noah Carl, publishing editorials praising his research linking crime to ethnic groups. They also rallied to defend Carl’s academic freedom while ignoring attacks on democratic rights, such as the persecution of Julian Assange. The media frenzy is not accidental; it’s a political tactic—aimed at destroying individuals as a substitute for honest debate.

Individualising a Systemic Failure

Labelling this conflict as “Cofnas versus Arday” or portraying it as a clash between “the right and DEI” oversimplifies the situation and ignores underlying structural issues. Personal explanations—such as blaming a vindictive blogger, a dishonest professor, a woke establishment, or a racist backlash—often replace systemic causes with individual blame. The real issue is understanding what kind of university and press tend to produce such outcomes. In reality, these institutions are motivated not by the pursuit of truth but by managing reputational risks. Their loyalties are more aligned with donors, government policies, and market goals than with genuine scholarship. Their intellectual environment is shaped more by capital interests than by societal needs.

The pseudo-left’s focus on identity politics acts as a reactionary force in itself. By turning every social conflict into a matter of racial or gender identity, it gives the right wing an effective opposition. It keeps the working class, which could challenge the current order—responsible for tragedies like Arday’s death—disarmed and divided. A conflict between “race realism” and “anti-racism” within bourgeois academia doesn’t threaten the capitalist system that sustains both.

The public discourse surrounding Arday’s death — the moral panic, the fixation on individual virtue and villainy, the refusal to interrogate structural causes — serves a precise social interest. It keeps the population politically demobilised, morally panicked, and convinced that the great questions of social life are matters of personal conduct rather than class struggle.

Jason Arday’s tragedy is rooted in the institutions that made such conflicts between academics unavoidable and deadly. His death reflects a systemic issue that harms individuals to protect itself. The solution isn’t better risk management, improved DEI efforts, or a more courteous media. Instead, it lies in building a large, international socialist movement within the working class that aims to overthrow capitalist institutions and establish a society where human needs take precedence over profit, reputation, or spectacle.

Elegy for a Class Betrayed: Jonas Patrick Marvin’s Book and the Political Forces It Cannot Name

Marvin’s book arrives at a time when the British ruling class, alongside its media and academic supporters, tirelessly seeks to dissolve class into a mosaic of identities. In this environment, his steadfast emphasis on the reality of class—specifically, the ongoing existence of a working class shaped by exploitation, dispossession, and political betrayal—is particularly valuable. The book courageously challenges the popular notion that class has vanished into culture, region, or lifestyle categories. Marvin writes with sincerity, empathy, and a genuine effort to reclaim some of the collective dignity historically associated with working-class life. However, sincerity alone is not a strategy, and empathy does not substitute for analysis.

Marvin’s book, despite its vivid descriptions, primarily presents a phenomenology of decline rather than a clear explanation. It details the breakdown of working-class consciousness—such as its divisions into white, male, northern, immigrant, disabled, unemployed groups—but stops short of identifying the political forces behind this fragmentation. While it captures the emotional tone of defeat, it does not specify the institutions responsible for creating it. The author calls for a revival of “collective will,’ yet fails to propose a concrete plan to achieve it. Consequently, the book serves more as a lament than an intervention: it paints a picture of destruction but offers no insight into who built it.

The International Committee of the Fourth International has long argued that the British working class’s defeat was not an inherent social process. It wasn’t an unavoidable result of deindustrialisation, globalisation, or cultural shifts. Instead, it was a deliberate political failure caused by organisations that claimed to represent workers. Marvin’s book fails to confront this issue.

Instead of addressing the specific institutions that disarmed the working class—such as the Labour Party, trade unions, and labour reformist structures—he replaces them with vague terms like “power,” “capital,” and “the system.” By not naming these responsible forces, Marvin turns a political defeat into a cultural tragedy, framing the working class as victims of impersonal forces rather than of particular betrayals. This omission is significant; it’s the book’s primary limitation.

The miners’ strike of 1984–85

The miners’ strike of 1984–85 stands as a pivotal moment in modern British working-class history. It marked the point when the ruling class, supported by the state, faced off against a militant section of workers — with the Labour and trade-union bureaucracy ensuring their defeat. The SEP’s fortieth-anniversary analysis remains the clearest summary: Scargill waged the strike on a national-reformist platform, believing that militant action would secure concessions and that Labour would carry out a “Plan for Coal.” In response, the state used unprecedented force. The TUC refused to organise solidarity actions, Neil Kinnock opposed the strike, and the NUM fought alone for an entire year.

