The upcoming acquisition of a significant stake in Liverpool FC by a consortium led by Amit Bhatia, backed by Jeff Bezos and Eduardo Saverin, signals a new phase in turning football into a domain for the global financial elite. Reports suggest the group is nearing a stake exceeding 30 per cent, valuing the club at approximately £4.4 billion ($5.9–6 billion). An announcement is likely soon.
This development is part of a larger trend where all aspects of social life—such as sport, culture, media, and technology—are increasingly controlled and reshaped by a small group of billionaires. Their wealth comes from exploiting workers worldwide. Football, originally a sport for the working class, is now being integrated into the same financial and technological systems that govern logistics, surveillance, AI, and global finance.
A New Phase in the Oligarchic Capture of Football
Liverpool’s potential new investors hail from the most privileged echelons of global capitalism. Jeff Bezos, founder of Amazon, amassed his enormous wealth through the ruthless exploitation of hundreds of thousands of workers, who faced poverty wages, constant surveillance by algorithms, and dangerous productivity targets. His fortune grew significantly during the pandemic, as Amazon employees endured hazardous working conditions. Bezos is not simply a “sports investor”; he exemplifies American financial capitalism at its most predatory. Eduardo Saverin, co-founder of Facebook, renounced his US citizenship to dodge taxes and moved to Singapore. His wealth originates from a social media empire built on surveillance, data extraction, and the promotion of reactionary content through algorithms.
Amit Bhatia, son-in-law of steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal, belongs to a global elite whose wealth relies on exploiting workers across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. His abrupt divestment from Queens Park Rangers on the day Liverpool’s bid emerged highlights the financial manoeuvring — regulatory arbitrage and share shuffling — typical of Today’s oligarchy. The inclusion of these figures in Liverpool’s ownership signifies a significant shift. While under Fenway Sports Group (FSG), Liverpool was primarily considered a financial asset. John Henry played a key role in proposing the 2021 European Super League, aiming to replace the competitive league system with a closed cartel that would secure ongoing revenue for the wealthiest clubs. This plan, backed by JPMorgan Chase, was ultimately stopped by widespread fan resistance.
Now the club is being passed from one set of billionaires to another — but this time to individuals whose wealth is measured not in billions but in hundreds of billions.
Football as a Financial Instrument
Liverpool’s valuation at £4.4 billion highlights the sport’s dramatic transformation. Originally founded in 1892 by working-class individuals, the club now has a value that could support the NHS for months. The financialization of football emphasises club worth based on anticipated future revenues, global branding, and digital engagement rather than sporting success. In Marxist terms, football has become part of fictitious capital — claims on future value instead of current output. Clubs are traded like tech stocks, with valuations serving as speculative tools. Their ownership resembles that of a multinational. The Bezos–Saverin–Bhatia consortium is not investing in football as a sport. Instead, they view it as: a content source for Amazon’s media empire, a data collection point for feeding Amazon’s AI systems, a global brand asset integrated into Amazon’s retail and advertising networks, and a financial tool for the portfolios of the world’s wealthiest individuals.
The Conflict‑of‑Interest Question: A Window into the System
A key aspect of the deal is the unresolved question of whether an investor holding a stake in the Premier League broadcaster Amazon Prime Video can also own part of a Premier League club. This is primarily a political issue, not a technical one. The Premier League’s Owners’ and Directors’ Test does not impose significant restrictions on such cross-ownership. In reality, the capitalist system enforces regulations only when they do not conflict with the interests of the ruling class. When billionaires are involved, these rules are often treated as mere “guidelines.”
If the deal goes through unchallenged, it establishes a precedent: broadcasters might own clubs, clubs could control broadcasters, and a few oligarchs could vertically integrate the complete ecosystem. These same individuals would own the product, distribution channels, and ways of consumption. This represents the Americanization of football — not culturally, but in its structure.
Liverpool’s Sporting Transition: Irrelevant to Capital
Liverpool secured the Premier League title in 2025 but is currently going through a transition phase. Manager Arne Slot has left, Mohamed Salah has departed, and Michael Edwards has exited FSG. Despite significant spending, the club finished fifth last season. From the consortium’s perspective, these developments are mainly relevant for their impact on the asset’s valuation. At this level, a football club functions more as an investment vehicle than a sporting entity, serving purposes like capital appreciation, brand leverage, and generating broadcast and commercial income from a global fanbase.
