Philippines: Poverty, Big Tech and the sextortion economy

Sextortion, image-based sexual abuse and the online exploitation of children are spreading fast across the Philippines. They grow out of mass poverty, a labour-export economy and the profit drive of the tech monopolies, and Manila’s political establishment has neither the will nor the means to stop them.

Over the past decade, the Philippines has become one of the main centres of a global trade in sexual blackmail. In its most common form, a perpetrator wins a victim’s trust online, gets hold of intimate images, then threatens to send them to family, friends or employers unless the victim pays money or hands over more material. Images are sometimes obtained by deception, sometimes recorded in secret, and increasingly faked outright with artificial intelligence.

The victims are Filipino and foreign: schoolchildren in the provinces, young women blackmailed by former partners, overseas workers, and teenage boys in Britain, the United States and Hong Kong. The crimes are carried out on Facebook, Messenger, Instagram, WhatsApp, Telegram and TikTok. Some of the richest corporations on earth own the platforms.

The arrests reported in the Philippine press this year give only a glimpse. A man in Zamboanga City was arrested in February for blackmailing a former girlfriend with explicit photographs. The National Bureau of Investigation arrested another man in January for leaking intimate videos to coerce an ex-partner. A woman overseas Filipino worker (OFW) was targeted by a sextortionist shortly after landing at Ninoy Aquino International Airport. In March, police in Manila arrested a suspect accused of extorting foreign nationals online.

The Foundation for Media Alternatives (FMA), which tracks technology-facilitated gender-based violence, documented 52 cases in the first half of 2026 alone. It noted that reports rose in the opening months of the year. It covers only cases that reach the foundation. The real figure is many times higher. Shame, family pressure to protect the household’s reputation and distrust of the police keep most victims silent.

A generation targeted

Children and adolescents bear the brunt. The Disrupting Harm in the Philippines study was published in 2022 by ECPAT International, Interpol and UNICEF’s Office of Research-Innocenti. It surveyed internet-using children aged 12 to 17. One in five said they had suffered grave forms of online sexual exploitation and abuse in the previous year, including blackmail into sexual acts and the sharing of their images without consent. Scaled to the population, the researchers estimated that as many as two million children were affected in a single year.

Where this abuse happened on social media, Facebook and Messenger accounted for more than 90 per cent of cases. Most cases Philippine authorities investigated were first reported by foreign police forces and NGOs, not detected at home.

UNICEF has estimated that 80 per cent of Filipino children are vulnerable to online sexual abuse. In 2016, it described the country as the global epicentre of the trade in live-streamed child sexual abuse. Its national study listed the conditions that make the country such fertile ground: widespread English, cheap access to phones and the internet, and well-established money-transfer networks built to serve the remittance economy. In some cases, it found, children’s own parents arranged the abuse.

A July 2025 report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime found that teenage boys are by far the largest target group in the recent surge of financial sextortion. Typically, criminals approach them through fake profiles posing as girls. The same report noted that the Philippines is home to criminals who run sextortion schemes against victims in other countries. Britain’s National Crime Agency made this point in a 2025 campaign aimed at boys. Government operations rescued 41 minors from online sexual abuse in January and February 2026 alone.

Blackmail runs like a call centre.

Sextortion in the Philippines is not mainly the work of lone individuals. Much of it is an organised industry, and it copies the labour discipline of the business process outsourcing (BPO) sector that dominates the country’s urban employment.

This became clear in 2014, when Philippine police and Interpol arrested 58 people in a crackdown on an international sextortion network. In Bicol, investigators found that the operations were disguised as call centres. The Bicol groups had also built their own payment arrangements, designed to be hard for the authorities to trace. A Hong Kong police official told Inquirer.net that almost all the sextortion cases in his territory could be traced back to the Philippines.

At the time, the national police chief called the Philippines the “sextortion capital of the world.” Interpol officials rejected the label, pointing out that similar operations existed elsewhere and that the Philippines had been singled out because Manila had requested cooperation. That point deserves to be stressed. The problem is not a Filipino national trait. It is what happens when a desperate, educated, English-speaking workforce is plugged into a global digital economy with few legitimate outlets.

The money flows through the same channels as the remittances of millions of OFWs. A 2023 study by the University of Nottingham’s Rights Lab found that money service businesses such as Western Union and PayPal remain the main payment routes in online child exploitation cases in the Philippines. The corporations that profit from the remittance trade have every incentive to keep that infrastructure fast, cheap and lightly policed.

The class roots of the crisis

The official discourse treats sextortion as a problem of individual morality, parental neglect or poor “digital literacy.” This conveniently ignores the social conditions that produce it.

The Philippines is a country where millions of workers survive on informal and precarious jobs. Millions more are exported abroad as domestic workers, seafarers and care workers because the domestic economy cannot employ them. Whole families depend on remittances. Phones and cheap data are everywhere, but decent jobs are not. In these conditions, criminal syndicates find no shortage of recruits, and abusers find no shortage of vulnerable targets.

The COVID-19 pandemic made everything worse. Under Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines imposed some of the longest and harshest lockdowns in the world, enforced by police and the military. Children were banned from public spaces such as parks and shopping malls and confined to their homes and their phones. At the same time, mass layoffs plunged millions of families into deeper poverty. Researchers and child welfare agencies agree that online sexual exploitation surged in this period, driven in part by job losses and economic hardship.

The overseas worker system adds its own vulnerabilities. Long separations break up families and relationships, and intimate communication moves online. Workers abroad and their partners at home become targets for blackmail, and the threat of exposure to an employer can mean the loss of a job on which a whole family depends.

The tech monopolies and the deepfake threat

The platforms through which this abuse is carried out are not neutral pipes. Meta, which owns Facebook, Messenger, Instagram and WhatsApp, built its fortune on maximising engagement and harvesting user data. Its business model depends on letting strangers connect with as little friction as possible. Facebook dominates internet use in the Philippines to the point that, for many, it is the internet.

These corporations spend vast sums on lobbying and public relations, and comparatively little on protecting the people who use their services in poorer countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Content moderation in Filipino languages has long been under-resourced. When Meta made end-to-end encryption the default on Messenger at the end of 2023, child protection organisations warned it would make abuse harder to detect. The company went ahead regardless.

Now artificial intelligence is adding a new dimension. Cheap tools can produce convincing fake sexual images of anyone from an ordinary photograph. In February 2026, Philippine child-rights groups warned of rising online child exploitation using AI tools. Victims no longer need ever to have shared an intimate image to be blackmailed or humiliated. The same technology companies racing to dominate the AI market, and pouring hundreds of billions of dollars into it, have shown little interest in the social consequences.

Laws on paper, poverty in practice

The Philippine ruling class points to its laws: the Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, the Safe Spaces Act of 2019 and the Anti-Online Sexual Abuse or Exploitation of Children law of 2022. Each was passed with fanfare. Neither has stemmed the tide.

The Cybercrime Prevention Act is telling. Its most vigorous use has been its online libel provisions, wielded against journalists and critics of the government. The police anti-cybercrime units are small and swamped. Courts are slow. Victims who come forward face a gruelling process, and many give up.

Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration has other priorities. It has thrown open the country to an expanded US military presence and is integrating the Philippines into Washington’s war preparations against China. Resources flow to the armed forces while public schools, social welfare and child protection services are starved. Arrests of individual blackmailers and periodic raids on “dens” make good headlines, but they leave untouched the conditions that keep recruits and new victims coming.

The sexual exploitation of Filipino children and young people is a crime of global capitalism. It is fed by the poverty created by decades of imperialist domination, by an economy organised around exporting cheap labour, and by tech corporations that profit from every click. Ending it requires more than awareness campaigns and tougher sentences. It requires that the vast resources monopolised by a tiny elite be used to guarantee every family secure, well-paid jobs, decent housing, free quality education and real social services.

It also requires that the social media giants be taken out of private hands and placed under the democratic control of the working class, so that they are run to meet human need rather than to maximise profit. That is a task facing workers in the Philippines, the United States, Britain, and around the world, who must unite across borders in the fight for socialism.

Sources

Podcast Episode: The Era of Trial by Social Media Comes of Age

Pip: Russell Brand is in prison, and freerein61 has written what might be the most carefully argued piece you will read about why that fact — whatever you think of it — should make everyone uncomfortable.

Mara: The episode covers one extended argument: what happens to democratic rights when accusation, amplification, and corporate punishment arrive years before a jury does. Let's start with the case itself and what it reveals about how guilt gets decided in public life.

The Era of Trial by Social Media Comes of Age

Pip: The central claim here is structural, not personal. The argument is that a new sequence has replaced the rule of law in public life — and that the replacement happened so gradually that most people have stopped noticing it.

Mara: The post sets out that sequence precisely. The concern is "the evolving political and legal context in which guilt is determined in public life, and the degree to which foundational democratic principles are being supplanted by a sequence of accusation, media amplification, corporate sanction, and only subsequently, judicial process."

Pip: So the order is inverted. Punishment first, trial later — sometimes years later. And by the time the jury speaks, the economic and reputational damage is already permanent.

Mara: That is exactly the stakes the post identifies. Search engines embed allegations in a person's permanent digital identity. Employment disappears. Contracts end. Even acquittal, as the Kevin Spacey case demonstrated, cannot restore what years of publicity removed. The post notes that the key institutional question shifts from what has been proven to what will happen to us if we are seen not to punish.

Pip: Which is a remarkably honest description of how reputational risk management works — and a fairly damning one.

Mara: The post draws on several historical cases to make the pattern visible. The Cliff Richard case, where a police search was broadcast before any charge was laid. Operation Midland, where allegations about a Westminster abuse network collapsed entirely and the accuser was eventually convicted. The Lucy Letby conviction, raised not to question the verdict but to argue that journalism must retain the capacity to scrutinise established narratives without that scrutiny being treated as morally illegitimate.

Pip: The Birmingham Six get a mention there too — a reminder that the campaigns that eventually overturned those convictions required exactly the kind of scepticism toward dominant narratives that the current media environment actively punishes.

Mara: On the class dimension, the post is direct: "precisely because workers lack wealth and institutional power, they require protection against state and corporate arbitrariness more urgently than society's privileged layers." A millionaire can retain solicitors and reputation managers. A worker facing an online accusation usually cannot.

Pip: And the attention economy makes this worse, not better. The post puts it sharply: the platform's economic logic collides directly with the deliberative requirements of justice. A jury must listen. An algorithm must engage.

Mara: The Online Safety Act 2023 enters the argument here — not as simple censorship, but as a regulatory framework that places the state in an increasingly expansive relationship with private platforms. The post is careful to say the concern is not that Ofcom officials directly police opinions, but that the infrastructure for doing so is being constructed, and that powers created to target unpopular defendants rarely remain limited to them.

Pip: The conclusion is unambiguous: an accusation is not a conviction, virality is not proof, and a society that lets corporations decide who may participate in public life will not produce democratic speech. Where that leaves us is squarely in the territory of who controls the infrastructure of communication itself.


Mara: The thread running through all of this is that democratic rights were never gifts — they were won through struggle, and they require active defense precisely when they are least popular to defend.

Pip: Next time, we will see where that argument goes when the crisis deepens. Stay with us.

The Era of Trial by Social Media Comes of Age

In defence of democratic rights

The recent incarceration of Russell Brand has been widely portrayed in the British media as the culmination of a prolonged public controversy. Regardless of personal opinions about Brand or views on the verdict, a broader issue emerges that transcends the specifics of this case. The central concern is the evolving political and legal context in which guilt is determined in public life, and the degree to which foundational democratic principles are being supplanted by a sequence of accusation, media amplification, corporate sanction, and only subsequently, judicial process.

The implications of the Brand case extend well beyond the individual. In the past decade, a form of extrajudicial punishment has emerged that can be described as trial by social media. Newspapers and broadcasters publish allegations, then social-media platforms rapidly disseminate them. Employers, publishers, advertisers, and technology companies impose economic sanctions, while parliamentary committees and politicians intervene. Commentators frequently call for institutions to sever ties with the accused as a demonstration of virtue. Frequently, these actions occur before any evidence is presented to a jury. This process inverts the traditional sequence associated with the rule of law: rather than investigation, charge, trial, verdict, and punishment, society is increasingly encouraged to accept accusation, publicity, punishment, and only later, potentially years afterwards, a trial. Such developments pose a significant threat to democratic rights.

The presumption of innocence

The presumption of innocence is often characterised as an outdated legal technicality, relevant only within the courtroom and irrelevant to broader society. In fact, it represents a fundamental historical principle: the state bears the burden of proving its case against the individual, who is not required to establish innocence before a potentially prejudiced public. British contempt law restrictions were partly instituted in recognition of this issue. Limiting prejudicial publication during active proceedings aims not to shield defendants from criticism, but to safeguard the integrity of the trial process. Jurors are expected to determine guilt based on admissible evidence presented in court, not on media headlines, edited television segments, or viral social media posts encountered before jury service. Digital communication has subjected this principle to unprecedented strain. Information is now instantly replicable across jurisdictions and remains accessible indefinitely. While a judge may instruct a jury to disregard inadmissible material, such directions cannot eliminate the effects of prolonged publicity from collective memory.

This transformation is both quantitative and qualitative. Traditional mass media wielded significant influence, yet publication was largely confined to identifiable newspapers and television networks, each subject to certain legal and editorial constraints. Social media introduces a vast apparatus for instantaneous content reproduction. A newspaper investigation can evolve into a television discussion, followed by thousands of clips, memes, posts, podcasts, reaction videos, and search results. Allegations become embedded in an individual’s permanent digital identity. The core issue is not the existence of public opinion on criminal cases, which has always existed, but the emergence of an industrial system that translates accusations into reputational and economic penalties before judicial determination. This explains the importance of corporate intervention. A private technology corporation taking action against someone’s ability to publish or earn an income is not equivalent to a jury returning a criminal verdict. The evidential standards differ, the procedures differ, and the opportunities for appeal may differ radically. Yet precisely this distinction has increasingly disappeared from public discussion. In the social-media age, corporations occupy positions once unimaginable for private enterprises. A handful of enormous companies control major infrastructures through which political argument, journalism, culture and entertainment circulate. Their moderation and monetisation decisions therefore have consequences that extend far beyond ordinary commercial relationships.

The risks are heightened when corporate decisions align with political pressures. Although the formal distinction between government and private platforms remains significant, democratic oversight is essential because decisions affecting public expression often arise from relationships more complex than direct government censorship. This issue has gained further prominence with the establishment of the British online-safety regulatory framework. The Online Safety Act 2023 imposes statutory obligations on social-media companies and search services regarding illegal content and child protection. According to government guidance, platforms have borne legal responsibilities for illegal content since 17 March 2025, and Ofcom holds enforcement powers that include investigations, substantial financial penalties, and, in the most severe cases of non-compliance, applications to the courts to block services.This legislation must be represented accurately. Ofcom states that its role is to ensure regulated companies implement systems to protect users from harms identified in the legislation, and its published guidance requires providers to assess illegal-content risks and establish appropriate safeguards. The political concern is not that Ofcom officials directly determine permissible online opinions, but rather that the state has established an increasingly expansive regulatory relationship with private corporations whose infrastructures mediate a substantial portion of modern public communication. This development warrants thorough democratic scrutiny, not complacency.