This was not incompetence but the logic embedded in the trade-union bureaucracy’s structural role: a social layer whose existence hinges on suppressing independent working-class activism. The miners’ defeat did not transform Labour and the unions; it set the stage for such change. Blairism was not a mere deviation but the natural completion of Labour’s development. Marvin’s book cannot account for the decline of working-class power because it cannot explain the miners’ loss. Without that defeat, the later fragmentation of class consciousness does not make sense.

Identity Politics: The Ideological Weapon Marvin Describes but Cannot Analyse

Marvin catalogues the proliferation of identities — white, male, northern, immigrant, disabled — but treats them as organic developments. They were not. They were promoted. The SEP’s 2018 congress resolution identified identity politics as the political weapon of an upper-middle-class layer seeking to defend its privileges; it is directed against the working class and involves governments, media, universities, and NGOs. — all embraced identity politics because it fragments class consciousness, substitutes cultural antagonisms for class antagonism, diverts anger away from capitalism, and legitimises the political dominance of privileged layers. Marvin describes the fragmentation but not its purpose. He sees the symptoms but not the strategy.

The endorsements from Richard Seymour and China Miéville are deliberate indicators, revealing more than mere support. Both are tied to the post-Corbyn environment that has reconciled with parliamentary reformism—an approach that, instead of challenging the system responsible for working-class defeats, has acted as its latest conduit. Corbynism wasn’t a challenge to Blairism; it functioned as a safety valve. It channelled the radical energy of hundreds of thousands, especially young people, back into the Labour Party—an institution historically guilty of betrayal. Every retreat was presented as a strategic calculation; every capitulation, a tactical move. This led to Starmer’s rise as the most right-wing Labour leader ever, a trajectory rooted in Corbyn’s own failure to reject Labourism. Marvin’s book, supported by this milieu, cannot criticise the machinery of betrayal because its endorsers are part of it.

The ongoing crisis facing the Starmer government confirms the ICFI’s long-standing analysis. Labour now primarily appeals to higher managerial and professional workers, with only 14 per cent of routine and manual workers supporting it—far behind Reform. This trend isn’t just temporary; it signifies Labour’s complete disconnection from the working class. However, the Labour “left”—including Corbyn, McDonnell, and the Socialist Campaign Group—plays a key role in maintaining stability by advocating for an “orderly transition” and discouraging workers from taking independent action. Marvin’s book cannot account for this crisis because it fails to explain Labour’s fundamental transformation.

Marvin and the Pseudo‑Lefts: The Elegy That Protects the Betrayers

Marvin’s book naturally belongs to the sphere of the pseudo-left — including the post-Corbyn intelligentsia, the academic-NGO sector, and the cultural left that has severed ties with revolutionary politics. This group excels at lamenting the working class while often defending, sanitising, or ignoring the political forces responsible for its decline. Marvin’s tribute aligns perfectly with this perspective.

The pseudo-left acknowledges the working class’s setbacks but focuses obsessively on defeat through memoirs, documentaries, and sociological portraits of “left-behind” communities. However, it views these defeats as a social condition rather than a political failure. These setbacks are seen as tragic stories to be told, not betrayals to be examined or challenged. The role of the pseudo-left is to keep the suffering of the working class continuously visible without providing explanations or addressing the underlying causes.

This explains why figures like Seymour and Miéville endorse Marvin’s book. Their support isn’t accidental; it reveals a pattern: a sorrow for the working class that overlooks the institutions that disarmed it. The Labour Party, trade unions, the Corbyn movement, and all of identity politics vanish into the fog of “power” and “capital.” The pseudo-left favours this because it absolves them of accountability. They can mourn the working class while still defending the very systems that contributed to its defeat.

In this context, Marvin’s book does not oppose the pseudo-left; it actually supports it. By avoiding mention of Labourism, trade-unionism, and identity politics as the main factors that fragmented class consciousness and hindered working-class struggles, Marvin offers the pseudo-left exactly what it seeks: a cultural story of decline that masks the political betrayal at its heart. His lament becomes a shield—protecting Labour, the unions, and the post-Corbyn left from the accountability they deserve. The working class doesn’t need another lament; it doesn’t need another book that lists its injuries while concealing those responsible. Instead, it needs clarity, strategy, and leadership. It needs a movement that explicitly names its enemies—concretely—and prepares for a renewed, internationalist socialist struggle.

Marvin’s book cannot accomplish this. The pseudo-left fails to deliver, and only a revolutionary party that strongly rejects Labourism, identity politics, and the petty-bourgeois ideology can. In Britain, this is represented by the Socialist Equality Party and the International Committee of the Fourth International. Marvin talks about a betrayed class, but without identifying the betrayers, the betrayal continues. His book is more a lament than a rallying cry. The working class needs more than emotional descriptions of suffering; it needs a political movement that directly names those who have robbed it of power and offers a plan to regain the struggle.