Speculation that Bezos and Saverin might aim for full control is plausible. For wealthy individuals like them, holding a minority stake is not an end goal but a strategic foothold.
The Broader Pattern: The Oligarchy Consolidates Its Power
The shift to Liverpool reflects a wider trend. By 2026, Bezos has invested billions in AI companies, grown Blue Origin’s aerospace activities, and co-led a $12 billion funding round for Prometheus, an industrial AI firm now valued at $41 billion. The same elite pushing humanity toward global conflict — as the WSWS detailed during the 2026 World Cup — is also consolidating control over all aspects of social life.
The 2026 World Cup showcased glaring signs of capitalist excess: generating $15 billion in revenue, with dynamic ticket prices soaring to over $10,000, luxury hospitality packages costing more than an average worker’s yearly income, and the trophy transported in a Louis Vuitton trunk. Football is increasingly being marketed as a luxury item for the wealthy and a global advertising tool for corporations. The Bezos group’s interest in Liverpool aligns with these trends, representing the broader process of expropriating everything the working class has built by a parasitic financial elite.
The Marxist Perspective: Expropriate the Oligarchy
The banners at Anfield during the 2021 Super League revolt — “Created by the poor, stolen by the rich” — summed up the situation well. But the real solution isn’t better regulation, fan representation, or a “50+1” rule. These measures leave the core capitalist ownership model untouched. Football can’t be truly democratised under capitalism because the logic of capital is all-encompassing. Every reform risks new forms of exploitation. The only genuine solution is to expropriate the oligarchs, transform football clubs into democratic entities run by players, workers, and supporters, and replace capitalism with a socialist society where sport, like healthcare, education, and housing, is a public good instead of a means for billionaire profit.
On Shrove Tuesday, February 22, 1631, a group of London apprentices crossed the Thames in a rush toward a fortified estate in Southwark. Their goal was Holland’s Leaguer, London’s most exclusive brothel, operated for nearly thirty years by the fierce Bess Holland. Though the house withstood the attack—its drawbridge remained intact, and the moat proved effective—the event is more than just a colourful tale. It offers a vivid glimpse into early Stuart class society, highlighting moments where the tensions around labour, gender, government authority, and elite hypocrisy were temporarily laid bare.
Viewing Holland’s Leaguer solely as bawdy London folklore overlooks its deeper importance. It functioned as a hub within the growing capitalist economy, where displaced women sold their labour to elite men, and where the monarchy engaged in activities it publicly denounced. Additionally, it was a place where the frustration of exploited youth was diverted from its real cause. On a small scale, the siege of Holland’s Leaguer exemplifies the social tensions that eventually led to civil war a decade later.
The Liberty of the Clink: A State‑Sanctioned Economy of Vice
Holland’s Leaguer was located within the Liberty of the Clink, an area intentionally separated from the City’s jurisdiction. Bankside’s theatres, bear-baiting pits, taverns, and brothels thrived not due to lax enforcement but because the law was purposefully structured to overlook those activities in that zone. The Clink functioned as a device for managing contradictions: it was a district where “vice” could be isolated, taxed, and enjoyed by the elites without threatening the City’s moral image.
This setup wasn’t hypocrisy in a simple sense; it was built into the system. The Crown and the aristocracy needed places where their desires could be fulfilled without threatening the appearance of moral authority. Since theatres and brothels were highly profitable, socially significant, and deeply rooted in elite culture, they couldn’t be abolished. Instead, they were physically separated—moved across the river, out of sight but still accessible.
Holland’s Leaguer itself was a capitalist enterprise avant la lettre. Its exclusivity — fine linen, modern sanitation, controlled access — mirrored the emerging logic of commodification. Sex was not merely sold; it was curated. The clientele included wealthy courtiers, foreign visitors, and, by later report, King James I and his favourite, Buckingham. The same monarchy that periodically ordered the brothel’s closure was among its most valued patrons.
This episode reveals the first contradiction: a ruling class that criminalised people with low incomes for the very desires it enjoyed openly, and that regarded the women working in such houses as disposable labour rather than as individuals entitled to legal protection.
The apprentices who attacked Holland’s Leaguer were not moral crusaders. They were young workers bound by indenture, denied wages, poorly fed, and subject to the arbitrary authority of masters who controlled nearly every hour of their lives. Their conditions were closer to coerced labour than to the free wage work celebrated in English political mythology.
