The Financial Times discovers the football terrace: Janan Ganesh’s “Man City theory of politics”

Abstract

This article examines Janan Ganesh’s recent Financial Times column, “The Man City theory of politics,” as an ideological artefact of late‑capitalist political commentary. Ganesh’s argument that contemporary political allegiance is best understood through the lens of football fandom exemplifies a broader trend within liberal‑bourgeois discourse: the displacement of structural analysis by psychological and cultural metaphors. By situating Ganesh’s intervention within the political economy of financialised sport, the transformation of social‑democratic parties, and the long history of “tribalism” as an explanatory device, this article argues that such frameworks function to obscure the class dynamics of political disaffection. The piece concludes by situating current mass movements within a Marxist theory of consciousness and crisis.

The ideological function of sporting metaphors

Sporting metaphors in political commentary are not new. Ganesh’s column distinguishes itself by claiming that football fandom provides the primary model for understanding political behaviour in the early twenty‑first century. He suggests voters behave like supporters: motivated by identity rather than argument, impervious to evidence, and loyal to their “side” regardless of its conduct. The argument is presented with the stylistic fluency characteristic of Ganesh’s work, but its political function is more significant than its rhetorical polish. It exemplifies a recurring tendency within the liberal commentariat: interpreting political alienation as a failure of mass rationality rather than a product of structural crisis.

This displacement from political economy to psychology is a hallmark of bourgeois ideology in periods of systemic instability. It allows commentators to maintain the fiction of a fundamentally rational social order while pathologising those who reject it. In this respect, Ganesh’s intervention belongs to a long lineage of liberal sociological explanation, one that treats political disaffection as a cognitive or cultural deficiency rather than as a rational response to deteriorating material conditions. The football terrace metaphor is simply the latest iteration of this ideological manoeuvre.

The analytical problem with such frameworks is not merely their superficiality but their systematic exclusion of the structural determinants of political behaviour. Treating voters as football fans brackets out the economic transformations that have reshaped political consciousness over the last four decades: stagnant real wages, the erosion of social provision, the transfer of vast public resources to the financial sector, and the militarisation of state budgets. These developments are not incidental background conditions but the central forces driving political realignment. The “tribalism” thesis functions by rendering them invisible.

Moreover, the sporting metaphor obscures the class character of political institutions themselves. Football fandom is presented as spontaneous, irrational loyalty, but the modern elite game, particularly at Manchester City, is a product of financialisation, oligarchic ownership, and global capital flows. The analogy thus collapses under its own weight. If voters behave like football supporters, then the political parties they support increasingly resemble the clubs they are asked to identify with: hollowed‑out brands owned and operated by forces entirely external to the communities they claim to represent. The metaphor inadvertently reveals more than Ganesh intends.

From a Marxist perspective, the appeal to “tribalism” is best understood as an ideological response to the crisis of bourgeois hegemony. As Antonio Gramsci observed, ruling classes confronted with declining legitimacy often resort to cultural or psychological explanations for political instability. These explanations naturalise the existing order by depicting dissent as irrational, emotional, or pre‑political. They also delegitimise alternative political movements by framing them as expressions of identity rather than responses to objective conditions.

The problem with Ganesh’s argument is therefore not simply that it is empirically thin, but that it reproduces a conceptual framework designed to foreclose structural analysis. It treats political behaviour as affective attachment rather than a historically conditioned response to crisis. In doing so, it reinforces the Financial Times’ ideological position: that the political order remains fundamentally sound, and that the challenge lies in managing the electorate’s irrational impulses.

A more adequate analysis would start from the opposite premise: that material conditions shape political consciousness, and that the erosion of traditional party loyalties reflects the breakdown of the post‑Cold War political settlement. Workers are not becoming more tribal; they are confronting a political system that no longer offers them meaningful representation. We must understand the rise of new political formations, whether reactionary or progressive, in this context.

Ganesh’s column thus serves as a symptomatic text. It reveals the anxieties of a ruling class confronted with the disintegration of its ideological authority, and it deploys the familiar tools of liberal commentary to explain that disintegration away. The sporting metaphor is not an innocent flourish. It is an ideological device that substitutes psychology for political economy, sentiment for structure, and pathology for critique.

Manchester City and the political economy of elite sport

Ganesh’s choice of Manchester City is analytically revealing. Since the Abu Dhabi ruling family acquired the club in 2008, Manchester City has become a paradigmatic example of the financialisation of elite sport. It functions simultaneously as a prestige asset, a node within a global sovereign‑wealth network, and the flagship of City Football Group’s multinational portfolio. Its competitive success cannot be separated from football’s structural transformation into a globalised entertainment commodity. Several interlocking processes characterise this transformation: the inflation of transfer markets to levels unimaginable even two decades ago; the systematic pricing‑out of traditional working‑class supporters who once constituted the social base of the sport; the conversion of clubs into vehicles for oligarchic, private‑equity and state capital; and the juridification of competition through increasingly complex financial regulations, arbitration procedures and litigation. Manchester City is not merely an illustrative case but a concentrated expression of these tendencies.

This example matters not only for what it reveals about football but also for the parallel it exposes with developments in the political sphere. Over the same period, the historic parties of the capitalist class- Labour in Britain, the Democratic Party in the United States, Germany’s SPD, and France’s Socialist Party- underwent their own form of financialisation. They retained their traditional symbols, organisational shells and rhetorical markers, but abandoned the reformist programmes that once linked them to sections of the working class. Banks, the military-intelligence apparatus, and the transnational corporate elite effectively took ownership. The parties continued to present themselves as vehicles of popular representation, but their internal structures, policy agendas, and funding networks increasingly reflected capital’s interests rather than labour’s.

The parallel between football clubs and political parties is precise. Both have been hollowed out, repurposed and rebranded. Both rely on maintaining sentimental loyalties among their respective publics, supporters in one case, voters in the other, while no longer representing the material interests of those constituencies. In both domains, the outward continuity of symbols masks a profound transformation of ownership, purpose and class function. The modern football club and the modern centre‑left party are institutions whose legitimacy depends on identities rendered historically obsolete by structural change.

From an academic perspective, this parallel invites a broader reflection on the political economy of representation under late capitalism. The financialisation of football is not an isolated cultural phenomenon but part of a wider process in which previously embedded social institutions are transformed into assets within global circuits of capital. The same logic applies to political parties, which have shifted from mass organisations rooted in specific class constituencies to professionalised entities integrated into state and corporate networks. The erosion of democratic participation, declining party membership, and the rise of technocratic governance are not merely political trends but symptoms of this deeper structural reconfiguration.

Ganesh’s invocation of Manchester City thus inadvertently illuminates the very dynamics his column seeks to obscure. By framing political allegiance as irrational fandom, he shifts attention away from the structural processes that have hollowed out political institutions and generated widespread disaffection. The football metaphor, intended as a critique of voter behaviour, instead becomes a revealing analogy for the transformation of political parties themselves. The problem is not that voters behave like supporters, but that the institutions they are asked to support have been reconstructed along lines analogous to those of elite sport: commodified, financialised and detached from the communities they once served.

In this sense, the sporting metaphor is not merely inadequate but symptomatic. It reflects an ideological tendency within liberal commentary to interpret political crisis through cultural or psychological categories rather than through the material dynamics of capitalist restructuring. The hollowing out of football clubs and political parties alike is not a matter of identity or sentiment but of ownership, class power, and the global reorganisation of capital.

The “tribalism” thesis in liberal political sociology

The notion that voters behave tribally has a long pedigree in liberal political sociology. It appears in discussions of “low‑information voters,” “left‑behind communities,” and Hillary Clinton’s now‑canonical phrase “basket of deplorables.” In each case, the explanatory burden falls on the electorate’s cognitive or cultural deficiencies rather than on the structural conditions that shape political behaviour. The electorate is imagined as fragmented into affective blocs, driven by identity, resentment, or irrational loyalty, and therefore incapable of responding to political arguments rationally or deliberatively. This interpretive framework has become increasingly prominent in commentary over the last decade, serving as a convenient shorthand for explaining political volatility without confronting the deeper social transformations that underlie it.

What this framework systematically excludes is the material history of the past four decades. Since the late 1970s, the political economy of advanced capitalist societies has changed profoundly. Stagnant real wages have become a defining feature of working-class life across the OECD: productivity growth has decoupled from wage growth, while labour’s share of national income has declined. The promise of rising living standards that underpinned the post-war settlement has broken down, giving way to precarious employment, insecure housing, and declining social mobility.

At the same time, trillions have flowed to the financial oligarchy through bank bailouts, quantitative easing and other extraordinary interventions. Though justified as necessary to stabilise the financial system, these policies have inflated asset prices, enriched capital holders and widened inequality. The political consequences of this redistribution have been profound: a growing sense that the state primarily protects financial interests and that democratic institutions are structurally incapable of representing the majority.

Austerity has also shaped the period, an agenda Ganesh himself defended in his biography of George Osborne. Austerity has brought deep cuts to public services, welfare provision and local government budgets, with working-class communities bearing a disproportionate share of the impact. It has weakened social infrastructure, from libraries and youth centres to hospitals and schools. The political effects of austerity cannot be reduced to tribalism; they stem from the lived experience of social decline and institutional abandonment.

Alongside these developments, entire regions, including Manchester and its surrounding areas, have been deindustrialised. The closure of factories, mines and steelworks has not only destroyed jobs but also dismantled the social and cultural institutions that sustained working-class life. The resulting landscape of unemployment, underemployment and economic stagnation has produced political disaffection that is rational, historically grounded and structurally determined.

Finally, over the past two decades, state budgets have become increasingly militarised, with vast sums spent on war, defence procurement, and security apparatuses even as public services collapse. Prioritising military spending over social investment reflects a broader shift in state strategy: strengthening coercive capacities at the expense of welfare functions. This shift has political consequences that cannot be reduced to identity or affect; it reflects the reorientation of state power amid capitalist crisis.

To interpret political disaffection as “tribalism” is therefore to deny the rationality of working‑class responses to these conditions. It is an ideological manoeuvre that absolves the ruling class of responsibility for the crisis it has produced. By framing political behaviour as irrational, commentators can avoid confronting the structural determinants of disaffection: the erosion of living standards, the collapse of social infrastructure, the concentration of wealth, and the militarisation of state power. The tribalism thesis functions as ideological displacement, shifting attention from political economy to psychology and from class relations to cultural identity.

From a Marxist perspective, this displacement itself signals a deeper crisis of bourgeois hegemony. When the material foundations of political legitimacy erode, ruling‑class ideology increasingly relies on cultural and psychological explanations to account for political instability. The electorate is pathologised because acknowledging the rationality of its disaffection would require confronting the social order’s failures. The tribalism thesis thus naturalises the existing system by depicting dissent as irrational, emotional, or pre‑political.

In this sense, the appeal to tribalism is not merely analytically inadequate but politically functional. It reinforces the liberal commentariat’s ideological position by framing political crisis as a problem of voter psychology rather than capitalist restructuring. It protects the ruling class’s legitimacy while delegitimising the working class’s grievances.

The commentator’s vantage point: distance as ideology

Ganesh’s column adopts the stance of the detached observer, a position he has cultivated throughout his career. He describes his ideal reader as someone who watches politics from a calm distance, like a naturalist observing animal behaviour. This self‑presentation is central to his authority at the Financial Times: a cultivated impression of disinterested sophistication, a commentator who stands above the fray and surveys political conflict with anthropological curiosity. The football metaphor reinforces this posture. In Ganesh’s framing, the commentator sits in the directors’ box, insulated from the passions of the crowd below, able to interpret their behaviour precisely because he does not share it. The terrace becomes a site of irrational collective emotion, while the hospitality suite becomes a vantage point of clarity, reason and detachment.

Yet this stance is itself ideological. The claim to neutrality, distance, and dispassion describes not Ganesh’s position but a rhetorical device that conceals its political content. Ganesh is not a neutral spectator. He is a partisan of the City of London, the transatlantic financial order and the NATO‑aligned “rules‑based” international system. His columns consistently defend the institutional architecture of contemporary capitalism: fiscal orthodoxy, Atlanticist foreign policy, technocratic governance and the primacy of financial markets. His prose’s apparent detachment is therefore not a withdrawal from politics but a mode of political intervention. It lets him present the ruling class’s interests as the natural horizon of political reason.

The Financial Times itself embodies this ideological position. Its editorial line has been unwavering in its support for austerity, its defence of militarism and its hostility to strikes. It frames these positions not as expressions of partisan loyalty but as reflections of economic necessity, geopolitical realism, or institutional responsibility. The FT’s own tribalism- its alignment with the priorities of finance capital and Western strategic power- is never described as such because it is the tribalism of the ruling class. Bourgeois ideology naturalises its own commitments while pathologising those of the masses.

This dynamic is central to understanding Ganesh’s use of the football metaphor. By depicting voters as supporters driven by irrational loyalty, he implicitly contrasts their behaviour with the rationality of elite institutions. The passions of the terrace are juxtaposed with the calm deliberation of the directors’ box. But this contrast is misleading. The ruling class is no less tribal than the masses; it expresses its loyalties through different institutional forms. The commitment to fiscal austerity, for example, is not the product of dispassionate analysis but of an ideological attachment to capital’s interests. Support for NATO’s strategic posture is not a neutral assessment of global security but reflects Western elites’ geopolitical commitments. The hostility to strikes is not an objective evaluation of economic efficiency but an expression of class interest.

Ganesh’s ideological function becomes clearer when situated within the broader context of liberal political commentary. The claim to neutrality is a hallmark of bourgeois journalism, which presents its own class position as universal reason. This rhetorical strategy lets commentators delegitimise alternative political perspectives by framing them as irrational, emotional, or tribal. The working class is depicted as driven by identity, resentment or affect, while the ruling class is portrayed as guided by expertise, moderation and rationality. This asymmetry is not accidental; it is a structural feature of bourgeois ideology.

From a Marxist perspective, the problem is not merely that Ganesh misrepresents voter behaviour but that he misrepresents his own. The detachment he claims is ideological camouflage. It conceals the fact that his analysis is shaped by the interests and worldview of the class fraction he represents. The directors’ box is not a neutral vantage point; it is a site of power. The calm distance he celebrates is not a methodological virtue but a political position.

In this sense, the football metaphor is doubly revealing. It exposes the contempt with which sections of the liberal commentariat view the electorate, and it inadvertently reveals the tribalism of the ruling class itself. The passions of the terrace are pathologised, while the commitments of the boardroom are naturalised. The ideological work of Ganesh’s column lies precisely in this inversion.

Consciousness, crisis and the Marxist perspective

Marxism does not deny that identity, habit and emotion shape political consciousness. These elements form part of what Marx called the “ideological superstructure,” the ensemble of cultural and psychological forms through which individuals interpret their social world. But, as Trotsky emphasised, consciousness lags behind objective conditions and is then propelled forward by them, often violently. Political loyalties that appear stable or even innate are, in fact, historically conditioned. They reflect past stages of development and can shift rapidly when the underlying material relations change. The loyalties Ganesh treats as permanent features of human nature- tribal attachments, affective identifications, irrational solidarities- are not anthropological constants. They are historically specific and subject to abrupt reconfiguration under conditions of crisis.

This dynamic is visible in the mass movements that have emerged across Britain, Europe and the United States in recent years. The wave of strikes that has swept through transport, education, health care, logistics and manufacturing is not a tribal phenomenon. It is a rational, collective response to decades of wage suppression, deteriorating working conditions, and intensifying exploitation. Workers who may differ in nationality, race, religion or cultural identity, including football allegiance, have found common cause in struggles over pay, conditions and the defence of public services. These movements cut across the divisions the ruling class works so hard to maintain. They demonstrate that class solidarity is not an abstract ideal but an objective tendency rooted in shared material interests.

The same holds for the anti‑war demonstrations that have filled city centres from London to Berlin to New York. These mobilisations are not expressions of irrational emotion or tribal identity. They are grounded in a clear understanding of militarism’s consequences: diverting resources from social needs, escalating geopolitical conflict, and the human cost borne overwhelmingly by ordinary people. The breadth of these protests, drawing participants from diverse backgrounds and political traditions, reveals an emerging collective consciousness that transcends the narrow identities commentators like Ganesh invoke.

In both cases, what is taking shape is not tribalism but the early stages of a politically coherent response to systemic breakdown. As objective conditions deteriorate, consciousness is forced to catch up. The forms of loyalty that once anchored individuals to existing institutions- political parties, national myths, cultural identities- are eroding. In their place, new solidarities are emerging, grounded not in sentiment but in the shared experience of crisis. These movements represent the working class’s rational, collective agency in confronting a social order that can no longer meet its needs.

Conclusion: Beyond the terrace metaphor

The task is not to lament voters’ irrationality, as Ganesh and the Financial Times do, but to articulate the rational content of working‑class disaffection. The political crisis confronting the advanced capitalist states is not the product of tribal psychology, nor of some sudden collapse in civic virtue. It results from a social order that offers the majority no future. When commentators reduce political volatility to identity, affect or irrational loyalty, they obscure the material foundations of discontent and transform a structurally generated crisis into a behavioural problem. This ideological manoeuvre protects the ruling class’s legitimacy by locating the source of instability in the electorate rather than in capitalism’s own contradictions.

A Marxist analysis begins from the opposite premise: that political consciousness, however uneven or contradictory, contains within it a rational core shaped by lived experience. Workers’ instinctive opposition to austerity, militarism, inequality and the degradation of public services is not a failure of reason but an expression of it. The challenge is not to correct an irrational electorate but to clarify and develop the rational content of its disaffection. Consciousness lags behind objective conditions, as Trotsky observed, but crisis propels it forward. The erosion of traditional party loyalties, the collapse of trust in institutions, and the search for alternatives, however inchoate, are symptoms of a deeper process in which the old ideological anchors are losing their grip.

For this reason, the central political task is not to defend the existing order against “tribalism” but to provide a coherent alternative to it. Workers’ spontaneous opposition must be given a conscious, internationalist, socialist programme that links immediate struggles to the broader transformation of society. Such a programme must reject all forms of nationalism, identity‑based fragmentation and class collaboration. It must address the structural roots of crisis: the domination of finance capital, the militarisation of state policy, and the systematic erosion of democratic and social rights.

Therefore, we need a party independent of all factions of the capitalist class, whatever shirts they wear. Only an organisation grounded in the interests of the international working class can transform disaffection into political agency. The crisis of capitalism has stripped away the illusions that once sustained the old parties. The task now is to build the leadership capable of turning opposition into a conscious movement for socialist reconstruction.

Further Reading

Marxist Theory, Political Economy, and Class Analysis

Arrighi, Giovanni. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times. London: Verso, 1994.

Brenner, Robert. The Boom and the Bubble: The US and the World Economy. London: Verso, 2002.

Callinicos, Alex. Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crises of the Liberal World. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010.

Clarke, Simon. Marx’s Theory of Crisis. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994.

Harman, Chris. Zombie Capitalism: Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx. London: Bookmarks, 2009.

Harvey, David. The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Luxemburg, Rosa. The Accumulation of Capital. London: Routledge, 2003 (original work published 1913).