From Fleet Street to the algorithm

Trial by media is not new. British newspapers have damaged reputations for generations. Sensational reporting, moral panics, and politically motivated campaigns predate platforms like Facebook, X, YouTube, and TikTok. The primary change lies in the technological and economic infrastructure. While the traditional press produced newspapers on a daily cycle, digital platforms continuously monitor audience reactions and disseminate content through automated recommendation systems. Controversy acquires economic value because attention itself is monetised. Consequently, an accusation involving a celebrity becomes more than a news story; it generates content that can be perpetually reproduced across a vast ecosystem of professional journalism, amateur commentary, and algorithmically distributed material.

The commercial incentives are evident. Moral outrage sustains audience engagement, with each new allegation prompting additional cycles of reaction. Even denials generate further content, and every development can be repurposed into new programs, articles, or videos. As a result, capitalism has industrialised denunciation. However, this does not imply that allegations are inherently false due to media profit motives, nor does it suggest that individuals alleging abuse should remain silent. The fundamental point is that neither commercial profitability nor viral popularity should determine criminal guilt.

The lessons of previous media disasters

British history offers numerous warnings against disregarding this distinction. Sir Cliff Richard is a prominent example of the consequences of turning a police investigation into a televised spectacle. Police searched his home in connection with an allegation, and the event was broadcast widely. Richard was neither arrested nor charged, and his successful privacy case against the BBC illustrated the profound harm publicity can inflict before any judicial determination. The Metropolitan Police investigation known as Operation Midland serves as another cautionary example. Extraordinary allegations regarding an alleged Westminster abuse network were entertained and publicised, resulting in severe consequences for those accused. The eventual collapse of these allegations and the subsequent conviction of accuser Carl Beech demonstrated the significant costs incurred when institutional credulity and public certainty surpass evidentiary standards.The intention is not to suggest direct equivalence among these cases, as they differ substantially in their facts, investigations, and legal outcomes. The common thread is the caution against conflating accusation with adjudication.This warning remains relevant even when an individual is ultimately convicted. The principle of a fair trial derives its significance from its universality. Democratic rights must not depend on the prior sympathies of journalists, politicians, or the public. Rights that apply only to popular defendants are not genuine

The prosecution of Kevin Spacey exemplifies another aspect of this issue. Although his eventual acquittal in the London proceedings resolved the criminal charges before the jury, it could not restore his professional and reputational standing, which years of allegations and publicity had already damaged. This distinction is of considerable importance. The current media environment generates consequences that extend beyond judicial decisions: employment opportunities vanish, contracts are terminated, and access to cultural work is lost. Search engines permanently associate individuals’ names with allegations. Friends and professional associates may fear that maintaining contact could themselves become grounds for denunciation. Certain institutional responses may be justified, as organisations have obligations to employees and the public, particularly when credible allegations concern immediate safety. However, precaution and conviction are not synonymous. Failing to recognise this distinction encourages institutions to act primarily based on reputational considerations. The central question shifts from “What has been proven?” to “What will happen to us if we are seen not to punish?” This represents an extraordinarily dangerous foundation for public life.

The controversies surrounding Lucy Letby’s conviction show that the argument cannot be reduced to protecting celebrities accused of wrongdoing. Questions regarding media certainty are significant both before and after conviction. Once a high-profile criminal case becomes embedded in a dominant public narrative, challenging any part of it becomes extremely difficult. Journalists may have invested years in the story. Institutions have defended their actions through it. Politicians have commented on it. Documentaries, podcasts, and books have been commissioned around it. The financial and institutional interests generated by a major criminal narrative do not dissipate when the jury retires. This does not imply that any specific conviction is necessarily unsafe; only the appropriate judicial and review processes can determine that. Rather, it establishes a more fundamental point: journalism must retain the capacity to investigate potential miscarriages of justice without treating criticism of an established narrative as morally illegitimate.

The historic campaigns surrounding miscarriages of justice, from the Birmingham Six and Guildford Four onwards, demonstrate the importance of precisely such scepticism. The disorders following the killings in Southport in 2024 revealed another dimension of this transformation. Social-media communication became closely linked to debates about disorder, misinformation, criminal prosecution, and the legitimate boundaries of expression. No socialist can object to prosecuting genuine incitement to violence under the law. Freedom of speech has never entailed freedom from responsibility for criminal conduct. However, hateful or irresponsible expression should not erase the distinction between speech, incitement, and physical action. A broader risk is normalising exceptional procedures whenever politicians declare an emergency. Governments facing social crises often assert that extraordinary conditions necessitate extraordinary powers. However, powers created to address unpopular targets rarely remain limited to those groups. Legal and technological mechanisms established today may be employed in entirely different political contexts in the future. The working class should therefore evaluate every extension of state power not solely from the perspective of the government’s current target, but from the perspective of potential future applications.

Who possesses the microphone?

Advocates of social-media denunciation often characterise it as the democratisation of justice. From this perspective, established institutions historically silenced victims, while social networks now enable ordinary individuals to speak. This claim has some validity. Digital communication has undoubtedly allowed individuals to publish allegations and testimony without prior approval from newspaper editors or broadcasting executives. However, the theoretical ability to post content does not equate to possessing equal social power. The primary mechanisms of amplification remain profoundly unequal. Billionaire-owned media corporations employ professional newsrooms. Technology corporations control platforms through which vast audiences communicate. Governments possess press offices, police forces, and regulatory powers. Celebrities and corporations can purchase professional public-relations services. Ordinary workers possess nothing comparable. The worker subjected to harassment by a manager, victimised by an employer or injured because a corporation ignored safety measures does not ordinarily receive days of national broadcasting attention. Thousands of social grievances disappear almost completely from public discussion. What therefore presents itself as democratisation can conceal another hierarchy: everyone may speak, but only certain institutions possess the power to ensure that millions hear them.

The class content of democratic rights

For Marxists, democratic rights cannot be treated as gifts a benevolent state bestows on the population. They emerged historically through bitter struggles against arbitrary authority. The English Revolution challenged monarchical absolutism and generated unprecedented debates concerning sovereignty, representation and popular rights. The Levellers’ agitation demanded political equality beyond the objectives of much of Parliament’s propertied leadership. Later struggles for freedom of the press, trade-union organisation and universal suffrage were inseparable from the emergence of an increasingly self-conscious working class.

Chartism transformed democratic demands into a mass social movement. None of these struggles abolished class rule, but they established rights upon which subsequent working-class political and social organisation depended. This historical experience makes the fashionable dismissal of civil liberties particularly reactionary. The presumption of innocence, freedom of speech, public trials and procedural protections are sometimes derided as merely “bourgeois rights”. But precisely because workers lack wealth and institutional power, they require protection against state and corporate arbitrariness more urgently than society’s privileged layers. A millionaire can employ solicitors, barristers, reputation managers and political contacts. A worker hauled before a court or dismissed because of an online accusation usually cannot. One of the most politically damaging developments of recent years has been the tendency within affluent sections of the middle class to portray elementary principles of due process as obstacles to justice. The reasoning is fundamentally wrong. Abuse does not cease to be abuse merely because evidence must be demonstrated. Nor is somebody “silenced” because an allegation is investigated rather than automatically accepted as fact.

A serious response to sexual violence, exploitation or harassment requires properly funded investigative institutions, access to legal support, social provision for victims and judicial proceedings capable of establishing facts. Replacing those things with social-media denunciation does not strengthen the oppressed. It replaces legal proof with social power. And once social power decides guilt, the advantage inevitably passes to those possessing newspapers, money, political connections, corporate platforms and influence. The underlying transformation cannot therefore be understood simply as a decline in journalistic standards. Media organisations and technology platforms operate within definite social relations. Their overriding economic purpose is not to discover truth but to accumulate profit. Enormous corporate interests concentrate ownership, while relationships with governments, advertisers, and financial markets shape the environment in which editorial decisions are made. The attention economy intensifies these tendencies because outrage itself has become monetisable. Measured in clicks, views, subscriptions and advertising impressions, indignation can become a commodity. Complex evidence develops slowly; accusation travels instantly. Qualification is difficult to package; certainty generates reaction. A judicial proceeding may last months, while social-media judgement requires seconds. The platform’s economic logic therefore collides directly with the deliberative requirements of justice. A jury must listen. An algorithm must engage. Confusing the two is catastrophic.

War, austerity and democratic repression

These developments acquire their full significance only when placed within the wider crisis of capitalist democracy. Across Europe, governments confronting deepening economic inequality, military confrontation, collapsing public services and mounting social opposition are simultaneously expanding mechanisms for regulating political communication. The relationship is not accidental. A ruling elite preparing increasingly unpopular policies cannot depend indefinitely on popular consent. It therefore seeks ways to manage opposition, shape information, and delegitimise dissent. Measures introduced under apparently unobjectionable objectives can create legal and technological infrastructures with much broader applications.

The Online Safety Act 2023 itself illustrates the scale of the regulatory transformation. The Act received Royal Assent on 26 October 2023 and imposes new legal duties upon user-to-user and search services. Official guidance states that providers must implement systems and processes to address illegal content, while Ofcom establishes codes and has enforcement powers. The Act also formally recognises rights considerations. Government guidance states that Ofcom must consider users’ rights when developing measures and that providers themselves have corresponding duties regarding users’ rights. These provisions make it especially important that criticism remain precise. The political concern is not established by simply labelling all online regulation “censorship”. It concerns how regulatory powers operate in practice, how definitions develop, how corporate platforms respond to compliance incentives, and whether mechanisms designed to target genuinely illegal material can contribute to broader restrictions on lawful political expression. Such questions should be investigated, not assumed.

Because allegations against a famous and controversial individual evoke strong reactions, democratic principles matter. Defending due process for an accused person does not require admiration for that person. It does not require endorsing his politics, lifestyle, previous statements or public persona. And it certainly does not require indifference towards people alleging serious abuse. It requires only recognition of a foundational principle: a criminal allegation has to be proved. If that principle is abandoned whenever an accused person becomes unpopular, it ceases to exist as a principle. The socialist movement has historically defended democratic rights not because courts under capitalism are politically neutral institutions, but because limitations upon arbitrary state power provide essential conditions in which the working class can organise and fight. The same principle applies today to corporate power. A society in which banks can economically exclude individuals, platforms can erase audiences, employers can dismiss workers and media corporations can pronounce guilt before trial is not becoming more democratic because those institutions are technically private. Private concentrations of power can be as destructive of freedom as state bureaucracy, particularly when the two increasingly interact.

None of this diminishes the suffering caused by sexual violence or other serious crimes. Genuine accusations must be investigated. Evidence must be obtained. Witnesses must be heard and treated with dignity. Prosecutors must make decisions based on the evidence. Defendants must have access to the case against them and the opportunity to challenge it. Juries must determine guilt according to admissible evidence and the legal standard of proof. These are not bureaucratic obstacles standing between victims and justice. They are justice. Without them, society has only competing assertions backed by unequal amounts of money, publicity, and institutional influence. The answer to failures of the criminal-justice system is therefore not to replace courts with newspapers, parliamentary committees or technology companies. It is to fight for a genuinely democratic judicial system, adequately funded legal representation and independent investigation, while defending freedom of expression and the presumption of innocence.

The working class must defend democratic rights.

Ultimately, democratic rights cannot be safely entrusted to those whose social power increasingly depends on restricting them. The media corporations will not dismantle the profitable machinery of sensationalism. Technology monopolies will not voluntarily surrender their enormous power over communication. Governments will not renounce regulatory powers simply because those powers might someday be abused. Defending democratic rights therefore requires a social constituency whose interests fundamentally oppose arbitrary power. That constituency is the international working class. Workers require freedom of speech to organise politically. They require freedom of association to build organisations independent of employers and governments. They require the presumption of innocence and due process because they lack the money to insulate themselves against arbitrary prosecution. They require an independent press because the dominant media overwhelmingly articulates the interests and assumptions of the privileged layers of society. The struggle against arbitrary state and corporate power is consequently inseparable from the struggle against the capitalist social order that concentrates both economic wealth and control over communication in extraordinarily few hands. Trial by social media has reached maturity because the technological foundations of mass communication have developed far more rapidly than democratic control over them. Humanity has communications technology that gives billions of people unprecedented access to information, while ownership of the most important infrastructure remains concentrated in private corporations.

That contradiction cannot be resolved by demanding still greater power for billionaires to police their platforms, nor by handing governments unlimited authority over digital communication. It requires bringing the technological resources upon which modern social communication depends under genuine democratic control. The central principle must therefore remain uncompromising. An accusation is not a conviction. Popularity is not evidence. Virality is not proof. Corporate punishment is not due process. A parliamentary demand is not a judicial verdict. The rights won through centuries of struggle remain indispensable precisely because political reaction repeatedly presents their destruction as progress. A society that abandons the presumption of innocence in the name of protecting victims will ultimately protect neither victims nor defendants. A society that lets corporations decide who may participate in public life will not produce democratic speech. And a society accustomed to seeing punishment precede proof is being prepared for forms of political repression extending far beyond the sensational celebrity cases through which those methods have been normalised. The defence of democratic rights must therefore be taken out of the hands of media monopolies, technology corporations, and the capitalist state. It must become a conscious political struggle of the working class itself.

Bibliography and further reading

Legislation and official material

Contempt of Court Act 1981. UK Public General Act 1981 c.49.

Online Safety Act 2023. UK Public General Act 2023 c.50. The official legislation database provides the statutory text and records subsequent amendments. [legislation.gov.uk]

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, Online Safety Act: Explainer. The government’s account outlines the Act’s scope, platform duties and Ofcom’s regulatory responsibilities. [gov.uk]

Ofcom, Illegal Content Duties under the Online Safety Act, updated 25 June 2026. Particularly useful for distinguishing the actual statutory compliance regime from broader political arguments about censorship. [ofcom.org.uk]

Ofcom, Online Safety. Current regulatory material and guidance relating to implementation. [ofcom.org.uk]

Civil liberties, justice and the state

E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act. London: Allen Lane, 1975.

E. P. Thompson, Writing by Candlelight. London: Merlin Press, 1980.

E. P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays. London: Merlin Press, 1978.

John Rees, The Leveller Revolution: Radical Political Organisation in England, 1640–1650. London: Verso, 2016.

Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution. London: Temple Smith, 1972.

Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714. London: Nelson, 1961.

George Rudé, Wilkes and Liberty: A Social Study of 1763 to 1774. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.

Dorothy Thompson, The Chartists: Popular Politics in the Industrial Revolution. London: Temple Smith, 1984.

Media, capitalism and public communication

Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon, 1988.

Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity, 2017.

Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. London: Profile Books, 2019.

Dan Schiller, Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999.

Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication. London: Sage, 2009.

Christian Fuchs, Social Media: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage, 2014.

Robert W. McChesney, Digital Disconnect: How Capitalism Is Turning the Internet Against Democracy. New York: New Press, 2013.

Walking in the Footsteps of London’s Working Class: A Review of David Rosenberg’s Rebel Footprints

A walking guide recovers two centuries of struggle in the capital, yet it fails to provide readers with the political lessons that these struggles were intended to convey.

Ninety years on from the Battle of Cable Street, the debate about London’s radical past is far from academic. In a city currently marked by such extreme social inequality, by the crisis of housing affordability, by the decline of public services and by the re-emergence of a kind of nationalism and anti-migrant politics, the history of those who had fought against poverty, exploitation, political repression and fascism is very much with us.

This is what makes the third edition of David Rosenberg’s Rebel Footprints a particularly valuable contribution. It is neither a conventional history of London nor merely a guidebook. Rather, it offers a political geography of the city, built from the author’s own walks, connecting streets and buildings to the movements that occurred there. Pluto Press describes the revised edition as guiding the reader from well-known to lesser-known sites associated with struggles from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. The third edition substantially revises the book, now comprising eleven main chapters. The Russian Revolution and the East End, Hackney, and radical Soho all receive new or reorganised treatment. The volume concludes with an epilogue on the Brick Lane struggles of the 1970s, and Michael Rosen provides the foreword.