Shrove Tuesday served as a safety valve: a single day when the built-up frustration of youthful repression could be released. Importantly, violence was allowed — often encouraged — provided it was aimed at safe targets. Places like brothels, theatres, and taverns were considered acceptable outlets for anger; in contrast, merchants, guildmasters, and the government were absent. This exemplifies a typical class society dynamic where horizontal violence among exploited groups replaces confrontation with those in power. The apprentices targeted visible victims—sex workers, who also suffered displacement—instead of challenging the property systems causing suffering for both groups.
The apprentices were still in the process of forming a distinct class. Their common living situations, collective grievances, and occasional street violence helped develop a proto-political identity. While not revolutionary yet, they were becoming less willing to accept their assigned roles. A decade later, they would join the crowds that expelled Charles I from London. The 1631 riot wasn’t a revolutionary act, but it served as a rehearsal for one.
Sex Workers and the Gendered Labour Regime of Early‑Modern London
The women of Holland’s Leaguer were unfairly portrayed as morally ‘fallen’ by Puritan pamphlets. In fact, they were victims of a swiftly changing labour market caused by enclosure, falling rural wages, and the loss of traditional rights, which drove many to London. There, women encountered obstacles to joining guilds and often had to settle for jobs like domestic service, laundry, nursing, hawking, or fringe piecework. Sex work was not a moral failing but a survival strategy—an economic necessity to cope with a city that systematically undervalued female labour.
Brothels such as Holland’s Leaguer were not anomalies but integral parts of early-modern capitalism: venues where gendered labour exploitation was focused, commodified, and controlled for elite audiences. The apprentices’ assault on the brothel was therefore not a clash between virtue and vice but between two exploited groups, with their conflict aligning with the interests of the ruling class.
Holland’s Leaguer and the Historiography of Proto‑Proletarian Consciousness
The 1631 destruction of Holland’s Leaguer is more than just a striking event in London’s social past. It is central to a significant historiographical debate about when and how the English working classes started to develop a shared political awareness. Scholars like Christopher Hill, Brian Manning, Barry Reay, and Buchanan Sharp present perspectives that interpret the siege not as a mere rumour but as a key moment in the gradual emergence of a proto-proletariat in early Stuart England.
Hill: Apprentices as a Semi‑Proletarian Class
Hill’s work remains foundational. In The World Turned Upside Down and The Century of Revolution, he argued that apprentices were a transitional class: economically indispensable, politically subordinate, and increasingly aware of the contradiction. Their periodic riots were not random explosions of youthful disorder but expressions of a class whose labour was expanding while its rights remained static.
Hill would see the attack on Holland’s Leaguer as a classic example of this dynamic. Apprentices acted collectively, outside the control of their masters, in a way that revealed both their grievances and their potential political agency. The riot was misdirected — aimed at sex workers rather than merchants or magistrates — but it demonstrated a capacity for mobilisation that would become decisive in the 1640s.
Manning: Popular Agency and the Coming Revolution
Brian Manning sharpened Hill’s insight by insisting on the political agency of “the middling and poorer sort.” For Manning, apprentices were not merely reactive; they were active participants in shaping the revolutionary crisis. Their street actions were early rehearsals for the mass demonstrations that would force Charles I out of London.
Manning’s emphasis on popular mobilisation helps us see Holland’s Leaguer as part of a continuum. The same social layer that attacked the brothel in 1631 would, a decade later, besiege Lambeth Palace, disrupt royal processions, and form the backbone of London’s revolutionary crowds. The riot was not revolutionary, but it belonged to the same repertoire of collective action.
Reay: Gender, Sexuality and Displaced Labour
Barry Reay’s work on sexuality and popular culture adds a crucial dimension. Reay shows that sex work in early‑modern London was not a moral aberration but a structural response to economic displacement. Women entered the trade because enclosure, falling wages and exclusion from guild labour left them few alternatives.
Reay’s analysis reframes Holland’s Leaguer as a site where two exploited groups — apprentices and sex workers — collided. Their antagonism was not natural but manufactured. Both were victims of early‑capitalist transformation; both were denied legal protection; both were indispensable to the functioning of London’s economy. Their conflict served the interests of the ruling class by preventing solidarity between exploited layers.
Sharpe: Ritualised Disorder and Social Control
Buchanan Sharp’s work on Shrove Tuesday riots shows how the authorities tolerated certain forms of disorder as a mechanism of social control. Apprentices were permitted to vent their frustrations so long as they targeted “safe” objects: brothels, theatres, taverns. Sharp’s analysis explains why the attack on Holland’s Leaguer was indulged while attacks on merchants or magistrates were not.
