Packing the Library: Fifty Years of Books and the Struggle for Marxism

A personal library assembled over fifty years is more than a collection of books. It is a material record of intellectual and political development. Moving it to new premises marks the beginning of another stage in a writing project rooted in the history of Marxism, the Trotskyist movement, and the struggle to understand the great revolutionary experiences of the working class.

Over the coming months I will begin packing up my library and moving it into premises more commensurate with its size. A conservative estimate puts the collection at around 2,000 volumes, accumulated over half a century. What might appear from the outside as the relatively mundane business of boxing books, moving shelves and reorganising a workspace has inevitably assumed a more personal and political significance.

To dismantle a library is to excavate one’s own intellectual history. Books encountered decades ago reappear. Forgotten arguments return. The circumstances under which particular works were bought suddenly return. Each shelf corresponds to a period of life and, in my case, to a stage in a political development that began in a London comprehensive school during the 1970s and proceeded, through more than one false start and political dead end, towards Marxism and Trotskyism.

I never assembled the library primarily for possession’s sake. I have never regarded myself as a bibliophile in the conventional sense. These books were acquired because I wanted to understand something: why society takes the form it does, why capitalism has survived despite the suffering and inequality it produces, why revolutionary movements have succeeded or failed, why Stalinism arose in the Soviet Union, and above all how the experiences of previous generations of workers and revolutionaries bear upon the problems confronting the working class today. That process began not with Marx, Lenin or Trotsky, but with the novel.

Pimlico Comprehensive and the Working-Class Novel

The first books I bought seriously were set texts at Pimlico Comprehensive School when I was 16. Among the writers I encountered were Alan Sillitoe, Carson McCullers, Keith Waterhouse, Shelagh Delaney and Stan Barstow. They occupy only a small physical space in a library that subsequently expanded into thousands of volumes, but their intellectual significance was considerable.

These writers emerged from, or sought to represent, social worlds largely excluded from the respectable version of post-war society. Sillitoe’s factory workers, Delaney’s Salford, Barstow’s West Riding and the lonely and marginalised figures inhabiting McCullers’s American South opened up experiences remote from the official culture presented by newspapers, television and the political establishment.

For a working-class teenager, the effect was considerable. Literature revealed that the experiences surrounding you could themselves become the subject of serious art. But it simultaneously raised problems it could not resolve. Why were people’s lives organised in this way? Why did some possess wealth and power while others sold their labour merely to live? Why did class determine so much about an individual’s possibilities?

The best of these novels registered the human consequences of class society with extraordinary sensitivity. Still, literature by itself could not provide a scientific explanation of the social relations producing those consequences. That required an encounter with history and politics. Those first books were therefore instrumental in my movement towards the left. Half a century later, they remain on my shelves.

Militant, Stalinism and Trotsky’s History

Once politics became a serious interest, my book-buying accelerated dramatically. The Militant Tendency, then operating within the Labour Party, maintained an extensive book catalogue, and I began ordering from it with considerable enthusiasm. I eventually spent more than £1,000, a substantial sum at the time. The scale of my purchases evidently attracted someone’s attention because two young Militant members were eventually dispatched to my door to recruit me.

My membership lasted approximately six months. The promise of socialism attracted me. What proved inadequate was Militant’s political perspective, centred on transforming the Labour Party into an instrument for socialist change. The organisation treated the existing labour movement as a vehicle through which socialism would somehow emerge, rather than subjecting it to the historical and political examination its own record demanded.

The books survived my membership. Most remain in the library. I subsequently joined the Communist Party of Great Britain, searching again for a political organisation capable of explaining capitalism and providing a strategy for its overthrow. That experience lasted another six months. It was enough. There is perhaps some historical justice in the fact that, while the library contains materials from virtually every other period of my political development, it contains no books from my brief membership of the Stalinist Communist Party.

The decisive intellectual influence of these years came from an entirely different political tradition. At 17 I read Leon Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution. Few books I have encountered subsequently have equalled its impact. Here history was no longer presented principally as the actions of governments, ministers and celebrated individuals. Trotsky reconstructed revolution as a living process in which millions of human beings entered history consciously.