The enterprise is immense. Rosenberg brings workers, immigrants, women, political exiles, anti-fascists, and socialist organisers back into the picture in a way they have largely been absent. The significance of the history he recovers makes the shortcomings of his political approach all the more glaring. Rebel Footprints is absolutely full of the notion that history is made through struggle. It simply doesn’t come to terms with the question of why movements of such immense courage and such broad popular support ended up with such limited political outcomes, why they were defeated or why they were absorbed into institutions which were themselves committed to the defence of the social order against which those movements had been directed. The central issue is therefore a question of political perspective. It is a history of rebellion, but not a history of the working class’s struggle for revolutionary leadership.

A rebellious city

The underlying concept of Rebel Footprints is absolutely effective. The streets we normally see as routes between railway stations, offices, shops, and houses are reconfigured as physical evidence of political struggle. London stops being the endless accumulation of palaces, monuments and institutions of the state as presented to us by the tourist industry. It becomes a landscape of contestation.

The 2026 edition begins with “Trailblazers for Democracy in Fleet Street and Clerkenwell”, followed by “Sparks of Rebellion in Bow and Whitechapel”. It then explores “The Russian Revolution and London’s East End”, “No Gods, No Masters: Radical Bloomsbury”, “Hackney’s Buried Histories” and the struggle for housing in Bethnal Green and Shoreditch. Subsequent chapters move south and west through Battersea and Soho, then head east again to Poplar, Bermondsey, and, finally, Cable Street and Long Lane. The historical itinerary continues beyond the main chapters with the epilogue, “Battleground Brick Lane 1970s”.

In my view, this is one of Rosenberg’s real masterpieces. The geographical structure prevents radical history from being boiled down to the life stories of a few famous people. Political movements get a locality. They had meeting houses, workshops, factories, tenements and streets. Rosenberg has been running London social and political history walks since 2008. When talking about the genesis of the project, he has been very clear about the influence of Bill Fishman, the historian who believed you could understand history in a very real way, not just through the lecture hall but by walking through the very places where it happened. That is a very democratic approach. It’s a way of confronting the monumental history of the city that the ruling class has always presented as its own.

History against official London

This is where Rebel Footprints is at its very best. London’s history is increasingly being presented through the lens of heritage, tourism and property. The working people who actually built the city are only there in passing. Rosenberg flips the script completely. The centre of historical interest moves from Westminster, the monarchy and the City to the political activity of the very people who are normally invisible. The book is designed to get you to look at the apparently mundane and ask a very different set of questions: who lived here, who worked here, who organised here and what struggles took place here?

That approach has real power in a city which is constantly being reshaped by property speculation. Working-class areas get redeveloped and repackaged, and their social history is often turned into marketable ‘heritage’. Rosenberg’s approach is the other way around. The city itself becomes the archive. The history is also inherently international. London was not just the British capital. All over the world, industrialisation, empire and political repression have brought workers, refugees and political exiles into the city. Radical London was never a purely English phenomenon.

History is of course particularly pertinent when migrants are once again being presented as the cause of social problems they didn’t create. The history of workers breaking down national, ethnic, and religious barriers points overwhelmingly to a class explanation of inequality. The very notion of internationalism in the labour movement is, however, problematic, and Rebel Footprints doesn’t address it adequately. London was both the epicentre of working-class resistance and the capital of the world’s largest empire. The relationship between those two realities is fundamental to understanding British labour history.

The Russian Revolution comes to the East End

One of the most significant additions in the 2026 edition is a whole chapter on ‘The Russian Revolution and London’s East End’. That massively broadens the political canvas. The Russian Revolution can’t just be tacked on as part of the general tradition of London radicalism. October 1917 was a moment of total rupture. For the first time, the working class, under Marxist leadership, took state power and began reconstructing society on a socialist basis. That in itself was a moment of international political significance, and Britain was no different.

The importance of the Russian Revolution to the British working class cannot be confined to inspiration, solidarity, and radical culture. It sparked a major debate about revolutionary organisation, reformism, and the working class’s political independence. That debate had a very real and tangible effect on the British labour movement. This is where the distinction between radical history and Marxist history becomes so important. Radicalism is such a broad term that it can cover everything from democrats to anarchists, pacifists, syndicalists, feminists, trade unionists, Labour reformists, communists, and revolutionary Marxists. What these different tendencies had in common was that they all provided diametrically opposed answers to the fundamental questions of state, capitalism, imperialism and political leadership. To absorb them into a single category of ‘radicalism’ and celebrate them as such risks erasing the very disagreements that ultimately shaped history.

The Labour Party as the destination of struggle

This is clearest where the histories of local revolt intersect with the growth of Labourism. You can see it in many of the people you met in Rosenberg’s London who went from militant working-class politics to parliamentary Labourism. It wasn’t just a series of individual biographies. It was a fundamental process in shaping the British labour movement.

The key historical question, of course, is why. The reformist interpretation is that the Labour Party, the recognition of trade unions, municipal reform, and ultimately the post-war welfare state were simply the institutionalisation of the popular struggles of the 19th century. In that view, the rebels of the 19th century are the forerunners of 20th century social democracy.

A Marxist account has to put the issue in a different light. Reform and revolution were alternative approaches to the problem, stemming from different conceptions of the capitalist state. The point is that reform in itself doesn’t alter the capitalist relations of property or the nature of state power. The 20th century has shown time and again that reforms won under pressure from the working class can be taken away when the balance of class forces has shifted. British working-class radicalism therefore cannot be thought of as having reached its logical conclusion in the Labour Party. Labourism itself has to be a subject of historical analysis.

Poplar and the limits of municipal socialism

The Poplar struggle is the textbook example. The willingness of the councillors to go to jail rather than impose such onerous burdens on the poor working people was absolutely a landmark moment in London labour history. It was a demonstration of what could happen when a body of elected representatives was under the pressure of a mobilised working class. Poplar also, of course, highlights the limits of municipal politics. Municipal socialism can redistribute resources within the boundaries of the national state. It cannot abolish the capitalist social relations that are the very source of inequality.

This is particularly pertinent to George Lansbury. You can’t understand his political evolution in terms of sheer personal courage or moral commitment alone. You have to see it as part of the evolution of Labourism. Trotsky’s Where Is Britain Going? (1925) is still absolutely essential precisely because it looked at the contradictions of British reformism at a time of intensifying class struggle. Trotsky argued that the apparent gradualism and peacefulness of British politics masked deep-seated class antagonisms. That argument is not confined to Lansbury. Workers could be extremely militant within organisations which were formally and in practice nationally reformist. That contradiction is the thread which runs through much of the history Rosenberg reconstructs.

Battersea and the politics of accommodation

The Battersea section is another example of the book’s strength in that it doesn’t present a one-dimensional political picture. It’s very much a geographical chapter in which south London is not some marginal area to the more ‘familiar’ revolutionary history of the East End. Of course, you have the same thing with individuals who start out in working-class and socialist movements and then go on to become quite accommodative of the existing order. Those shifts too can’t be explained by biography alone. They resulted from very specific historical and material conditions. The strength of British capitalism, the huge amount of capital accumulated through empire, the power of the parliamentary system and the development of a privileged trade union bureaucracy all exerted a pressure on the labour movement.

That’s why London’s history is inextricably bound up with Britain’s position as an imperial power. The same city which was home to such profound levels of poverty was the administrative and financial heart of the empire. The fact that such extreme poverty coexisted with the metropolis’s immense wealth was a direct consequence of the international structure of British capitalism. You simply can’t make sense of the particular vigour of British reformism without placing imperialism at the very centre of the analysis rather than at the margins.

Cable Street: heroism and political mythology

The chapter on Cable Street remains inevitably one of the most powerful parts of this historical landscape. The Battle of Cable Street on 4 October 1936 belongs to the collective memory of London’s working class because Jewish, Irish and other workers mobilised against Oswald Mosley’s fascist movement and attempts to march through the East End.

There is every reason to defend this memory. But Cable Street must also be rescued from mythology. The question is not whether Communist Party members and supporters fought courageously. Many unquestionably did. The historical problem is the politics of Stalinism and the Popular Front. By 1936 the Communist International had abandoned the revolutionary internationalism associated with the October Revolution. The Popular Front subordinated the independent political movement of workers to alliances with supposedly democratic sections of the bourgeoisie.

This was not an abstract dispute occurring somewhere outside the history Rosenberg describes. At precisely the time British workers confronted fascists in London, the Spanish Revolution posed questions of state power, revolution, and counter-revolution with immense urgency. Any account that commemorates anti-fascist militancy while treating the Popular Front primarily as a strategy of broad democratic unity misses the fundamental political issue. Courage cannot substitute for programme. Indeed, that is one of the central lessons running through twentieth-century history: workers repeatedly demonstrated immense courage while being led by organisations whose political strategy subordinated them to forces protecting capitalist property and state power.

What is missing: Trotskyism

The absence of sustained engagement with the Trotskyist movement consequently becomes more conspicuous as the historical narrative approaches the 1930s. Trotskyism was not simply another radical current competing beside anarchism, Labourism, feminism or Stalinism. The Left Opposition, and later the Fourth International, arose from the struggle against the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet Union and Stalinism’s abandonment of socialist internationalism. This had direct implications for every major political question in the latter part of Rosenberg’s book: fascism, the German catastrophe of 1933, the Popular Front, the Spanish Revolution, imperialism, and the approach of another world war.

One need not convert a London walking guide into a history of the Fourth International. But once a book seeks not simply to identify places but to explain radical political traditions, suppressing or marginalising conflicts over revolutionary programme becomes consequential. Without those conflicts, Stalinism risks appearing as merely another component of the broader radical tradition. It was far more historically significant than that.

Brick Lane and the extension beyond 1939

The addition of“Battleground Brick Lane 1970s” is therefore particularly interesting. It breaks the earlier tendency for Rosenberg’s narrative to terminate around the Second World War and carries the geography of struggle into London’s later history. That is a valuable development because migration changed but did not end the political character of the East End. The location that had earlier witnessed the organisation of Jewish immigrant workers became associated with later struggles involving newer migrant communities.

Placing those experiences within the same geographical landscape carries considerable historical power. The danger, however, remains that the concept of radical continuity replaces political differentiation. Successive populations certainly confronted discrimination and racist mobilisation. But the organisations, programmes and international political conditions within which they fought changed profoundly. Continuity of struggle should not be confused with continuity of politics.

Rosenberg and Corbynism

The project’s political standpoint becomes particularly apparent in Rosenberg’s own retrospective account of the book’s history. Writing about the third edition in November 2026, Rosenberg recalled that Jeremy Corbyn was one of the speakers at the launch of the original edition in 2015. He describes Corbyn’s subsequent entry into the Labour leadership contest as heralding “one of the most exciting and hopeful periods in Labour’s post-war history” and notes that enthusiasm for earlier radicals increased when Corbyn became Labour leader, with what Rosenberg calls a “solid mandate for radical change”.

This is politically revealing. Corbynism represented an attempt to channel the widespread opposition created by years of austerity back through the Labour Party. Its essential proposition was that Labour could be reclaimed and transformed through mass membership and pressure from below. The fate of this project cannot be treated as external to the political lessons of Rebel Footprints. If history is invoked to demonstrate what mobilisation can accomplish, it is equally necessary to examine what happens when mobilisation remains politically imprisoned within organisations defending the existing state. The critical historical issue is therefore not simply that movements need courage, organisation or pressure from below. British labour history has all three. The issue is political independence.

History from below and the problem of leadership

The book shares many strengths with the tradition usually described as history from below. It turns attention away from monarchs, prime ministers and generals and towards people whose experiences were routinely excluded from official history. That intellectual achievement should not be diminished. But there is a danger in transforming history from below into history only from below.

The working class does not make history under circumstances of its own choosing. Spontaneous struggle does not automatically provide the political programme needed to overcome capitalism. Workers encounter existing parties, trade unions, bureaucracies and ideologies. Different tendencies struggle consciously for leadership. Consequently, leadership is itself a historical question. Why did revolutionary opportunities end in defeat? Why did reformist organisations acquire authority? Why did Communist parties that originated under the impact of October become defenders of Stalinism? Why did organisations created by workers come to police workers’ struggles? These questions cannot be answered simply by reconstructing mobilisation, however sympathetically or vividly. The working class requires historical memory, but memory without political analysis can become commemoration.

The continuing value of Rebel Footprints

None of this diminishes the usefulness of Rosenberg’s achievement. The fact that the third edition exists at all indicates the continuing appetite for histories different from those supplied by official heritage culture. A contemporary favourable assessment describes the walks as a form of public “history from below” that makes the histories of ordinary people accessible through the city itself. Readers should use the book exactly in that spirit.

Walk Fleet Street and Clerkenwell. Walk Bow and Whitechapel. Walk Bloomsbury, Hackney, Battersea, Soho, Poplar, Bermondsey, Cable Street and Brick Lane. Look behind the expensive apartments, redeveloped warehouses and commercial façades. Recover the city inhabited by generations who refused to accept the conditions imposed upon them. But then ask the questions that the landscape itself cannot answer. Why were their victories limited? Why were reforms reversed? Why did organisations built through working-class sacrifice accommodate themselves to capitalism? Why did socialist internationalism come into conflict with Labourism and Stalinism? And why, after two centuries of struggle, does extraordinary private wealth continue to exist beside deprivation in one of the richest cities on earth? Those questions lead beyond the politics of radical remembrance.

Which footprints should be followed?

This is ultimately the contradiction at the heart of the third edition of Rebel Footprints. Rosenberg has produced something genuinely valuable: a counter-map of London. It is a city populated not simply by kings, financiers, property owners and politicians, but by workers, immigrants, women, socialists, democrats and anti-fascists. It reminds the reader that rights presented retrospectively as natural stages in Britain’s peaceful democratic development were secured through bitter struggles.

Yet history provides more than inspiration. It provides warnings. The working class’s greatest defeats did not occur because workers failed to struggle. Frequently they struggled heroically. Defeat resulted when courage and militancy were subordinated to political programmes incapable of challenging capitalist power. That is why revolutionary history cannot finally be reduced to a collection of inspiring rebellions.

London’s radical past contains competing political traditions, not a single progressive inheritance. Chartism, anarchism, parliamentary Labourism, Stalinism and revolutionary Marxism cannot simply be placed together beneath the heading of rebellion. Their differences concerned the most fundamental question of all: which class should hold political power?

In 2026 that question is far from historical. The physical London Rosenberg guides us through has changed drastically. But the social antagonism that produced earlier struggles has not disappeared. Enormous private fortunes coexist with workers struggling with housing and living costs. Migrants are again made scapegoats for crises they did not create. Nationalism is used to divide workers whose interests cross borders.

Rebel Footprints helps recover the memory of those who resisted previous manifestations of these forces. Its limitation is that memory is continually allowed to stand where political explanation is required. Readers should nevertheless take the book onto the streets. Walk the routes. Find the halls, estates, factories, meeting places and battlegrounds. Remember the matchwomen, Chartists, immigrant workers, suffragettes, tenants, socialists and anti-fascists. But their greatest legacy is not the proposition that protest eventually persuades society to become more progressive.

It is that every serious advance of the working class was secured through struggle against entrenched interests, while the decisive question remained the political programme under which that struggle was conducted. The footprints therefore point somewhere Rosenberg does not finally go. They point from protest towards the problem of political power, from radicalism towards socialism, and from the recovery of working-class history towards the necessity of revolutionary and internationalist leadership.