The riot thus reveals a key feature of early‑Stuart governance: the state managed popular anger by directing it sideways—horizontal violence substituted for vertical challenge.
A Microcosm of Class Formation
These historians collectively depict Holland’s Leaguer as a small-scale reflection of early Stuart social dynamics: Hill highlights apprentices as a semi-proletariat; Manning emphasises popular agency and political activism; Reay discusses gendered labour and economic shifts; and Sharpe considers ritualised disorder as a form of social control. The destruction of the brothel was significant; it revealed the tensions within early-modern capitalism—such as labour exploitation, gendered insecurity, elite hypocrisy, and misplaced popular rage. This event is not just part of London’s bawdy folklore but also a precursor to the English Revolution.
The State Intervenes: Coercion as the Final Arbiter
When Charles I ultimately commanded the closure of Holland’s Leaguer in December 1631, he relied on military force rather than moral persuasion. Soldiers, not magistrates, were dispatched to enforce his order. Bess Holland responded with resistance, raising the drawbridge to cause the first soldiers to fall into the moat, and her brothel workers dumped chamber pots over the troops below.
The siege endured for almost a month, serving as a display of state authority amid waning power. The Personal Rule had alienated many social groups, while financial measures eroded the monarchy’s legitimacy. Religious policies also sparked widespread discontent. In this climate, shutting down a brothel became a symbolic act—showing the King’s attempt to assert control in a society that was slipping beyond his reach.
The closure had no effect; Holland just moved. The economic factors behind brothels—poverty, gendered labour markets, and elite demand—stayed the same. The state only suppressed a symptom without addressing the root cause.
From Scandal to Spectacle: Commodifying the Crisis
In just a few weeks, Holland’s Leaguer shifted from a site of conflict to a cultural commodity. Ballads spread widely, and Nicholas Goodman’s pamphlet cast the siege as moral theatre. Shackerley Marmion’s play turned the event into entertainment aimed at the same social groups that had patronised the brothel. This swift shift to commodification is deliberate; it reflects how class society processes scandal: exploitative labour becomes entertainment, state violence turns into farce, and class tensions are repackaged as local colour. The ideological role is evident: spectacle masks underlying social structures. The social issues—gendered exploitation, elite hypocrisy, misplaced popular anger—that created Holland’s Leaguer are hidden behind storytelling and theatricality.
Holland’s Leaguer and the Coming Revolution
Viewing Holland’s Leaguer through a Marxist perspective, it serves as a microcosm of early-Stuart England’s impending crisis. The monarchy relies on coercion instead of consent. The working class becomes less willing to accept its social role. The ruling elite’s hypocrisy weakens its ideological authority. The cultural realm commodifies crises instead of resolving them. The destruction of the brothel exposes a society where class tensions intensify, ideological conflicts deepen, and social controls begin to weaken. The apprentices’ riot, while not revolutionary, hints at the instability that would eventually lead to civil war, regicide, and the temporary fall of the monarchy.
Conclusion: A Case Study in Class Society
Holland’s Leaguer should be remembered not just as a colourful episode in London’s bawdy history but as an example of how early-modern class society organised, controlled, profited from, and ultimately abandoned its poorest and most vulnerable labourers. It shows how public anger was directed at the wrong targets, how gendered labour was commodified for elite amusement, and how the state only intervened when elite interests were at risk. Its contradictions—economic, social, ideological—provide a revealing glimpse into the world that led to the English Revolution. Beneath the chaos of riot and siege, deeper systems of exploitation and resistance were at work, which within a decade would threaten the monarchy’s very foundation.
Marmion, Shackerley. Holland’s Leaguer: A Comedy. London, 1632.
Contemporary ballads on Holland’s Leaguer (British Library, Roxburghe Collection).
City of London Court Records, Shrove Tuesday disturbances (Guildhall Library Manuscripts).
The Liberty of the Clink administrative records (Southwark Local Studies Archive).
Secondary Sources
Christopher Hill
Hill, Christopher. The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714. London: Routledge, 1961.
Hill, Christopher. The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution. London: Penguin, 1972.
Hill, Christopher. Society and Puritanism in Pre‑Revolutionary England. London: Secker & Warburg, 1964.
Brian Manning
Manning, Brian. The English People and the English Revolution. London: Bookmarks, 1991.