The Hounding of Jason Arday: Media Complicity and the Racial Politics of Academic Scandal

Jason Arday’s death on August 14, just a week after resigning from his Cambridge professorship, highlights a broader systemic problem rather than an isolated tragedy. It reveals a media environment that sensationalises racial scandals for profit, an academic world that views minority scholars as interchangeable symbols, and a political climate where issues of diversity are passionately debated. Although media outlets now offer condolences and publish reflective editorials, these gestures seem superficial given the extensive coverage before his death. Since then, over 249 articles have appeared, many of which previously contributed to months of speculation, mockery, and personal attacks against Arday, reflecting a purposeful ideological bias.

To understand what happened to Arday, it is essential to analyse not just the allegations themselves, but also the mechanisms that amplified them, the racialised dynamics influencing how they were received, and the wider political economy of scandal journalism within the neoliberal university.

Scandal as Commodity: The Political Economy of Media Harassment

The charges against Arday—related to his doctoral thesis, athletic achievements, and academic schedule—warranted investigation due to their seriousness. Yet, seriousness alone isn’t enough to justify the level of coverage. Over time, proportionality was abandoned, transforming the coverage into a spectacle. This change is deliberate and built into the media system itself. Today’s media functions on a straightforward profit motive: scandals draw audiences.

This boosts engagement, drives more traffic, and bolsters the ad-based revenue that most outlets depend on. In this system: more prominent figures attract greater scandal; racialised individuals enhance ideological appeal; and prestigious institutions profit from their downfall. As the youngest Black professor in Cambridge’s history, Arday was uniquely situated at this intersection of incentives. His rise carried symbolic weight, making his decline commercially lucrative. Instead of critically scrutinising Arday, the media consumed his story.

Cambridge University’s conduct throughout the incident exposes the superficiality of elite institutions’ claims of commitment to diversity. Such universities, including Cambridge, have refined a dual approach: publicly elevating minority scholars to showcase progress, then quickly distancing themselves when these scholars become politically problematic. Araday’s appointment was celebrated as a sign of change, yet when media scrutiny grew intense, Cambridge defaulted to minimal procedural responses. They carried out their investigation, released a report citing “honest and reasonable errors,” and then remained silent as media criticism escalated. This silence was not neutral; it was complicity.

In the neoliberal university model, diversity serves more as a marketing ploy than a genuine principle. Institutions that have historically upheld elite privilege now promote inclusion not through structural change, but because diversity has become a profitable commodity in higher education. The logic is clear: universities vie for students, donors, partnerships, and global reputation. In this race, diversity acts as a branding tool—symbolising modernity, progress, and moral virtue. Brochures are filled with images of diverse student groups; announcements highlight appointments of minority scholars; strategic documents emphasise themes of equity and belonging. Ultimately, representation becomes a form of advertising.

But branding is not transformation. The neoliberal university’s commitment to diversity rarely extends beyond the symbolic. It is diversity without redistribution, inclusion without power, representation without structural change. The institution remains governed by the same hierarchies of wealth, class and patronage that have defined it for centuries. What changes is the imagery.

This dynamic produces a familiar pattern. Minority scholars are elevated as proof of institutional progress, yet their position is precarious. They are celebrated when they serve the university’s public relations needs, and abandoned when they become politically inconvenient. Diversity hires are treated as emblems, not colleagues — symbols of institutional virtue rather than participants in institutional governance. Their presence is instrumentalised, not protected.

The result is a system in which diversity initiatives coexist comfortably with widening inequality, casualised labour, collapsing student support services and the financialisaton of university governance. Diversity becomes a way to mask these contradictions, to present the institution as socially progressive while its underlying structures remain untouched.

This is the essence of neoliberal diversity: representation deployed to legitimise an institution that has not changed. It is not a challenge to hierarchy but a supplement to it — a way of modernising the university’s image while preserving its class character.

The tragedy, as recent events have shown, is that individuals placed at the centre of this branding exercise bear the human cost when the image fractures. Diversity is celebrated when it flatters the institution, and discarded when it threatens it. In this sense, the neoliberal university does not simply fail to protect minority scholars; it places them in the line of fire. Elite institutions embrace diversity only insofar as it enhances their public image. When that image becomes threatened, the individual is discarded. Arday was celebrated as a symbol; he was abandoned as a liability.