Bibliography

Book under review

Rosenberg, David. Rebel Footprints: A Guide to Uncovering London’s Radical History. 3rd ed. Foreword by Michael Rosen. London: Pluto Press, 2026. 416 pp. ISBN 9780745351810. [plutobooks.com], [amazon.co.uk]

Earlier editions and related work

Rosenberg, David. Rebel Footprints: A Guide to Uncovering London’s Radical History. London: Pluto Press, 2015.

Rosenberg, David. Rebel Footprints: A Guide to Uncovering London’s Radical History. 2nd ed. Foreword by Ash Sarkar. London: Pluto Press, 2019.

Rosenberg, David. Battle for the East End: Jewish Responses to Fascism in the 1930s. Nottingham: Five Leaves, 2011.

Further reading

Branson, Noreen. Poplarism, 1919–1925: George Lansbury and the Councillors’ Revolt. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1979.

Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. 1845.

Fishman, William J. East End Jewish Radicals, 1875–1914. London: Duckworth, 1975.

Lenin, V. I. “Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder. 1920.

Pankhurst, E. Sylvia. The Suffragette Movement. London: Longmans, 1931.

Piratin, Phil. Our Flag Stays Red. London: Thames Publications, 1948.

Rocker, Rudolf. The London Years. London: Robert Anscombe, 1956.

Thompson, E. P. The Making of the English Working Class. London: Victor Gollancz, 1963.

Trotsky, Leon. Where Is Britain Going? 1925.

Trotsky, Leon. The Spanish Revolution (1931–39). New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973.

The Success That Isn’t: A Reply to Jill Lepore on American Socialism

“The Republican and Democratic parties, or, to be more exact, the Republican-Democratic party, represent the capitalist class in the class struggle.”Eugene V. Debs, The Socialist Party and the Working Class (1904).

“Should America go communist as a result of the difficulties and problems that your capitalist social order is unable to solve, it will discover that communism, far from being an intolerable bureaucratic tyranny and individual regimentation, will be the means of greater individual liberty and shared abundance.”
Leon Trotsky, If America Should Go Communist (1934). [marxists.org]

The economic prerequisites for the socialist revolution are fully matured in the US. The political premises are likewise far more advanced than might appear on the surface.” James P. Cannon, Theses on the American Revolution.

“The Ninth Congress of the Socialist Equality Party convenes at a critical turning point in the political history of the United States and the world—the point of intersection of war, economic crisis, and rapidly growing social radicalization.”

David North, An assessment of the decade of socialist revolution and the tasks of the Socialist Equality Party, 11 August 2026. [wsws.org]

The New Yorker asks whether American socialism can survive its success. The real question is whether the working class can free itself from the Democratic Party, and from those who call themselves socialists to keep it there.

One week after the 2026 midterm elections, The New Yorker published an essay by Harvard historian Jill Lepore titled “Can American Socialism Survive Its Success?” Its subtitle states the thesis plainly: the American movement has often watched its ideas flourish while its organisations withered, and the question now is whether today’s resurgence will go the same way.

The framing is revealing, both for what it assumes and for what it leaves out. For the liberal establishment, the problem of socialism is one of institutional durability: membership rolls, mailing lists, and electoral machinery. Socialism is treated as a set of popular “ideas”, free buses, rent freezes and childcare, that drift into the mainstream, while the organisations that carried them fade away. This is presented as a tragic but natural cycle of American political life.

Marxists reject this framework from the outset. Socialism is not a menu of reforms that a capitalist party may or may not adopt. It is the programme for the working class to seize political power and reorganisation of economic life based on social need, not private profit. By that standard, the “success” The New Yorker invites its readers to contemplate is nothing of the kind.

Whose success?

The Nov. 3 midterms trigger the piece. Six candidates backed by the DSA have taken House seats, bringing the total number of self-described democratic socialists in Congress to eight (per CNBC). Zohran Mamdani is the mayor of New York; Katie Wilson is the mayor of Seattle. Current Affairs has called it ‘Socialism’s Moment’.

But all of these candidates ran as Democrats on the Democratic line, and all of them will be in a Democratic caucus. CNBC’s own report points out that the sheer size of the Democratic majority will severely limit the leverage any of them can exert. In other words, the ‘socialist’ wave has delivered its votes to a party of Wall Street, the military/intelligence complex and the war machine. This party has never been an independent vehicle for the working class’s political interests.

The same report actually makes a more telling point. DSA leaders claim they are having greater success with donors, including wealthy ones, as the organisation continues building its infrastructure ahead of 2028. That is the real measure of the “success” they are celebrating. It is not the growth of working-class consciousness or independent working-class organisation, but the successful integration of a middle-class political layer into the machinery of bourgeois politics.

The same exit poll found that 70% of voters feel the economic system is rigged in favour of the rich. That’s the actual state of play: a very real and growing antagonism towards capitalism exists among tens of millions of workers. The key question is what political outlook and what organisation will give that antagonism a form of conscious expression? DSA’s answer, ‘just vote Democrat,’ is designed to ensure that it never takes on an independent political form.

What really destroyed the organisations

The idea that socialist organisations in America ‘died out’ while their ideas survived is a complete liberal myth. It’s a myth which conveniently ignores the real political reasons for their demise. The SP of Eugene Debs, which pulled in nearly a million votes in 1912, wasn’t just dissolved by some inescapable law of American exceptionalism. It was crushed by state repression. Debs went to prison for anti-war activities. The Espionage and Sedition Acts were the tools of repression used against the anti-war movement, and the Palmer Raids and mass deportations came in the postwar period. Meanwhile, the SP was being torn apart by the impact of the Russian Revolution and the internal struggle between its revolutionary and reformist elements.

In the 1930s, the great industrial struggles that built the CIO, including Minneapolis, Toledo and Flint, demonstrated the immense social power of the American working class. Socialists, communists and other militants played decisive roles. Yet the Stalinised Communist Party, pursuing the Popular Front strategy dictated by Moscow, worked to subordinate this movement to Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Party. The Trotskyists of the Socialist Workers Party, whose members had played a leading role in the 1934 Minneapolis Teamsters strikes, were prosecuted and imprisoned under the Smith Act during the Second World War.

Afterwards, trade unions purged militants and became instruments of Cold War anti-communism and labour-management collaboration. The tendency from which the modern DSA sprang (Michael Harrington’s Democratic Socialist Organising Committee, founded in 1973 and absorbed into DSA in 1982) was based on the idea of ‘realigning’ or ‘transforming’ the Democratic Party rather than creating an independent revolutionary party of the working class.

The lesson of this history is not that socialist organisations are inherently weak. It is that the constant subordination of the working class to bourgeois politics has repeatedly killed off the prospect of the working class ever becoming an independent political force. The social reforms that did survive (Social Security, labour rights, Medicare, etc.) were all concessions taken from American capitalism under the pressure of the times. They were not evidence of capitalism evolving into socialism. The fact that both Democrats and Republicans eventually rolled them back is the very definition of the opposite.

City Hall and the limits of “sewer socialism”

New York was the flagship of the new movement. Mamdani was elected on a platform of initiatives including fast and free buses, a rent freeze for rent-stabilised tenants, and universal childcare. In June, after appointing six of its nine members, the Rent Guidelines Board voted 7-1 to freeze one- and two-year stabilised leases from October 2026 to September 2027.

No worker will begrudge tenants a bit of relief from rising rents. It is important to be clear, though, that this is not socialism. A temporary freeze on rents in the regulated part of the market doesn’t change capitalist ownership of land, housing and finance. The property developers, landlords, banks, and other financial interests at the heart of the housing system remain exactly as they are.

Mamdani himself has referred to the municipal socialist tradition in Milwaukee and the so-called ‘sewer socialists’. That tradition was largely about efficient municipal administration and the provision of public services. Any improvements such policies may bring about remain within the realm of municipal reform. They don’t, in any way, eliminate capitalist property or transfer political power to the working class.

New York is still one of the great centres of world capitalism. No municipal administration, however well-intentioned in its reform programme, can transform the class relations institutionalised on Wall Street, since those relations go far beyond the municipal boundary and rest on ownership of the means of production.

This isn’t really a question of individual treachery or individual sincerity. It’s a question of programme. A movement that takes responsibility for administering capitalism has to operate within the economic, political, and legal framework of that administration. Eventually, workers’ interests will run up against the demands that finance, property, and the state make of that administration.

The historical experience of reformist governments internationally, from SYRIZA in Greece to ostensibly left administrations elsewhere, therefore demands serious examination. Winning office and possessing political power are not the same thing.

Ideas without a programme, organisation without independence

The New Yorker’s formula, ideas flourish while organisations wither, should therefore be turned on its head. The central problem is not that American socialists have been organisationally incapable of sustaining attractive reforms. It is that organisations claiming the socialist mantle have repeatedly rejected the working class’s political independence.

DSA is not an independent working-class political party. It operates overwhelmingly through the Democratic Party and organises electoral campaigns for candidates who stand within that party. This contradiction became especially stark during the 2022 railroad dispute, when Congress intervened and imposed a contract on rail workers, preventing a national strike.

An organisation cannot overcome this contradiction merely by increasing its membership, fundraising capacity or representation in elected institutions. Organisational growth and socialist political development are entirely different things. Indeed, under definite conditions the first can proceed at the expense of the second.

The question “Can socialism survive its success?” is therefore posed falsely. What may unquestionably survive is a political apparatus possessing elected representatives, campaign funds, professional staff and positions within existing institutions. But an organisation that grows by integrating itself ever more deeply into the capitalist political structure is not necessarily succeeding as a socialist movement. It may instead be abandoning the historical content of socialism while retaining its name.

What the discussion leaves out

A discussion of American socialism in November 2026 that confines itself to elections and organisational longevity necessarily passes over the decisive questions confronting the working class.

The first is war. American capitalism remains at the centre of an international system characterised by sharpening geopolitical conflicts and enormous military expenditures. Socialism cannot be reduced to domestic redistribution while foreign policy and militarism are treated as separate questions. Opposition to imperialist war belongs at the centre of a genuinely international socialist programme.

The second question is the defence of democratic rights. The growth of authoritarian forms of rule cannot be separated from extreme social inequality and the political crisis it generates. A ruling class confronted by growing social opposition increasingly regards democratic forms as obstacles to securing its interests. The defence of democratic rights therefore depends upon the independent mobilisation of the working class rather than confidence in the institutions or representatives of either capitalist party.

Third is the working class’s international character. Workers in New York and Seattle confront corporations, banks, financial markets and supply chains extending across national boundaries. Their conditions of life are inseparable from those of workers in London, São Paulo, Shenzhen and throughout the world economy. There is consequently no national, still less municipal, road to socialism.

Finally, there is the rank and file. The more significant development is not simply the election of a handful of politicians presenting themselves as democratic socialists but the emergence of struggles by workers against employers and, increasingly, against trade-union bureaucracies seeking to contain those struggles. Socialist politics must seek to develop the working class’s independent initiative and organisation. These are the conditions in which the socialist question is actually posed: not principally as the popularity of individual reforms, but as a question of class power.

The question that should be asked

The real question is not whether American socialism can survive its success. It is whether the American working class will break politically with the Democratic Party and construct its own revolutionary political leadership on an internationalist and socialist programme.

Widespread hostility to inequality, declining living standards, and the domination of political life by immense concentrations of wealth provide an objective basis for such a development. But hostility towards capitalism does not spontaneously become socialist consciousness. Nor will it reach socialism through the electoral structures of the Democratic Party, the fundraising apparatus of DSA or the administration of municipal reforms.

It requires the conscious assimilation of the strategic experiences of the American and international working class throughout the twentieth century, including the Russian Revolution, the degeneration of the Soviet Union, the rise of Stalinism, the Popular Front, fascism, the betrayal of revolutionary opportunities and the prolonged struggle waged by Leon Trotsky and the Fourth International against Stalinism and reformism.

This is precisely what disappears when socialism is reduced to the history of organisations, policies and electoral cycles. The fundamental historical question is not why particular socialist organisations disappeared. It is what programme they fought for, what class interests they represented and, above all, what political relationship they established between the working class and the capitalist state. The New Yorker worries that socialist organisations may wither once again. The working class should draw a very different lesson from this history. It is time to build the organisation that will not.

Bibliography

Articles and reports

Guttenplan, D. D. “The Rapid-Fire Political Education of Zohran Mamdani.” The Nation, 12 May 2026.

Izaguirre, Anthony. “Rent Board Fulfils Mamdani’s Vow to Freeze the Rent on 1 Million NYC Apartments.” Associated Press, 25 June 2026.

Lepore, Jill. “Can American Socialism Survive Its Success?” The New Yorker, 9 November 2026.

“America Doesn’t Like Socialism, but the Candidates Keep Winning.” CNBC, 7 November 2026.

“Socialism’s Moment Is Here.” Current Affairs, 2026.

“NYC Rent Guidelines Board Final Vote.” NY1, 25 June 2026.

Books

Cannon, James P. Socialism on Trial. New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1942.

Dobbs, Farrell. Teamster Rebellion. New York: Monad Press, 1972.

Harrington, Michael. Socialism. New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972.

Isserman, Maurice. The Other American: The Life of Michael Harrington. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000.

Kipnis, Ira. The American Socialist Movement, 1897–1912. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952.

Salvatore, Nick. Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982.

Trotsky, Leon. The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International (The Transitional Program). 1938.

Weinstein, James. The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912–1925. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.

From ‘Revolution’ to the Dock: The Political and Social Demise of Russell Brand

A verdict, and a political trajectory

On 5 November 2026, a jury at Southwark Crown Court convicted Russell Brand of one count of rape and three counts of sexual assault. The jury of eight men and four women, required by Mr Justice Bennathan to reach unanimous verdicts, acquitted him on two further counts of rape and one of attempted indecent assault. The convictions relate to offences committed between 2004 and 2009. The rape conviction concerns a 21-year-old woman whom Brand met after a performance in west London in 2009.

Brand, 51, denied every charge and was remanded in custody following the verdict. On 9 November, Mr Justice Bennathan sentenced him to 10 years and six months’ imprisonment. Brand must serve at least two-thirds of the sentence before becoming eligible for release.

In his sentencing remarks, the judge told Brand that as he became famous he had also become a“sexual predator”, and said that the offences demonstrated a disregard for women’s right to refuse sexual contact. The judge also stressed that the sentence concerned only the offences of which the jury had convicted Brand and that he disregarded allegations on which the jury had returned not-guilty verdicts. The Metropolitan Police have said that further allegations concerning Brand remain under investigation. Those allegations are separate from the convictions for which he was sentenced and have not been determined by a court.

The victims are entitled to lifelong anonymity, and this article does not cover their testimony. What concerns us here is the social and political figure: the man who, little more than a decade ago, was hailed in liberal circles as the voice of a disaffected generation, and whose political evolution subsequently carried him into the orbit of Tucker Carlson, Elon Musk and the Trump movement.

Brand’s trajectory is not merely a story of personal collapse. It is a concentrated expression of the bankruptcy of celebrity “anti-politics”, of the media industry that manufactured and protected him, and of the decay of a petty-bourgeois radicalism that rejected the working class as the conscious agent of social change. That Brand could travel in scarcely a decade from calling for “revolution” on BBC Newsnight to sharing platforms with figures associated with the American right is itself a devastating commentary on the politics he represented.