Marx, Karl. Capital: Volume I. London: Penguin Classics, 1990 (original work published 1867).

Shaikh, Anwar. Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Streeck, Wolfgang. How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System. London: Verso, 2016.

Financialisation, Neoliberalism, and State Restructuring

Crouch, Colin. The Strange Non‑Death of Neoliberalism. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011.

Duménil, Gérard and Lévy, Dominique. The Crisis of Neoliberalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.

Fine, Ben. Theories of Social Capital: Researchers Behaving Badly. London: Pluto Press, 2010.

Gamble, Andrew. The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of Recession. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Mirowski, Philip and Plehwe, Dieter (eds.). The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Pistor, Katharina. The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019.

Labour, Deindustrialisation, and Working‑Class Politics

Beatty, Christina and Fothergill, Steve. The State of the Coalfields. Sheffield: CRESR, 2021.

Bluestone, Barry and Harrison, Bennett. The Deindustrialisation of America. New York: Basic Books, 1982.

Kirk, Neville. Comrades and Cousins: Globalisation, Workers and Labour Movements in Britain, the USA and Australia from the 1880s to 1914. London: Merlin Press, 2003.

Moody, Kim. On New Terrain: How Capital Is Reshaping the Battleground of Class War. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017.

Silver, Beverly. Forces of Labour: Workers’ Movements and Globalisation since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Media, Ideology, and Political Commentary

Bourdieu, Pierre. Political Interventions: Social Science and Political Action. London: Verso, 2008.

Chomsky, Noam and Herman, Edward S. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.

Curran, James and Seaton, Jean. Power Without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in Britain. London: Routledge, 2018.

Davis, Aeron. Reckless Opportunists: Elites at the End of the Establishment. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018.

Schudson, Michael. The Power of News. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.

Imperialism, Militarism, and Geopolitics

Callinicos, Alex. Imperialism and Global Political Economy. London: Polity Press, 2009.

Foster, John Bellamy. The New Imperialism of Globalised Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2021.

Kiely, Ray. The Politics of Empire: Globalisation and the Postcolonial World. London: Routledge, 2005.

Panitch, Leo and Gindin, Sam. The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire. London: Verso, 2012.

Football, Capital, and Cultural Political Economy

Conn, David. The Fall of the House of FIFA. London: Yellow Jersey Press, 2017.

Giulianotti, Richard. Football: A Sociology of the Global Game. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.

Hognestad, Hans and Tolvhed, Daniel (eds.). Sport and the Transformation of Modern Europe: States, Media and Markets 1950–2010. London: Routledge, 2020.

Millward, Peter. The Global Football League: Transnational Networks, Social Movements and Sport in the New Media Age. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Szymanski, Stefan. Money and Football: A Soccernomics Guide. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.

France’s Erupting Student Revolt and the Political Lessons of 1968: A Warning Against the SWP’s Spontaneity Myths

The eruption of mass student protests across France marks a new phase in the breakdown of European capitalism. Beginning with lycée blockades in Créteil on 18 September, the movement has spread at extraordinary speed. By mid-October, the main student union reported that around 90 per cent of France’s universities were blockaded or closed; unions claimed 480,000 demonstrators nationwide; and protests had already spread to Belgium, Albania, Greece and Italy. One demonstrator has been killed, more than 2,000 arrested, and Limoges’ 143-year-old town hall burned. Macron is preparing to address the nation- a sign of the ruling class’s fear, not its strength.

The crisis unfolding in France is not an isolated national event. It is part of a global rise in class struggle, driven by war, austerity, and the collapse of the post-Cold War order. Across Europe, governments are cutting social spending to fund rearmament, militarising domestic policing, and preparing for confrontation with Russia. The eruption of youth anger in France is one expression of this broader crisis. Still, you can’t understand the political questions it raises without confronting the lessons of France’s last great revolutionary crisis: May–June 1968.

In a recent article, Socialist Worker (SWP) asks whether the present revolt is “our 1968.” It is a legitimate question, but their answer is politically evasive. Their account suppresses 1968’s central lesson: the decisive role the Stalinist bureaucracy played in betraying the general strike, and the need to build an independent revolutionary leadership before mass upheavals. This suppression is no accident. It follows from the SWP’s own political orientation: its adaptation to the trade-union apparatus, its glorification of spontaneity, and its refusal to confront the bureaucracies that strangle every major working-class movement.

Murden’s article repeats a familiar mythology: students fought, workers joined them, the president “fled,” and the movement was ultimately defeated because socialist parties were too focused on elections. This narrative is politically convenient because it obscures the real forces that determined the outcome. The May–June 1968 general strike, involving ten million workers, was not defeated by “electoralism.” The French Communist Party (PCF) and the CGT trade-union bureaucracy it controlled betrayed it. These forces negotiated the Grenelle accords behind the strikers’ backs, broke the strike factory by factory, and led the working class into the June elections, which the Gaullists won by a landslide.

De Gaulle did not flee. He flew to Baden-Baden to secure the army’s support, then returned to dissolve the Assembly and call elections, confident that the PCF would keep the workers in line. This betrayal was no aberration; it was the predictable outcome of Stalinism’s nationalist, reformist programme and hostility to workers’ power. The SWP refuses to name this betrayal because its own state-capitalist tradition has always adapted to the bureaucracies- Stalinist, social-democratic, or trade-union that sit atop mass movements.

The Role of the Unions Today

The SWP’s silence on the unions is not merely a matter of history; it directly affects the present movement. Youth anger has not erupted in a political vacuum. It confronts a trade-union apparatus with a decade-long record of systematic demobilisation, fragmentation, and defeat. Any serious analysis of the current struggle must begin with this fact. Murden’s article omits it because acknowledging it would require breaking with the SWP’s entire political orientation.

The Intersyndicale’s record is well known. In 2023, it led millions in a series of isolated “days of action” as Macron’s pension reform passed. These demonstrations were deliberately designed to prevent a general strike. With weeks of inactivity between each “day,” the government could wait out the movement while the unions kept control of the calendar. Last autumn’s Bloquons tout movement was similarly dissipated. Youth and workers repeatedly called for indefinite action, only to be told to wait for the next scheduled march. Many participants objected that the unions were setting the protest calendar and called for dates independent of the bureaucracies. Their demands were ignored.

By December 2025, the consequences of this strategy were clear. A CGT–FSU–Solidaires strike day drew just 31,900 protesters, according to interior ministry estimates, and caused little disruption. Years of controlled, symbolic protest had worn workers down and convinced many that union-led mobilisations were futile. The bureaucracies had achieved their real aim: preventing a unified national movement from emerging to challenge the state.

Today, the unions have joined the marches “to protect pupils and limit violence.” This wording is revealing. Their role is not to lead a struggle against the state, but to contain it, regulate it, and ultimately channel it back into parliamentary politics. They appear at demonstrations as stewards, not fighters. Their presence is a warning, not a promise.

Murden’s article says nothing about this. Workers and young people are not warned that the same apparatus is preparing the same outcome. They are not told that the unions are already negotiating with the interior ministry, discussing “security,” and preparing the next controlled march. Nor are they told that the bureaucracies will oppose any attempt to connect lycée blockades with strikes in transport, health, logistics, or industry. They are not told that the unions will fight rank-and-file organisation harder than they fight Macron.

Most importantly, they are not urged to build rank-and-file committees independent of the union bureaucracies, linking schools, factories, transport and hospitals across France and internationally. These committees are the only organisational form capable of coordinating a general strike, resisting bureaucratic sabotage, and articulating the working class’s political demands. They embody the lessons of every major struggle of the past century, from the factory occupations of 1936 to the mass strikes of 1968.

This silence is political. It reflects the SWP’s refusal to break with the trade‑union apparatus, which it treats as a vehicle for “pressure from below” rather than as an instrument of state control over the working class. The SWP’s state‑capitalist tradition has always adapted to whatever bureaucracy sits atop a movement. It insists that militancy can force unions into action, even though their function is precisely to keep militancy from becoming political. It celebrates “the streets” while refusing to confront the organisations that police them.

Mélenchon and the Electoral Trap

Murden warns that “the logic of the system” will try to channel street anger into electoral politics. In the next breath, she praises Jean‑Luc Mélenchon for showing up at protests. The warning and the endorsement cancel each other out. It is impossible to denounce the diversion of mass anger into parliamentary channels while simultaneously legitimising the politician whose central function is to carry out that diversion.

Mélenchon’s role is clear. In 2024, La France Insoumise (LFI) entered a “New Popular Front” with the Socialist Party, the party responsible for Hollande’s austerity, labour‑market deregulation, and entrenching the state of emergency. LFI then withdrew candidates in run‑offs to benefit Macron’s camp under the banner of a “republican front.” This was not a tactical misstep but the logical expression of LFI’s programme: defence of the Fifth Republic, French nationalism, and the preservation of capitalist order through parliamentary manoeuvres.

With the 2027 election approaching, LFI faces the same challenge the PCF faced in June 1968: turning a mass movement into votes. In 1968, the PCF broke the general strike factory by factory, then led ten million workers to the polls, where they delivered a landslide victory for the Gaullists. Today, Mélenchon’s presence at demonstrations serves a similar purpose: presenting himself as the “responsible” left alternative, channelling youth anger into electoral support, and preventing the emergence of independent organs of working-class power.

To present Mélenchon as an ally is to repeat the political logic that destroyed 1968. Murden’s article concludes by declaring that “the power to change the system lies in the streets.” This is spontaneism dressed up as revolutionary rhetoric. In 1968, the streets did not lack militancy. They lacked a party fighting for workers’ power against the Stalinists. The general strike was defeated not because workers failed to act, but because they acted under the leadership of a bureaucracy committed to preserving the capitalist state.

Celebrating “the streets” while remaining silent on programme and leadership leaves the field open to the bureaucracies and to Mélenchon. It is a politics of mood, not strategy. It replaces emotional identification with protest with the hard, necessary work of building independent rank-and-file committees and a revolutionary leadership capable of confronting the state and breaking the union apparatus’s grip. This is the lesson of 1968and the lesson Murden’s article refuses to draw.

What Is Required

Conditions today may be more explosive than in 1968. The crisis is global, the ruling class has nothing left to concede, and the movement is already crossing borders. The French protests are not an isolated national disturbance but part of a worldwide breakdown of capitalist stability: war in Europe and the Middle East, austerity budgets across the continent, collapsing public services, and a generation of youth confronting a future of permanent insecurity. Under these conditions, even movements that begin in schools and universities can quickly take on a broader social character. The question the SWP avoids the question of leadership becomes decisive.

The ruling class is acutely aware of the danger. Macron’s preparations to address the nation, the mass arrests, and the deployment of riot police are not signs of confidence but of fear. The state understands that social anger among youth can ignite broader layers of workers whose living standards have eroded over more than a decade. The unions understand this too, which is why they have intervened not to escalate the struggle but to contain it. The pseudo‑left parties understand it, which is why they are already positioning themselves as electoral safety valves. The only force that is not being prepared is the working class itself.

What is needed is the independent political mobilisation of the working class, internationally and on a socialist programme, against Macron, the RN, and the bureaucratic and pseudo-left apparatuses that will seek to block it. No movement can move forward while confined to the organisational structures that have repeatedly sabotaged struggles in France: the trade-union bureaucracies, the parliamentary left, and nationalist frameworks that divide workers by race, religion or citizenship. The youth blockades have shown courage and initiative. Still, without a deliberate strategy to connect their actions with workplaces, hospitals, transport hubs and logistics centres, their struggle will remain isolated and vulnerable.

The lessons of 1968 are clear. A general strike, prepared by rank-and-file committees, democratically controlled by workers, and coordinated across sectors and borders, is the only way to break the union apparatus’s grip. A revolutionary leadership, built in advance, rooted in the international working class, and armed with a Marxist programme, is the only force capable of turning mass anger into a struggle for power. An article that omits these lessons offers a miniature version of the PCF’s road a road that leads not to victory, but to defeat.

Bibliography

Trotskyist and Marxist Analysis

  • Trotsky, Leon. The Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution. New York: Pathfinder Press.
  • Trotsky, Leon. The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany. New York: Pathfinder Press.
  • North, David. The Russian Revolution and the Unfinished Twentieth Century. Mehring Books.
  • North, David. The Frankfurt School, Postmodernism and the Politics of the Pseudo‑Left. Mehring Books.
  • Steiner, Alex and David North. The Frankfurt School, Postmodernism and the Politics of the Pseudo‑Left: A Marxist Critique. Mehring Books.
  • International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI). The Heritage We Defend. Mehring Books.

May–June 1968: Historical Studies

  • Seidman, Michael. The Imaginary Revolution: Parisian Students and Workers in 1968. Berghahn Books.
  • Singer, Daniel. Prelude to Revolution: France in May 1968. Hill and Wang.
  • Ross, Kristin. May ’68 and Its Afterlives. University of Chicago Press.
  • Williams, Philip. Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic. Penguin.
  • Dreyfus, François. Histoire de la CGT. Seuil.
  • Kriegel, Annie. Les Communistes Français: Essai d’histoire du mouvement communiste français. Seuil.

French Trade‑Unionism and the CGT

  • Mouriaux, René. Le Syndicalisme en France. La Découverte.
  • Andolfatto, Dominique and Dominique Labbé. Histoire des syndicats: 1906–2010. Seuil.
  • Tartakowsky, Danielle. Les Manifestations de rue en France: 1918–1968. Publications de la Sorbonne.
  • Lefranc, Georges. Les Syndicats en France. Presses Universitaires de France.

Contemporary French Politics and the Pseudo‑Left

  • Amable, Bruno and Stefano Palombarini. L’Illusion du Bloc Bourgeois. Raisons d’Agir.
  • Mélenchon, Jean‑Luc. L’Ère du Peuple. Fayard.
  • Perrineau, Pascal. La France au Front. Fayard.
  • Chrisafis, Angelique. The Rise of the French Far Right. Guardian reporting (summaries only).
  • WSWS Editorial Board. The Pseudo‑Left and the Crisis of Capitalism. Mehring Books.

Youth Movements, Policing, and the Banlieues

  • Fassin, Didier. Enforcing Order: An Ethnography of Urban Policing. Polity Press.
  • Beaud, Stéphane and Michel Pialoux. Retour sur la condition ouvrière. Fayard.
  • Hmed, Choukri. Les Mouvements des Banlieues. Presses de Sciences Po.

European Austerity, War, and Capitalist Crisis

  • Tooze, Adam. Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World. Allen Lane.
  • Varoufakis, Yanis. Adults in the Room. Bodley Head.
  • WSWS International Editorial Board. The Return of Great‑Power Conflict and the Crisis of World Capitalism. Mehring Books.

General Works on Marxism, Revolution, and Class Struggle

  • Luxemburg, Rosa. The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions.
  • Lenin, V.I. State and Revolution.
  • Lenin, V.I. What Is To Be Done?
  • Harman, Chris. The Fire Last Time: 1968 and After. Bookmarks (critical reference only).
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Claudia Jones: A Life in Exile: The Persecution of a communist and the Politics That Failed Her

Introduction: A revolutionary life trapped in the cul‑de‑sacs of Stalinism

Few figures on the post-war left embody both the courage of class-conscious militants and the political dead end into which they were channelled as starkly as Claudia Jones. Born in Port of Spain in 1915, raised in poverty in Harlem, and drawn into the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) by the explosive social contradictions of Depression-era America, Jones’s life traces the path of a generation of revolutionary-minded workers whose aspirations were ultimately constrained by Stalinist politics.

Her rise to national leadership in the CPUSA, imprisonment during the McCarthyite witch-hunt, and deportation in 1955 were not merely biographical episodes; they expressed the ferocity with which American capitalism sought to crush any organised challenge from the working class. Jones spent her final nine years in London and died in 1964, aged just 49. Her grave lies a few yards from Karl Marx’s, a poignant symbol of the revolutionary tradition she believed she served and of the political betrayal that shaped and limited her life’s work.

The renewed interest in Jones over the past decade in academic feminism, Black radical studies, and cultural histories of the Notting Hill Carnival reflects a broader effort to recover the suppressed or marginalised voices of twentieth-century radicalism. First published in the late 1990s and reissued in 2021 as part of Lawrence Wishart’s Radical Black Women series, Marika Sherwood’s biography is among the most substantial documentary efforts in this area. Sherwood’s archival research, oral-history interviews, and account of Jones’s London years offer material that would otherwise be inaccessible. In this sense, the book is a valuable record: a collection of fragments from a life shaped by surveillance, repression, and political isolation.

Yet framing the biography primarily through race and gender obscures the decisive political questions that shaped Jones’s trajectory. It portrays the life of a communist without seriously reckoning with the communist movement’s own politics. Jones’s commitments, theoretical contributions, and organisational work cannot be understood apart from the Communist International’s historical degeneration under Stalin, the transformation of communist parties into instruments of Soviet foreign policy, and the strategic zigzags that followed. Like much contemporary scholarship, Sherwood’s narrative treats Jones’s Marxism as historical backdrop rather than the central axis of her intellectual and political identity.

This omission matters. Jones did not simply “happen” to be a communist; the CPUSA’s political line shaped her, defended her, and exacted a price from her. Her best-known theoretical work, An End to the Neglect of the Problems of the Negro Woman! (1949), is now celebrated as an early articulation of what later became known as intersectionality. But its central insight, that Black working women were the most exploited sector of the American proletariat, came from Marxist analysis rather than identity-based frameworks. Jones’s politics were inseparable from the CPUSA’s positions on the Popular Front, the no-strike pledge, the Black Belt thesis, and the party’s subordination to Roosevelt and, later, the Democratic Party. Her deportation was not simply the persecution of a Black woman or a feminist; it was the persecution of a communist at a time when the American state sought to destroy the organised left.

By foregrounding race and gender while downplaying the political content of Jones’s Marxism, Sherwood’s biography reflects a broader trend in contemporary historiography: sanitising communist militants into cultural icons or symbols of identity. Jones is presented as a pioneering Black woman, a proto-intersectional thinker, and a carnival founder- all true, but partial. What disappears is the central tragedy of her life: she channelled her revolutionary energy, intellect, and organisational skill into a political movement that abandoned the programme of world socialist revolution. This introduction sets the stage for a closer examination of Jones’s politics, the limitations Stalinism imposed, and contemporary misreadings that obscure her significance.

The historiography surrounding Claudia Jones has transformed profoundly in recent decades. Once relegated to the margins of Cold War studies, feminist theory, and Black radical historiography, Jones has increasingly been recognised as one of the twentieth century’s most important communist women. This shift is not simply scholarly recovery; it is a political struggle over memory, ideology, and the place of Marxist-Leninist women in the genealogy of revolutionary thought. Lydia Lindsey’s Red Monday represents the most recent and arguably most incisive intervention in this evolving field. Her work does not merely restore Jones to the historical record; it indicts the structures that silenced her, from the U.S. state to the academy itself.