The New York Times: Liberalism’s Complicity in Racialised Ridicule

The New York Times’ involvement in the incident is especially telling, as it reveals the ideological role of the liberal press. The Times published an article ridiculing Arday’s personal life with the headline: “Jason Arday may want to get himself a nice pair of orange trousers.” This was not genuine journalism; it was contemptuous mockery disguised as commentary. Moreover, it carried racial undertones that would be unimaginable if directed at a white scholar accused of similar misconduct. The Times later removed the article, replacing it with an Error 410 where the satire once was. This removal does not indicate remorse but appears to be damage control—an editorial acknowledgement, only made after Arday’s death, that the piece should never have been published. The Times’ behaviour mirrors its role in the Claudine Gay affair: performative concern for academic standards masking a deeper hostility to the presence of Black scholars in elite institutions.

Simon Baron-Cohen’s description of Arday’s final hours is deeply troubling. Arday spoke of experiencing “relentless scrutiny,” “ridicule,” and the discrediting of “absolutely every detail of his life.” He believed he was being targeted by a “racist playbook”—a pattern recognisable to anyone familiar with how Black academics are often treated in elite settings. This playbook typically involves: identifying a prominent Black scholar, scrutinising their credentials in detail, exaggerating minor mistakes into moral failings, framing the situation as a sign of institutional decline, and then using the scandal to undermine diversity efforts. This approach is not equally applied to white academics; it’s mainly used against those whose presence in elite institutions is already contested by ideological opponents. Arday’s case clearly exemplifies this pattern.

The Family’s Statement: The Reality of Sustained Abuse

Arday’s family expressed it bluntly: “Jason endured over three years of relentless abuse… The persistent misinformation overwhelmed Jason.” This is not exaggeration but a depiction of the ongoing psychological harm caused by years of hostile coverage, insinuation, and public shame. The press tends to avoid scrutinising its own actions. Editors have resumed their normal activities. While Hacked Off’s demand for an inquiry is justified, it will likely be disregarded. The British press does not oversee itself; it safeguards its interests.

Arday’s death is part of a broader political agenda: using academic scandals as a weapon in cultural battles over diversity, equity, and representation. The ideological right presents these incidents as evidence that diversity compromises merit, minority scholars are promoted beyond their abilities, and elite institutions are failing due to ‘wokeness.”

The liberal press performs a softer version of the same narrative: concern for standards, hand‑wringing about academic integrity, and a refusal to confront the racialised dynamics of scrutiny. Both converge on the same outcome: the destruction of individual scholars and the reinforcement of institutional whiteness.

The rapid shift in media coverage—with outlets softening or deleting their previous reporting—does not reflect remorse but signals institutional panic. The story has already transitioned from scandal to tragedy, from demanding scrutiny to seeking sympathy, and from holding accountability to forgetting it altogether. This is not a moment of reckoning; it’s a retreat. The press is not expressing grief over Arday; it is safeguarding its own interests.

The Chronicle of a System, Not an Exception

Jason Arday’s death isn’t random; it’s a foreseeable result of a society that treats Black scholars as symbols rather than equals, uses diversity for show instead of genuine inclusion, profits from scandal, and relies on an unregulated press that fuels humiliation. What happened to Arday isn’t an isolated incident but reflects how personal destruction is normalised in a media system where racialised stories are lucrative and elite institutions delegate their disciplinary roles to the media. His death highlights media complicity and serves as a warning—without addressing the underlying structural incentives, such tragedies are bound to happen again.

Sources and Bibliography

1. Neoliberalism and Higher Education

  • Brown, Wendy. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. Zone Books, 2015.
  • Giroux, Henry A. Neoliberalism’s War on Higher Education. Haymarket Books, 2014.
  • Slaughter, Sheila, and Gary Rhoades. Academic Capitalism and the New Economy. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.
  • Collini, Stefan. Speaking of Universities. Verso, 2017.
  • Marginson, Simon. “The Worldwide Trend to Higher Participation in Higher Education.” Higher Education, vol. 72, 2016.

2. Diversity as Branding / Diversity Regimes

  • Ahmed, Sara. On Being Included: Racism and Diversity in Institutional Life. Duke University Press, 2012.
  • Ahmed, Sara. What’s the Use? On the Uses of Use. Duke University Press, 2019.
  • Berrey, Ellen. The Enigma of Diversity: The Language of Race and the Limits of Racial Justice. University of Chicago Press, 2015.
  • Melamed, Jodi. Represent and Destroy: Rationalising Violence in the New Racial Capitalism. University of Minnesota Press, 2011.
  • Hylton, Kevin. “Institutionalised Whiteness, Racial Microaggressions and Black Bodies Out of Place in Higher Education.” Whiteness and Education, 2016.