An honest accounting must also be made of the proceedings against him. When the allegations first became public in September 2023, following a joint investigation by The Times, The Sunday Times and Channel 4’s Dispatches, the World Socialist Web Site warned against trial by media and insisted upon the presumption of innocence. That principle did not entail declaring Brand innocent. It meant insisting that criminal guilt could be determined only through established judicial procedures in which allegations could be tested, and the accused could mount a defence.

That process has now taken place. Brand was charged, represented by senior counsel, tried before a jury over several weeks, convicted on some counts and acquitted on others. Each charge had to be determined according to the evidence relating to it. Whatever criticisms socialists must make of the capitalist state and judicial system, the proceedings themselves refute the crude contention circulated by Brand’s right-wing defenders that a fair trial was simply impossible in Britain.

The celebrity revolutionary, 2013–2015

Brand’s emergence as a political celebrity was facilitated by the very institutions that he professed to oppose. In October 2013, he guest-edited the New Statesman and, days later, sat opposite Jeremy Paxman on BBC Newsnight. Brand said he had never voted, denounced a political establishment subordinated to corporations, and spoke in favour of a “socialist egalitarian” society.

The interview was watched millions of times. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crash, years of austerity and the Liberal Democrats’ repudiation of their promises over university tuition fees, Brand’s denunciations struck a chord with many young people who saw nothing in the official political establishment that represented their interests.

Sections of the liberal media responded in an instructive way. Rather than seriously interrogating what Brand meant by revolution, parts of the press transformed him into a political phenomenon. Prospect included him among its “World Thinkers” in 2015. His book Revolution, published in 2014, became a bestseller. His YouTube series The Trews attracted a large audience, while his involvement in the struggle of tenants at the New Era estate in Hoxton against eviction by a US investment fund seemed to connect his rhetoric to genuine social opposition.

Yet the political content of Brand’s “revolution” was always profoundly confused. It combined elements of anarchism, Eastern mysticism, self-help and twelve-step recovery culture with hostility towards organised politics itself. Instead of calling for the construction of an independent political movement of the working class, he counselled abstention from conventional politics and elevated personal transformation and local direct action into substitutes for political programme, organisation and historical perspective.

Capitalism consequently appeared not primarily as a definite system of property and class relations, founded upon private ownership of the means of production and production for profit, but as a kind of spiritual and psychological disorder. Alienation might therefore be overcome through consciousness, authenticity, community action and individual awakening. Class in the Marxist sense, as an objective social relationship and the foundation of political organisation, virtually disappeared.

This perspective’s limitations were dramatically exposed within eighteen months. Days before the May 2015 general election, having previously encouraged his followers not to vote, Brand interviewed Labour leader Ed Miliband and urged support for Labour. The supposedly uncompromising rejection of establishment politics thus ended in an endorsement of the party of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, the Iraq War and the deregulated City of London.

The episode revealed something fundamental. Without a programme, historical analysis or class orientation, radical rhetoric could swing abruptly from denunciation of the parliamentary system to accommodation with one of its principal parties. The “revolution” had discovered the ballot box almost overnight.

From the ‘left’ to the far right

The Covid-19 pandemic accelerated Brand’s political evolution. His enormous online audience had originally been built through attacks on inequality, corporate power and the political establishment. Increasingly, however, these themes became entangled with scepticism concerning vaccination and public-health policies, alongside a growing preoccupation with vaguely defined “elites”, censorship and the “Deep State”. In 2022, his programme Stay Free with Russell Brand moved to Rumble, a video platform that became increasingly associated with conservative and right-wing online politics in the United States.

Some of Brand’s interventions still contained elements of genuine opposition to official policy, including criticism of the role of the United States and NATO in Ukraine. But these positions no longer fit within a coherent critique of imperialism or capitalism. Instead, opposition to war and corporate power increasingly coexisted with the themes and personalities of the American culture wars.

After the allegations against him emerged in 2023, Brand’s public political and personal identity shifted again. He converted publicly to Christianity, was baptised in 2024, and increasingly cultivated an audience among conservative Christians and supporters of the American right. He appeared with Tucker Carlson and became associated with political environments involving Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Turning Point USA.

The political distance travelled was considerable. A man once presented by sections of the British liberal establishment as the charismatic representative of anti-capitalist youth was now being welcomed by forces associated with Trump’s political movement. Yet this development should not simply be understood as a betrayal of a previously coherent socialist politics. No such politics existed to betray. Rather, Brand’s evolution exposed the inherent instability of his earlier outlook.

A politics that rejected the independent political mobilisation of the working class, interpreted complex social relations primarily through the actions of shadowy or corrupt elites, and elevated individual authenticity above programme and organisation possessed no reliable political compass. Its language of rebellion could therefore migrate remarkably easily between ostensibly left-wing and right-wing forms of populism. Under conditions of deepening social crisis, opposition to “the establishment” ceased to have any necessarily progressive content. Anti-politics became increasingly compatible with the politics of reaction.

The trial and the myth of the ‘political prisoner’

After the allegations became public, Brand increasingly portrayed himself as the victim of an establishment campaign directed against a dissident voice. Sections of the American right enthusiastically adopted this interpretation. Elon Musk publicly supported Brand after the allegations appeared in 2023. Tucker Carlson subsequently connected Brand’s predicament to his attacks on pharmaceutical companies, establishment institutions and Western policy towards Ukraine. After criminal charges were brought, Carlson presented the proceedings as politically motivated and questioned whether Brand could receive justice in Britain.

This campaign had little to do with a consistent defence of democratic rights. Brand had become a politically useful media figure, and his legal difficulties could therefore be incorporated into an existing narrative in which right-wing personalities and online influencers portrayed themselves as victims of an all-powerful liberal establishment. It was nevertheless necessary to reject the opposite position. Brand’s defenders’ politically reactionary arguments could not justify declaring him guilty before trial. Democratic rights cannot be defended selectively according to whether one approves of the accused.

That is why opposition to trial by media in 2023 was correct. The principle involved is elementary: allegations, however grave, are not criminal convictions. Guilt must be established through evidence tested before a court in proceedings in which the accused has the right to defend himself. The subsequent trial did precisely what Brand’s political defenders claimed could not occur. He was represented by experienced counsel and permitted to contest the allegations against him. His barrister urged the jury to distinguish between behaviour they might find personally objectionable and conduct proved to be criminal. The resulting verdicts show that the jury distinguished between the charges, returning both acquittals and convictions.

The claim that Brand was simply a “political prisoner” therefore cannot be sustained merely by asserting that he had become an opponent of establishment politics. His political opinions neither proved guilt nor provided immunity from criminal prosecution. Brand’s highly visible turn towards Christianity also became part of his new public identity. His appearances carrying a Bible and his repeated references to his faith fit neatly into the wider narrative of spiritual rebirth he had developed for his international audience. Whatever Brand’s personal beliefs, the political significance of this transformation is unmistakable. The former advocate of loosely defined spiritual revolution had reconstructed himself as a Christian dissident confronting what he and his allies described as a corrupt establishment.

The industry that made him

Any serious assessment of Brand must also examine the entertainment industry that created the conditions for his extraordinary celebrity. He committed the offences for which he was convicted while rising rapidly through British television and radio before moving into Hollywood. Brand’s deliberately provocative sexual persona was not incidental to this ascent. It became part of the commodity being sold. Broadcasters constructed programmes around his personality and cultivated the image of the uncontrollable celebrity provocateur. The commercial imperative was obvious: outrage generated attention, attention generated audiences, and audiences generated revenue.

The notorious 2008 BBC Radio 2 scandal involving obscene prank calls to the actor Andrew Sachs finally demonstrated that there were limits to what institutions could tolerate once controversy threatened the institution itself. But by then the mechanisms through which celebrity behaviour was indulged, normalised and monetised were already evident. Subsequent investigations into how concerns about Brand were handled raised broader questions about institutional culture and junior employees’ capacity to challenge powerful performers. The essential issue therefore cannot be reduced to the moral character of one celebrity.

This is where a socialist analysis must distinguish itself from the approach associated with the more affluent sections of the #MeToo milieu. In 2023, parts of the liberal media collapsed the distinction between accusation and conviction, turning the individual celebrity into the exclusive explanation for an entire institutional culture. Such an approach simultaneously threatens fundamental democratic principles and obscures the social relations that make abuses of power possible.

The hierarchical organisation of the entertainment industry places enormous influence in the hands of celebrities, executives and owners. Junior researchers, production workers, runners and other often precariously employed workers can find themselves dependent upon precisely those above them for continued employment and advancement. Celebrity itself is a commodity. Once corporations have invested substantial amounts of money in a profitable personality, enormous commercial incentives arise to preserve that personality’s market value.

The phenomenon is therefore not reducible simply to “bad men”. It involves structures of wealth, employment, power and dependency embedded within the entertainment business itself.

Brand’s later political evolution also cannot be separated from the economics of alternative online media. Digital media has created a lucrative market in permanent outrage. The successful influencer must continually produce novelty, controversy and conflict to maintain engagement. Audiences are encouraged to regard conventional journalism as inherently dishonest, while the influencer’s personality becomes the principal guarantee of truth. Grievance consequently becomes a business model.

Within this economy, every criticism can be framed as censorship, every institutional sanction as persecution, and every controversy as further confirmation that the dissident personality threatens powerful interests. Brand did not merely participate in this media economy. Increasingly, it shaped his public identity.

The lessons

The rise and fall of Brand contains political lessons extending far beyond one individual. The social anger he expressed in 2013 was genuine. Millions of young people had experienced the consequences of the financial crash, austerity, declining living standards, war and extreme concentrations of wealth. They confronted an official political culture seemingly incapable of articulating any alternative. That alienation has certainly not disappeared.

But Brand demonstrated precisely why such anger cannot be entrusted to celebrities, however charismatic, nor channelled through a politics that substitutes personality, lifestyle and authenticity for an understanding of class, history and political organisation. The extraordinary ease with which Brand travelled from the pages of the New Statesman to the political environment surrounding Tucker Carlson demonstrates the instability of celebrity anti-politics. A vague denunciation of corrupt “elites” does not constitute socialism.

Capitalism is not simply the rule of dishonest politicians, greedy bankers, pharmaceutical corporations, media executives or secretive bureaucracies. It is a historically developed social system based upon definite class relations and the private ownership of society’s productive forces. Without understanding this, opposition to capitalism can be redirected endlessly from one supposed enemy to another without ever confronting the social foundations of exploitation.

There is another lesson. It was correct in 2023 to oppose trial by media and insist upon the presumption of innocence. That principle does not disappear because a defendant subsequently proves unpopular, nor does it become retrospectively mistaken when a jury eventually returns guilty verdicts. The principle has now been tested through the judicial process. Brand faced criminal charges, contested those charges and was acquitted on some while being convicted on others. To continue to portray the verdict itself as sufficient proof of a political conspiracy is not a defence of democratic rights. It attempts to transform political sympathy for an individual into immunity from the ordinary requirements of criminal law.

Brand’s political career began with a genuine social phenomenon: mass disgust with inequality, official politics and the consequences of the capitalist crisis. But celebrity radicalism proved incapable of providing any way forward. The working class requires no prophets manufactured by the entertainment industry. It requires a political perspective grounded in the accumulated historical experience of the international workers’ movement and an organisation capable of uniting workers across national, racial and religious divisions against the capitalist system itself.

Brand once offered “revolution” without class, programme or party. What remained after the rhetoric had evaporated was the individual personality itself. That was always the fundamental weakness. And it was ultimately the political trajectory the project contained from the beginning.

Bibliography

Books and primary material

Brand, Russell (2014), Revolution. London: Century.

BBC Newsnight (2013), Jeremy Paxman interview with Russell Brand, broadcast 23 October 2013.

New Statesman (2013), issue guest-edited by Russell Brand, 24 October 2013.

Russell Brand: Comedy, Celebrity, Politics (2016). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Socialist and political commentary

Scripps, Thomas (2023), “Media mob lynches comedian and actor Russell Brand over sexual assault allegations”, World Socialist Web Site, 21 September 2023.

McRedmond, Finn (2023), “We have lost Russell Brand”, New Statesman, 7 March 2023.

McRedmond, Finn (2025), “Russell Brand’s transatlantic trial”, New Statesman, 30 May 2025.

Prospect (2015), “World Thinkers 2015: Russell Brand”, 16 February 2015.

News reports: allegations, charges and right-wing response

Mediaite (2023), “‘I Support Russell Brand’: Elon Musk gives full-throated backing”.

Salon (2023), “Right-wing conspiracists flock to support Russell Brand”, 20 September 2023.

Mediaite (2025), “Tucker Carlson calls on Trump to ‘rescue’ Russell Brand”.

NPR (2025), “Russell Brand pleads not guilty to rape, sexual assault charges in U.K.”, 30 May 2025.

PBS NewsHour/AP (2025), “Russell Brand pleads not guilty to charges of rape and sexual assault”.

Variety (2026), “Russell Brand’s rape trial delayed to October”.

News reports: verdict and sentencing

CNN (2026), “Actor and comedian Russell Brand found guilty of rape and sexual assault”, 5 November 2026.

Al Jazeera (2026), “Russell Brand found guilty of rape and sexual assault by UK court”, 5 November 2026.

The Hollywood Reporter (2026), “Russell Brand found guilty of rape and sexual assault at London trial”, 5 November 2026.

NPR (2026), “From comedian to convicted rapist: What to know about Russell Brand”, 5 November 2026.

CNN (2026), “Hiding in plain sight? Russell Brand’s conviction poses tough questions for UK entertainment industry”, 8 November 2026.

NPR (2026), “Russell Brand to learn sentence after being found guilty of rape and sexual assault”, 8 November 2026.

NBC News (2026), “Russell Brand awaits sentencing as he faces ‘significant’ prison time”, 9 November 2026.

Usman Khawaja: “It was all of us” — Sandpaper gate and the scapegoating at the heart of Australian cricket

Eight years after the Cape Town ball-tampering scandal, former Australian Test opener Usman Khawaja says responsibility extended beyond the three players. His intervention further undermines the official account that reduced a systemic crisis in Australian cricket to the misconduct of three individuals.

The official mythology constructed around Australian cricket’s 2018 ball-tampering scandal is beginning to unravel. Eight years after television cameras caught Cameron Bancroft attempting to alter the condition of the ball with sandpaper at Newlands in Cape Town, former Australian Test opener Usman Khawaja has declared that knowledge and responsibility for what occurred belonged not merely to the three players subsequently punished by Cricket Australia (CA), but to the team collectively. [smh.com.au]

The assertion appears in Khawaja’s autobiography, Sabr, with extracts published ahead of the book’s release. His formulation could hardly be clearer: “It was all of us. Not the batters, not the bowlers, not the staff. All of us.” He insists he believed from the outset that the team should have accepted responsibility collectively, rather than concentrating it on Steve Smith, David Warner and Cameron Bancroft. [theguardian.com]

Even more damaging is Khawaja’s claim that Cape Town was not the beginning of the affair. According to his account, sandpaper had already been discussed and used during the preceding Test at St George’s Park in Port Elizabeth. He recalls open dressing-room discussion about finding a way to roughen the ball, identifying sandpaper as an effective method, and Bancroft volunteering to use it. He also recalls Smith indicating that he did not want to know what was being done.

These are Khawaja’s allegations, not findings established by a new independent investigation. But if substantiated, they would be devastating to the account Cricket Australia has accepted and defended since 2018. CA’s investigation attributed prior knowledge of the Cape Town scheme to Smith, Warner and Bancroft. The first two received 12-month playing bans and Bancroft nine months. Warner also received an indefinite leadership ban, which was overturned in 2024.