Manning, Brian. Revolution and Counter‑Revolution in England, 1658–1660. London: Bookmarks, 2003.
Manning, Brian. The Far Left in the English Revolution. London: Bookmarks, 1971.
Barry Reay
Reay, Barry. Popular Cultures in England, 1550–1750. London: Longman, 1998.
Reay, Barry. The Last Rising of the Apprentices: London 1661. Stroud: Sutton, 1999.
Reay, Barry. Sexuality in Early Modern England. London: Routledge, 1998.
Buchanan Sharp
Sharp, Buchanan. In Contempt of All Authority: Rural Artisans and Riot in the West of England, 1586–1660. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
Sharp, Buchanan. “Rituals of Riot: Popular Violence in Early Modern England.” Past & Present 130 (1991): 90–122.
Sharp, Buchanan. The English Riots of 1641. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Early‑Modern London, Sex Work, and Urban Labour
Griffiths, Paul. Lost Londons: Change, Crime and Control in the Capital City, 1550–1660. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Griffiths, Paul. “The Structure of Prostitution in Elizabethan London.” Continuity and Change 8, no. 1 (1993): 39–63.
Ingram, Martin. Carnal Knowledge: Regulating Sex in England, 1470–1600. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Archer, Ian. The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Shoemaker, Robert. The London Mob: Violence and Disorder in Eighteenth‑Century England. London: Hambledon, 2004.
Stallybrass, Peter. The Politics and Poetics of Transgression. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
Theatres, Liberties, and the Bankside Economy
Dillon, Janette. Theatre, Court and City, 1595–1610: Drama and Social Space in London. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Gurr, Andrew. Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Egan, Gabriel. The Struggle for Shakespeare’s South Bank. London: Shakespeare’s Globe, 2019.
The English Revolution and Popular Politics
Underdown, David. Revel, Riot and Rebellion: Popular Politics and Culture in England, 1603–1660. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Kishlansky, Mark. A Monarchy Transformed: Britain 1603–1714. London: Penguin, 1996.
Fletcher, Anthony, and Peter Roberts (eds.). Religion, Politics and Society in Sixteenth‑Century England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Further Reading
Shoemaker, Robert. Gender in English Society, 1650–1850. London: Longman, 1998.
Capp, Bernard. The World of John Taylor the Water-Poet, 1578–1653. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Slack, Paul. Poverty and Policy in Tudor and Stuart England. London: Longman, 1988.
Wrightson, Keith. Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain. London: Penguin, 2000.
Beier, A.L. Masterless Men: The Vagrancy Problem in England 1560–1640. London: Methuen, 1985.
Archival and Digital Resources
British Library, Early English Books Online (EEBO).
London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), Apprentice Registers.
“As a vast, solid phalanx, the generations come on; they have the same features, and their pattern is new in the world. All wear the same expression, but it is this which they do not detect in each other. It is the one life which ponders in the philosophers, which drudges in the labourers, which basks in the poets, which dilates in the love of the women. –
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Notebooks”
“The best things come, as a general thing, from the talents that are members of a group.”
Henry James 1879 biography of Nathaniel Hawthorne
‘Is imagination so fanciful that it can invent a memory and then transform it into something we understand as true?’
Eduardo Halfon
“First of all, art is the cognition of life. Art is not the free play of fantasy, feelings, and moods: art is not the expression of merely the subjective sensations and experiences of the poet; art is not assigned the goal of primarily awakening in the reader good feelings. Like science, art cognises life. Both art and science have the same subject: life, reality. But sciences analyse, art synthesises; science is abstract, art is concrete; science turns to the mind of man, art to his sensual [i.e., sensory] nature. Science cognises life with the help of concepts, art with the aid of images in the form of living, sensual contemplation.”
Aleksandr Voronsky
Eduardo Halfon is part of a new generation of Latin American writers who, to paraphrase Sir Isaac Newton, have seen further than most because they have stood on the shoulders of giants. These giants are well-known. In a recent interview, Halfon was asked about his earliest influences. “Mostly North American writers, and most of them in the short story tradition. Maybe that’s why I constantly go back to that genre. I’m essentially a short story writer. That’s where I feel most comfortable, or least uncomfortable. My technique or approach in constructing a short story is very much based on the North American tradition, much more so than the Latin American one. I feel much closer to Hemingway and Carver and Cheever, for example, than I do to Borges and Cortázar and García Márquez.[1]
Halfon and others are still paying their debt to these greats, but they are also now striking out on a new road. As Halfon succinctly put it, “ My house, then, is built on two pillars. But a writer must begin by destroying one’s house.