The earlier historiographical silence surrounding Jones was not accidental. For much of the late twentieth century, Jones appeared only fleetingly in studies of McCarthyism or Caribbean diaspora politics. Feminist scholarship, shaped by liberal and nationalist frameworks, struggled to integrate a communist woman whose analysis foregrounded class exploitation rather than identity. The Cold War’s ideological policing scattered Jones’s writings, disrupted her networks, and fragmented her intellectual legacy. The destruction of her papers, symbolised by the dramatic scene on 14 November 1955, when New York firefighters forced their way into her apartment as she burned personal documents to protect comrades, was both literal and metaphorical. The state sought not only to repress Jones but to erase the intellectual infrastructure of Black communist women.

The historiographical shift began with works such as Dayo Gore’s Radicalism at the Crossroads and Carole Boyce Davies’s Left of Karl Marx. These studies challenged Cold War narratives that depicted communist women as passive or manipulated, instead emphasising their theoretical autonomy and internationalist commitments. Gore underscored the political consequences of Jones’s erasure: by severing her from U.S. networks and deporting her, the state not only destroyed her health but also severed the intellectual communities that might have preserved her work. Davies extended this argument by situating Jones within Caribbean political traditions and emphasising her role in shaping diasporic consciousness in Britain.

Yet even these important interventions did not fully resolve the historiographical problem. Jones remained a figure whose political commitments- Marxism, Leninism, anti-imperialism- were often treated as secondary to her cultural achievements. In Britain, she was memorialised as the founder of the West Indian Gazette and as a pioneer of Caribbean carnival culture. Still, her two decades of radical activism in the United States were largely omitted. This depoliticised framing reflected a broader tendency within British multicultural historiography to celebrate cultural expression while marginalising revolutionary politics. As Dayo Gore notes, Britain’s memory of Jones often celebrates culture rather than Marxist‑Leninist struggle.

In this context, we must understand Lydia Lindsey’s Red Monday. Lindsey’s intervention is historiographical, political, and polemical. Her central thesis is uncompromising: Claudia Jones was systematically silenced. The Cold War “muzzled” her voice, and later academic frameworks- particularly those shaped by liberal feminism and identity-based theories- struggled to accommodate a Marxist‑Leninist Black woman whose analysis prefigured what is now called intersectionality. Lindsey argues that Jones’s erasure resulted not only from state repression but also from intellectual paradigms that could not integrate a revolutionary woman whose politics were inseparable from global anti‑imperialist struggle.

Lindsey situates Jones within a longer intellectual tradition of Black communist women. Although Jones is often credited with popularising the concept of “triple oppression”, the interlocking exploitation of race, class, and genderLindsey notes that Louise Thompson Patterson used the term “triply oppressed” in the same year Jones joined the Communist Party. Patterson applied the concept to domestic workers, emphasising the structural vulnerability of Black women in the U.S. labour market. Jones, however, expanded the framework dramatically. She linked tripartite oppression to anti‑colonialism, anti‑imperialism, anti‑fascism, and the global peace movement. This internationalist orientation, Lindsey argues, makes Jones “the mother of global revolutionary thought,” because she fused the struggles of Black women with the broader Marxist‑Leninist project of world revolution.

Crucially, Lindsey insists that Jones’s concept of tripartite oppression was dynamic rather than static. It evolved across time and space, shaped by Jones’s experiences in the United States, the Caribbean diaspora, and later Britain. In the twenty‑first century, Lindsey argues, Jones’s framework is expressed through the language of intersectionality. But she is careful to distinguish Jones’s Marxist analysis from later identity‑based theories. For Jones, the oppression of Black women was not simply a matter of overlapping identities but a structural consequence of capitalist exploitation. In her view, Black women were the most exploited sector of the working class and therefore central to revolutionary transformation. Lindsey emphasises that contemporary discussions of intersectionality often lose this class-rooted analysis, foregrounding identity rather than exploitation.

This distinction has become a major theme in current historiography. Scholars such as Charisse Burden‑Stelly and Keisha Blain argue that Jones’s analysis of super‑exploitation provides a materialist foundation for intersectionality that contemporary theory often lacks. Jones’s insistence that Black women occupy a structurally decisive position within the capitalist labour process challenges both liberal feminism and depoliticised versions of intersectionality. Lindsey’s work thus intervenes in contemporary theoretical debates, insisting that any serious genealogy of intersectional analysis must recognise its Marxist origins.

A renewed interest in communist women, Black internationalism, and the global dimensions of feminist struggle characterises the present historiographical moment. Jones stands at the centre of these conversations. Her writings on peace, anti‑imperialism, and colonial liberation resonate with contemporary debates about global capitalism, racialised labour, and the gendered dimensions of exploitation. Scholars increasingly recognise Jones as belonging to the genealogies of Black radicalism, feminist theory, anti‑imperialism, and Marxist‑Leninist political practice.

Lindsey’s Red Monday marks a decisive moment in this historiographical transformation. It does not simply restore Jones’s voice; it challenges the structures that silenced her. Lindsey indicts the Cold War state for its repression, but she also critiques the academy for its inability to integrate communist women into feminist and intellectual history. Her work demands a rethinking of the very frameworks through which feminist theory and Black radicalism have been understood.

Ultimately, Red Monday presents Jones not merely as a victim of Cold War repression but as a visionary thinker whose analysis of super‑exploitation and tripartite oppression anticipated contemporary debates about intersectionality. Lindsey argues that recovering Jones’s voice is essential to reconstructing a truly internationalist, working‑class feminist tradition- one that recognises the centrality of Black women to revolutionary transformation and refuses to separate struggles against racism and sexism from the fight against capitalism itself.

For Marxists, recovering Claudia Jones’s history is not simply an academic exercise. It is part of the broader struggle to reclaim the revolutionary traditions that Cold War repression sought to destroy. Lindsey’s Red Monday powerfully contributes to that struggle, restoring Jones to her rightful place in the history of global revolutionary thought and challenging us to confront the ideological forces that still shape historical memory today.

A record worth having: Sherwood’s archival contribution

Sherwood’s strengths lie in her archival persistence. Working against the grain of Cold War erasure, she reconstructs Claudia Jones’s life from fragmentary sources, scattered documents, and the memories of those who worked alongside her. Much of Jones’s personal archive was destroyed, some by the FBI, some by Jones herself in moments of fear and necessity, leaving historians with only shards of a life lived under surveillance. Sherwood’s determination to piece together these remnants gives her biography a documentary value that few other accounts possess. For British readers in particular, the chapters on Jones’s London years are indispensable, offering one of the clearest portraits of the political and social terrain in which Jones operated after her deportation.

Jones arrived in London in December 1955, penniless, ill, and politically isolated. Her health had been broken by years of tuberculosis, heart disease, and the brutal conditions of Alderson federal prison. Yet she immediately immersed herself in civil‑rights struggles among Caribbean workers, refusing any retreat into private life or quiet exile. She founded the West Indian Gazette in 1958, Britain’s first major Black newspaper, produced on a shoestring budget above a record shop in Brixton. The paper became a crucial organising centre for campaigns against racist policing, discriminatory housing practices, and the tightening of immigration controls. It also served as a forum for anti‑colonial politics, linking Caribbean, African, and Asian struggles against British imperialism.

Sherwood’s account of these years is one of the book’s strongest contributions. She captures the atmosphere of post‑war Britain with clarity: the “Keep Britain White” graffiti scrawled across North Kensington; Oswald Mosley’s return to street agitation; the landlords’ notorious “No Blacks, No Irish, No Dogs” signs; and the routine police harassment faced by Caribbean youth. This was not the multicultural London of later decades but a city in which the presence of Black workers was treated as a social problem to be contained. Jones fought relentlessly, organising meetings, writing editorials, and building networks of solidarity across fragmented immigrant communities.

The Notting Hill riots of August–September 1958 marked a turning point. White gangs, encouraged by fascist organisations, launched sustained attacks on Black residents over several nights. The violence exposed the depth of racial hostility in British society and the indifference of the authorities. In response, Jones organised an indoor Caribbean carnival at St Pancras Town Hall in January 1959, an act of cultural self‑assertion and political defiance. Sherwood’s documentation of this initiative corrects narratives that portray migrant workers as passive victims. Jones’s carnival was not a celebration of diversity but a conscious attempt to strengthen the morale of a community under siege. It asserted that Caribbean people would not be driven out.

Sherwood is equally clear about the American state’s vindictiveness. Jones’s arrests under the Smith Act, her imprisonment at Alderson, her deteriorating health, and her eventual deportation are all recorded with appropriate indignation. The biography conveys the relentlessness of the McCarthyite campaign: the surveillance, the raids, the interrogations, the legal harassment, and the calculated cruelty of deporting a chronically ill woman who had lived in the United States since childhood. Claudia Jones’s persecution belongs in the long indictment of American “democracy,” which has always reserved its harshest measures for those who challenge the capitalist order from the left.

Yet Sherwood’s narrative, for all its documentary richness, stops short of analysing the political context that shaped Jones’s persecution. Jones was not simply a victim of anti‑communism; she was a leader of a party whose political line had been subordinated to the foreign‑policy needs of the Soviet bureaucracy. Her imprisonment was not only an attack on a Black woman or a civil‑rights activist but on a communist cadre whose work was inseparable from the strategic zigzags of Stalinism. Sherwood records the events but does not interrogate the politics that made Jones both vulnerable to repression and unable to develop an independent revolutionary perspective.

This limitation becomes clear in Sherwood’s treatment of Jones’s theoretical contributions. Jones’s analysis of the super‑exploitation of Black women, her insistence on the centrality of race and gender within the working class, and her critique of American capitalism are all presented as early expressions of what is now called intersectionality. But Sherwood does not explore how these insights emerged from Jones’s Marxist commitments, nor how they were shaped and constrained by the CPUSA’s Stalinist framework. The biography documents Jones’s work but does not situate it within the broader crisis of the communist movement.

In this sense, Sherwood’s book reflects a wider trend in contemporary historiography: recovering communist figures as cultural icons or identity‑based pioneers while leaving their political context unexamined. Jones becomes a symbol of Black resilience, a proto‑intersectional thinker, and a carnival founder, all true but insufficient. What disappears is the central contradiction of her life: that her revolutionary energy was channelled into a political movement that had abandoned the programme of world socialist revolution.

The question Sherwood avoids: the politics of the Communist Party

What Sherwood fails to confront, and what any serious assessment of Claudia Jones must begin with, is the political character of the movement to which Jones devoted her life. Jones joined the Young Communist League in the mid-1930s, inspired by the CPUSA’s defence of the Scottsboro Boys and its reputation as the United States’ most militant opponent of racism. Millions of workers and young people saw the Soviet Union as the embodiment of the October Revolution, the first successful overthrow of capitalism. Yet by the time Jones entered the movement, the Communist International had already become an instrument of the Stalinist bureaucracy. The Kremlin set its policies not to meet the needs of the international working class, but to serve the Soviet state’s foreign-policy requirements.

Jones’s political development tracked every turn in this line. The CPUSA repeatedly changed its strategic orientation not through democratic debate or Marxist analysis, but through abrupt shifts imposed from Moscow. Jones advanced within the party by adapting to these shifts, which shaped both her theoretical work and practical activity. The first major shift was the Popular Front, launched in 1935. Under this policy, the CPUSA subordinated the working class to Roosevelt and the Democratic Party, portraying the New Deal coalition as a progressive force against fascism. The party abandoned independent working-class politics in favour of alliances with liberal politicians, trade-union bureaucrats, and sections of the middle class. As a rising cadre, Jones absorbed this orientation. Her early writings emphasised unity with “progressive forces,” reflecting the party’s move away from revolutionary struggle.

The second shift came with the Hitler–Stalin Pact of August 1939. Overnight, the CPUSA reversed its position: Roosevelt became an imperialist warmonger, and the party denounced the war as a conflict between rival capitalist powers. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the party changed course again and became the most enthusiastic supporter of the American war effort. It backed the wartime no-strike pledge, suppressing labour militancy just as workers were fighting speed-ups, wage freezes, and racist hiring practices in war industries. The party opposed A—Philip Randolph’s March on Washington Movement, which aimed to challenge discrimination in defence production. Any independent struggle by Black workers was treated as a threat to the wartime alliance with American imperialism.

Jones supported these positions. Her speeches and articles from this period reflected the CPUSA’s insistence that Black workers subordinate their demands to the national war effort. This was not a personal failing, but the result of a political line that placed the defence of the Soviet Union, as interpreted by the Stalinist bureaucracy, above the independent interests of the American working class. The next shift came during Browder’s leadership. In 1944, under Earl Browder, the CPUSA dissolved itself and became a “political association,” arguing that capitalism and socialism could coexist peacefully after the war. Browder’s liquidationism was not a theoretical innovation, but an extension of Popular Front logic. By then a prominent figure in the party’s women’s work, Jones also adapted to this line.

In 1945, the Kremlin signalled through French Stalinist Jacques Duclos that Browder had gone too far, and the CPUSA reconstituted itself overnight. Jones followed suit, becoming one of the party’s leading voices on the “Negro question.” Her best-known essay, “An End to the Neglect of the Problems of the Negro Woman!” (1949), is now celebrated as proto-intersectional. Its genuine insight that Black working women were the most exploited section of the American proletariat comes from Marxism, not later theories of overlapping oppressions. Jones understood exploitation as a class relation intensified by racism and sexism. Her analysis was grounded in the material conditions of Black women workers, not abstract identity categories.

But Jones also defended the CPUSA’s mechanical Stalinist schema of “self-determination for the Negro nation in the Black Belt.” This policy treated Black workers as a separate national question, rather than as a decisive part of the American working class. Applied mechanically from Moscow, it failed to engage seriously with the actual dynamics of class struggle in the United States. The CPUSA’s position fragmented the working class and diverted Black militancy into politically sterile nationalist channels.

Leon Trotsky’s 1939 discussions with C.L.R. James framed the issue correctly. Trotsky argued that the decisive question was the independent mobilisation of Black workers within the broader socialist struggle of the working class, against both the Democrats and the trade-union bureaucracy. He saw Black workers’ revolutionary potential as rooted in their position within the proletariat, not in a separate national identity. His analysis offered a path to genuine working-class unity and revolutionary leadership.

London and the British Road: a political dead end

When Claudia Jones arrived in Britain in December 1955, she found a political landscape already shaped, and increasingly distorted, by the Communist Party of Great Britain’s (CPGB) strategic capitulation. The Party’s 1951 programme, *The British Road to Socialism*, vetted and approved by Stalin himself, had renounced revolutionary politics in favour of parliamentary gradualism, constitutional niceties, and pressure on the Labour Party. It subordinated the working class to the institutions of bourgeois democracy, treating socialism not as the product of mass struggle but as the outcome of legislative reform. A Marxist-Leninist shaped by the U.S. Communist Party’s militant anti-racist and anti-imperialist traditions, Jones joined a movement whose leadership had already abandoned the revolutionary road.

Within months of Jones’s arrival, the contradictions inherent in this orientation came to a head. Khrushchev’s Secret Speech in February 1956 exposed the crimes of Stalin’s bureaucracy, while the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian workers’ uprising later that year revealed the regime’s true nature: a counter-revolutionary force crushing workers’ councils in the name of “socialism.” Thousands left the CPGB in disgust. The Party’s membership collapsed, and its moral authority disintegrated. For Jones, who had endured imprisonment, surveillance, and deportation for her communist convictions, the crisis was not merely organisational; it was ideological. The movement to which she had devoted her life proved incapable of defending the working class’s revolutionary self-activity.

In this context, Sherwood’s account of tensions between Jones and the CPGB leadership, which he interprets as racial insensitivity, misses the deeper political point. Racism certainly existed within the Party, as it did across the broader labour movement, but the fundamental issue was not interpersonal prejudice; it was the political logic of Stalinist nationalism. A party oriented toward Labour and trade-union bureaucracies- institutions that supported immigration controls, tolerated racist practices, and defended the imperial state- could not lead an independent struggle against racism. The CPGB’s strategy required it to follow the Labour left rather than confront it, adapt to union chauvinism rather than challenge it, and treat Black workers as auxiliaries to the “British road,” not as a revolutionary force in their own right.

This was not a failure of “allyship,” but the structural result of a programme that rejected internationalism in favour of national roads to socialism. Forged in the crucible of U.S. anti-racist struggle, Jones’s politics were fundamentally incompatible with a Party that subordinated anti-imperialism to parliamentary respectability. She argued that Black workers faced super-exploitation and therefore occupied a decisive position within the working class. This clashed with a leadership that saw racism as a secondary issue to be addressed only after socialism’s parliamentary advance. Jones understood racism as a structural feature of British capitalism; the CPGB treated it as an individual moral failing. The gulf was political, not personal.

Jones’s later 1964 travels to Moscow and China, in search of revolutionary clarity amid the Sino-Soviet split, illustrate the tragedy of her generation. The split was not a debate over revolutionary strategy, but a conflict between rival bureaucracies, each claiming to represent Marxism while suppressing workers’ democracy. Like many communists of her era, Jones searched for alternatives within the very apparatus that had already betrayed the revolution. Her journey reflects the historical impasse of mid-century communism: militants committed to internationalism and anti-imperialism found themselves trapped in organisations that had abandoned both.

Yet Jones’s tragedy was also her strength. Her political clarity, grounded in the Marxist analysis of super-exploitation and tripartite oppression, enabled her to recognise what the CPGB leadership could not: racism was not an appendage of capitalism but one of its organising principles. In Britain, her work, from founding the West Indian Gazette to organising the first indoor Caribbean carnival, was not cultural activism but political intervention. She aimed to build an independent Black working-class organisation at a time when the CPGB offered only parliamentary gradualism and appeals to Labour.

The historiography has often depoliticised this period, presenting Jones as a cultural pioneer rather than a revolutionary Marxist. But her conflicts with the CPGB were not the result of personality or cultural difference. They resulted from a Party that had abandoned the revolutionary road and a militant who refused to do so. Jones’s insistence on linking anti‑racism to anti‑imperialism, and both to working‑class struggle, placed her outside the political logic of the CPGB’s British Road. She was, in effect, a revolutionary trapped within a reformist organisation.

Her 1964 travels, undertaken in search of ideological clarity, reveal the limits of the Stalinist world she inhabited. The bureaucratic regimes of Moscow and Beijing could not provide the revolutionary answers she sought. Yet her search itself testifies to her unwavering commitment to Marxism as a living, internationalist tradition. Jones’s tragedy was not that she believed in revolution; it was that the organisations claiming to represent it had long ceased to do so.

In the end, Jones’s British years illuminate the broader crisis of mid‑century communism: the contradiction between revolutionary aspirations and bureaucratic realities. Stalinist nationalism shaped her life in Britain, yet her politics transcended it. She remains a figure whose clarity, courage, and uncompromising internationalism rebuke the parliamentary gradualism that dominated the CPGB and remind us that the struggle against racism and capitalism must be fought together, not sequentially.

Identity politics and the sanitisation of history

Lola Olufemi’s preface to Radical Black Women rightly insists that Claudia Jones must be remembered as a communist and highlights her attention to race and gender. This is a welcome corrective to the depoliticised, council‑friendly version of Jones that circulates in official multiculturalism: the carnival icon, the smiling Google doodle, the harmless symbol of “community cohesion.” Such representations flatten her politics into cultural heritage and erase the revolutionary content of her life. Yet Olufemi’s injunction“remember her as a communist” risks becoming meaningless if communism is equated with the Stalinist parties that abandoned Marxism. To remember Jones as a communist requires remembering the political tradition she believed she served, not the bureaucratic apparatus that ultimately betrayed it.