Khawaja’s question is therefore broader than who knew what and when during a cricket match. It concerns how sporting institutions respond when conduct generated within their own competitive culture threatens their legitimacy. Sandpapergate increasingly appears not merely as an episode of cheating but as a case study in the political economy of modern professional sport: the creation of relentless performance pressures from above, followed by the individualisation of responsibility when the consequences become publicly embarrassing.

The official story comes under renewed pressure.

Khawaja’s intervention is particularly serious because he says that, despite being a member of the Australian side and sitting beside Bancroft during the Test, CA’s investigator never interviewed him. That claim alone warrants an explanation. An investigation claiming to establish the boundaries of knowledge within a touring cricket team can hardly be considered exhaustive if it did not question team members who may have had relevant information. Yet Cricket Australia has responded by defending the integrity of the original process. After Khawaja’s revelations, the organisation said it remained comfortable with its investigation and its findings.

The issue is made still more significant by what had already entered the public record. In 2021, Bancroft, when asked whether the bowlers knew that the ball was being altered, responded that it was “self-explanatory”. Australia’s Cape Town bowling quartet of Pat Cummins, Mitchell Starc, Josh Hazlewood and Nathan Lyon subsequently issued a joint statement categorically denying prior knowledge that a foreign substance had been brought onto the field to alter the ball.

Those conflicting accounts cannot be reconciled by simply repeating the 2018 findings. Khawaja’s statement does not, by itself, prove the precise knowledge or conduct of every individual player, and it should not be used as a pretext for shifting the scapegoating operation from one group of cricketers to another. That would merely reproduce the essential logic of the original affair. The important question is not which additional individuals should now be publicly sacrificed. It is why the institutional and cultural circumstances that produced the scandal were reduced to the misconduct of three men.

Three men made to carry an institutional crisis.

The extraordinarily punitive treatment of Smith, Warner and Bancroft performed a definite function. By identifying three guilty individuals, Cricket Australia could present the scandal as an aberration from an otherwise healthy system rather than as the expression of that system. Khawaja now says that he argued in the dressing room that the team should accept what had happened collectively. His account is explicit: “We did this as a team. We knew what was going on, and we have to take it as a team.” Instead, as he puts it, the three punished players “got crucified”.

On Sunday, 8 November, Khawaja amplified this point, denying allegations that he had thrown former teammates “under the bus”. He described Smith, Warner and Bancroft as those who had taken the blame for everybody else and said that he continued to seek collective acceptance of responsibility. This goes to the heart of the affair. Scapegoating does not mean that the individuals concerned bear no responsibility. It means that their individual responsibility is isolated from the social or institutional circumstances in which their actions developed. The system survives by converting a systemic failure into an individual moral defect.

The mechanism is familiar throughout capitalist society. A bank caught engaging in misconduct discovers a “rogue trader”. A corporation confronted with illegality finds a handful of wayward employees. A government department confronted with a scandal promises disciplinary action against individual officials while preserving the policy and hierarchy that produced the disaster. Professional sport, increasingly organised according to the same commercial imperatives as every other major entertainment industry, operates no differently. The essential purpose is containment.

“Winning without counting the cost”

A striking contradiction sits at the centre of the Sandpapergate narrative. The supposedly aberrant behaviour of three Australian cricketers occurred within an organisation whose own subsequent cultural review identified serious problems concerning its fixation upon winning. The independent review Cricket Australia commissioned and The Ethics Centre conducted examined the organisation’s culture after Cape Town. Its central finding was that Australian cricket had developed what it termed a culture of “winning without counting the costs”. The review concluded that the emphasis placed upon winning had contributed to an erosion of organisational culture and that aspects of player management encouraged negative behaviour.

That wording is significant. CA emphasised that the review did not characterise the organisation as simply pursuing “win at all costs”, but rather as seeking to “win without counting the cost”. The distinction hardly exonerates the organisation. Instead, it identifies the institutional mechanism more precisely. The pursuit of victory had become separated from serious consideration of the methods used to obtain it and the consequences for players, opponents, and the game itself. The review did not confine itself to what occurred on the field. The Ethics Centre specifically framed winning as extending from on-field tactics to the formation of elite players and “the way in which the ‘business’ of cricket is undertaken”.

This was therefore never simply a story about sandpaper. It was about an institutional structure in which performance, commercial success, reputation and victory had become mutually reinforcing imperatives. Yet the public drama of 2018 transformed this broader organisational crisis into the personal disgrace of three players. The contradiction could scarcely be clearer. The cultural investigation acknowledged institutional conditions that encouraged harmful behaviour, while the disciplinary narrative kept responsibility for Sandpapergate tightly individualised.

The commodification of cricket

Cricket’s transformation over recent decades provides the broader context. Elite cricket is no longer organised principally around the game’s rhythms, traditions, or even competitive requirements. It exists within an expanding international entertainment market dominated by broadcast contracts, sponsorship, franchise competitions and the ceaseless production of commercially saleable sporting content.

This does not mean that highly paid international cricketers are equivalent to ordinary wage workers. Plainly they are not. A small layer of elite athletes can earn sums unavailable to the overwhelming majority of the population. But their privileged remuneration does not emancipate professional sport from capitalist social relations. It integrates the athletes far more completely into them. Their performances become commodities. Their personalities become brands. Their competitions become broadcast products. National identity itself becomes commercially exploitable material.

What appears publicly as an almost religious obsession with Australian cricketing supremacy therefore coincides with thoroughly material interests. Victory attracts audiences. Audiences sustain broadcasters. Broadcast exposure attracts sponsors. Success enhances individual commercial value. Failure threatens contracts, careers, reputations and institutional revenues. The romantic mythology of representing the nation consequently coexists with a ruthless commercial structure.

Within such a system, exhortations to win are never abstract. They descend through administrators, selectors, coaches and players as concrete pressures. A sporting culture that measures almost everything according to competitive success inevitably produces individuals searching for marginal advantages. The boundary between permissible innovation, gamesmanship and outright violation becomes increasingly vulnerable when winning assumes overriding importance.

This does not excuse cheating. It explains why moral sermons about three defective personalities explain so little. Indeed, the post-Cape Town cultural review commissioned by CA itself reached beyond individual misconduct. The Ethics Centre interviewed administrators, current and former cricketers and sponsors, scrutinising policies, remuneration structures, ethical frameworks and codes of conduct. The resulting institutional critique sits uneasily beside the insistence that the decisive responsibility for Cape Town could nevertheless be neatly confined to three players.

National morality and the business of sport

Sandpapergate acquired its extraordinary emotional force because Australian cricket had long presented itself as something more than professional entertainment. The national team was invested with claims about Australian character: toughness, honesty, aggression, resilience and playing hard but supposedly within an identifiable moral boundary. The visual spectacle of Bancroft concealing the sandpaper therefore punctured something more commercially valuable than the surface of a cricket ball. It damaged a national brand. Once the affair became a crisis of legitimacy, punishment had to be demonstrative. That process also reveals the peculiar hypocrisy surrounding professional sport. The relentless pursuit of competitive advantage is celebrated until someone crosses a boundary that too clearly exposes the system’s logic. At that point administrators suddenly rediscover morality.

The individual offender becomes useful precisely because he permits the institution to perform moral purification. Expulsion, suspension and public humiliation supposedly demonstrate the health of the organisation rather than raising questions about the environment that produced the offending action. Thus structural responsibility disappears precisely when it is most necessary to examine it.

Khawaja and collective responsibility

Khawaja’s most important contribution is therefore not simply his allegation concerning how many people knew about sandpaper. It is his insistence upon collective responsibility. That principle runs directly counter to the institutional logic through which Sandpapergate was resolved. If Khawaja’s account is accurate, the entire basis for the scandal’s public containment becomes questionable. But even independently of his specific allegations, the cultural findings commissioned by CA after Cape Town had already demonstrated something broader: Australian cricket possessed institutional problems that could not rationally be explained through the moral character of three players.

Khawaja’s eight-year delay in speaking publicly will inevitably be used against him. Critics can point out that the revelations accompany the publication of a commercially sold autobiography. That does not answer what he has alleged. Nor does the observation that memories differ after eight years resolve the conflict between his account and previous statements. The contradictions now require evidence, not insinuation.

If CA is confident in the 2018 investigation, nothing should threaten reopening the factual record through a genuinely independent process capable of establishing who was questioned, what evidence was gathered, how conclusions were reached, and whether significant testimony was excluded. Anything less leaves the obvious question unanswered: why was Khawaja, a member of the team who now says he possessed directly relevant information, not interviewed?

The unresolved meaning of Sandpapergate

Nevertheless, there is a danger in treating another investigation merely as an exercise in finding additional guilty individuals. That would miss the larger lesson. Sandpaper gate’s significance lies in the relationship between individual action and institutional pressure. The objective should not be to replace three scapegoats with six, eight or eleven. It is to understand how a culture was created in which such conduct became conceivable and how, when that culture produced a public disaster, responsibility was concentrated upon the most convenient individuals.

Smith, Warner and Bancroft unquestionably carried responsibility for their own conduct as established in the disciplinary process. But personal responsibility and institutional responsibility are not mutually exclusive. Insisting that one abolishes the other is the ideological sleight of hand that scapegoating depends on. The cultural review Cricket Australia subsequently commissioned seriously undermined that simplistic explanation. It identified a cricketing organisation damaged by its approach to winning and by its failure to reckon adequately with the costs of pursuing success. Khawaja has now reopened the even more explosive question of whether the Sandpapergate investigation’s narrow attribution of knowledge holds up.

Eight years later, Cricket Australia can no longer credibly respond simply by repeating its confidence in the original process. The deepest issue raised by Cape Town was never whether three Australian cricketers suddenly lost their moral compass. It was why a sporting institution saturated with competitive and commercial pressure produced such conduct, and why, when the affair exploded publicly, institutional survival demanded individualising responsibility.

Khawaja’s blunt formulation, “It was all of us”, cuts through the carefully constructed mythology of 2018. Whatever further evidence establishes about the knowledge of particular individuals, it points to a truth that extends far beyond cricket. When institutions create the conditions for misconduct but punish only those caught enacting it, scapegoating does not correct systemic failure. It is one of the main ways the system protects itself.

Bibliography

Cricket Australia. “Reviews Published into Cricket Culture.” cricket.com.au, 29 October 2018. [cricket.com.au]

Cricket Australia. “All 42 Culture Review Recommendations.” cricket.com.au, 29 October 2018. [cricket.com.au]

The Ethics Centre. Australian Cricket: A Matter of Balance. Review commissioned by the Board of Cricket Australia, October 2018. [sportnz.org.nz]

The Ethics Centre. “Cricket Australia: A Matter of Balance.” The review records its central finding that CA had developed a culture of “winning without counting the costs”. [ethics.org.au]

The Ethics Centre. “Renewing the Culture of Cricket in Australia.” 26 November 2019. [ethics.org.au]

Khawaja, Usman. Sabr. Autobiography, forthcoming at the date of this article, with publication scheduled for 10 November 2026. The Sandpapergate claims discussed above derive from material released ahead of publication. [smh.com.au]

Sydney Morning Herald. “It was all of us: Khawaja blows the whistle on more sandpaper use in South Africa in 2018.” 7 November 2026. This is the principal published source for Khawaja’s account of the dressing-room discussions and alleged use of sandpaper at Port Elizabeth. [smh.com.au]

ESPN. “‘It was all of us’ — Khawaja exposes sandpaper details from 2018.” 6 November 2026. [espn.com]

The Guardian. “‘It was all of us’: Khawaja says entire Australia team knew about sandpaper ball tampering plot.” 7 November 2026.

Reuters. “Khawaja denies throwing ‘anyone under the bus’ with comments about ball-tampering scandal.” 8 November 2026. [reuters.com]

Grenfell Britain: An insider’s indictment that stops at the threshold of socialism

A record of class contempt

The forthcoming Grenfell Britain: Greed, Power and a National Tragedy by Emma Dent Coad promises to be a powerful indictment of the social relations that produced the Grenfell Tower fire and of the political establishment that has denied justice to its victims ever since. Dent Coad stands in a unique relationship to the events. She was elected Labour MP for Kensington only four days before the fire of 14 June 2017, lived close to the tower and had already spent years as a councillor opposing the policies pursued by the Conservative-controlled Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The publisher presents the book as both an act of witness and an examination of what Grenfell reveals about Britain as a whole.

That starting point is entirely justified. Grenfell cannot be understood as an isolated building failure or even as the product merely of individual corruption, bureaucratic incompetence and corporate dishonesty. Seventy-two people died in a disaster whose essential conditions had been created over decades through deregulation, privatisation, attacks on council housing, cuts to fire services and the subordination of elementary human needs to property speculation and corporate profit. The final Grenfell Tower Inquiry report acknowledged that every death was avoidable and documented extensive failures extending through government, construction companies, manufacturers and the institutions supposedly responsible for protecting residents.

The term that best describes these processes was supplied nearly two centuries ago by Friedrich Engels: social murder. In The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845), Engels used the concept to describe how society knowingly places workers in circumstances that prematurely destroy their lives and then permits those circumstances to continue. The concept matters because it rejects attempts to separate individual catastrophes from the social order that produces them. The World Socialist Web Site applied this analysis to Grenfell immediately, and the Anatomy of the Grenfell Tower fire address delivered at the Socialist Equality Party’s August 2017 public meeting traced the disaster through the interconnected processes of deregulation, austerity, property speculation and the degradation of social housing. [wsws.org]

Evidence since then has vindicated that assessment. The inquiry’s final report found what the World Socialist Web Site described as “systematic dishonesty” among companies connected with the refurbishment, including efforts to manipulate testing, misrepresent data and conceal the dangers associated with products used in the tower. At the same time, government departments had failed over many years to respond adequately to warnings about combustible materials on high-rise buildings. [wsws.org]

What makes Dent Coad’s intervention potentially valuable is that she approaches these processes not as an outside commentator but as somebody who witnessed the extraordinary gulf separating two Kensingtons. On one side stand enormous concentrations of property wealth, luxury housing and some of the richest households in Britain. On the other are council tenants, low-paid workers and families struggling for decent housing in what the publisher itself describes as a broader housing crisis. The publicity for Grenfell Britain explicitly connects the disaster to unsafe housing, empty luxury developments and the continuing domination of housing policy by wealth and privilege.

Grenfell exposed this class divide with almost unbearable clarity. Residents had repeatedly warned of the dangers confronting them. The Grenfell Action Group’s warnings before the fire are now notorious. The failure was therefore not principally one of insufficient knowledge. Those with institutional authority possessed warnings and evidence, while those without power were treated as troublesome obstacles. As the inquiry’s own findings later showed, avoidable danger coexisted with corporate cost-cutting and government failure.

This is precisely why Grenfell cannot be reduced to the language of “lessons learned”. The facts point towards something far more fundamental: a social order in which the accumulation of private wealth takes precedence over the safety and dignity of working people. The facts Dent Coad assembles point towards a conclusion the working class of Grenfell had already reached by bitter experience.

The limits of the parliamentary perspective

The fundamental political problem posed by Dent Coad’s account, however, is the contradiction between the devastating character of the evidence and the parliamentary Labour framework within which its author has historically operated. Grenfell does not simply indict Conservative politicians, corrupt companies or an unusually callous local authority. It raises an unavoidable question about the Labour Party and the entire political system through which capitalist interests have been defended.