Like their earlier counterparts, these writers have to deal with their respective countries’ violent political pasts. In Halfon’s case, the past is the genocidal campaign by the Guatemalan ruling elite against its Mayan and working-class population. Although Halfon clearly is influenced by Guatemala’s great writers such as Miguel Angel Asturias, Augusto Monterroso and modern day writers such Francisco Goldman and David Unger his work is “intensely autobiographical, migratory and steeped in memory” Halfon’s focus on migration, memory and identity can be read as testimony to the real material dislocations produced by imperialism and capitalist restructuring throughout Latin America.
It is worth noting that every single Guatemalan writer or poet of note has been forced into exile due to the distinct possibility of being murdered by their respective dictators. Halfon noted this in an interview in 2015, “For the past century, Guatemalan writers have been writing and dying in exile. Miguel Ángel Asturias, who received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1967, wrote his books about Guatemala while living in exile, in South America and Europe. He died in Paris and is buried at Père Lachaise. The great short-story writer Augusto Monterroso, after being detained by the military forces of dictator Jorge Ubico, was forced to leave the country in 1944. He fled first to Chile, then to Mexico, where he lived the rest of his life, and where he wrote most of his stories, and where he’s now buried. Luis Cardoza y Aragón, arguably Guatemala’s most important poet of the last century, suffered a similar fate —he was also forced into exile in Mexico in the 1930s, where he wrote his poetry and where he, too, died. Guatemala’s greatest playwright, Carlos Solórzano, fled the country in 1939—first to Germany, then to Mexico—and never returned. The writer Mario Payeras, a guerrilla commander in the 1970s, also wrote while exiled in Mexico, where he suddenly and mysteriously died (his remains were buried in a cemetery in the southwest of the country, but have since vanished). One of the most important Guatemalan novels of the last few decades, El Tiempo Principia en Xibalbá (Time Commences in Xibalbá), was written by the indigenous writer Luis de Lión, who in 1984 was kidnapped by military forces, tortured for twenty days, and then disappeared. His murder wasn’t confirmed until fifteen years later, in 1999, when his name and number appeared in the now infamous “Military Diary”, a haunting military document that secretly listed the fate of all the Guatemalans disappeared by the military forces between August 1983 and March 1985. Luis de Lión, born José Luís de León Díaz, is number 135. His novel was published posthumously, that most extreme of exiles.”[2]
Halfon’s recurring motifs of displacement, cross-border families, and fragmented memory are not merely personal or cultural; they are literary expressions of material processes driven by the global capitalist system. Halfon is not a Marxist, but he clearly uses these literary expressions in much the same way that the great American writer Phillip Roth did in his work to uncover the past and prepare for future struggles. How else would you understand Roth’s extraordinary prescient novel The Plot Against America?
Halfon does not explicitly examine the growth of Fascism in Guatemala. Rather, evocations in his stories are an indirect examination of the expansion of informal, precarious labour, the restructuring of national economies through neoliberal “adjustment,” and the integration of millions into transnational labour markets, all of which create the objective conditions for mass migration and social struggles.
According to the International Labour Organisation, more than 2.1 billion of the world’s 3.6 billion workers now labour in the informal economy. Platform and casual work are central mechanisms of modern labour casualisation These processes force families to fragment, livelihoods to be uprooted, and memories to be reconstituted around loss, survival and mobility, the precise themes of Halfon’s fiction. It has been said of Halfon’s collective work that it seems to flow into a single ongoing novel.
Chris Power points out that Halfon’s “ other recurring themes include Guatemalan history, the Holocaust, questions of Jewish identity, and the nature of violence. The books recycle stories, such as Eduardo’s grandfather’s experience of Auschwitz and subsequent emigration to Guatemala; the family’s relocation to the States; and Eduardo’s own career as a writer. When a novel’s narrator and its author share a name and identity, it naturally prompts questions about what is true and what is invented. But Halfon’s primary concern seems not to be with establishing facts, as a memoirist might, but to rappel as deeply as possible into those crevasses where meaning and truth disappear.”[3]
Before discussing other things, it is worth commenting on the translations of Halfon’s books, which merit a book in themselves. Eduardo Halfon’s fiction—works such as The Polish Boxer, Monastery, and The Lost Boy—explore memory, migration, identity and the tangled legacies of war and displacement. It is important to study the translations seriously and treat them not as incidental “products” but as historical-cultural documents.