3. The Neoliberal University and Marketisation

  • Readings, Bill. The University in Ruins. Harvard University Press, 1996.
  • Canaan, Joyce, and Wesley Shumar (eds.). Structure and Agency in the Neoliberal University. Routledge, 2008.
  • Shore, Cris, and Susan Wright. “Audit Culture and Anthropology: Neoliberalism in British Higher Education.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 1999.
  • Lynch, Kathleen. Equality and Power in Schools: Redistribution, Recognition, and Representation. Routledge, 2019 (esp. chapters on higher education).

4. Critical Race Theory and Academic Gatekeeping

  • Crenshaw, Kimberlé. “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Colour.” Stanford Law Review, 1991.
  • Bell, Derrick. Faces at the Bottom of the Well. Basic Books, 1992.
  • Du Bois, W. E. B. Black Reconstruction in America. Free Press, 1998 (original 1935).
  • Hall, Stuart. The Fateful Triangle: Race, Ethnicity, Nation. Harvard University Press, 2017.

5. Diversity, Meritocracy, and Institutional Legitimacy

  • Bhopal, Kalwant. White Privilege: The Myth of a Post-Racial Society. Policy Press, 2018.
  • Bhopal, Kalwant, and Clare Pitkin. “Diversity and Inequality in Higher Education: A Critical Examination.” British Journal of Sociology of Education, 2020.
  • Boliver, Vikki. “How Fair Is Access to More Prestigious UK Universities?” British Journal of Sociology, 2015.
  • Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. Racial Formation in the United States. Routledge, 2014.

6. Media, Representation, and Institutional Image

  • Couldry, Nick. The Culture of Media: The Politics of Representation. Sage, 2000.
  • Davis, Aeron. Reckless Opportunists: Elites at the End of the Establishment. Manchester University Press, 2018.
  • Hall, Stuart et al. Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order. Macmillan, 1978 (for the ideological function of media narratives).

Ariel Hessayon Reopens the Case of Robert Lockier: Revolution, Martyrdom, and the Struggle Over Meaning in April 1649

(This is Part One of a Two-Part Article)

Ariel Hessayon’s “What Happened at Bishopsgate. Part One” initially appears to be a minor investigation: a detailed analysis of a small mutiny in April 1649 and the execution of cavalry trooper Robert Lockier. However, the essay fits into a genre familiar to Marxist historiography—meticulously reconstructing a seemingly trivial military event to expose the underlying conflicts ripping apart a revolution gradually being strangled by its own leaders. Hessayon’s success lies in illustrating how a pay dispute, equal to about a week’s wages, escalated in hours into a debate over the very meaning of the English Revolution. This isn’t just historical curiosity. It’s a study of how revolutionary groups create martyrs, how counter-revolutionaries enforce discipline, and how both sides strive to shape their narratives around the same event.

The Funeral as Political Theatre

Hessayon’s framing is masterful. He starts with Lockyer’s funeral two days after his execution: thousands march through the City; sea-green and black ribbons indicate Leveller loyalty; trumpets play a soldier’s farewell; a riderless horse is led as if for a fallen leader. This scene resembles Marx’s descriptions of funerals as political spectacles — from Baltimore textile workers to the Paris Commune — a familiar image. Death becomes a stage where class struggles play out.

Karl Marx’s varied yet vivid accounts of funerals—from Baltimore textile workers to the Paris Commune—view them not merely as private ceremonies but as public expressions of class. For Marx, funerals are moments when the oppressed turn grief into political power, using the dead as tools of the living. Ariel Hessayon’s reconstruction of Robert Lockier’s funeral in April 1649 aligns closely with this Marxian perspective, even without directly referencing Marx. The similarities are evident.

Marx consistently highlighted that working-class funerals served as visible displays of support. He believed a funeral procession could showcase a movement’s power more effectively than any written statement. In his writings on American labour, he called funerals “marches of labour,” noting that the coffin acted as a banner around which thousands gathered.

Hessayon’s description of Lockyer’s funeral aligns with this perspective. The sea-green ribbons, trumpets, riderless horse, and the thousands marching through the City were not just mourning rituals but a demonstration of Leveller power. The Levellers recognised, as Marx later explained, that funerals reveal class distinctions. Lockier’s funeral served as a political protest disguised as mourning.