Dent Coad’s personal record of opposition to Kensington and Chelsea Council deserves serious treatment. But individual sincerity cannot resolve the historical problem Labour itself represents. Grenfell took place after decades in which Conservative and Labour governments successively deregulated the economy, expanded the power of private capital, facilitated the financialisation of housing and subordinated local government to austerity and market mechanisms. In its assessment of the inquiry report, the World Socialist Web Site noted that the inquiry itself identified governmental failures stretching through both Conservative and Labour administrations, while failing to impose genuine political accountability on the leading figures responsible. [wsws.org]

Jeremy Corbyn’s experience is decisive in this respect. Corbyn’s election as Labour leader generated enormous expectations among workers and young people who saw his leadership as a chance to reverse decades of Blairism, austerity and war. Yet the political orientation remained centred upon transforming the Labour Party and achieving social change through Parliament rather than constructing an independent revolutionary movement of the working class. Grenfell itself exposed the consequences of this orientation.

The World Socialist Web Site repeatedly warned that Labour’s participation in the government-established Grenfell Inquiry risked subordinating popular demands for justice to institutions incapable of providing it. A 2018 report on a Justice4Grenfell meeting noted that Dent Coad participated alongside figures from the trade-union movement in pressuring the official inquiry and existing institutions. Another WSWS assessment in 2019 argued that Labour and its allies were legitimising an inquiry that could not itself establish criminal liability. [wsws.org]

The issue was never whether individual Labour politicians genuinely sympathised with the bereaved or regarded the conduct of the council and corporations with disgust. The more fundamental question was whether justice could be secured through the very state institutions responsible for maintaining the economic and political structures that produced Grenfell. It could not.

The 2019 general election supplied another bitter lesson. Dent Coad lost Kensington after having secured the historically Conservative constituency in 2017. But Labour’s defeat cannot seriously be explained simply through electoral arithmetic. Corbyn’s leadership retreated repeatedly before Labour’s right wing and refused to mobilise the enormous movement that had emerged around his leadership in a political struggle against the party’s Blairite apparatus. The result was not the transformation of Labour into an instrument of socialist politics but the preparation of conditions for restoring the party’s openly pro-business leadership. Grenfell therefore poses the question that parliamentary reformism cannot answer: what happens when the institutions the working class is told to appeal to are themselves structurally integrated into the defence of capitalist property and political power?

After the Inquiry: Where is the justice?

The publication of the final Grenfell Tower Inquiry report in September 2024 demonstrated the dimensions of this contradiction. It identified extensive failings and corporate wrongdoing, yet years after the disaster, criminal accountability had still not followed. The Grenfell Tower fire public inquiry’s final whitewash noted that the inquiry had no power to determine criminal or civil liability and that, when the report appeared, the Metropolitan Police had not arrested or charged anyone in connection with the disaster.

The subsequent After the Grenfell Fire inquiry: Where are the arrests? drew out the political implications. Its central argument was that Grenfell involved identifiable decisions made under conditions in which profit and commercial advantage were treated as more important than working-class safety. The inquiry documented regulatory failures, corporate dishonesty and the ability of private businesses to exploit a weakened regulatory regime, yet justice remained deferred. [wsws.org]

This continued under the Labour government elected in 2024. The final inquiry report appeared under Keir Starmer’s premiership. Starmer apologised on behalf of the British state and said that the disaster should never have happened. Still, the response did not overturn the basic conditions that had allowed political responsibility to be evaded. The WSWS noted at the time that the government promised to consider the inquiry’s recommendations, while accountability through prosecutions remained unresolved.

There could be little more devastating evidence of the inadequacy of the proposition that institutional exposure automatically produces justice. Grenfell has been investigated, reconstructed, analysed, documented and memorialised. Parliamentary statements have been delivered. Political apologies have been issued. Thousands of pages of inquiry evidence have entered the historical record. Yet the fundamental issue raised by the bereaved and survivors from the outset remains. Justice has not followed automatically from truth. Nor has the housing crisis that gave rise to Grenfell disappeared. Indeed, the publicity for Dent Coad’s forthcoming book makes precisely this argument. Grenfell Britain is promoted as asking why, if Grenfell failed to change everything, the conditions surrounding housing inequality and insecurity remain embedded in British society.

This is the question the book must ultimately confront. But the answer cannot finally be found by demanding that the existing political establishment behave differently. The persistence of the conditions exposed at Grenfell is not simply a failure of political will. It expresses social interests.

Grenfell and the logic of capitalism

Housing under capitalism possesses a fundamental contradiction. For the working class it is a basic social necessity. For capital, it is property, an investment, an asset class, and a source of rent, interest, and speculative wealth. In London this contradiction reaches grotesque proportions. Homes exist simultaneously as places where human beings must live and as financial instruments whose profitability may depend on restricting supply, increasing rents, or maximising land values.

Public housing represented, however partially and inadequately, an intrusion of social need into this logic. This is why its destruction became a central component of the neoliberal offensive associated with the Thatcher governments and why subsequent administrations never reversed that offensive. Council estates sitting upon enormously valuable London land occupy territory whose potential exchange value is regarded by developers, banks and investors as being squandered when it provides secure and affordable accommodation to working people. Grenfell stood at the geographical centre of this social antagonism.

The disaster therefore cannot be answered by regulatory rearrangement alone, necessary though rigorous safety regulation unquestionably is. Regulations operating within a society dominated by private profit are under continual pressure from the corporations they regulate. Housing remains shaped by the power of landowners, banks, developers and construction conglomerates. Local authorities operate amid financial constraints imposed from above. Governments of every political colouration insist that the commanding heights of economic life must remain privately owned.

This is why the concept of social murder remains indispensable. It shifts attention from individual wickedness towards the social structure that continuously reproduces conditions in which preventable suffering becomes normal. That does not absolve individuals or corporations of responsibility. On the contrary, those responsible for criminal conduct must be held accountable. But prosecution, however necessary, cannot by itself eliminate the economic system that generates the same conflict between private profit and social need in another form.

What is to be done

The great merit of Emma Dent Coad’s proposed indictment is therefore also the source of the political questions it must raise. If Grenfell demonstrates the consequences of corporate greed, political cowardice and class privilege; if successive governments allowed conditions to emerge in which working-class lives could be subordinated to commercial interests; if official investigations can document devastating evidence without automatically producing justice; and if the housing crisis persists after all the pledges that Grenfell must never happen again, then what conclusion follows?

Britain cannot need merely better politicians administering the same economic system. The necessary conclusion is a break with Labourism and every conception that the machinery of capitalist government can gradually be transformed into an instrument for abolishing the power of capital. The working class requires its own independent political movement, organised internationally and armed with a socialist programme. In Britain, this means building the Socialist Equality Party as the British section of the International Committee of the Fourth International and developing independent organisations of working-class struggle that can challenge the authority of the trade-union and Labour bureaucracies.

Housing must cease to be organised primarily as a vehicle for private accumulation. The major property interests, construction conglomerates and financial institutions upon which the housing system depends must be brought under democratic public ownership and workers’ control. Housing construction, maintenance and fire safety must be planned according to social need and scientifically established standards, not the profitability requirements of investors and contractors. Vast social resources must be directed towards building high-quality council housing and making existing homes genuinely safe. That would not constitute an administrative modification of capitalism. It would mean an attack upon capitalist property relations themselves.

Grenfell’s residents did not lack warnings. They did not lack intelligence. They did not lack determination. They did not lack evidence. Long before the fire they understood the danger facing them, and after the catastrophe survivors, relatives and residents refused to allow the dead to disappear beneath official condolences and public-relations exercises. What they lacked, and what the working class continues to lack, is political power.

Grenfell’s enduring significance lies here. The tower stands not merely as the site of a terrible disaster but as an indictment of an entire social order. No inquiry report can resolve that indictment, because the decisive question lies beyond any inquiry’s jurisdiction: which class controls society, and in whose interests are its immense resources organised? The answer to social murder is not another promise that capitalism will regulate itself more carefully. It is socialism.

Bibliography

Dent Coad, Emma. Grenfell Britain: Greed, Power and a National Tragedy. London: Verso, forthcoming 8 June 2027. The publisher description presents the book as an examination of Grenfell’s legacy and Britain’s continuing housing crisis. [penguinran…mhouse.com]

Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. 1845.

Scripps, Thomas. Anatomy of the Grenfell Tower fire. World Socialist Web Site, 22 August 2017. [wsws.org]

Scripps, Thomas. After the Grenfell Fire inquiry: Where are the arrests?. World Socialist Web Site, 12 September 2024. [wsws.org]

Stevens, Robert. Grenfell Tower fire public inquiry delivers its final whitewash. World Socialist Web Site, 4 September 2024.

Stevens, Robert. Labour and unions seek to corral social anger over Grenfell fire behind official inquiry. World Socialist Web Site, 20 June 2018. [wsws.org]

Stevens, Robert. Grenfell fire anniversary used by pseudo-left to boost Labour and Corbyn. World Socialist Web Site, 17 June 2019. [wsws.org]

Stevens, Robert. Grenfell Tower to be dismantled: Why is there still no justice?. World Socialist Web Site, 11 February 2025. [wsws.org]

Packing the Library: Fifty Years of Books and the Struggle for Marxism

A personal library assembled over fifty years is more than a collection of books. It is a material record of intellectual and political development. Moving it to new premises marks the beginning of another stage in a writing project rooted in the history of Marxism, the Trotskyist movement, and the struggle to understand the great revolutionary experiences of the working class.

Over the coming months I will begin packing up my library and moving it into premises more commensurate with its size. A conservative estimate puts the collection at around 2,000 volumes, accumulated over half a century. What might appear from the outside as the relatively mundane business of boxing books, moving shelves and reorganising a workspace has inevitably assumed a more personal and political significance.

To dismantle a library is to excavate one’s own intellectual history. Books encountered decades ago reappear. Forgotten arguments return. The circumstances under which particular works were bought suddenly return. Each shelf corresponds to a period of life and, in my case, to a stage in a political development that began in a London comprehensive school during the 1970s and proceeded, through more than one false start and political dead end, towards Marxism and Trotskyism.

I never assembled the library primarily for possession’s sake. I have never regarded myself as a bibliophile in the conventional sense. These books were acquired because I wanted to understand something: why society takes the form it does, why capitalism has survived despite the suffering and inequality it produces, why revolutionary movements have succeeded or failed, why Stalinism arose in the Soviet Union, and above all how the experiences of previous generations of workers and revolutionaries bear upon the problems confronting the working class today. That process began not with Marx, Lenin or Trotsky, but with the novel.

Pimlico Comprehensive and the Working-Class Novel

The first books I bought seriously were set texts at Pimlico Comprehensive School when I was 16. Among the writers I encountered were Alan Sillitoe, Carson McCullers, Keith Waterhouse, Shelagh Delaney and Stan Barstow. They occupy only a small physical space in a library that subsequently expanded into thousands of volumes, but their intellectual significance was considerable.

These writers emerged from, or sought to represent, social worlds largely excluded from the respectable version of post-war society. Sillitoe’s factory workers, Delaney’s Salford, Barstow’s West Riding and the lonely and marginalised figures inhabiting McCullers’s American South opened up experiences remote from the official culture presented by newspapers, television and the political establishment.

For a working-class teenager, the effect was considerable. Literature revealed that the experiences surrounding you could themselves become the subject of serious art. But it simultaneously raised problems it could not resolve. Why were people’s lives organised in this way? Why did some possess wealth and power while others sold their labour merely to live? Why did class determine so much about an individual’s possibilities?

The best of these novels registered the human consequences of class society with extraordinary sensitivity. Still, literature by itself could not provide a scientific explanation of the social relations producing those consequences. That required an encounter with history and politics. Those first books were therefore instrumental in my movement towards the left. Half a century later, they remain on my shelves.

Militant, Stalinism and Trotsky’s History

Once politics became a serious interest, my book-buying accelerated dramatically. The Militant Tendency, then operating within the Labour Party, maintained an extensive book catalogue, and I began ordering from it with considerable enthusiasm. I eventually spent more than £1,000, a substantial sum at the time. The scale of my purchases evidently attracted someone’s attention because two young Militant members were eventually dispatched to my door to recruit me.

My membership lasted approximately six months. The promise of socialism attracted me. What proved inadequate was Militant’s political perspective, centred on transforming the Labour Party into an instrument for socialist change. The organisation treated the existing labour movement as a vehicle through which socialism would somehow emerge, rather than subjecting it to the historical and political examination its own record demanded.

The books survived my membership. Most remain in the library. I subsequently joined the Communist Party of Great Britain, searching again for a political organisation capable of explaining capitalism and providing a strategy for its overthrow. That experience lasted another six months. It was enough. There is perhaps some historical justice in the fact that, while the library contains materials from virtually every other period of my political development, it contains no books from my brief membership of the Stalinist Communist Party.

The decisive intellectual influence of these years came from an entirely different political tradition. At 17 I read Leon Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution. Few books I have encountered subsequently have equalled its impact. Here history was no longer presented principally as the actions of governments, ministers and celebrated individuals. Trotsky reconstructed revolution as a living process in which millions of human beings entered history consciously.

The events of 1917 emerged neither as a conspiracy nor as the inevitable outcome of impersonal forces. The Russian Revolution was presented as an immense confrontation of classes, parties and programmes, in which objective conditions created revolutionary possibilities but political leadership ultimately determined whether those possibilities were realised. Trotsky’s work demonstrated what Marxist historical writing could achieve. It united the reconstruction of events with an analysis of the class forces underlying them and, above all, with an understanding of the decisive role of revolutionary consciousness and leadership.

The implications extended far beyond 1917. If the October Revolution represented the working class’s conscious seizure of power under Bolshevik leadership, then Stalinism could not be identified with Bolshevism. The bureaucratic regime that subsequently emerged required a historical explanation. Trotsky provided that explanation through his struggle against the degeneration of the Soviet state and the nationalist doctrine of “socialism in one country”. Reading the History was therefore decisive in making me a Marxist. It also gave me an intellectual starting point for understanding why the crimes committed under Stalin represented not the fulfilment of October but its bureaucratic betrayal.

The WRP, the Redgrave Books and One Long Night

The library’s next major expansion came after I joined the Workers Revolutionary Party in 1982. My period of candidate membership lasted an entire year, which I have sometimes thought might qualify as a minor record in the history of revolutionary politics. I bought extensively during these years, and much of that material remains in the collection. The books from this period have acquired an additional historical significance because they belong to the years immediately preceding the crisis that erupted in 1985 inside the WRP and the International Committee of the Fourth International.

One of the largest single additions to my library came shortly before that split. I was told that Vanessa Redgrave was moving house and needed to dispose of a substantial quantity of books. I bought many of them. These volumes now occupy a peculiar position within the collection. Whatever their original provenance, they became part of my own intellectual history at precisely the point when major political questions concerning the history and programme of the Trotskyist movement were coming sharply to the surface.

Among the books I value most highly is a proof copy of Maria Joffe’s One Long Night. Joffe, widow of the Soviet diplomat and Left Oppositionist Adolph Joffe, endured decades of imprisonment and persecution under Stalinism. Her memoir belongs to the documentary record of the destruction of the revolutionary generation associated with October and of those who continued to resist bureaucratic reaction.

Such books matter because the struggle over historical memory is itself political. Stalinism could not consolidate its rule by physically destroying its opponents alone. It had to falsify the historical record, erase individuals from revolutionary history and transform the October Revolution into something compatible with the interests of a privileged bureaucracy. Trotskyism survived under extraordinarily difficult conditions because it defended not simply particular individuals or organisational traditions, but the international socialist programme upon which the Russian Revolution had been based.

A library containing this literature is therefore more than an accumulation of political texts. It preserves traces of struggles that the defenders of the existing order, including its Stalinist and reformist representatives, repeatedly proclaimed finished. They were not finished.