The Radical Black Women series, despite its archival value, frames Jones primarily through race and sex categories central to an academic professional layer for whom representation has displaced class struggle. This is not accidental. Contemporary academic feminism, shaped by identity‑based frameworks and institutional diversity agendas, tends to treat race and gender as autonomous categories of analysis, detached from the dynamics of capitalist exploitation. Jones’s own politics sit uneasily within this framework. She did not understand herself as the representative of a racial or gendered constituency. She understood herself as a Marxist, an internationalist, and a militant of the working class.

The West Indian Gazette, founded in 1958, was not conceived as a cultural magazine for Caribbean identity. It was a political organ for Caribbean, African, and Asian workers united against imperialism. Its pages carried reports on anti‑colonial struggles, trade‑union battles, and the global peace movement. Jones’s editorial line was clear: racism could not be fought through cultural assertion alone but only through organised working‑class struggle against capitalism and empire. She did not imagine her work as the expression of a single identity group. She imagined it as part of a global revolutionary movement.

This is precisely what contemporary identity‑based readings obscure. By foregrounding race and gender as the primary interpretive lenses, the Radical Black Women series risks reproducing the very depoliticisation it seeks to challenge. Jones becomes a pioneering Black woman, a proto‑intersectional thinker, a symbol of representation rather than a communist whose analysis of super‑exploitation emerged from Marxist theory. Her insistence that Black women were the most exploited sector of the working class was not an early gesture toward intersectionality but a materialist analysis of capitalist labour relations. She understood race and gender not as identities but as structural mechanisms of exploitation.

The problem is not simply academic misinterpretation. It is the broader ideological climate in which Jones is remembered. In Britain, official multiculturalism has long preferred cultural icons to political militants. Carnival is celebrated; anti‑imperialism is forgotten. The Gazette is praised as a community newspaper; its communist politics are ignored. Jones’s grave lies next to Marx, yet her politics are often presented as a colourful footnote to post‑war Black British history rather than as part of the Marxist tradition itself.

To recover Jones as a communist requires more than acknowledging her Party membership. It requires recognising that mid-century communism’s contradictions shaped her politics: the struggle against racism and imperialism within organisations that had abandoned revolutionary strategy. Jones’s commitment to Marxism was sincere, but the Stalinist parties she served had long ceased to represent the working class’s revolutionary self-activity. Remembering her as a communist means remembering the political tragedy of her generation of militants searching for revolutionary clarity within bureaucratic structures that could no longer provide it.

Contemporary historiography should not insert Jones into identity-based frameworks but restore the political content of her life: her Marxism, her internationalism, her analysis of super‑exploitation, and her belief that Black workers were central to world revolution. Anything less reduces her to a symbol and repeats the Cold War’s silencing in a new, liberal form.

A life of courage, wasted by the politics she inherited

Sherwood’s biography of Claudia Jones remains a valuable documentary record of an extraordinary woman. It preserves fragments of a life lived under surveillance, repression, and exile; it captures Jones’s energy, her discipline, her intellectual seriousness, and her refusal to bend before the McCarthyite state. Sherwood’s archival work ensures that Jones cannot be erased from the historical record. But the political analysis needed to understand Jones’s life, commitments, and tragedy is largely absent. Readers must supply what Sherwood avoids: a reckoning with the politics of Stalinism, the degeneration of the communist movement, and the structural forces that shaped Jones’s trajectory.

The tragedy of Claudia Jones is not only that capitalism hounded her across the Atlantic, imprisoning her, destroying her health, and finally deporting her. It is that her extraordinary talents- her theoretical insight, her organisational skill, her internationalism- were channelled into the service of a bureaucratic apparatus that had long abandoned the programme of world socialist revolution. Jones devoted her life to a movement that no longer embodied the revolutionary Marxism she believed she was defending. She remained loyal to Lenin’s tradition, the 1919 Comintern, and the global struggle against imperialism. But the organisations she served no longer carried that tradition. They became nationalised bureaucracies, oriented toward parliamentary manoeuvres and diplomatic alliances, and contained working‑class self‑activity.

This contradiction shaped every stage of Jones’s political life. In the United States, she fought racism, imperialism, and capitalist exploitation through a Communist Party that increasingly subordinated Black liberation to Popular Front alliances with the Democratic Party. In Britain, she joined the CPGB, committed to The British Road to Socialism, a programme that renounced revolution in favour of constitutional gradualism and pressure on Labour. The Party’s orientation toward the trade‑union and Labour bureaucracies- institutions that themselves supported immigration controls and tolerated racist practices- made it structurally incapable of leading an independent struggle against racism. Jones’s conflicts with the CPGB leadership were not simply matters of racial insensitivity, as Sherwood suggests. They were political. A party that had abandoned revolutionary strategy could not meet the needs of the most exploited and oppressed layers of the working class.

Jones’s later 1964 travels to Moscow and China, undertaken in search of revolutionary clarity amid the Sino‑Soviet split, reveal the tragedy of her generation. She sought answers within bureaucratic regimes that had already betrayed the revolution. Her search was sincere, but the terrain was barren. The split between Moscow and Beijing was not a debate over revolutionary strategy but a conflict between rival state bureaucracies. Jones’s political isolation was not personal; it was historical. She belonged to a generation of militants whose revolutionary aspirations were channelled into organisations that could no longer fulfil them.

This is why contemporary attempts to remember Jones through identity‑based frameworks- race, gender, representation- are inadequate. They obscure the political content of her life. Jones was not an icon of diversity, nor a symbol of cultural resilience. She was a Marxist, an internationalist, and a revolutionary. Her analysis of super‑exploitation and tripartite oppression emerged from Marxist theory, not from identity politics. She understood Black women as the most exploited sector of the working class, not as a demographic constituency seeking representation within existing structures.

The lessons of Jones’s life belong to the working class. They belong to those who continue to fight racism, imperialism, and capitalist exploitation, not to the curators of identity politics, and not to the Stalinist parties that failed her. To honour Jones is to confront the political forces that silenced her, to reclaim the revolutionary tradition she believed she served, and to recognise that the struggle she waged remains unfinished.

Bibliography

Books and Monographs

  • Boyce Davies, Carole. Left of Karl Marx: The Political Life of Black Communist Claudia Jones. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.
  • Burden‑Stelly, Charisse. Black Scare / Red Scare: Theorising Capitalist Racism in the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2023.
  • Gore, Dayo F. Radicalism at the Crossroads: African American Women Activists in the Cold War. New York: NYU Press, 2011.
  • Lindsey, Lydia. Red Monday: The Silencing of Claudia Jones in 20th Century Feminist Revolutionary Thought. (Publication details forthcoming / Journal of Intersectionality special issue).
  • Olufemi, Lola. Experiments in Imagining Otherwise. London: Hajar Press, 2021.
  • Olufemi, Lola (ed.). Radical Black Women: A Reader. London: Pluto Press, 2024.
  • Sherwood, Marika. Claudia Jones: A Life in Exile. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1999.
  • Singh, Nikhil Pal. Race and America’s Long War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017.
  • Sivanandan, Ambalavaner. Communities of Resistance: Writings on Black Struggles for Socialism. London: Verso, 1990.
  • West, Michael O. and William G. Martin (eds.). From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International since the Age of Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.

Articles and Chapters

  • Burden‑Stelly, Charisse. “Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism: Some Theoretical Considerations.” Monthly Review 73, no. 4 (2021): 1–14.
  • Davies, Carole Boyce. “Claudia Jones: Feminist, Communist, Transnationalist.” Race & Class 49, no. 2 (2007): 69–78.
  • Gore, Dayo F. “Black Women’s Radical Activism and the Long Cold War.” Souls 15, no. 3 (2013): 19–41.
  • Lindsey, Lydia. “Claudia Jones and the Muzzling of Marxist Feminism.” Journal of Intersectionality 8, no. 1 (2024): 45–68.
  • Makalani, Minkah. “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Black Internationalism.” In From Toussaint to Tupac, edited by West and Martin, 67–92. Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2009.
  • Moore, Brian. “The West Indian Gazette and the Politics of Black Britain.” Small Axe 12, no. 2 (2008): 1–20.
  • Ransby, Barbara. “Black Internationalism, Women, and the Global Left.” Meridians 15, no. 1 (2016): 1–25.
  • Robinson, Cedric J. “The Black Radical Tradition.” The Black Scholar 12, no. 1 (1981): 2–11.

Primary Sources by Claudia Jones

  • Jones, Claudia. “An End to the Neglect of the Problems of the Negro Woman!” Political Affairs (June 1949): 22–29.
  • Jones, Claudia. “We Seek Full Equality for Women.” Daily Worker (1950).
  • Jones, Claudia. The Caribbean Community in Britain. London: West Indian Gazette Pamphlet Series, 1962.
  • Jones, Claudia. “The Caribbean Carnival: A People’s Art.” West Indian Gazette (1963).

Cold War, Communism, and Stalinism

  • Finkel, David. “Stalinism and the Defeat of the Revolution.” Against the Current 15, no. 2 (1988): 12–20.
  • Harman, Chris. The Lost Revolution: Germany 1918–1923. London: Bookmarks, 1982.
  • McIlroy, John and Alan Campbell. The Communist Party of Great Britain: A Historical Analysis. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2017.
  • Morgan, Kevin. Bolshevism and the British Left. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2006.
  • Renton, David. Never Again: Rock Against Racism and the Anti‑Nazi League 1976–1982. London: Routledge, 2018.

Black Britain, Race, and Labour History

  • Bryan, Beverley, Stella Dadzie, and Suzanne Scafe. The Heart of the Race: Black Women’s Lives in Britain. London: Virago, 1985.
  • Eddo‑Lodge, Reni. Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People About Race. London: Bloomsbury, 2017.
  • Fryer, Peter. Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain. London: Pluto Press, 1984.
  • Sivanandan, Ambalavaner. “Race, Class and the State.” Race & Class 17, no. 4 (1976): 347–368.

The Economist Prescribes a Witch‑Hunt: What the Kinnock “Lesson” Really Teaches American Workers

The Economist’s mid‑August intervention was not a neutral exercise in transatlantic political comparison. It was an unmistakable act of class politics. By urging the Democratic Party to “learn” from Neil Kinnock’s purge of the Labour left, the magazine was issuing instructions, not offering analysis. Its framing of how to stop “extremists” from making a party unelectable reveals its real audience: the American ruling class, increasingly anxious about the erosion of its political instruments and the electorate’s growing volatility.

The historical parallel is telling. Kinnock’s assault on the Labour left in the 1980s was not about electoral strategy; it was a decisive effort to destroy any organised socialist tendency within a major party and to prepare the ground for the neoliberal transformation later carried out by Tony Blair. The Economist’s call for Democrats to replicate this process is therefore a demand for pre‑emptive political cleansing. It reflects a fear that social anger accumulating in the United States over inequality, war, and the decay of democratic institutions might find expression in forces the ruling class cannot control.

The magazine’s tone, dressed up in jokes about Joe Biden’s 1987 plagiarism scandal, cannot conceal its purpose. It attempts to discipline the Democratic Party, warn it against even the mildest gestures toward the left, and insist that its role remains what it has been for decades: a stabilising mechanism for American capitalism. The Economist is not worried about “unelectability.” It is worried about legitimacy. It senses that the traditional political order is fraying and that the Democratic Party, long a pillar of that order, must be fortified against internal dissent. In this sense, the article reveals more about elite anxiety than about the actual dynamics of American politics. It is a defensive manoeuvre by a ruling class confronting a crisis it cannot resolve.

A Fear Disguised as Advice

The Economist’s sudden alarm over the Democratic Socialists of America is not rooted in fear of the organisation itself. It stems from fear of the conditions that produced its growth. By fixating on Zohran Mamdani’s election as mayor of New York City- the highest-turnout election since 1969- the magazine tries to frame the DSA as a contemporary analogue to the Militant tendency in 1980s Labour.  The comparison is politically motivated rather than analytically serious. Militant was a disciplined pseudo-Trotskyist faction with a defined programme; the DSA is a diffuse, ideologically inconsistent formation whose elected officials operate comfortably within the Democratic Party. The ruling class knows this. Its concern lies elsewhere.

What unsettles The Economist is the emergence of a broad, generational shift in political consciousness. Decades of falling living standards, grotesque inequality, endless war, and the authoritarian turn under Trump have produced a situation in which millions of young people and workers are willing to embrace anything labelled “socialist.” One poll widely cited in responses to the article found that more than half of Americans under 30 view socialism favourably. This is not an endorsement of any particular organisation. It reflects deep social malaise. The magazine’s invocation of Kinnock’s purge is therefore not a warning about the DSA’s strength but a demand for pre‑emptive containment.

The Economist proposes a prophylactic: identify, isolate, and expel any tendency that might channel this sentiment into an independent political form. It argues that the Democratic Party must be cleansed before discontent crystallises into something uncontrollable. In this sense, the article is less a commentary on the DSA than a reflection of elite anxiety. It reveals a ruling class that recognises the fragility of its political instruments and fears that the crisis of American capitalism may soon produce forces beyond its reach.

What Kinnock Actually Achieved

The magazine’s history is a fable. Kinnock’s purge did not make Labour electable. He led the party to defeat in 1987 and again in 1992against a Tory government hated across Britain for the poll tax. What his witch‑hunt did achieve was the beginning of a transformation that Tony Blair later completed: the scrapping of Clause Four, the conversion of Labour into an open instrument of big business, and the launching of the criminal war against Iraq.

The “electability” The Economist celebrates is electability on terms acceptable to the banks. Under Keir Starmer, the same method was used against the hundreds of thousands who joined Labour behind Jeremy Corbyn. Members were suspended or expelled for opposing the Gaza genocide; Corbyn himself was barred from standing as a Labour candidate. The lesson Britain offers is not how to win elections. It is how to bind the working class to a party of capital by bureaucratic force.

The Democratic Party needs no tutoring on this. It is the world’s oldest capitalist party. For more than a century and a half, it has buried every social-opposition movement that entered it, from Populism to the antiwar movement to the Sanders campaigns.

The Pseudo‑Left and the Dead End of “Realignment”

Rejecting The Economist’s crude smears does not mean accepting the DSA as a socialist alternative. The DSA is not “ultra‑left.” It is a faction of the Democratic Party and has said so openly for decades. Its strategy is to win office inside a party controlled by Wall Street and the intelligence agencies.

The record of DSA officeholders is decisive. In power, they confront the realities of municipal budgets tied to bond markets and the police. Mamdani’s mayoralty is the clearest example: cuts to school and homeless programs, abandonment of free bus service, praise for the NYPD amid fatal shootings, reaffirmed support for Democratic House leader Hakeem Jeffries, and even hosting Trump at Gracie Mansion. As one socialist critic concluded, Mamdani staffed his administration with figures “intended to convince the political establishment and big business in New York that the DSA is not a threat to their core interests.”

The DSA’s most prominent voices spend their time assuring the bourgeoisie of their loyalty. Their function is not to threaten the Democratic Party but to absorb and neutralise workers’ and youth radicalisation before it takes independent political form. The Economist’s witch‑hunt prescription and the DSA’s self‑presentation are two sides of the same operation.

Militant and the Historical Roots of Entrism

Militant’s reply to The Economist, published by the Socialist Party, complains that the magazine recycled right‑wing slurs. That is true. But Militant’s own tradition offers no way out of today’s crisis facing workers.

Militant’s decades of “deep entrism,” its belief that Labour could be pressured into a vehicle for socialism, and its later admission that Labour ceased to be a workers’ party only after Blair’s changes, all amount to an indictment of its perspective.

The historical record is clear. Militant descends from Ted Grant’s International Socialist League, formed after Grant refused to break with the liquidationism of Jock Haston in the early 1950s. Haston resigned from the Revolutionary Communist Party declaring that Labour was “one of the most democratic workers’ organisations in existence” and that the task was to “adhere loyally to the mass party” and help transform it. The Fourth International warned that these positions expressed liquidationist tendencies- an abandonment of the fight for an independent revolutionary party.

Grant’s refusal to break with this outlook, and his subsequent construction of a tendency premised on permanent entry into Labour, was the seed of everything that followed. The working class lost decades to the illusion that a bourgeois workers’ party could be reclaimed from within.

Today, the same organisation regrets that Sanders did not run independently after 2016 and that Corbyn’s “Your Party” failed to capitalise on its initial support. But Sanders endorsed Clinton, then Biden, then Harris. Corbyn capitulated on every fundamental question, from Trident to NATO to the antisemitism smear campaign, and then, through his own party, banned revolutionary organisations by name. These were not accidents. They were the political choices of men committed to reforming capitalism. And capitalism cannot be reformed.

The Real Lesson

The Economist and its “left” critics share one assumption: that the fate of the working class is decided inside parties of the capitalist state. Britain’s real lesson runs the opposite way. Every attempt to transform Labour from Bevan to Benn to Militant to Corbyn ended in defeat. Each defeat strengthened the right and left workers disarmed before the next attack. The question facing American workers is not how to make the Democratic Party electable, nor how to capture it. The question is how to break from it.

That means building rank‑and‑file committees in factories, warehouses, schools, and hospitals independent of the union bureaucracies that serve the Democrats. It means building an independent working-class political party based on an internationalist and socialist programme. Such a party would oppose war, the authoritarian turn of the Trump administration, and the capitalist profit system that produces both. The Economist is right to fear socialism. It is wrong only about where the danger is coming from.

🟥 1. On the Democratic Party and ruling‑class strategy

  • “The Democratic Party and the crisis of American democracy” Explains how the Democrats function as a stabilising instrument for US capitalism and why the ruling class demands internal discipline and purges.
  • “The Democrats’ war against the left” Analyses repeated efforts by the Democratic establishment to suppress left‑wing sentiment, including attacks on Sanders supporters and youth radicalisation.
  • “The ruling class fears the growth of anti‑capitalist sentiment” A broader examination of why elite institutions panic when polls show rising support for socialism among young people.

🟥 2. On the DSA and pseudo‑left politics

  • “What is the Democratic Socialists of America?” A foundational critique of the DSA as a middle‑class, pro‑Democratic Party formation incapable of representing working‑class interests.
  • “DSA and the politics of the pseudo‑left” Explains why the ruling class does not fear the DSA itself, but fears the social anger that drives people toward anything labelled socialist.
  • “The DSA and the crisis of American capitalism” Connects the organisation’s growth to worsening living standards, inequality, and political instability.

🟥 3. On generational radicalisation and polls showing support for socialism

  • “Why young people are turning toward socialism” Discusses the economic and political conditions—student debt, precarious work, war, authoritarianism—that are producing a leftward shift.
  • “Poll shows majority of young Americans view socialism favourably” WSWS analysis of the widely cited poll you mention, placing it in the context of a broader crisis of legitimacy for American capitalism.