The events of 1917 emerged neither as a conspiracy nor as the inevitable outcome of impersonal forces. The Russian Revolution was presented as an immense confrontation of classes, parties and programmes, in which objective conditions created revolutionary possibilities but political leadership ultimately determined whether those possibilities were realised. Trotsky’s work demonstrated what Marxist historical writing could achieve. It united the reconstruction of events with an analysis of the class forces underlying them and, above all, with an understanding of the decisive role of revolutionary consciousness and leadership.

The implications extended far beyond 1917. If the October Revolution represented the working class’s conscious seizure of power under Bolshevik leadership, then Stalinism could not be identified with Bolshevism. The bureaucratic regime that subsequently emerged required a historical explanation. Trotsky provided that explanation through his struggle against the degeneration of the Soviet state and the nationalist doctrine of “socialism in one country”. Reading the History was therefore decisive in making me a Marxist. It also gave me an intellectual starting point for understanding why the crimes committed under Stalin represented not the fulfilment of October but its bureaucratic betrayal.

The WRP, the Redgrave Books and One Long Night

The library’s next major expansion came after I joined the Workers Revolutionary Party in 1982. My period of candidate membership lasted an entire year, which I have sometimes thought might qualify as a minor record in the history of revolutionary politics. I bought extensively during these years, and much of that material remains in the collection. The books from this period have acquired an additional historical significance because they belong to the years immediately preceding the crisis that erupted in 1985 inside the WRP and the International Committee of the Fourth International.

One of the largest single additions to my library came shortly before that split. I was told that Vanessa Redgrave was moving house and needed to dispose of a substantial quantity of books. I bought many of them. These volumes now occupy a peculiar position within the collection. Whatever their original provenance, they became part of my own intellectual history at precisely the point when major political questions concerning the history and programme of the Trotskyist movement were coming sharply to the surface.

Among the books I value most highly is a proof copy of Maria Joffe’s One Long Night. Joffe, widow of the Soviet diplomat and Left Oppositionist Adolph Joffe, endured decades of imprisonment and persecution under Stalinism. Her memoir belongs to the documentary record of the destruction of the revolutionary generation associated with October and of those who continued to resist bureaucratic reaction.

Such books matter because the struggle over historical memory is itself political. Stalinism could not consolidate its rule by physically destroying its opponents alone. It had to falsify the historical record, erase individuals from revolutionary history and transform the October Revolution into something compatible with the interests of a privileged bureaucracy. Trotskyism survived under extraordinarily difficult conditions because it defended not simply particular individuals or organisational traditions, but the international socialist programme upon which the Russian Revolution had been based.

A library containing this literature is therefore more than an accumulation of political texts. It preserves traces of struggles that the defenders of the existing order, including its Stalinist and reformist representatives, repeatedly proclaimed finished. They were not finished.

Birkbeck, the English Revolution and Historical Writing

The library’s largest sustained expansion began with my studies at Birkbeck and the completion of my degree in 2003. At that point another strand of intellectual development became central: the seventeenth-century English Revolution.

I had written a dissertation on the subject which, with the benefit of hindsight, was not particularly good. But dissatisfaction can sometimes have more productive consequences than satisfaction. The attempt to find somewhere for my essays eventually contributed to the creation of my website and, from there, to a much more sustained programme of historical reading and writing.

The consequences for the bookshelves were dramatic. Probably around half of the present collection, roughly a thousand books, dates from this broad period. The shelves expanded to encompass the English Revolution, the Civil War, the Levellers and other radical movements, the development of Parliament, religious and political conflict, and the immense historiographical controversies surrounding the seventeenth century.

But the subject could never be confined to the seventeenth century itself. Serious study of the English Revolution raises fundamental questions about historical interpretation. Was it a revolution? What social forces produced it? What relationship existed between political and religious ideas and the material interests of contending classes? How should we understand the Levellers and other radical currents? What was the upheaval’s international significance?

Behind these questions lay the still larger issue of historical materialism.