 In The Civil War in France, Marx noted that the funerals of Communards acted as ‘public lessons,’ where the revolution expressed its identity through martyrs. The fallen became symbols of collective resistance, and various political groups debated their importance. Hessayon points out a similar pattern in 1649: Lockier’s death was quickly exploited by the Leveller leaders to rally support, seeking “fresh martyr’s blood” to revive a struggling movement. Meanwhile, Cromwell and Fairfax, from the opposing social class, also acknowledged the corpse’s symbolic power. Lockier’s execution aimed to discipline the army and strengthen the Grandees’ authority. Both sides fought to interpret the dead’s meaning—mirroring Marx’s analysis of the funerals of Delescluze and other Communards.

Marx’s insights on Ireland and Chartism highlight that funerals serve as stages where different factions vie to shape their narratives. The body becomes a focal point for ideological conflict. Hessayon’s study of the pamphlet war involving Lockyer — including True Narrative, The Army’s Martyr, and royalist newsbooks — exemplifies this dynamic. The funeral was more than just a procession; it marked the start of a propaganda battle, with each faction aiming to reinterpret Lockier’s life and death to advance their political agendas. Marx would have instantly understood this struggle.

Marx viewed funerals as events that turn individual death into collective meaning, with the deceased often drawn into struggles they did not choose. Hessayon’s main point—that Levellers did not mainly drive Lockier’s mutiny and that they later co-opted his death—aligns with Marx’s idea of revolutionary martyrdom. Lockier’s life remains largely unknown, and his political stance unclear. However, his death became a symbol because political groups needed it. Both the Levellers and the Grandees used him, reducing him to a symbol. This exemplifies Marx’s funeral theory in action.

Hessayon’s reinterpretation of Lockyer’s funeral functions as a Marxist critique, albeit without directly mentioning Marx. It portrays funerals as acts of class performance, with martyrs serving as tools for political agendas, and the deceased as battlegrounds for ideological conflict. The analysis illustrates how both revolutionary groups and counter-revolutionary elites vie to shape the narrative surrounding the same body.

Hessayon correctly states that this event was not mere spontaneous grief but a carefully coordinated political message. The Levellers, whose movement had suffered repression and was losing influence within the army, recognised the power of martyrdom. They quickly worked to turn Lockier — a largely obscure figure — into a symbol of their mission. The funeral was more than an act of mourning; it was an effort to reassert control over the revolutionary army and challenge the authority of the Grandees, who were increasingly bringing the army under their discipline.

The dispute over Lockyer’s significance started even before his body was cold. Hessayon outlines how competing print outlets—including the officially approved True Narrative, the Leveller-backed Army’s Martyr, and numerous royalist newsbooks—all aimed to shape the event to serve their own agendas. The funeral marked the first act in this propaganda battle.

The Mutiny: A Footnote That Refuses to Stay Small

The traditional view, inherited from Brailsford, Manning, and Rees, sees Bishopsgate as a Leveller mutiny, described as the “penultimate act” before Burford. However, Hessayon’s archival research undermines this straightforward story. His evidence shows the arrears amounted to just three to eleven days’ pay—hardly a sign of a principled rebellion. Whalley’s regiment was not randomly selected for the unpopular Irish service, which typically ignited Leveller protests. Additionally, sources offer no reliable information about Lockier’s ideological stance—whether Baptist, Leveller, or Dissenter. This conclusion challenges familiar Leveller veneration: the mutiny appears to have been mainly a spontaneous response to economic grievances. Leveller leaders like Lilburne and Overton only arrived later and exploited Lockier’s death for their own purposes.

This does not criticise the Levellers but clarifies how revolutionary politics truly operate. Leaders often do not originate events; rather, they interpret, frame, and use them. Hessayon’s detailed account is more grounded than the romantic view because it forces us to consider the link between grassroots discontent and political leadership’s efforts to stay coherent under repression.

Grandees and Levellers: Opposing Politics, Parallel Needs

Hessayon’s key insight, evident even through a simple reading of his document, is that Cromwell and Fairfax, on one side, and Lilburne and Overton, on the other, arrived at similar conclusions despite having different political aims. For the Grandees, setting an example was crucial; the army was divided over issues like Ireland, unpaid wages, and political unrest. A swift execution would serve as a disciplinary act and demonstrate that the revolution’s military authority was now securely in place. Conversely, for the Levellers, Lockyer’s death became a source of inspiration—serving as martyrs’ blood—to motivate supporters who felt discouraged by repression and the consolidation of power by the Grandees.

Both factions reduced Lockyer to a symbol, using his death to serve their own interests. They competed over how his story was told. This isn’t about morality; it’s about class power. The elites aimed to protect property and social order, while the Levellers sought to keep democratic activism alive. Both sides recognised the political value of a martyr’s body.