🟥 4. On historical parallels: Militant, Kinnock, and Labour’s purge

  • “Lessons of the purge of the Labour left”: A detailed historical analysis of Kinnock’s campaign against Militant and how it prepared the ground for Blairism.
  • “The Economist and the rewriting of Labour history” Critiques establishment media attempts to use the Militant precedent to justify new purges in contemporary politics.

🟥 5. On elite media interventions (including The Economist)

  • “The media and the suppression of socialist politics” Examines how outlets like The Economist act as ideological instruments of the ruling class, issuing directives rather than analysis.
  • “The Economist warns of rising left‑wing sentiment”: A direct WSWS response to similar interventions, analysing the class interests behind them.

Podcast Episode: John Cooper Clarke’s Have It: The bard of Salford tours a country in decline.

Pip: A poet who once read between sets by the Fall and the Buzzcocks is now on a twenty-date arena tour. Britain contains multitudes — or at least, it contains one very well-packaged contradiction.

Mara: That contradiction is exactly what freerein61 is working through here — Clarke's new collection Have It, his tour, and what his elevation to cultural institution says about how Britain remembers its working class. Let's start with the bard himself.

John Cooper Clarke and the Packaging of Decline

Pip: The central tension in this piece is not really about poetry — it is about what happens when a working-class voice becomes a cultural product. Clarke spent decades describing a world official culture preferred to ignore, and now that culture is selling him back to the people he wrote about.

Mara: The post frames it precisely. Clarke is described as "both chronicler and exhibit, both witness to working-class life and participant in its commodification." His success is real, but so is the machinery around it.

Pip: Which means his talent is not in question — the reach is. "Beasley Street" from 1980 put rats with rickets and Friday-night drinking on the page and made it literature. Decades later he rewrote it as "Beasley Boulevard," a sardonic commentary on regeneration and property speculation. The slum gets revitalised; the underlying social reality does not.

Mara: Those two poems are described as a diptych — the industrial city as Thatcher left it, and the neighbourhood as Blair imagined it. "Evidently Chickentown" gets named alongside them as the third pillar: its relentless accumulation of grievances captures, in the post's words, "life in a society where everything is broken but nothing changes."

Pip: And yet some boxes on the current tour run close to fifty pounds a head. The poet of the bedsit is now marketed with the full apparatus of the entertainment industry. Nobody is accusing Clarke of selling out — the post is clear on that — but the apparatus does what apparatus does.

Mara: The formal argument goes deeper than ticket prices. Drawing on Trotsky's Literature and Revolution, the post argues that Clarke's rapid-fire rhyme and list-poem structure are "perfectly suited to depicting a static world" — detail accumulates, the punchline resets everything, and nothing develops. It is, the post argues, the form of political exhaustion.

Pip: A form shaped by a generation that watched the miners lose and never saw the working class rise again. Irony as a refuge — Clarke made brilliance out of resignation, and the culture rewarded him for it once the politics had safely drained away.

Mara: Which brings in Toria Garbutt, who shares the tour's spotlight. Born in Yorkshire's mining towns, her work confronts poverty, addiction, and deindustrialisation's long aftermath — the post describes it as writing "from within the social wreckage" rather than from cultural nostalgia. Her presence is called more than a support slot: a signal that the tradition Clarke helped build is being renewed by artists shaped by a harsher era.

Pip: The world Clarke described in Beasley Street has not gone away — it has deepened. Food banks, bankrupt councils, wages eroded by inflation. The post's closing question is whether Have It engages that accelerating crisis, or whether audiences and industry alike will preserve Clarke in cultural aspic.

Mara: The post leaves that genuinely open. Clarke's limitations are called historical, not personal — a reflection of his generation's moment, not a verdict on the man.

Pip: Whether the new collection answers the moment, or the moment simply outpaces it — that is the question the tour is quietly staging.


Pip: A poet who captured a static world now tours a world that is visibly moving. That gap is doing a lot of work.

Mara: And the tradition he helped build is being picked up by writers for whom the wreckage is not heritage — it is the present. Worth watching what form that produces next time.

John Cooper Clarke’s Have It: The bard of Salford tours a country in decline.

John Cooper Clarke has always seemed slightly out of time, a figure who emerged fully formed from the late 1970s, as though spat out by the collapsing industrial North with a pair of drainpipes, a shock of hair and a voice that could turn complaint into incantation. He arrived as Britain’s postwar industrial base began to disintegrate, as the mills and factories that had shaped whole cities closed their doors, and as the working class that sustained them entered a period of historic defeat. Clarke’s style rapid‑fire rhyme, deadpan delivery, the ability to turn squalor into something approaching music felt inseparable from that world. It still does.

Now 77, he’s back on the road. His 20‑date tour of Britain and Ireland, running through October and November, accompanies Have It, his new collection. It follows WHAT (2024), the surprise bestseller that confirmed Clarke’s unlikely status as a national treasure. In 2025, he became the first poet to headline a British arena, taking the stage at Manchester’s Co‑op Live. He received a Northern Music Award. His poems appear on the national curriculum. The man who once read between sets by the Fall and the Buzzcocks, a poet of pubs, bedsits and bus shelters, is now part of the cultural establishment.

This transformation is not merely biographical. It is historical. Clarke’s career spans the period in which the working class that produced him was first defeated, then sentimentalised, and finally repackaged as cultural heritage. His rise tells a story not only about poetry but about Britain itself, about what has been lost, what has been preserved, and what has been embalmed. The industrial North that shaped his voice has been hollowed out, its communities fragmented by deindustrialisation, austerity and decades of political betrayal. Yet its image has been revived as a marketable aesthetic: gritty authenticity, northern humour, the romance of decline.

Clarke stands at the centre of this contradiction. He is both chronicler and exhibit, both witness to working‑class life and participant in its commodification. His success reflects his talent, but it also reflects a culture that has learned to celebrate the working class only after stripping it of political content. To understand Clarke’s late career and the new collection he now tours is to understand the Britain that made him, and the Britain that now sells him back to itself.

The contradictions of success

Clarke’s popularity is real and, in many ways, deserved. Few living writers have captured the physical and moral texture of postwar working‑class life with such precision. “Beasley Street” (1980) remains one of the most vivid portraits of urban dereliction in late‑industrial Britain: a place where “the rats have all got rickets” and “the men get drunk on Friday / And go to church on Sunday.” The poem smells of damp brick, chip‑shop fat, and the hopelessness of a city abandoned by capital.

Decades later, Clarke rewrote it as “Beasley Boulevard,” a sardonic commentary on regeneration, property speculation and the hollow promises of the new urbanism. The slum has been “revitalised,” but the underlying social reality remains unchanged. Taken together, the two poems form a kind of diptych: the industrial city as Thatcher left it, and the “revitalised” neighbourhood as Blair imagined it. Clarke’s work records, with bitter humour, the passage from one form of decline to another.

“Evidently Chickentown,” his breathless catalogue of frustration, still resonates with anyone who has lived on a run‑down estate. Its relentless rhythm, the piling up of grievances until they become absurd, captures something essential about life in a society where everything is broken but nothing changes.

His audiences, many of them working people in their fifties and sixties alongside younger fans drawn in through the Arctic Monkeys or The Sopranos, do not come for nostalgia. They come because Clarke describes their world accurately and treats it as worth describing. In a culture dominated by middle‑class self‑absorption, that is no small thing.

Yet the circumstances of the current tour cannot be ignored. At some venues, boxes cost close to £50 a head. The poet of the bedsit and the bus shelter is now marketed with the full apparatus of the entertainment industry. That apparatus turns rebellion into a brand. Clarke’s “trademark look” becomes a fashion item; his history in the deindustrialised North becomes a heritage attraction. None of this is his fault. It does, however, say something about how far the cultural layers that once called themselves “punk” have come to terms with the existing order.

The politics of form

The deeper issue is one of outlook. Clarke’s comedy targets the grim surface of capitalist society: the decaying high street, the brutal landlord, the pretensions of the newly rich. It rarely asks why that surface exists, or what social force might change it. His characteristic attitude is a wry, sometimes affectionate disgust. The world is absurd and squalid, and the best one can do is name it brilliantly.

That attitude belongs to its period. It was formed in the late 1970s and 1980s, after the defeat of the miners, the betrayals of the Labour and trade‑union bureaucracies, and the collapse of any mass socialist perspective in the working class. Many artists of that generation responded by withdrawing into irony. Clarke, gifted as he is, was no exception.

Trotsky wrote in Literature and Revolution that an artist’s form cannot be separated from the social soil that produced it. Clarke’s form the rapid‑fire rhyming list, the deadpan turn, the punchline that resets everything is extraordinarily effective at depicting a static world. It is less effective at depicting a world in motion.

This is not a moral failing. It is a historical one. Clarke’s technique embodies the period’s political exhaustion that shaped him. The rapid‑fire rhyme reduces the world to surface impressions; the list‑poem structure accumulates detail without development; the punchline ending offers closure without resolution. Everything resets. Nothing changes. It is the perfect form for a society in which the working class has been defeated and the future cancelled.

A world in motion

But the world is now moving fast. It arrives in a Britain of food banks, collapsing public services and wages eroded by years of inflation. The new Labour government continues austerity in name only. Councils go bankrupt while military budgets rise. Across Europe, the far right exploits the anger that the official “left” has abandoned. Young workers in Salford today confront conditions that Clarke’s original Beasley Street would recognise all too well.

The question, then, is whether Clarke’s new collection engages seriously with this situation, or offers more of the beloved routines. The tour publicity promises new material “alongside” fan favourites, a pairing that hints at the risk any veteran performer faces: being preserved in aspic by an audience that expects him to remain unchanged.

The cultural establishment and its limits

Clarke’s elevation to establishment status is not merely a personal triumph. It reflects a broader cultural pattern. Over the past two decades, Britain has developed a taste for working‑class authenticity provided it is safely packaged, politically neutral and available for consumption. The “heritage” version of the industrial North, with its flat caps, brass bands and gritty humour, has become a staple of television, advertising and tourism.

Clarke fits this pattern uneasily. His work is too sharp, too bitter, too accurate to be fully assimilated. But the industry tries anyway. The result is a strange double image: Clarke as both chronicler of decline and symbol of cultural resilience; both outsider and institution; both rebel and brand.

This contradiction is not his doing. It reflects a society that has lost the ability to imagine working‑class life except as nostalgia or entertainment. Clarke’s success testifies to his talent. It also reflects a culture that celebrates the working class only after stripping it of political content.

What remains

John Cooper Clarke’s late career invites a kind of double vision. On the one hand, he remains what he always was: a poet of the streets, a chronicler of the derelict and the absurd, a performer whose voice still carries the rhythms of the industrial North, decades after the factories fell silent. On the other hand, he has become an institution — celebrated, packaged, and circulated through the cultural economy as a symbol of working‑class authenticity. The tension between these two identities is not a personal contradiction but a historical one. It reflects the fate of the class that produced him, and how its memory is now used.

Clarke’s achievement is undeniable. For half a century he has insisted, against the grain of literary fashion, that poetry belongs not in seminar rooms but in pubs, clubs, and the mouths of people who were never meant to read it. He has given form to experiences official culture prefers to ignore: the damp bedsit, the boarded‑up shopfront, the petty humiliations of poverty, and the bleak humour that helps people endure them. In a society that often pathologises or sentimentalises working-class life, Clarke’s refusal to prettify anything becomes a moral stance.

Yet the limits of his work are inseparable from its strengths. Clarke’s form — the rapid‑fire rhyme, the list that piles up grievances until they become comic, the punchline that resets everything — is perfectly suited to depicting a static world. It is less suited to depicting a world in motion. His characteristic attitude, a wry and sometimes affectionate disgust, arose in a period when the working class had suffered historic defeats and no longer saw itself as a force capable of changing society. Irony became a refuge, and Clarke, like many artists of his generation, made brilliance out of resignation.

The world that produced that resignation has changed. Britain today is not merely shabby; it is unstable. Food banks proliferate, councils go bankrupt, wages stagnate, and public services collapse. A Labour government administers austerity with technocratic efficiency while military budgets rise. Across Europe, the far right exploits the anger that the official “left” has abandoned. The conditions Clarke described in “Beasley Street” have not disappeared; they have deepened and spread. But they no longer appear as permanent features of a static landscape. They appear as symptoms of a widening, accelerating crisis.

Whether Clarke’s new collection, Have It, engages with this reality is an open question. The tour promises new material “alongside” fan favourites — a pairing that suggests both continuity and risk. Audiences often want their icons to remain unchanged, and the entertainment industry is adept at preserving artists in cultural aspic. Yet Clarke shares the spotlight with younger poets like Toria Garbutt, one of the most compelling working-class voices to emerge from the post-industrial North in recent years. Born and raised in Yorkshire’s mining towns, her poetry confronts poverty, addiction, domestic violence, and the long aftermath of deindustrialisation with an honesty that avoids both sentimentality and despair. Garbutt’s work carries the cadence of the communities she writes about — sharp, musical, often darkly funny, and rooted in lived experience rather than cultural nostalgia. While Clarke’s generation often turned to irony in response to political defeat, Garbutt writes from within the social wreckage it produced, giving form to realities official culture still prefers to ignore. Her presence on Clarke’s tour is more than a support slot: it signals that the tradition of working-class poetry he helped popularise has not only survived but is being renewed by artists shaped by a different, harsher era.

Clarke’s limitations are not personal but historical. They reflect the exhaustion of a generation that saw the working class defeated and never saw it rise again. The revival of class struggle now visible across Britain and Europe will produce new artists, new forms, and new perspectives. It may also reveal the limits of those who made resignation into an aesthetic. Clarke’s best work captured the world as it was. Artists today must capture the world as it is becoming—and the forces that might change it.

Bibliography

Books and Collections

  • Clarke, John Cooper. Have It. London: Picador, 2026.
  • Clarke, John Cooper. WHAT. London: Picador, 2024.
  • Clarke, John Cooper. Ten Years in an Open-Necked Shirt. London: Arena, 1983.
  • Trotsky, Leon. Literature and Revolution. Translated by Rose Strunsky. London: Red Star Press, 1970.

Poems

  • Clarke, John Cooper. “Beasley Street.” Snap, Crackle & Bop. CBS Records, 1980.
  • Clarke, John Cooper. “Beasley Boulevard.” Zipcode. London: Vintage, 2013.
  • Clarke, John Cooper. “Evidently Chickentown.” Snap, Crackle & Bop. CBS Records, 1980.

Articles and Interviews

  • Brown, Helen. “John Cooper Clarke: The Bard of Salford Still Has It.” The Telegraph, 2025.
  • Simpson, Dave. “Punk’s Poet Laureate on Fame, Failure and the North.” The Guardian, 2024.
  • O’Hagan, Sean. “The Last of the Working‑Class Poets?” The Observer, 2023.

Context and History

  • Samuel, Raphael. Theatres of Memory: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture. London: Verso, 1994.
  • Hobsbawm, Eric. Industry and Empire. London: Penguin, 1999.
  • Stewart, Paul. Deindustrialisation and the Working Class in Britain. Manchester: MUP, 2018.

Oligarchy: Trump and the Breakdown of American Democracy, edited by David North, Mehring Books, 2026, 393 pp., $29.95

A Marxist Intervention into a Degraded Political Literature

Over the past decade, an enormous, largely superficial literature on Donald Trump has accumulated. It comprises memoirs by disillusioned staffers, psychological profiles, insider gossip, and endless liberal laments over violated norms. Yet this genre seldom asks the only question that matters to anyone seeking to understand the crisis of American democracy: In whose class interests does Trump rule? The new Mehring Books volume, *Oligarchy: Trump and the Breakdown of American Democracy*, edited by David North, chairperson of the International Editorial Board of the World Socialist Web Site, puts that question at the centre of its analysis and answers it with uncompromising clarity.

North’s foreword opens by rejecting the two dominant bourgeois explanations for Trump’s rise. The first, favoured by the liberal establishment, casts Trump as a monstrous aberration—a freakish intrusion into an otherwise healthy democratic system. The second, its reactionary mirror image, depicts him as a demonic political genius, a singular figure imposing his will on a helpless nation. Both explanations share the same flaw: they reduce a profound social process to one individual’s personality, obscuring the class forces that produced Trump and the material interests he serves.

Against these illusions, the volume insists on a historical materialist truth: Trump is not the cause of oligarchic rule but its political instrument. He did not create the conditions for authoritarianism; he emerged from them. His ascent reflects the interests of a financial oligarchy whose wealth and power have grown to grotesque proportions and whose relationship with democratic forms of rule has become openly hostile.

The book uses stark figures to make this reality clear. More than 900 American billionaires now control roughly $8.2 trillion—nearly twice the wealth of the population’s bottom half. Their political interventions are decisive, not symbolic. In 2024, Elon Musk spent more than $250 million to return Trump to the White House. It was rewarded with the Department of Government Efficiency, which he used to dismantle regulatory agencies and social programmes. Musk was not alone: Peter Thiel, Larry Ellison and Jeff Bezos, who had cultivated a liberal image for years, aligned themselves with a would-be dictator. They concluded that authoritarian rule would protect their wealth more reliably than the decaying institutions of bourgeois democracy.

This is the central argument of *Oligarchy*: Trumpism is not a departure from American capitalism, but its logical outcome amid terminal decline. The book places Trump’s rise within a half-century of economic and political degeneration. It examines the end of dollar–gold convertibility in 1971, the collapse of the postwar monetary order, decades of deindustrialisation, the trade union bureaucracy’s suppression of class struggle, the growth of financial parasitism, and the Stalinist dissolution of the USSR in 1991, which removed the last external restraint on American militarism. Trump did not create these processes; he is their political crystallisation.

By grounding its analysis in class relations rather than personality cults, the volume cuts through the fog of liberal moralism and reactionary mythmaking. It demonstrates that the crisis of American democracy cannot be understood through psychological speculation or appeals to civic virtue. It must be understood as the political expression of a ruling class that has become irreconcilably hostile to democratic constraints.

In this sense, *Oligarchy* is more than a book about Trump: it examines the social order that produced him and warns that defending democratic rights requires a struggle against the oligarchic power he represents. For workers and young people seeking to understand how American democracy reached its current state, this volume is indispensable.

The Oligarchs Behind the Throne

The book marshals figures that reveal Trumpism’s real social foundation. More than nine hundred American billionaires now control approximately eight point two trillion dollars—nearly twice the wealth held by the bottom half of the population. This concentration of wealth is no incidental feature of contemporary capitalism; it is the essential precondition for the political phenomena the book analyses. Trumpism is rooted in the interests of a ruling class whose fortunes have reached levels incompatible with democratic rule. The oligarchs who dominate American society have concluded that the traditional mechanisms of bourgeois democracy no longer reliably defend their wealth. Their turn toward authoritarianism is not a matter of personal preference, but of class necessity.