The study of history is never politically innocent. The assault upon Marxist interpretations of the English Revolution did not take place independently of the broader ideological offensive against Marxism during the closing decades of the twentieth century. Historical controversies reflected, in mediated form, the political climate produced by the defeats of the working class, the degeneration of the old labour organisations and eventually the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

My library’s expansion consequently followed the development of these controversies. Books led to other books. Footnotes opened previously unknown arguments. Historiographical disagreements demanded investigation of the political assumptions underlying apparently specialised academic disputes. What began with a relatively poor undergraduate dissertation gradually became a continuing engagement with the relationship between historical scholarship and contemporary politics.

Books as the Material Record of a Political Development

Seen together, the 2,000 volumes therefore amount to something quite different from a conventional private collection. The Sillitoe and Delaney volumes bought as a schoolboy belong to the discovery that working-class experience could become a legitimate subject of literature. Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution belongs to the discovery that those experiences could be scientifically understood as part of the historical struggle of classes. The literature accumulated through Militant, the Communist Party and the WRP records the search for a political movement capable of acting upon that understanding. The books acquired after Birkbeck record another development: the attempt to write history rather than consume it.

False starts marked that journey. Some books were undoubtedly bought and deserved to remain unread, and others were read more carefully than they deserved. Political development never proceeds in the straight line imposed upon it retrospectively. One investigates tendencies that lead nowhere, accepts arguments subsequently rejected, and only gradually acquires the historical experience necessary to distinguish what is essential from what is secondary. The value of a serious political library lies partly in the fact that it preserves these stages rather than concealing them.

Artificial Intelligence and a New Stage

The most recent development introduces another element into this history. Artificial intelligence has altered the technical conditions under which an individual can undertake historical and political research. Like every major technological innovation under capitalism, AI is developing within definite class relations. Corporations and governments approach it, above all, from the standpoint of profitability, labour displacement, surveillance, competitive advantage, and the intensification of exploitation. There is nothing inherently emancipatory about technology operating within capitalist property relations. But a Marxist response does not consist of recoiling from technological development. The productive forces created by capitalism repeatedly come into conflict with the social relations within which they develop. The task is to understand both technology’s emancipatory potential and the class interests that determine its present use.

For an individual engaged in historical research, the possibilities are already considerable. Vast quantities of material can be searched and compared far more rapidly than previously. Bibliographical trails can be followed more efficiently. Arguments drawn from different periods and historiographical traditions can be related to one another. Research that once required weeks of preliminary investigation can sometimes be organised in a fraction of that time. That does not abolish the necessity for knowledge. On the contrary, the ability to evaluate material becomes more important. A machine can locate relationships between texts, but it cannot substitute for the political and historical understanding required to determine which relationships matter, which claims withstand examination and what social interests underlie competing interpretations.

After fifty years of reading, that distinction is crucial. For the first time, I feel able to research and write articles at a level approaching the political and historical understanding accumulated through decades of reading and political experience. AI has not produced that understanding. The books did. Political experience did. Historical study did. The technology makes it possible to mobilise that accumulated knowledge with a speed and breadth that were previously extraordinarily difficult for an individual writer working largely alone.

The Library as a Working Archive

This is the significance of moving the library. Over the coming months, the books will be packed, transported and reorganised in a small office where they can function properly as a working research collection. The change is practical, but it also marks the start of a new stage in the website’s development. The intention is not to preserve the collection as a monument to fifty years of reading. Libraries become intellectually useless when they become mausoleums. Books justify the space they occupy when they continue to be read, questioned, compared and used.

The shelves that began with Sillitoe, Delaney, Barstow and McCullers at Pimlico Comprehensive eventually acquired Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky; the documentary history of the Russian Revolution and its degeneration; the literature of the Fourth International; materials from the WRP years; and an extensive collection dealing with the English Revolution, its radical movements and the historiographical battles through which its meaning has been contested.