Historiographical Comparison: Brailsford, Manning, Rees, and the Revisionists

A mid-20th-century Marxist perspective has historically influenced the historiography of Bishopsgate and the Leveller mutinies. This view regarded the Levellers as the ideological leaders of the revolutionary army. Christopher Hill’s broader interpretation — viewing the English Revolution as a bourgeois uprising propelled by plebeian radicalism — created the intellectual environment in which scholars like H. N. Brailsford, Brian Manning, and John Rees developed their accounts. Although these historians differed in details, they all shared the assumption that Leveller influence within the army was widespread, organised, and ultimately decisive.

H.Brailsford, active in the 1910s and 1920s, provided the basic narrative. His book, The Levellers and the English Revolution, depicted Bishopsgate as an early Leveller mutiny—a principled protest by politically aware soldiers against the Grandees’ shift towards counter-revolution. Brailsford’s notable strength was his moral clarity, but he tended to overreach with evidence. He regarded sparse sources as supporting the disciplined ideology of the Levellers, even though the historical record is actually ambiguous.

Brian Manning, working in the 1960s–90s, refined the class analysis but retained the same interpretive architecture. For him, Bishopsgate was part of a rising wave of plebeian radicalism driven by material grievances and Leveller agitation. Manning’s emphasis on social depth — artisans, small producers, and soldiers as the revolutionary engine — strengthened the Marxist reading but did not substantially question the assumption that Leveller cadres were central to mutiny dynamics.

John Rees, writing from a modern socialist viewpoint, emphasises the political importance. In The Leveller Revolution, he describes Bishopsgate as the “penultimate act” before Burford, marking a critical moment when Leveller influence in the military was at its peak. Rees considers factional complexities more carefully than Brailsford but still portrays Lockyer and his associates as deliberate Leveller activists. His storytelling is engaging, yet it relies on a level of ideological confidence that the sources do not fully support.

Revisionists like Morrill, Kishlansky, and Foxley oppose the traditional Marxist view. They minimise ideology, overlook class conflict, and see mutinies as administrative issues rather than political struggles. Kishlansky, for instance, dismisses Leveller influence in the army, considering them minor pamphleteers with little impact on military reality. While the revisionists excel at source interpretation, they lack political insight. By removing ideological elements, they reduce the revolution to a constitutional dispute among elites.

Hessayon’s approach falls between these extremes. He preserves class analysis and resists dismissing ideology, instead scrutinising the traditional Marxist story with detailed archival research. His conclusion—that Bishopsgate was not mainly a Leveller mutiny and that Leveller leaders later claimed Lockyer’s death—contradicts Brailsford, Manning, and Rees, yet avoids endorsing revisionist doubt. Hessayon maintains complexity while upholding political significance.

In doing so, he forces a reconsideration of how revolutionary leadership relates to spontaneous rank‑and‑file discontent. The Levellers were neither omnipresent nor irrelevant; they were a political movement operating under severe constraints, capable of rapid ideological framing but not always in command of events. The Grandees were not merely administrators but active agents of counter‑revolution. The revisionists miss this entirely; the older Marxists overstated it. Hessayon threads the needle.

 Avoiding the Trap of Source‑Critical Agnosticism

This type of source-critical reconstruction risks becoming a form of agnostic even-handedness, where propaganda from Grandees and Levellers is seen as equally distorted versions of a truth beyond reach. Hessayon avoids this by situating Bishopsgate within the broader revolutionary crisis. That week, following Lockyer’s death, was marked by intense upheaval: the Diggers occupied St George’s Hill, a women’s petition with 10,000 signatures was presented to Parliament, Colonel Poyer was executed by a firing squad—the same size as the one that would kill Lockyer two days later—and mutinies broke out at Salisbury, Banbury, and Burford. Weeks later, Captain William Thompson, killed at Wellingborough, still referenced Lockyer’s blood among his grievances.

This was part of the Grandees’ broader effort to dismantle the revolutionary army that enabled their victory, not an isolated barracks dispute. Hessayon’s contextualization maintains the episode’s class significance and avoids drifting into postmodern relativism.

Hessayon’s intervention matters because it challenges two simplistic narratives: the romantic Leveller myth—which claims every mutineer was a dedicated Leveller and every Leveller a near-socialist hero—and the revisionist view that ideology was irrelevant. The Civil War was merely a misunderstanding among aristocratic gentlemen. He rejects both, restoring complexity without ignoring class. Hessayon depicts the Levellers as a political movement with genuine influence but limited scope, capable of effective propaganda but not pervasive throughout the army. He also portrays the Grandees as evolving into counter-revolutionaries, intent on disciplining the soldiers who propelled them to power. This is the precise area where serious Marxist scholarship must engage.