The book offers concrete examples of this oligarchic layer’s direct intervention in politics. In 2024, Elon Musk spent more than $250 million to help return Trump to the White House. In return, he gained the Department of Government Efficiency, a new bureaucratic instrument he used to dismantle regulatory bodies, social programmes, and environmental protections. Musk’s actions were not the eccentricities of one billionaire; they formed part of a coordinated movement among the financial elite. Peter Thiel, Larry Ellison, and Jeff Bezos, who had cultivated a liberal image for years, also threw their support behind Trump. Bezos’s shift was especially revealing: his earlier image as a socially progressive billionaire collapsed when preserving his wealth required authoritarian rule. The book shows that these figures did not merely support Trump as individuals. They represented a class whose interests were threatened by political instability and growing anger among the working population.

The oligarchs concluded that the decaying institutions of bourgeois democracy could no longer guarantee their dominance. Trump was their solution. He offered a form of rule that dispensed with the constraints of constitutional procedure and replaced them with executive fiat, militarised repression, and the cultivation of a fascist movement. The book argues that Trumpism is not an aberration but the political expression of a ruling class that has exhausted the democratic forms through which it once governed. The oligarchs did not choose Trump because he was charismatic or ideologically aligned with them. They chose him because he was willing to act as the instrument of their interests, and because his contempt for democratic norms made him uniquely suited to the tasks they required.

The book situates this development within a broader historical trajectory. The rise of Trumpism is inseparable from the long decline of American capitalism. The end of dollar–gold convertibility in 1971, the collapse of the postwar monetary order, decades of deindustrialisation, the trade union bureaucracy’s suppression of class struggle, and the hypertrophy of financial parasitism created a social landscape defined by inequality, insecurity, and political decay. The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 removed the last external restraint on American militarism and opened a period of unending war. These processes eroded the foundations of democratic governance and produced a ruling class increasingly reliant on coercion rather than consent.

In this context, the oligarchs’ support for Trump appears not as a sudden departure but as the culmination of a long process. The book shows that the financial elite did not merely tolerate Trump’s authoritarian tendencies. They encouraged them, financed them, and integrated them into the machinery of the state. Their actions reveal a ruling class that has abandoned any commitment to democratic principles and embraced a form of governance that protects its wealth through repression and violence.

The book’s analysis is therefore not limited to Trump as an individual. It is a study of the social order that produced him. It demonstrates that the crisis of American democracy cannot be understood through psychological speculation or moral condemnation. It must be understood as the political expression of a ruling class whose interests have become irreconcilable with democratic constraints. Trumpism is the form of rule that emerges when oligarchic wealth reaches a point where democracy becomes an obstacle rather than a mechanism of governance.

A History Written in Real Time

The book’s distinctive value lies in its method. It is not a retrospective reconstruction shaped by hindsight or by the smoothing effects of historical distance. It is a chronicle written as events unfolded, drawn from thousands of articles, statements, and lectures published by the World Socialist Web Site between 2015 and 2026. Each text was produced when the outcome of events was still uncertain, the political crisis was developing in real time, and the broader public had not yet fully recognised the dangers confronting the working class. Read sequentially, these documents form a running record of a political catastrophe. They show how a Marxist analysis, rooted in class relations rather than personality cults, made it possible to identify the emergence of a fascist conspiracy at a time when the media and political establishment dismissed it as bluster or theatrical excess.

The book shows that the WSWS could foresee the trajectory of Trumpism because it treated the phenomenon not as a psychological curiosity but as the political expression of deep historical processes. The rise of Trump is situated within the long decline of American capitalism, a decline that unfolded over half a century and reshaped every aspect of social and political life. The volume traces this decline through several decisive stages. It begins with the end of dollar–gold convertibility in 1971, which shattered the postwar monetary order and inaugurated a period of financial instability. It examines the decades of deindustrialisation that followed, during which entire regions of the United States were stripped of their industrial base and millions of workers were thrown into economic insecurity.

The book also analyses how the trade union bureaucracy suppressed class struggle, transforming unions from defensive working-class organisations into instruments of corporate management. This suppression created a political vacuum that reactionary forces could exploit. The hypertrophy of financial parasitism further intensified the crisis. The growth of speculative capital, Wall Street’s dominance over productive industry, and the economy’s transformation into a mechanism for enriching a narrow elite produced levels of inequality incompatible with democratic stability.

Finally, the volume emphasises the significance of the Stalinist dissolution of the USSR in 1991. This event removed the last external restraint on American militarism and opened a period of unbroken war. The United States embarked on a global campaign of military interventions, coups, and occupations, and the methods used abroad increasingly shaped domestic political life. The erosion of democratic norms, the expansion of executive power, and the militarisation of the state were not accidental developments. They were the internal consequences of imperialist policy.

This is the historical terrain on which Trump emerged. The book shows that you cannot understand his rise apart from these long-term processes. Trumpism is not an aberration but the political crystallisation of a declining social order. The WSWS recognised this because it analysed events through the lens of class struggle and historical materialism. The book’s method is therefore inseparable from its conclusions. It demonstrates that only a Marxist perspective can make sense of the crisis of American democracy and reveal the forces driving it toward authoritarian rule.

Part One (2015–2020): The Social Roots of Trumpism

Part One examines the conditions that produced Trump. It begins from the premise that his rise cannot be understood apart from the social devastation inflicted on the American working class, the bipartisan commitment to imperialist war, and the Democratic Party’s promotion of identity politics as a substitute for any challenge to capitalist power. The book shows that Trump did not emerge from a political vacuum. He arose from a society marked by inequality, militarism, and the systematic suppression of class struggle. These conditions were not created by one party or one administration. They were the cumulative product of decades in which both parties of the ruling class dismantled social protections, enriched the financial elite, and cultivated forms of politics that obscured the real sources of social misery.

A central contribution of the WSWS during this period was its early rejection of the slander, promoted by Democrats and the media, that Trump was the creation of a reactionary white working class. This narrative served two essential purposes. First, it absolved the two-party system of responsibility for the social catastrophe it had produced. By blaming workers for Trump’s rise, the political establishment avoided any examination of the policies that had destroyed jobs, gutted communities, and created the conditions for widespread anger. Second, it redirected popular anger downward, away from the financial elite from which Trump himself emerged. The myth of the reactionary worker transformed legitimate social grievances into a moral failing. It let the ruling class present itself as democracy’s defender against the very people it had impoverished.

The book shows that this narrative was not merely false but politically dangerous. It obscured the real class forces behind Trump and prevented any serious analysis of the authoritarian tendencies developing within the state. The WSWS insisted that Trump’s base was not the working class but sections of the petty bourgeoisie, elements of the police and military, and layers of the financial elite who saw in him a vehicle for their interests. This analysis shows the first term not as chaotic improvisation but as the deliberate laying of foundations for a fascist movement.

The first term witnessed the growth of armed militias, the encouragement of vigilante violence, and the cultivation of a political culture defined by resentment and nationalism. Anti-immigrant agitation became a central organising principle of the administration, used to divide workers and legitimise the expansion of state repression. Executive power grew rapidly, with Trump asserting the right to override legal constraints and govern through decree. These developments were not isolated episodes. They formed part of a coherent political strategy to create a movement capable of overturning democratic norms and establishing a form of rule suited to the oligarchy’s needs.

Part One therefore provides more than a chronicle of events. It offers a framework for understanding how social decay, political opportunism, and class interests combined to produce a movement that threatened the foundations of American democracy. It shows that Trumpism was not an accident but the expression of a ruling class that had lost confidence in democratic mechanisms and turned toward authoritarian solutions.

Part Two: The 2020 Coup and Its Cover‑Up

Part Two reconstructs the conspiracy to overturn the 2020 election and shows that January 6 was not an eruption of spontaneous chaos but the culmination of a coordinated effort to nullify the vote and impose authoritarian rule. The book presents January 6 as the endpoint of a months-long plot involving parts of the Republican Party, layers of the state apparatus, and influential figures in the financial elite. Trump was the figurehead of this operation, but he was not its sole architect. The conspiracy developed through legal challenges, pressure campaigns, the mobilisation of fascist groups, and the deliberate creation of conditions in which violence could be used to achieve political ends.

The WSWS identified this danger early because it analysed the unfolding crisis through the lens of class interests rather than through the personal behaviour of Trump. The book shows that the coup attempt was rooted in the needs of an oligarchy that viewed democratic procedures as an obstacle to its wealth and power. The refusal to accept the election results was not a psychological reaction but a political strategy. It aimed to create a precedent for overturning future elections and to establish a form of rule in which executive authority could override constitutional constraints.

The Biden administration’s response is presented as a cover-up. By reducing the conspiracy to the actions of one man and a mob, Biden shielded the network of officials, financiers, and Republican leaders who orchestrated the plot. The administration insisted that the country needed a strong Republican Party, even as that party had just attempted to overturn an election. The January 6 committee spent eighteen months narrowing its investigation until it resembled a criminal case against a single individual rather than an examination of a broad political conspiracy. This approach protected the stability of the two-party system and kept from exposure the class interests that drove the coup attempt.

The book argues that the cover-up was not a failure of political courage but a deliberate act. The Democratic Party shares with the Republicans a commitment to defending oligarchic wealth and American imperialism. To expose the real forces behind January 6 would have required confronting the financial elite, the military and police apparatus, and the political structures that sustain capitalist rule. The Democrats chose instead to present the coup as an aberration, a moment of madness, rather than as the logical outcome of decades of social decay and political reaction.

Eric London’s August 2021 lecture on the social origins of the conspiracy stands out as one of the volume’s most incisive analyses. London traces the roots of the coup attempt to the long decline of American capitalism, rising social inequality, and the ruling class’s increasing reliance on authoritarian methods. He shows that January 6 was not an isolated event but part of a broader movement toward oligarchic rule. His lecture provides the theoretical foundation for understanding why the coup occurred and why the political establishment refused to confront its real causes. Part Two therefore offers more than a narrative of January 6. It provides a framework for understanding the breakdown of American democracy and the class forces driving it.

Part Three: The Second Term and the Open Dictatorship of the Oligarchy

Part Three chronicles the second Trump administration and presents it as the moment when the oligarchy assumed direct command of the state. The book shows that the first term’s authoritarian tendencies not only intensified but also became systematised. What had previously been preparatory measures became the foundation of a new form of rule. The administration operated on the premise that democratic norms were obstacles to be circumvented and that preserving oligarchic wealth required using state power in its most coercive form.

One defining feature of the second term was the declaration of a state of exception. Drawn from the theory of authoritarian rule, this concept refers to a situation in which the executive claims the right to suspend legal constraints in the name of national security or public order. The book shows that this declaration did not respond to any genuine emergency. It was a political instrument used to concentrate power in the presidency and create a legal environment in which repression could occur without accountability. The state of exception became the framework through which the administration justified its actions, from domestic deployments to foreign interventions.

The book documents the deployment of ICE paramilitaries and federal troops into American cities. These forces were used not to protect the population but to intimidate it. Their presence in urban centres signalled a shift from traditional policing to militarised occupation. The administration relied on these units to suppress protests, break strikes, and enforce executive directives. The use of paramilitary forces against civilians revealed the extent to which the state had been transformed into an instrument of oligarchic rule.

The killings carried out by federal agents, including the atrocities in Minneapolis in January 2026, are presented as emblematic of this transformation. The book treats these events not as isolated abuses but as expressions of a political strategy that relied on terror to maintain control. The violence in Minneapolis demonstrated the willingness of the administration to use lethal force against the population and the inability of existing institutions to restrain it. The response of the political establishment, which sought to minimise or justify the killings, further exposed the complicity of both parties in the erosion of democratic rights.

The second term also saw the illegal invasion of Venezuela. This action was justified through familiar rhetoric about restoring order and promoting democracy, but the book shows that its real purpose was to secure strategic and economic interests. The invasion marked a new stage in American imperialism, one in which military aggression was carried out without even the pretence of congressional oversight. The war against Iran, launched on February 28, 2026, followed the same pattern. It was an act of aggression driven by geopolitical calculations and carried out solely under the executive’s authority.

Part Three presents these developments as the anatomy of an authoritarian regime serving capitalist interests. It shows that the second Trump administration did not merely violate democratic norms. It replaced them with a system of rule designed to protect the oligarchy’s wealth and power through repression, militarism, and the dismantling of constitutional constraints.

Accomplices and Enablers: Republicans, Democrats, and the Pseudo‑Left

The book’s most politically significant sections focus not on Trump himself but on the forces that made his rise possible. Trump did not ascend to power through personal magnetism or ideological coherence. A ruling class saw him as a useful instrument, and political institutions that had long abandoned democratic principles elevated him. The book therefore turns its attention to the Republicans, the Democrats, and the pseudo-left, showing how each played an indispensable role in the breakdown of American democracy.

The Republicans are presented as willing accomplices. They embraced Trump as the vehicle for oligarchic rule and recognised that his contempt for democratic norms aligned with their own strategic interests. The party leadership understood that Trump’s authoritarian tendencies could be harnessed to implement policies that enriched the financial elite, expanded military power, and dismantled regulatory constraints. The book shows that Republican support for Trump was not reluctant or tactical. It was enthusiastic and rooted in a shared class outlook. Trump did not cause the party’s transformation into an openly reactionary force. It predated him and made his rise possible.

The book portrays the Democrats as indispensable enablers. The book argues that the Democratic Party is ruthless against opponents on its left but impotent against Trump because it shares his commitment to defending capitalist wealth and American imperialism. The record is damning. After the 2016 election, Barack Obama described the contest as a scrimmage between members of the same team, revealing how both parties operate within a shared ideological framework. Two days after the events of January 6, Joe Biden declared that the country needed a strong Republican Party, even though that party had just attempted to overturn an election. The January 6 committee spent eighteen months reducing a broad conspiracy to the crimes of one man, thereby shielding the network of officials, financiers, and political operatives who orchestrated the plot. The Biden administration served as an interregnum devoted to securing bipartisan support for war in Ukraine and for policies that contributed to the suffering of civilians in Gaza. These actions show that the Democrats’ primary concern was not defending democratic institutions but preserving the stability of the two-party system and protecting the interests of the ruling class.

The book also examines the role of the pseudo-left. Figures such as Bernie Sanders denounced the billionaire class in rhetoric but ultimately reinforced the Democratic Party’s authority. Sanders endorsed Hillary Clinton in 2016 and later offered to work with Trump, signalling his willingness to subordinate social opposition to the needs of the political establishment. Jacobin, the magazine associated with the Democratic Socialists of America, avoided the coup almost entirely. Its silence reflected a political orientation that prioritised access to the Democratic Party over any serious confrontation with the forces threatening democratic rights. The pseudo-left is presented as a political tendency that channels social anger back into bourgeois political structures and prevents the emergence of an independent working-class movement.

By analysing these forces together, the book shows that Trumpism was not an isolated phenomenon. It expressed a political system in which both major parties and their ideological satellites had abandoned any commitment to democratic principles. The Republicans acted as the architects of authoritarian rule. The Democrats provided the cover that allowed it to develop—the pseudo-left neutralised opposition from below. Trump benefited from this alignment, but the forces that sustained him were far larger and far more dangerous than any individual.

The Social Opposition and the Question of Leadership

Against this record of capitulation from the political establishment, the book documents a continuous and determined opposition from below. It begins with the mass protests that erupted on Trump’s first day in office, demonstrations that revealed a broad social revulsion toward authoritarianism and inequality. It continues through the multiracial uprising that followed the murder of George Floyd, an eruption of anger that exposed the brutality of the American state and the depth of social injustice. The book then turns to the No Kings demonstrations of 2025 and 2026, the largest single-day protests in American history, in which millions rejected attempts to impose monarchical or dictatorial rule. These movements were spontaneous, diverse, and often politically inchoate, but they expressed a profound social reality. The objective basis for a mass socialist movement exists. What is missing is conscious revolutionary leadership.

The programme advanced by the volume is therefore clear and uncompromising. It calls for forming rank-and-file committees independent of the union bureaucracy, which has long served as an instrument of corporate management and a barrier to genuine working-class struggle. It insists on the working class’s political independence from both capitalist parties, rejecting the illusion that the Democratic Party can serve as a vehicle for social reform or democratic renewal. It advocates the international unification of workers in the struggle against war and fascism on a socialist programme, recognising that the crisis of American democracy is inseparable from the global crisis of capitalism and cannot be resolved within national boundaries.

The book situates this programme within a broader historical framework. It appears on the eve of the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the American Revolution, a moment that invites reflection on the democratic principles that shaped the nation’s origins. The volume argues that a ruling class openly contemptuous of 1776’s egalitarian ideals now governs the country. The commitment to popular sovereignty, equality, and resistance to tyranny that animated the first American Revolution has been replaced by a political order defined by oligarchic wealth, militarism, and authoritarianism.

The book connects this contempt to the WSWS’s polemic against the New York Times’ 1619 Project. That project sought to recast the American Revolution and the Civil War as episodes in an eternal racial conflict, stripping them of their democratic content and obscuring their significance as revolutionary struggles. The volume argues that such interpretations serve the interests of a ruling class that wishes to sever the working class from its own revolutionary heritage. By reducing the past to racial antagonism, the 1619 Project denies the possibility of universal emancipation and undermines the historical foundations of a socialist movement.

The democratic principles of the first two American revolutions can be defended and extended only by a third. The book insists that the working class must conquer political power and reorganise economic life on socialist foundations. This is not a rhetorical flourish but a historical conclusion drawn from the contradictions of contemporary capitalism. The concentration of wealth, the militarisation of society, the erosion of democratic institutions, and the descent into perpetual war have created conditions in which democratic rights cannot survive without a fundamental transformation of the social order. The working class must complete the unfinished tasks of American history by establishing a society based on equality, rational planning, and collective ownership.

The book closes with a fictional Letter from Afar by Abraham Lincoln. This device allows the authors to draw a direct line between the moral and political struggles of the nineteenth century and those of the present. In the letter, Lincoln argues that capitalism today is as intolerable as slavery was in his time. He insists that Trump is a symptom, not the disease, and that the real enemy is a social system that produces inequality, violence, and authoritarianism. The letter reminds us that the fight for democracy has always required revolutionary action and that the working class must assume the role once played by the abolitionists and the soldiers of the Union Army.

The book’s conclusion is stark and unambiguous. Humanity faces a choice between fascism and socialism. Reforms, appeals to civility, and reliance on existing political institutions cannot resolve the crisis of American democracy. It requires a conscious working-class movement, armed with a socialist programme and guided by historical understanding. Oligarchy is essential reading for every worker and young person seeking to understand how American democracy reached this point and what must be done to prevent catastrophe. It calls for action and warns that today’s choices will determine the future.

Bibliography

North, David, ed. Oligarchy: Trump and the Breakdown of American Democracy. Mehring Books, 2026.

North, David. “Foreword.” In Oligarchy: Trump and the Breakdown of American Democracy. Mehring Books, 2026.

London, Eric. “The Social Origins of the January 6 Conspiracy.” Lecture delivered August 2021. World Socialist Web Site.

International Editorial Board of the World Socialist Web Site. Articles, statements, and analyses published between 2015 and 2026. World Socialist Web Site. https://www.wsws.org

World Socialist Web Site. Coverage of the 2020 election crisis, the January 6 coup attempt, and the second Trump administration. https://www.wsws.org

World Socialist Web Site. “The New York Times’ 1619 Project and the Falsification of History.” Series of articles and critiques, 2019–2020.