For instance, Halfon’s The Polish Boxer was worked on by an international group of five translators who worked in concert with each other to deliver a very good manuscript. These translators understand how translations shape how working people around the world encounter cultures and struggles not their own. Translation determines which voices reach mass audiences and under what political framing.
Halfon and his translators stand on the shoulders of the groundbreaking translator Gregory Rabassa. His translations helped define an international readership’s image of Latin American culture and politics. Understanding these processes exposes the cultural market’s role in commodifying exile, migration, and anti‑imperialist themes and creates a basis for challenging who benefits and who is represented.
Gregory Rabassa’s work, most famously his English translations of Gabriel García Márquez, Julio Cortázar and Clarice Lispector, offers a model for studying translation as both a literary and political activity. It is important to learn from Rabassa methodically. The reader should combine a close technical study of his translations with an analysis of the publishing, class and cultural forces that shape which books circulate internationally.
As Rabassa once wrote, “The translator, we should know, is a writer too. As a matter of fact, he could be called the ideal writer because all he has to do is write; plot, theme, characters, and all other essentials have already been provided, so he can sit down and write his ass off.”[4]
Eduardo Halfon’s new book is elliptical, memory-driven and obsessed with names, absence and family traces. Still, it is also a powerful entry point for understanding how imperialism and transnational capital shape private lives. Reading Halfon alongside the history of the United Fruit Company (later Chiquita) provides the reader with a powerful understanding of the Guatemalan civil war, fought from 1960 to 1996, which was triggered by the United States at the behest of the United Fruit Company.
The US oligarchy was the largest landowner in the Central American republic. The United Fruit, in collaboration with the US government, sanctioned and organised alongside the Guatemalan ruling elite and its military, systematic kidnappings and murders that were part of the government’s counter-insurgency campaign saw death squads murder hundreds of thousands of political opponents and Mayan people.
The United Fruit Company was not a benign employer but a transnational corporation whose profits depended on control of land, labour, and transport. In Guatemala and across Central America, UFCO backed oligarchic politics, shaped infrastructure for export agriculture, and collaborated with US state power to secure its property and markets. The company’s role in creating the “banana republic” form, where export interests dominated politics and security, helped produce recurrent repression, dispossession and intervention that set the context for the civil war and ongoing violence.
US imperialism’s hand in Guatemala (1954 coup against Árbenz, long-term support for military regimes and counterinsurgency) turned economic disputes over land and labour into matters of geopolitical strategy. The Guatemalan state served as a repressive instrument of the dominant class. In Guatemala, this meant the security forces acting to defend plantation and export interests against labour organising and land reform.
The successor firms to United Fruit have continued the pattern of corporate power shaping violence and act with impunity. Contemporary cases, such as Chiquita’s payments to Colombian paramilitaries and the company’s light legal consequences, illustrate how transnationals use force and collusion to secure profits and suppress labour, often with the tacit protection of governments.
Eduardo Halfon’s fiction, memory-driven, autobiographical and formally inventive, provides a vital entry point into understanding how class, imperialism and genocide shape subjective experience. To study Halfon in relation to the Guatemalan civil war means reading literature as historical testimony: to connect aesthetic form and private memory with the social forces that produced mass murder, displacement and the long-term campaign of state terror.
Understanding Halfon together with the historical record helps expose the continuing rule of the oligarchy, judicial impunity and US influence, factors central to contemporary struggles over land, indigenous rights and militarisation.
Halfon rarely offers direct economic history; instead, his stories register the aftershocks: absences, silences, disrupted families, migrations and the odd conjunctions of identity that result from capitalist domination. Where Halfon evokes a vanished aunt, a rented house, a childhood street, those private traces map onto structures of class power: plantations that displaced communities, export economies that enclosed common land, and states that protected corporate assets rather than popular needs.
To read Halfon politically is to read the gaps as social symptoms: the inability to name perpetrators, the sense of illegible history, the recurring motif of “not knowing” where a relative went or why a place changed. These are not merely aesthetic devices but the subjective remnant of forced migrations, economic coercion and political terror produced by export capitalism and imperialist intervention.