Part two’s success is anticipated because it will present one of the most significant Leveller studies in recent years — not by dismissing the Levellers, but by placing them within their true historical context.

Martyrdom and Counter‑Revolution

Lockyer’s death is not merely a moral lesson. Instead, it serves as a detailed example of how revolutions are initiated, challenged, and ultimately betrayed. Hessayon’s essay, along with the broader context he describes, reveals a fundamental truth: each revolutionary movement creates martyrs, and each counter-revolution fosters the conditions for their emergence. The debate over their significance itself becomes part of the class struggle. As the English Revolution of 1649 neared its end, the leading figures solidified their authority, the Levellers fought to maintain their influence, and ordinary soldiers were disciplined into submission. Lockyer’s execution marked a pivotal moment—not because of his identity, but because of what his death might symbolise.

Hessayon reopens the case of Robert Lockyer. In doing so, he reopens the question of how revolutions die, how their meanings are fought over, and how the dead are conscripted into battles they never chose.

Sources and Bibliography

I. Primary Sources: Karl Marx and Revolutionary Funerals

Marx, Karl.

  • The Civil War in France (1871). Marx’s most substantial discussion of funerals as revolutionary theatre, especially the burial of Communards such as Charles Delescluze.
  • Articles on the American Labour Movement (1850s). Includes descriptions of Baltimore textile workers’ funerals as demonstrations of class strength. Collected in Marx/Engels Collected Works (MECW), vols. 12–15.

Engels, Frederick.

  • “Speech at the Grave of Karl Marx,” Highgate Cemetery, 17 March 1883.
  • “Karl Marx’s Funeral,” Der Sozialdemokrat, 22 March 1883. Essential for understanding how Marx’s closest collaborator interpreted funerals as political acts.

Liebknecht, Wilhelm.

  • “Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx,” Der Sozialdemokrat, 22 March 1883. A key example of how the German Social Democrats immediately politicised Marx’s death.

II. Primary Sources: Lockyer, Bishopsgate, and the Levellers (1649)

Pamphlets and Newsbooks

  • A True Narrative of the Late Mutiny (Grandees’ official account).
  • The Army’s Martyr (Leveller-sponsored pamphlet).
  • Royalist newsbooks including Mercurius Pragmaticus, The Moderate Intelligencer, Mercurius Elencticus, etc.

These constitute the propaganda battlefield Hessayon reconstructs — 33 newsbook references across 17 titles, each shaping Lockier’s meaning.

Hessayon, Ariel.

  • “What Happened at Bishopsgate. Part One” (2024). The central modern source for Lockier’s funeral, the mutiny’s chronology, and the competing narratives.

III. Secondary Sources: Marx, Funerals, and Political Symbolism

Draper, Hal.

  • Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, Vols. I–IV. Contains discussions of mass demonstrations, symbolic politics, and Marx’s treatment of public rituals.

Stedman Jones, Gareth.

  • Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion (2016). Offers contextual analysis of Marx’s political journalism and his use of public spectacle.

Sperber, Jonathan.

  • Karl Marx: A Nineteenth-Century Life (2013). Provides biographical context for Marx’s political engagements, including funeral culture.

Musto, Marcello (ed.).

  • Workers Unite! The International 150 Years Later (2014). Contains essays on Marx’s political strategies and symbolic practices.

IV. Secondary Sources: Levellers, Mutinies, and the English Revolution

Classic Marxist Historiography

Brailsford, H. N.

  • The Levellers and the English Revolution (1912; reissued 1961). Foundational narrative treating Bishopsgate as a Leveller mutiny.

Manning, Brian.

  • The English People and the English Revolution (1976). Emphasises plebeian radicalism and Leveller influence.

Rees, John.

  • The Leveller Revolution (2016). Presents Bishopsgate as the “penultimate act” before Burford.

Revisionist Historiography

Kishlansky, Michael.

  • The Rise of the New Model Army (1979). Minimises Leveller influence; treats mutinies as administrative breakdowns.

Morrill, John.

  • Essays on the English Civil War (1980s–2000s). Representative of the constitutionalist revisionist school.

Foxley, Rachel.

  • The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (2013). Modern scholarly reassessment of Leveller ideology.

Robertson, Geoffrey.

  • The Levellers: The Putney Debates (2007). Useful for political context and modern interpretations.