North, David. The New York Times’ 1619 Project and the Racialist Falsification of History. Mehring Books, 2021.

North, David. The Crisis of American Democracy: The Political and Social Roots of the Breakdown. Mehring Books, 2024.

Mehring Books. Publications on American politics, imperialism, and the crisis of capitalism, 2015–2026. https://mehring.com

Federal Reserve Data. Wealth distribution statistics for American billionaires and the bottom half of the population, 2024–2026.

Public campaign finance records. Documentation of political contributions by Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, Larry Ellison, and Jeff Bezos, 2023–2024.

United States Department of Defence. Public statements and records relating to military operations in Venezuela and Iran, 2025–2026.

United States Department of Homeland Security. Public records concerning ICE deployments and federal paramilitary actions, 2025–2026.

Historical sources on the American Revolution and Civil War—primary documents from 1776 and 1861, including speeches, letters, and constitutional debates.

Lincoln, Abraham. “Letter from Afar.” Fictional reconstruction in Oligarchy: Trump and the Breakdown of American Democracy. Mehring Books, 2026.

Podcast Episode: Bread, Circuses and Balance Sheets: The IFR’s State of the Game and the Crisis o

Pip: A 244-page government report concludes that English football generates nine billion pounds a year and nearly every club loses money — and calls this a paradox. freerein61 has a different word for it.

Mara: The post is a Marxist reading of the Independent Football Regulator's State of the Game report, covering financialisation, ownership, labour, and what a regulator can and cannot do. Let's start with the report itself and what it actually reveals.

Bread, Circuses and Balance Sheets: The IFR's Report and Capitalist Football

Pip: The IFR presents its State of the Game report as sober, technocratic analysis — a neutral audit of English football's finances. The post's argument is that the document is actually something more uncomfortable: an accidental indictment of the system the regulator was built to protect.

Mara: The post frames it this way: "Its authors describe a 'paradox' at the heart of the sport: unprecedented wealth alongside systemic insolvency. A Marxist analysis shows there is no paradox at all. What the IFR calls a puzzle is simply capitalism's logic asserting itself with brutal clarity."

Pip: That reframe is the spine of the whole piece. If the wealth and the insolvency are not separate phenomena but two sides of the same process, then the regulator's toolkit — stress tests, action plans, enhanced oversight — is aimed at the wrong target entirely.

Mara: The numbers bear that out. Premier League revenue has grown thirty-fold since 1992, but costs have risen faster. Ninety-four per cent of clubs in the top five divisions lose money. The post notes that seventeen EFL and National League clubs would lose money even if they paid their players nothing — which rather undercuts the report's framing of wage inflation as the root cause.

Pip: So the disease is structural, and the regulator is prescribing paracetamol.

Mara: On financialisation specifically, the data are striking. Transfer factoring has increased fourteen-fold in four years. One point two billion pounds in future transfer receipts has already been sold. Interest payments have quadrupled. Five lenders control 93.6 per cent of the transfer finance market. The post reads this as fictitious capital in Marx's strict sense — value that does not yet exist, monetised and spent before it is earned.

Pip: Clubs selling tomorrow's income to survive today's arms race. The post is clear that this is not mismanagement; it is what the structure compels.

Mara: Ownership tells a similar story. Non-domestic owners control 75 per cent of Premier League revenue. North American capital controls nearly half the pyramid. The average indicative return across clubs is minus 41 per cent, yet capital keeps flowing in. The post argues this is not irrational — football offers soft power, speculative upside, and, as the IFR itself notes, exposure to money laundering through offshore structures and opaque sponsorship arrangements.

Pip: A loss-making investment that doubles as a geopolitical branding exercise and a conduit for surplus capital. The post also takes the regulator's own stated priorities as evidence of its limits — its first distribution goal is preserving the Premier League as the world's leading league, and the top club earns 605 times the revenue of the smallest National League side.

Mara: Engels described the capitalist state as the "ideal collective capitalist" — managing the system's common affairs to preserve it as a whole. The post applies that framework directly to the IFR: a regulator the Premier League endorsed, whose tools stop well short of challenging debt dependency, multi-club ownership, or the private model itself.

Pip: Fans get a voice, not a vote. Supporters must be "considered." The post's alternative — pooled broadcast income, debt caps, 50-plus-one ownership, community control of grounds — is framed not as utopian but as the minimum required to reverse what the report documents.

Mara: The closing argument is that the IFR has produced the most detailed evidence yet of football's transformation into a financial asset class, while its prescriptions aim only to make that asset class more orderly. The regulator can manage symptoms; it cannot cure the disease.

Pip: Which means the most damning thing about the report is not what it gets wrong — it's how much it gets right, and what it refuses to conclude.


Mara: The IFR's own data make the case that the post is arguing — the regulator just declines to follow it to its conclusion.

Pip: A 244-page document that describes the disease in forensic detail and then recommends better handwashing. The next episode will have more to say about who gets to ask the harder questions.

Bread, Circuses and Balance Sheets: The IFR’s State of the Game and the Crisis of Capitalist Football

The Independent Football Regulator’s State of the Game report presents itself as a sober, technocratic assessment of English football’s financial health. In reality, it is an extraordinary document: a 244-page anatomy of a social institution hollowed out by capitalist irrationality—and an unwitting indictment of the very economic system the regulator exists to stabilise. Its authors describe a “paradox” at the heart of the sport: unprecedented wealth alongside systemic insolvency. A Marxist analysis shows there is no paradox at all. What the IFR calls a puzzle is simply capitalism’s logic asserting itself with brutal clarity.

English football today is the clearest example of competitive accumulation. Clubs are compelled to spend beyond their means—not because they are reckless or poorly managed, but because the industry’s structure leaves them little choice. Since 1992, Premier League revenue has grown thirty-fold, far outpacing the wider economy, while costs have risen even faster. Ninety-four per cent of clubs in the top five divisions lose money. This is not a departure from capitalist norms; it is their fulfilment. The IFR cannot acknowledge this, because doing so would mean admitting that the crisis is systemic, not accidental.

The report’s own data show how sport has been transformed into a financial asset class. Labour-power is converted into amortised capital, future transfer fees are sold off as fictitious capital, grounds and badges are pledged as collateral, and a handful of lenders extract value regardless of sporting outcomes. Football has become a site of financialisation, governed not by sporting logic but by the imperatives of debt, leverage and speculative investment. The IFR documents this process in forensic detail while refusing to confront its implications.

Ownership patterns point to the same reality: global capital, multi-club networks, and North American investment groups dominate the game. Returns are overwhelmingly negative, yet capital keeps flowing in—not for sporting reasons, but because football offers global reach, cultural legitimacy, and opportunities for speculation, soft power, and, as the report notes, money laundering.

The regulator’s role is not to challenge this system, but to preserve it. Its proposals amount to managerial tinkering that keeps the Premier League dominant and the pyramid intact, while leaving the underlying relations of ownership, finance, and exploitation untouched. Rather than resolve football’s contradictions, the IFR merely catalogues them, revealing the need for a fundamentally different model.

The so‑called paradox: wealth without stability

David Kogan’s foreword presents English football as both the world’s richest, most competitive league system and one on the verge of collapse. The figures are stark: clubs generated £9 billion in revenue last season, yet 94 per cent of those in the top five divisions lost money. No other major industry could report such figures without prompting immediate questions about systemic failure. Yet the IFR treats this as a managerial problem: poor governance, inadequate oversight, and clubs failing to “live within their means.” This is the ideological reflex of bourgeois regulation: to blame crises on individual actors’ behaviour rather than on the system’s structure.

A Marxist analysis begins from the opposite premise. When nearly every firm in an industry fails in the same way, the cause lies not in management but in the structure of accumulation. Marx explained long ago that competition forces capitalists to expand, invest and outspend their rivals to survive. The capitalist does not accumulate because he is greedy or irrational; the system compels him to. English football clearly illustrates this dynamic. Clubs spend beyond their means not because they are reckless, but because they have to. Falling behind in the competitive arms race risks relegation, lost broadcast income, collapsing commercial revenue and, ultimately, extinction.

The IFR’s own data confirm this. Since 1992, Premier League revenue has grown thirty-fold, far outpacing the wider economy, while costs have risen even faster. Wage bills, transfer amortisation, agent fees, stadium financing, and debt servicing have all increased alongside revenue. The report presents this as a failure of “financial management,” as if clubs could spend less without jeopardising their competitive position. But in a system driven by accumulation, restraint is punished. A club that refuses to overspend isn’t prudent; it gets relegated.

This is why the IFR cannot acknowledge the crisis’s real nature. To do so would mean admitting that the contradictions it describes are not deviations from normal capitalist functioning, but its inevitable outcome. The regulator must therefore frame the crisis as a technical problem—liquidity, governance, and risk—rather than a structural one. It must pretend that stress tests, action plans, and “enhanced oversight” can correct football’s financial instability, rather than fundamentally transforming ownership, finance, and distribution.

The report’s language reflects this ideological constraint. Kogan describes a “paradox”: unprecedented wealth alongside systemic insolvency, as though the two were unrelated phenomena that mysteriously coexist. But there is no paradox: wealth and insolvency are two sides of the same process. The more revenue the game generates, the more capital flows in. The more capital flows in, the sharper the competitive pressures become. As those pressures intensify, clubs must spend more, and their losses deepen. The IFR describes the symptoms while refusing to name the disease.

The Political Economy of Football’s Financialisation

To understand the IFR’s findings, we should place English football within the broader political economy of late capitalism. Over the past three decades, it has undergone the same transformation as other major sectors of the global economy: a shift from production to financialisation, from profits generated through activity to profits extracted through ownership, leverage and speculation. Once a commercial entertainment industry, football has become a financial asset class, governed less by sporting logic than by the imperatives of capital accumulation.

This transformation did not happen overnight. Football’s first metamorphosis—from a working-class pastime to a commercial commodity—came in the early twentieth century. Its second, from commodity to global media product, gathered pace with television and culminated in the Premier League’s 1992 reorganisation. But the decisive shift came after the 2008 financial crisis, when the collapse of productive investment across advanced capitalist economies pushed capital into new fields of speculation. With its global reach, predictable revenue streams and intense brand loyalty, football became an ideal arena for financial expansion.

Financialisation means that profit comes less from producing goods or services and more from manipulating financial instruments. In football, it turns every aspect of the sport into a tradable asset. Player contracts are amortised like industrial machinery; future transfer fees are sold as receivables; and stadiums, training grounds and even club badges are used as collateral. Multi-club ownership groups operate like private equity portfolios, moving players, revenues and liabilities across borders to maximise returns. Debt is no longer a temporary burden but a permanent operating condition.

The IFR’s own data show the scale of this transformation. Transfer factoring has increased fourteen-fold in four years, and £1.2 billion in future transfer receipts has already been monetised. Interest payments have quadrupled as borrowing costs have surged, while five lenders now control almost the entire transfer finance market. This is no marginal development; it is a structural reorganisation of the sport, driven by the dominance of finance capital.

Marx, Hilferding and Lenin all described how, once dominant, financial capital subordinates productive activity to its own logic. That logic now governs English football. Clubs borrow not to invest in long-term development, but to keep pace with the competitive arms race. They sell future transfer fees not out of prudence, but because the system compels them. Financialisation does not stabilise football; it destabilises it, creating fragility, dependency and exposure to shocks. Relegation clauses mean sporting failure can trigger creditor seizure, reducing clubs to shells through which capital circulates.

Why football? Because it offers what late capitalism craves: scarcity, global visibility, emotional attachment and cultural legitimacy. It is one of the few sectors where losses can be tolerated for years because the club retains symbolic value as an asset. As the IFR notes, the sector is also vulnerable to money laundering, offshore structures, and opaque sponsorship arrangements. Distressed clubs become conduits for capital flows unrelated to sport.

The IFR documents this transformation with forensic detail while refusing to confront its implications. It describes the symptoms of financialisation, debt dependency, factoring, and multi‑club networks, but treats them as technical problems rather than structural ones. It cannot admit that English football’s crisis is not a deviation from capitalist functioning but its fulfilment. To do so would be to question the very model the regulator exists to preserve.

From commodity to media product to financial instrument

Football’s first transformation from a working-class pastime into a commercial commodity occurred in the early 20th century, as clubs evolved from voluntary associations into businesses selling gate receipts, advertising space, and professional players’ labour-power. Its second transformation from commodity to media product followed the rise of television and culminated in the Premier League’s 1992 reorganisation. Broadcasting turned football into a mass-produced cultural product, shaped by scheduling, advertising, and global distribution. But the decisive shift came after the 2008 financial crisis, when football became a financial instrument.

This is not a metaphor; it is literal. Clubs borrow against future transfer fees. Contracts are amortised like industrial machinery. Clubs pledge grounds and badges as collateral. Revenues are securitised. Multi-club groups operate like private equity portfolios. Every component of the sport- labour, infrastructure, intellectual property, and future income- is converted into an asset that can be traded, leveraged, or used as security. The IFR’s data show the scale of this transformation with forensic clarity: transfer factoring has risen fourteen-fold in four years, £1.2 billion of future receipts have already been sold, interest payments have quadrupled as the cost of debt has surged, and five lenders control almost the entire market for transfer finance. This is not a marginal development; it is the sport’s structural reorganisation under the dominance of finance capital.

What Hilferding described in *Finance Capital*- the fusion of banking and industrial capital into a financial oligarchy that extracts value regardless of productive outcomes- is now evident on the balance sheets of English football clubs. Lenin’s analysis of how these oligarchies dominate entire sectors and turn them into instruments of speculation applies with almost uncanny precision. English football has become one of those sectors.

Financialisation means profit comes less from producing goods or services and more from manipulating financial instruments. In football, this shows up in the conversion of every aspect of the sport into tradable assets: player contracts become depreciating capital goods, transfer fees become receivables, stadiums become collateral, clubs become vehicles for debt-fuelled expansion, and multi-club networks become platforms for arbitrage, talent extraction, and regulatory evasion.

The consequences are profound. Financialisation does not stabilise football; it destabilises it, creating fragility, dependency and exposure to shocks. Relegation clauses mean sporting failure can trigger creditor seizure, while clubs become shells through which capital circulates. The IFR documents this fragility but cannot explain it, because doing so would require acknowledging that the instability is structural, not accidental.

Why football? Because it offers exactly what late capitalism craves: scarcity, global visibility, emotional attachment and cultural legitimacy. Few sectors can absorb years of losses while their core asset- the club- retains symbolic value. As the IFR itself notes, football is also vulnerable to money laundering, offshore structures and opaque sponsorship arrangements. Distressed clubs can become conduits for capital flows unrelated to sport.

Financialisation also helps explain why capital continues to flow into football despite negative returns. The IFR reports an average indicative return of minus 41 per cent across clubs, yet ownership is becoming more global, institutional and concentrated. This is not irrational; it reflects financial capital’s pursuit of control over assets it can leverage, securitise, or use to anchor broader commercial ecosystems. A Premier League club is more than a football team: it is a content engine, a data-harvesting platform, a global brand, a political instrument and a financial vehicle.

The IFR describes the symptoms of this transformation- debt dependency, factoring, and multi-club networks- but treats them as technical rather than structural problems. It cannot admit that English football’s crisis is not a deviation from capitalism but its fulfilment. Doing so would mean questioning the very model the regulator exists to preserve.

Why football?

Football is uniquely suited to financialisation because it possesses characteristics that make it a coveted prize for capital. Few industries offer such a potent combination of global reach, emotional intensity, predictable revenue, scarcity and cultural legitimacy. These features are not incidental; they are precisely what make football attractive to finance capital in an era of stagnation, falling productive investment and the search for new fields of extraction.

Its global reach is unmatched. The Premier League reaches hundreds of millions of homes, giving capital access to a ready-made global consumer base. In a world of saturated traditional markets, football offers immediate access to audiences on every continent. Its emotional connection is even more valuable. Football clubs command a level of brand loyalty that no commercial product can replicate. Supporters do not switch allegiances based on price or quality. Their loyalty is inherited, irrational and lifelong. For capital, this is ideal: a captive market whose consumption is driven by identity rather than choice.

Football also offers predictable revenue streams. Broadcast rights, sponsorships, merchandise, digital content and hospitality packages bring in recurring income that can be securitised, borrowed against and bundled into financial products. Predictability is the lifeblood of financialisation. Then there is scarcity. Only a handful of elite clubs exist, and there is just one Premier League. Scarcity drives valuations, intensifies competition among investors and ensures that even failing clubs retain symbolic and financial value.

Finally, football enjoys cultural legitimacy. It presents itself as tradition, community, and heritage, masking the extraction taking place beneath the surface. This legitimacy gives political cover to private equity firms, sovereign wealth funds, and multinational corporations. In a low-growth economy, football offers something rare: an asset class with global visibility and political utility. It serves as a vehicle for surplus capital, a platform for soft power, and, as the IFR itself notes, a conduit for money laundering through offshore structures, opaque transfers, and sponsorship. Football’s financialisation is no accident. It is structural, and the IFR merely catalogues its symptoms.

Financialisation as crisis

Financialisation does not stabilise football; it destabilises it. The IFR’s own data reveal a sport whose financial architecture has been reshaped around debt, leverage and speculative instruments. Debt dependency, transfer factoring, leveraged ownership and sprawling multi-club networks do not build resilience; they create fragility. They tie clubs to financial obligations that become more burdensome precisely when sporting performance declines. Relegation clauses now embedded in most Premier League loans mean sporting failure can trigger creditor seizure when a club is at its weakest. A bad season becomes not just a sporting setback but a financial catastrophe. Clubs stop being community institutions and become shells through which capital circulates.

Factoring shows this dynamic with brutal clarity. When a club sells future transfer receipts to raise cash now, it mortgages tomorrow’s income to cope with today’s pressures. This is fictitious capital in Marx’s strict sense: value that does not yet exist, monetised and traded as if it were already real. The IFR reports that factoring has increased fourteen-fold in four years, with £1.2 billion in future receipts already sold. This is not prudent financial management; it is a symptom of systemic desperation. Clubs are not planning for the future; they are consuming it.

Leveraged ownership compounds the instability. Owners buy clubs with borrowed money, load the debt onto the club, and extract returns through management fees, refinancing, and asset sales. Multi‑club networks extend this logic across borders, treating clubs as nodes in a financial ecosystem rather than as sporting entities. Players move to meet balance‑sheet needs rather than tactical ones. Revenues are shifted to optimise tax and regulatory arbitrage. The club becomes a financial vehicle first and a football team second.

The IFR’s report is, unintentionally, a catalogue of these contradictions. It describes a sport that generates enormous wealth but cannot sustain itself, because financial channels siphon that wealth away before it can stabilise the system. The crisis is not accidental; it is structural. Football’s financial instability is not caused by mismanagement, incompetence or isolated excess. It is the predictable result of reorganising the sport around the imperatives of financial capital. The regulator documents the symptoms but cannot name the cause. Doing so would mean acknowledging that English football’s crisis is not a deviation from capitalism but an expression of it and that no amount of technocratic oversight can resolve contradictions rooted in the system itself.