Birkbeck, the English Revolution and Historical Writing

The library’s largest sustained expansion began with my studies at Birkbeck and the completion of my degree in 2003. At that point another strand of intellectual development became central: the seventeenth-century English Revolution.

I had written a dissertation on the subject which, with the benefit of hindsight, was not particularly good. But dissatisfaction can sometimes have more productive consequences than satisfaction. The attempt to find somewhere for my essays eventually contributed to the creation of my website and, from there, to a much more sustained programme of historical reading and writing.

The consequences for the bookshelves were dramatic. Probably around half of the present collection, roughly a thousand books, dates from this broad period. The shelves expanded to encompass the English Revolution, the Civil War, the Levellers and other radical movements, the development of Parliament, religious and political conflict, and the immense historiographical controversies surrounding the seventeenth century.

But the subject could never be confined to the seventeenth century itself. Serious study of the English Revolution raises fundamental questions about historical interpretation. Was it a revolution? What social forces produced it? What relationship existed between political and religious ideas and the material interests of contending classes? How should we understand the Levellers and other radical currents? What was the upheaval’s international significance?

Behind these questions lay the still larger issue of historical materialism.

The study of history is never politically innocent. The assault upon Marxist interpretations of the English Revolution did not take place independently of the broader ideological offensive against Marxism during the closing decades of the twentieth century. Historical controversies reflected, in mediated form, the political climate produced by the defeats of the working class, the degeneration of the old labour organisations and eventually the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

My library’s expansion consequently followed the development of these controversies. Books led to other books. Footnotes opened previously unknown arguments. Historiographical disagreements demanded investigation of the political assumptions underlying apparently specialised academic disputes. What began with a relatively poor undergraduate dissertation gradually became a continuing engagement with the relationship between historical scholarship and contemporary politics.

Books as the Material Record of a Political Development

Seen together, the 2,000 volumes therefore amount to something quite different from a conventional private collection. The Sillitoe and Delaney volumes bought as a schoolboy belong to the discovery that working-class experience could become a legitimate subject of literature. Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution belongs to the discovery that those experiences could be scientifically understood as part of the historical struggle of classes. The literature accumulated through Militant, the Communist Party and the WRP records the search for a political movement capable of acting upon that understanding. The books acquired after Birkbeck record another development: the attempt to write history rather than consume it.

False starts marked that journey. Some books were undoubtedly bought and deserved to remain unread, and others were read more carefully than they deserved. Political development never proceeds in the straight line imposed upon it retrospectively. One investigates tendencies that lead nowhere, accepts arguments subsequently rejected, and only gradually acquires the historical experience necessary to distinguish what is essential from what is secondary. The value of a serious political library lies partly in the fact that it preserves these stages rather than concealing them.

Artificial Intelligence and a New Stage

The most recent development introduces another element into this history. Artificial intelligence has altered the technical conditions under which an individual can undertake historical and political research. Like every major technological innovation under capitalism, AI is developing within definite class relations. Corporations and governments approach it, above all, from the standpoint of profitability, labour displacement, surveillance, competitive advantage, and the intensification of exploitation. There is nothing inherently emancipatory about technology operating within capitalist property relations. But a Marxist response does not consist of recoiling from technological development. The productive forces created by capitalism repeatedly come into conflict with the social relations within which they develop. The task is to understand both technology’s emancipatory potential and the class interests that determine its present use.

For an individual engaged in historical research, the possibilities are already considerable. Vast quantities of material can be searched and compared far more rapidly than previously. Bibliographical trails can be followed more efficiently. Arguments drawn from different periods and historiographical traditions can be related to one another. Research that once required weeks of preliminary investigation can sometimes be organised in a fraction of that time. That does not abolish the necessity for knowledge. On the contrary, the ability to evaluate material becomes more important. A machine can locate relationships between texts, but it cannot substitute for the political and historical understanding required to determine which relationships matter, which claims withstand examination and what social interests underlie competing interpretations.

After fifty years of reading, that distinction is crucial. For the first time, I feel able to research and write articles at a level approaching the political and historical understanding accumulated through decades of reading and political experience. AI has not produced that understanding. The books did. Political experience did. Historical study did. The technology makes it possible to mobilise that accumulated knowledge with a speed and breadth that were previously extraordinarily difficult for an individual writer working largely alone.

The Library as a Working Archive

This is the significance of moving the library. Over the coming months, the books will be packed, transported and reorganised in a small office where they can function properly as a working research collection. The change is practical, but it also marks the start of a new stage in the website’s development. The intention is not to preserve the collection as a monument to fifty years of reading. Libraries become intellectually useless when they become mausoleums. Books justify the space they occupy when they continue to be read, questioned, compared and used.

The shelves that began with Sillitoe, Delaney, Barstow and McCullers at Pimlico Comprehensive eventually acquired Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky; the documentary history of the Russian Revolution and its degeneration; the literature of the Fourth International; materials from the WRP years; and an extensive collection dealing with the English Revolution, its radical movements and the historiographical battles through which its meaning has been contested.

What links them is not uniformity, because they contain writers representing every conceivable political and historical standpoint. What unites the collection is the struggle to understand history. Moving 2,000 books will be physically exhausting. But politically and intellectually the move represents precisely the opposite of winding things down. It prepares me for more work. The books accumulated through fifty years of reading are no longer simply the record of how I arrived at my present standpoint. Properly organised and combined with the possibilities opened by new technology, they can become the working archive for a considerably expanded programme of historical and political writing.

The journey that began with working-class novels read at Pimlico Comprehensive, passed through the first encounter with Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution, the experiences of the revolutionary movement, and decades spent studying the English Revolution, therefore continues. Packing the library is not an act of putting the past away. It prepares for what comes next.

Kensington and Chelsea: An insider’s indictment that stops at the threshold of a socialist conclusion

Few places expose the class divisions of British capitalism more brutally than the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. Here fabulous private wealth exists alongside overcrowding, hunger and social deprivation. Within a relatively small area, multimillion-pound properties and apartments that function primarily as repositories of international wealth stand close to council estates whose residents have endured deteriorating services, insecurity, and decades of political neglect. These are not simply contrasting social worlds accidentally occupying the same geographical space. They are interconnected products of a society in which housing and land have increasingly been subordinated to private profit, property speculation and the accumulation of wealth.[1]

These contradictions acquired their most terrible expression on 14 June 2017, when the Grenfell Tower fire killed 72 people. Grenfell was not an inexplicable accident that suddenly descended upon an otherwise functioning social system. It exposed before millions of people the consequences of decades in which council housing, building regulation, local government and public services had been progressively subjected to austerity, privatisation, outsourcing and the requirements of the market. The catastrophe revealed, with terrible clarity, the social consequences of a political order in which the living conditions and safety of working-class residents were repeatedly subordinated to financial considerations.

This social landscape gives Emma Dent Coad’s One Kensington its considerable importance. A Labour councillor in Kensington and Chelsea from 2006, Dent Coad was elected MP for Kensington in the general election of 8 June 2017, only days before the Grenfell catastrophe. The tower stood at the end of her road. Her book consequently occupies an unusual position between eyewitness testimony, political memoir and an indictment of one of Britain’s wealthiest local authorities. Its strongest passages provide an invaluable account of the arrogance, indifference, and class contempt working-class residents encountered while trying to secure safe housing and decent public services.

But the book also contains a fundamental contradiction. The evidence Dent Coad accumulates points toward an indictment of the social order itself. At the same time, her political conclusions remain largely within the framework of Labourism, parliamentary reform, and improved local government. One Kensington comes repeatedly to the threshold of a socialist explanation of the conditions that produced Grenfell, only to retreat from the conclusions demanded by its own evidence.

A record of class contempt

The most compelling sections of One Kensington concern the everyday operation of class power. Dent Coad describes not merely incompetent administration but an entire political culture in which social tenants and working-class communities were increasingly seen as obstacles to redeveloping enormously valuable land. North Kensington residents lived in the same borough as billionaires, international investors and owners of extraordinarily expensive properties, some of which were rarely occupied. Yet immense accumulated wealth did nothing to guarantee decent housing, secure public services, or provide basic social protection for everyone living in the borough.

This is precisely why the personal attitudes of Conservative councillors cannot adequately explain the inequalities documented in the book, however contemptuous those attitudes may have been. Kensington’s extreme inequalities express the workings of the property market itself. The extraordinary rise in London land and housing values turned residential property into a major vehicle for accumulating and preserving wealth. Working-class communities therefore occupied homes standing on land that became increasingly attractive to developers and investors. Under these conditions, the language of “regeneration” acquired a definite class meaning: council estates could be represented as obsolete, existing communities disrupted and public land opened to forms of development from which those communities derived little or no benefit.

Dent Coad is particularly effective when demonstrating how these processes appeared at street and council level. Her background in architecture and housing gives her account an understanding of the relationship between planning decisions and social inequality. Food poverty, overcrowding, deteriorating estates and divisions in health and life expectancy appear throughout the book not as abstractions but as features of everyday existence within a borough internationally associated with extreme wealth. The result is a powerful documentary charge sheet against both Kensington and Chelsea Council and the broader social priorities it embodied.

Grenfell transformed that charge sheet into something still more serious. The working-class residents who repeatedly raised concerns about their homes were not suffering from a simple failure of communication between government and governed. Their experience demonstrated how little weight their needs carried when measured against the financial, commercial and political priorities governing housing. This is why Grenfell must be understood not only as administrative negligence but as a class question.

Grenfell and social murder

Friedrich Engels famously employed the concept of “social murder” in The Condition of the Working Class in England to describe circumstances in which existing social relations knowingly condemn working people to premature death. The concept remains indispensable to understanding Grenfell because it moves discussion beyond the narrow search for a single catastrophic mistake. It directs attention towards the accumulated political and economic decisions that created the conditions in which catastrophe became possible.

Grenfell emerged from a historical process encompassing deregulation, outsourcing, the degradation of council housing, the fragmentation of responsibility and the increasing subordination of construction and housing to commercial interests. Individual decisions plainly mattered, as did questions of corporate and institutional responsibility, but those decisions were taken within a society dominated by the capitalist market. The tragedy cannot therefore be explained simply by saying that Kensington and Chelsea happened to be run by unusually callous Conservatives.

This is where the evidence presented in One Kensington begins to exceed the author’s own political framework. Dent Coad’s account describes a system operating according to recognisable class interests, but her proposed political remedies remain centred upon reforming the institutions through which that system operates. The contradiction becomes increasingly difficult to ignore as the book proceeds.

The limits of the parliamentary perspective

Dent Coad’s political horizon remains fundamentally that of Labour reformism. The principal enemy is Conservative-controlled Kensington and Chelsea, while the alternative is sought through community campaigning, progressive councillors, better MPs and the election of a Labour government committed to different priorities. The enthusiasm surrounding Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership forms an important part of this perspective. Yet Corbynism itself showed the limits of trying to channel mounting social opposition through the existing Labour and parliamentary apparatus.

The problem is not that better councillors, stronger regulations or more socially conscious MPs would make no difference. Reforms improving housing conditions and building safety should obviously be supported. The deeper question is why such elementary requirements continually collide with powerful economic interests. A council may regulate property development more aggressively than another; Parliament may enact improved building standards; governments may impose stricter requirements upon landlords and construction companies. Yet none of these measures abolishes the underlying contradiction between housing as a basic human necessity and housing as private property, a financial asset, and a source of profit.

Dent Coad’s political conclusions largely ignore that contradiction. Conservative mismanagement consequently becomes the explanation for conditions that developed under governments of both major parties. The Blair and Brown governments did not overturn the market transformation initiated under Thatcher. New Labour accommodated the essential economic framework created in the preceding decades, extending private-sector involvement in public services while accepting the market’s dominance over housing and land.

Corbynism and the unanswered political question

The election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader in 2015 expressed a genuine movement to the left among workers and young people after decades of austerity, war, privatisation and declining living standards. This social movement played a major role in Labour’s unexpectedly strong performance in the 2017 general election and in Dent Coad’s remarkable victory in Kensington. A constituency synonymous with wealth and Conservative power returned a Labour MP, apparently demonstrating the potential for a radical political realignment.

But the subsequent defeat of Corbynism exposed the fatal weakness of its perspective. Rather than building an independent political movement against the Labour right and the social forces it represented, Corbyn insisted that the Labour Party could be reconciled around a parliamentary road to reform. Repeated compromises strengthened his opponents while disorienting his supporters. Dent Coad’s loss of Kensington in 2019 by just 150 votes formed part of the broader defeat.

For One Kensington, this experience should have raised the most fundamental question: if the Labour Party could not be transformed even under conditions in which hundreds of thousands joined or supported it in the expectation of radical change, what basis remained for believing that the working class could achieve a fundamental social transformation through Labour parliamentarianism? The book never seriously answers this question. Instead, Labour’s defeat appears principally as a political setback rather than evidence requiring a reassessment of the party itself.

From indictment to socialist programme

One Kensington nevertheless deserves to be read. Dent Coad’s eyewitness evidence, accumulated detail and anger over the treatment of working-class residents give the book lasting value. She records a borough where immense concentrations of wealth existed alongside poverty, overcrowding and insecurity, and she shows the extraordinary distance between official rhetoric about community and the experiences of those forced to negotiate the institutions supposedly responsible for protecting them.

But the power of that testimony makes the weakness of the political conclusions still more apparent. The central question is not whether Kensington and Chelsea could be administered more compassionately. Clearly it could. Nor is it whether stronger building regulations, competent housing management, more council housing and genuine democratic accountability are urgently required. They are. The decisive issue is why these basic social requirements repeatedly conflict with the interests of private property.

Safe and decent housing for all cannot ultimately be guaranteed while housing remains subordinated to profit and speculation. The construction industry, major developers, land and essential building-material production cannot remain instruments of private enrichment. At the same time, society is expected somehow to guarantee that human need takes priority over financial return. The major corporations dominating these sectors must be placed under public ownership and democratic working-class control. At the same time, housing itself must cease to function primarily as a commodity and speculative asset and become a guaranteed social right.

Such measures inevitably raise the question that One Kensington avoids: political power. They cannot be realised merely by replacing bad administrators with good ones while preserving the economic relations determining what local and national governments can do. They require the independent political organisation of the working class based on an international socialist programme directed against capitalism itself.

The working people of North Kensington were never lacking courage. They were never lacking warnings, intelligence, solidarity or organisation. Before Grenfell, residents repeatedly tried to make their voices heard; afterwards, bereaved families, survivors, and the wider community showed extraordinary determination in demanding truth and accountability. Their tragedy was not the absence of community activism. It was the absence of a political movement capable of transforming that social anger into an independent struggle against the class interests responsible for the conditions they confronted.

That is ultimately the contradiction at the heart of One Kensington. Dent Coad provides an insider’s indictment of a profoundly unequal society, and much of the evidence she presents is devastating. But her politics remain tied to the institutions and the Labour Party through which that society has been administered. Her evidence points beyond municipal reform, parliamentary manoeuvre and hopes for another Labour renewal. It points to the need for independent political mobilisation of the working class and the socialist reorganisation of society. The book takes the reader to that threshold, but it does not cross it.

Bibliography

Dent Coad, Emma. One Kensington: Tales from the Frontline of the Most Unequal Borough in Britain. London: Quercus, 2022; paperback edition, 2023.

Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. 1845.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 Report. London: HMSO, 2019.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 2 Report. London: HMSO, 2024.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. 1848.


[1] One Kensington: Tales from the Frontline of the Most Unequal Borough in Britain, by Emma Dent Coad, Quercus, 2022; paperback edition, 2023.