Like most Guatemalan writers, Halfon learned to write as if his life depended on it. For most readers of his books, it must be hard to understand that writers like Halfon are in constant fear of assassination because of what they write and uncover. A prime example of this is Francisco Goldman. His book The Art of Political Murder nearly got him killed.
In an interview with the Guardian, Halfon recounts feeling paranoid about being followed. My understanding of the political situation in Guatemala is that Halfon is not paranoid. Given Guatemala’s track record of killing writers and journalists who get in their way, it is a real threat, not just paranoia.
It is worth quoting in length from Halfon’s Guardian article. Halfon believes that many things in Guatemala are not spoken or written about.
“ Just after I published my first novel in Guatemala, in 2003, I had a beer with the Salvadoran writer Horacio Castellanos Moya, who was living there at the time. We met at an old bar called El Establo. As soon as he saw me walk in, he raised his bottle of beer, congratulated me, smiled a crazy man’s smile, and then warned me to leave the country as soon as possible.
Guatemalan writers, and Guatemalans in general, have lived for almost a century now in a climate of fear. If anyone dared to speak out, they either disappeared into exile or disappeared literally. This fear is still prevalent, woven deep into the subconscious of the Guatemalan people, who, over time, have been taught to be silent. To not speak out. To not say or write words that might kill you.
The first consequence of this, of course, is overall silence. Certain things in Guatemala are not spoken or written about. The indigenous genocide in the 1980s. The extreme racism. The overwhelming number of women being murdered. The impossibility of land reform and redistribution of wealth. The close ties between the government and the drug cartels. Although these are all subjects that almost define the country itself, they are discussed and commented on only in whispers or from the outside. But a second and perhaps more dangerous consequence of a culture of silence is a type of self-censorship: when speaking or writing, one mustn’t say anything that puts oneself or one’s family in peril. The censoring becomes automatic, unconscious. Because the danger is very real. Although the days of dictators are now gone, the military is still powerful, and political and military murders are all too common.
It was at a bookstore called Sophos. I was browsing some books on the table when an elderly man came over and introduced himself. He was dressed in a coat and tie. He said he had read my novel and talked for a few minutes about his impressions. He then shook my hand again and, still holding on to it, said it had been a pleasure to meet me, that I should take care, be careful. I asked him carefully about what. He just smiled politely and went on his way. I considered it strange, but didn’t give it much thought. Maybe he was just being nice? Maybe I misinterpreted his greeting (usted cuídese, you take care)? Anyway, I had almost forgotten about it until several weeks later, when I received a phone call. The voice on the phone said I didn’t know him, but that he was calling as a friend to warn me about my enemies.”[5]
Suppose you make the effort to read Halfon’s work; it is a joy. His work opens questions about the culture of migration, the commodification of memory, and the role of literature in representing displacement.
“It is unquestionably true that the need for art is not created by economic conditions. But neither is the need for food created by economics. On the contrary, the need for food and warmth creates economics. It is very true that one cannot always go by the principles of Marxism in deciding whether to reject or to accept a work of art. A work of art should, in the first place, be judged by its own law, that is, by the law of art. But the beauty of Marxism is that it alone can explain why and how a given tendency in art has originated in a given period of history; in other words, who it was who made a demand for such an artistic form and not for another, and why.”
Notes
1. The Purest Form of Writing, the Most Intimate Form of Reading-Eduardo Halfon, in conversation with his translators Lisa Dillman and Daniel Hahn, with Avinoam Patt, massreview.org/sites/default/files/10_60.3Halfom/index.pdf
The UN Historical Clarification Commission, “Guatemala: Memory of Silence”) and forensic anthropology studies on exhumations.
The Art of Political Murder: Who Killed Bishop Gerardi? Francisco Goldman Atlantic Books Paperback – 1 Feb. 2010-
Art as the Cognition of Life: Selected Writings 1911-1936 Paperback – 1 Jan. 1998by Aleksandr Konstantinovich Voronsky (Author), Frederick S. Choate (Translator)
5. Mastermind, by David Unger -AKASHIC BOOKS Paperback – 19 May 2016
About The Author
Eduardo Halfón (born 1971) is a Guatemalan novelist and essayist whose compact, often autobiographical works probe memory, identity, migration, and Jewishness in Latin America and the United States. His books — including titles translated into English such as The Polish Boxer, Monastery, and The Book of Owners — use fragmented narrative, irony and personal testimony to interrogate how individual life is shaped by history, displacement and cultural inheritance. His latest book is Tarantula.
A Trumpet of Sedition 