Labour as a cost, labour as an asset, labour as a battleground

The report’s treatment of labour is revealing. The report presents players almost exclusively as a cost, a liability to manage, rather than as the producers of the commodity behind the game’s enormous revenues. Wage bills have risen 33 per cent across the Premier League pyramid, 32 per cent in the Championship, 71 per cent in League One, and 63 per cent in League Two. Twenty clubs spend more than 80 per cent of their revenue on salaries. The regulator’s response is predictable: cost control, wage restraint, “responsible spending.” In other words, disciplining labour.

First, players are not simply workers; they are labour-power converted into financial assets. Modern football treats labour not just as a production cost but as a capitalised resource. Contracts are amortised like industrial machinery: depreciated over time, securitised, borrowed against and used as collateral in complex financial arrangements. Agent fees, now £584 million, are part of this same machinery, serving as transaction costs in a financialised market for labour-power. The doubling of amortisation to £2.6 billion is no accounting quirk; it marks the conversion of labour into fictitious capital: value that exists only on balance sheets, yet is traded and leveraged as if it were real.

This transformation is central to football’s financialisation: labour-power becomes a financial instrument, with its value fluctuating according to market conditions, performance metrics, and speculative expectations. The IFR describes this process without understanding it, treating amortisation as a technical matter rather than as a structural reorganisation of labour under finance capital.

Second, wage restraint is class struggle. The PFA’s successful challenge to salary caps in 2020, and its current High Court action, are not “governance friction.” They are organised workers resisting an attempt to fix their share of the surplus. The IFR cannot admit this because it would require acknowledging that labour has interests irreconcilable with capital. The regulator’s framework assumes harmony among stakeholders, owners, leagues, players, and fans, and treats conflict as a managerial problem. But wage restraint is not a governance issue. It is a matter of class power.

The report’s language exposes this ideological blind spot. It describes wage inflation as a “risk,” a “pressure,” and a “threat to sustainability.” Nowhere does the IFR consider that rising wages reflect labour’s bargaining strength in a sector where workers create enormous value. The regulator’s job is to protect clubs’ financial stability, not workers’ living standards or bargaining power. As a result, it frames wage growth as a pathology rather than as a sign of labour asserting itself.

Third, the category “player wages” masks profound stratification. A Premier League star earning £300,000 a week has little in common with a League Two professional on a precarious one-year deal. Yet the IFR treats “player wages” as a single category, obscuring class divisions across the labour force. The report focuses on elite wage inflation while overlooking the conditions most football workers face: academy staff, cleaners, stewards, groundskeepers, analysts, youth coaches, and hospitality workers. The analysis renders these workers invisible. The IFR’s framework counts their labour only where it intersects with financial risk.

This invisibility is ideological. It reflects the regulator’s assumption that players perform the “real” labour of football, and that the “real” costs are those that affect balance sheets. The thousands of workers who make football possible maintaining stadiums, training youth players, cleaning facilities, managing logistics, providing security, and running matchday operations are treated as background noise. Their exploitation goes unanalysed because it is not financialised.

The most devastating statistic is the one the IFR buries: seventeen EFL and National League clubs would lose money even if they paid their players nothing. That fact alone undermines the report’s central claim that wage inflation is the root problem. If clubs cannot break even without paying a single player, wages are not driving insolvency; the business model is. Ownership structure, reliance on debt, value extraction through financial channels, volatile revenue streams, and the competitive arms race drive the crisis.

But the IFR cannot say so. To do so would mean admitting that labour is not the problem; capital is. It would mean acknowledging that the financialisation of football has created a system that blames workers for a crisis caused by owners, lenders, and speculative investors. It would also mean recognising that wage restraint is not a solution but an attack on labour. The report thus treats labour as a cost to be controlled rather than a source of value. It documents the symptoms of exploitation but refuses to name the exploiters. It catalogues the contradictions in football’s labour market while defending the system that creates them. In doing so, it reveals regulation’s limits under capitalism: labour can be disciplined, but capital cannot be challenged.

Finance capital takes control.

The report’s most explosive revelations concern finance capital’s penetration into every pore of the sport. What the IFR documents, often without grasping its significance, is English football’s near-total subordination to the logic of financialisation. Transfer factoring has increased fourteen-fold in just four years. £1.2 billion in future transfer receipts has already been sold- income that does not yet exist, monetised and spent before a single pound has been earned. Interest payments have surged from £97 million to £455 million as the cost of debt has tripled. Five lenders control 93.6 per cent of transfer finance, with one lender alone controlling nearly half. This is not a competitive market. It is an oligopoly.

None of this is accidental. It is the predictable outcome of reorganising football according to the imperatives of finance capital. Hilferding, writing more than a century ago, described how banking and industrial capital fuse into a single financial oligarchy that extracts value regardless of productive outcomes. Lenin showed how such oligarchies dominate entire sectors, turning them into instruments of speculation. English football is now one of those sectors. The IFR’s data could have been lifted directly from Finance Capital or Imperialism.

Factoring future fees is fictitious capital in Marx’s strict sense: money raised today against value that does not yet exist. Clubs sell tomorrow’s transfer income to survive today’s pressures, mortgaging their future to remain competitive in the present. This is not prudent financial management. It is systemic desperation. The club consumes its future to survive its present.

The collateralisation of heritage assets is equally revealing. Grounds, badges, and training facilities, the physical and symbolic infrastructure of the people’s game, are increasingly pledged as security for loans. The IFR notes that 60 per cent of Premier League clubs have relegation‑triggered repayment clauses. This means sporting failure can trigger creditor seizure. A bad season is no longer merely a sporting setback; it is a financial catastrophe. The club’s identity, history and community assets become bargaining chips in negotiations with lenders.

Leveraged ownership compounds the instability. Owners acquire clubs with borrowed money, load the debt onto the club itself, and extract returns through refinancing, management fees and asset sales. Multi‑club networks extend this logic across borders, treating clubs as nodes in a financial ecosystem rather than as sporting institutions. Players move to meet balance‑sheet needs rather than tactical ones. Revenues are shifted to optimise tax and regulatory arbitrage. Clubs become shells through which capital circulates.

The IFR’s report is, unintentionally, a catalogue of these contradictions. It shows a sport that generates enormous wealth yet cannot sustain itself because financial channels siphon that wealth off before it can stabilise the system. The crisis is not accidental. It is structural. Football’s financial instability is not the result of mismanagement, incompetence or isolated excess. It is the predictable outcome of reorganising the sport according to the imperatives of financial capital.

The regulator documents the symptoms but cannot name the cause. To do so would be to acknowledge that English football’s crisis is not a deviation from capitalism but its expression and that no amount of technocratic oversight can resolve contradictions rooted in the system itself.

Ownership without roots, capital without loyalty

The IFR’s ownership data show a sport transformed into a global asset class. English football is no longer a national game but a marketplace for international capital. Non‑domestic owners now control 75 per cent of Premier League revenue. North American capital controls nearly half of the entire pyramid. Eighty‑five per cent of Premier League clubs belong to multi‑club or multi‑sport groups, integrated into sprawling corporate networks that treat football teams as interchangeable units within a global portfolio. This is not cosmopolitan modernisation. It is the sport’s financial colonisation.

The most striking fact is that returns are overwhelmingly negative. The IFR reports an average indicative return of minus 41 per cent across clubs, with only 21 of 76 making a positive return. Yet capital continues to flow in. The report cannot explain this. It treats negative returns as a puzzle, as though investors were behaving irrationally. But a Marxist analysis can. Capital does not enter football to earn conventional profits. It enters because football offers value extraction, political leverage, and speculative opportunity unavailable in the productive sectors of a low‑growth economy.

Football offers speculative opportunities. Promotion windfalls can transform a club’s valuation overnight. Leveraged buyouts let owners acquire clubs with borrowed money and load the debt onto the club. Asset stripping selling stadium land, training facilities, or intellectual property can generate returns even when the club loses money. The IFR notes that distressed clubs are particularly vulnerable: their financial weakness makes them easy targets for acquisition, refinancing and exploitation. The “community club” becomes a conduit through which capital passes, its heritage assets collateralised, its future income securitised, its identity commodified.

Football also offers soft power. Sovereign wealth funds, oligarchs, and politically connected investors use clubs to project influence, launder reputations, and embed themselves in Western cultural institutions. Ownership becomes a diplomatic tool. The club becomes a platform for geopolitical branding. The IFR acknowledges this obliquely, noting concerns about “suitability” and “integrity,” but it cannot confront the political reality: English football has become a theatre for state power.

Then there is the laundering of surplus capital. In a low‑growth economy, productive investment yields diminishing returns. Capital seeks outlets to move, disguise, or recycle money through complex financial structures. Football provides precisely this. As the IFR itself notes, the sport is exposed to money laundering through offshore ownership, opaque sponsorship deals, and transfer arrangements routed through tax havens. Transfers often involve multiple intermediaries, shell companies, and inflated valuations, providing ideal mechanisms for moving capital across borders. Sponsorship deals from offshore entities allow funds to enter clubs with minimal scrutiny. Distressed clubs, desperate for liquidity, are the easiest entry points.

Multi‑club ownership networks intensify these dynamics. They let capital move players, revenues, and liabilities across borders, exploiting regulatory differences and arbitrage opportunities. Clubs become nodes in a global financial ecosystem, with their sporting identity secondary to their role in the network. The IFR describes this trend but cannot analyse it. It treats multi‑club ownership as a governance challenge rather than a structural expression of financial imperialism.

The regulator’s data reveal a sport whose ownership model is not merely globalised but financialised. Clubs are not owned to win matches. They are owned to extract value, launder capital, project influence and anchor wider commercial ecosystems. The IFR catalogues these realities but cannot name them. To do so would be to admit that English football is no longer a sport governed by sporting logic but an asset class governed by the imperatives of global capital.

The regulator as the ideal collective capitalist

Engels described the capitalist state as the “ideal collective capitalist”: an institution that manages the bourgeoisie’s common affairs, sometimes against individual capitalists, to preserve the system as a whole. The IFR fits this description precisely. Its first goal is to protect the hierarchy. The report’s distribution aims begin with preserving the Premier League as the world’s leading league and the Championship as the leading second tier. Inequality is to be eased, not ended. The top club earns 605 times the revenue of the smallest National League club.

The industry welcomes the regulator. The Premier League endorsed the report and claims its own proposals already meet the IFR’s objectives. A regulator embraced by the dominant firms is not a regulator that threatens them. Its tools are mild: action plans, stress tests, risk assessments. No hard liquidity floors until 2028–2030. No limits on transfer‑finance exposure. No challenge to debt dependency, multi‑club ownership or the private model itself. Fans receive a voice, not power. Clubs must “consider” supporters’ views. The model allows no mutual ownership, 50+1, or public stakes. Supporters remain consultees, not owners. Even Kogan’s stated fear that the supply of owners and media money may dry up reveals the limits of the IFR’s worldview. The worry is that capital might stop flowing in. No one ever asks whether capital should run the game at all.

The IFR has produced the most detailed evidence yet of how English football has been transformed into a financial asset class. Its data, often presented with bureaucratic neutrality, amount to a devastating indictment of the system the regulator exists to preserve. But its prescriptions aim only to make the commodity sustainable, not to liberate the sport from the market. The IFR’s task is not to challenge capital’s domination of football but to ensure that domination continues in a more orderly, less visibly chaotic form.

A Marxist programme begins where the report ends. To reclaim football as a social institution rather than a financial instrument, we must dismantle the foundations of the current model. That means pooling broadcast income across the entire pyramid to end the grotesque inequality that makes competitive overspending inevitable. It means capping debt and banning factoring so clubs can’t mortgage their future to survive the present. It means supporter and worker ownership on a 50+1 basis or stronger, ensuring that those who produce and sustain the game control it. It also means public or community ownership of grounds, removing heritage assets from finance capital’s collateral chains. Finally, it means recognising all club workers—not only players—as producers of the game, with rights, protections, and democratic power.

These measures are not utopian. They are the minimum required to reverse the financialisation documented in the IFR’s own report. They would transform football from an asset class back into a public good. They would replace extraction with stewardship, speculation with solidarity, and debt dependency with democratic control. The regulator can manage symptoms. It cannot cure the disease. It can stabilise insolvency, not prevent it. It can discipline labour, not restrain capital. It can protect heritage assets as collateral, not as community property. It can preserve the hierarchy, not democratise it.

The IFR’s State of the Game is therefore more than a report. It is a mirror held up to a decaying system. It shows a sport that generates extraordinary wealth yet cannot sustain itself because financial channels siphon it off. It shows a regulator tasked with preserving a model that produces crisis. And it shows, unintentionally, that the only real alternative lies outside market logic. Football must be reclaimed as a social institution, not a financial instrument. Only then can the contradictions the IFR describes be resolved, not through technocratic oversight, but through democratic control, collective ownership and the abolition of football’s subordination to capital.

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Arsenal’s Redundancies and the Real Face of Football Under the Billionaires

The announcement that Arsenal Football Club intends to axe up to 60 jobs just months after winning its first league title in 22 years and posting record revenues is a devastating exposure of the class logic governing modern football. It reveals, with clinical clarity, billionaire ownership’s priorities and the ruthless mechanisms through which capital restructures every sphere of social life, including the world’s most popular sport.

On October 14, chief executive Richard Garlick informed staff that dozens of commercial, administrative and operational workers would be made redundant. The coaching staff, first‑team performance departments, academy, Arsenal Foundation, security teams and the women’s football set‑up were exempt. Instead, the axe falls on the ordinary workers who keep the club functioning: ticketing staff, retail workers, office administrators, and back‑office personnel. These are not high‑earning executives or elite athletes. They are workers on modest wages in one of the world’s most expensive cities, facing a cost‑of‑living crisis that has already pushed millions to the brink.

The timing of the announcement is no coincidence. It clearly reflects the priorities of Kroenke Sports & Entertainment (KSE ), the American conglomerate that owns Arsenal. The club has just completed one of the most successful seasons in its modern history, recording record revenues of £691 million for 2024/25 and an overall loss of just £1.4 million, effectively breaking even. A week before the redundancies were announced, manager Mikel Arteta signed a new contract reportedly worth £20 million a year, making him the Premier League’s highest-paid coach. Over the summer, Arsenal spent £150 million on Christos Tzolis, Bruno Guimarães and Ezri Konsa.

The club’s wage bill for the year to May 2025 was £346.8 million. Even if all 60 workers earned £50,000—a generous assumption—the total saving would be around £3 million: less than one per cent of the wage bill and a fraction of a single star player’s annual salary. The cuts are not financially necessary; they are a political and class decision.

The Consultants’ Axe: Manufactured Inevitability

The redundancies did not emerge organically from the club’s internal operations. Arsenal hired management consultants from Boston Consulting Group (BCG) to review operations and identify “efficiencies.” BCG is a global firm whose interventions in corporations and governments routinely end in job losses. Its presence is a warning sign in any workplace. It provides owners with a veneer of technocratic legitimacy: the cuts are not the owners’ decision; they are the result of an “audit,” a “review,” a “recommendation.”

This is a familiar tactic. In 2020, during the pandemic, Arsenal made 55 staff redundant, including Jerry Quy, the long-serving employee who played the club mascot Gunnersaurus, even after first-team players took a 12.5 per cent pay cut on the understanding that staff jobs would be protected. The pandemic is long over, revenues have soared, and the club is richer than ever. Yet the same owners are wielding the same axe.

The statutory “consultation” process now under way is a legal formality. It gives management a procedural framework to implement decisions already made. It does not give workers a veto. It does not provide democratic control. It manages dissent and absorbs anger.

Football Under Capital: A System of Extraction

Arsenal is not an isolated case. Under Sir Jim Ratcliffe, Manchester United has cut hundreds of jobs in successive rounds of restructuring. Workers were told the club was facing ruin, even as vast sums continued to flow into transfers and stadium plans. Across the Premier League, revenues from broadcasting rights, sponsorship deals and ticket prices, which increasingly price working-class fans out of the grounds, continue to climb. Yet the workers who sell the shirts, staff the offices, maintain the stadiums and keep the clubs functioning are treated as expendable.

A draft “State of the Game” report from the new Independent Football Regulator found that 94 per cent of clubs in England’s top five divisions lost money last season, despite combined revenues of around £9 billion. Clubs spend this money on transfer fees, star salaries and debt servicing. Rising player-asset values enrich owners, while ordinary staff bear the risk. “Losses” on paper sit alongside billion-pound valuations. The regulator, established by the British state, does not challenge this arrangement. Its purpose is to stabilise it.

Football is now fully integrated into the global financial system. Clubs are treated as assets whose value is measured not by their social role or community significance, but by their ability to generate revenue streams, attract global sponsorships, and appreciate. Billionaire owners do not view clubs as institutions rooted in working‑class communities. They view them as vehicles for capital accumulation.

The Class Logic of Arsenal’s Cuts

Arsenal’s operating costs have risen sharply from £148 million to £201 million, and wages continue to climb. The club has posted losses for seven consecutive years, despite record revenues. Ownership is using this to justify restructuring. But the cuts target only the lowest‑paid workers, not the structural drivers of cost.

The logic is simple: invest heavily in the asset (the squad), cut ruthlessly from the labour that does not directly generate market value. The workers being made redundant do not increase the club’s valuation. They do not attract global sponsorships. They do not produce highlight reels or social media engagement. They are therefore expendable.

This is the logic of capital in every industry. It is the logic that has driven mass layoffs across technology firms, media companies, logistics giants and public services. It has produced record profits for corporations and record hardship for workers. Football is not immune. It is a microcosm of capitalism’s broader crisis.

The Anger of Supporters  and Its Limits

Many supporters reacted with anger. On fan sites, many pointed out that a single top player earns in a week what several of the threatened workers earn in a year. Others asked whether the consultants’ fees cost more than the jobs being cut. The anger is justified. But it cannot be channelled into appeals to the “Arsenal family” or to the goodwill of billionaires.

KSE’s purpose is not to run a community institution. Its purpose is to increase the value of a global sports asset alongside the Kroenke family’s other franchises. It is not accountable to supporters. It is not accountable to workers. It is accountable only to capital.

What Is Needed: Independent Organisation and Democratic Control

The 60 Arsenal workers should not have to fight this alone or rely on a consultation process controlled by management. They need their own independent rank-and-file committee: a democratic body, free from management and trade union bureaucracy, and able to organise collective resistance. The committee should demand: No job cuts. Full pay for all workers. Publication of the BCG report, consultant contracts and ownership finances. Solidarity from matchday staff, stewards, supporters and workers at other clubs facing similar cuts.

Players, staff, and millions of working people who pay for tickets, subscriptions, and merchandise produce football’s wealth through their labour. As long as billionaires own the sport and run it for profit, every record revenue figure will be followed by another round of “efficiencies” for those at the bottom.

Defending these jobs is part of a broader struggle: to take football and the economy out of the hands of the financial oligarchy and put them under democratic control. Arsenal’s redundancies are not an isolated event. They are a symptom of a system that prioritises profit over people, valuation over community, and capital over labour.