What links them is not uniformity, because they contain writers representing every conceivable political and historical standpoint. What unites the collection is the struggle to understand history. Moving 2,000 books will be physically exhausting. But politically and intellectually the move represents precisely the opposite of winding things down. It prepares me for more work. The books accumulated through fifty years of reading are no longer simply the record of how I arrived at my present standpoint. Properly organised and combined with the possibilities opened by new technology, they can become the working archive for a considerably expanded programme of historical and political writing.

The journey that began with working-class novels read at Pimlico Comprehensive, passed through the first encounter with Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution, the experiences of the revolutionary movement, and decades spent studying the English Revolution, therefore continues. Packing the library is not an act of putting the past away. It prepares for what comes next.

Kensington and Chelsea: An insider’s indictment that stops at the threshold of a socialist conclusion

Few places expose the class divisions of British capitalism more brutally than the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. Here fabulous private wealth exists alongside overcrowding, hunger and social deprivation. Within a relatively small area, multimillion-pound properties and apartments that function primarily as repositories of international wealth stand close to council estates whose residents have endured deteriorating services, insecurity, and decades of political neglect. These are not simply contrasting social worlds accidentally occupying the same geographical space. They are interconnected products of a society in which housing and land have increasingly been subordinated to private profit, property speculation and the accumulation of wealth.[1]

These contradictions acquired their most terrible expression on 14 June 2017, when the Grenfell Tower fire killed 72 people. Grenfell was not an inexplicable accident that suddenly descended upon an otherwise functioning social system. It exposed before millions of people the consequences of decades in which council housing, building regulation, local government and public services had been progressively subjected to austerity, privatisation, outsourcing and the requirements of the market. The catastrophe revealed, with terrible clarity, the social consequences of a political order in which the living conditions and safety of working-class residents were repeatedly subordinated to financial considerations.

This social landscape gives Emma Dent Coad’s One Kensington its considerable importance. A Labour councillor in Kensington and Chelsea from 2006, Dent Coad was elected MP for Kensington in the general election of 8 June 2017, only days before the Grenfell catastrophe. The tower stood at the end of her road. Her book consequently occupies an unusual position between eyewitness testimony, political memoir and an indictment of one of Britain’s wealthiest local authorities. Its strongest passages provide an invaluable account of the arrogance, indifference, and class contempt working-class residents encountered while trying to secure safe housing and decent public services.

But the book also contains a fundamental contradiction. The evidence Dent Coad accumulates points toward an indictment of the social order itself. At the same time, her political conclusions remain largely within the framework of Labourism, parliamentary reform, and improved local government. One Kensington comes repeatedly to the threshold of a socialist explanation of the conditions that produced Grenfell, only to retreat from the conclusions demanded by its own evidence.

A record of class contempt

The most compelling sections of One Kensington concern the everyday operation of class power. Dent Coad describes not merely incompetent administration but an entire political culture in which social tenants and working-class communities were increasingly seen as obstacles to redeveloping enormously valuable land. North Kensington residents lived in the same borough as billionaires, international investors and owners of extraordinarily expensive properties, some of which were rarely occupied. Yet immense accumulated wealth did nothing to guarantee decent housing, secure public services, or provide basic social protection for everyone living in the borough.

This is precisely why the personal attitudes of Conservative councillors cannot adequately explain the inequalities documented in the book, however contemptuous those attitudes may have been. Kensington’s extreme inequalities express the workings of the property market itself. The extraordinary rise in London land and housing values turned residential property into a major vehicle for accumulating and preserving wealth. Working-class communities therefore occupied homes standing on land that became increasingly attractive to developers and investors. Under these conditions, the language of “regeneration” acquired a definite class meaning: council estates could be represented as obsolete, existing communities disrupted and public land opened to forms of development from which those communities derived little or no benefit.

Dent Coad is particularly effective when demonstrating how these processes appeared at street and council level. Her background in architecture and housing gives her account an understanding of the relationship between planning decisions and social inequality. Food poverty, overcrowding, deteriorating estates and divisions in health and life expectancy appear throughout the book not as abstractions but as features of everyday existence within a borough internationally associated with extreme wealth. The result is a powerful documentary charge sheet against both Kensington and Chelsea Council and the broader social priorities it embodied.

Grenfell transformed that charge sheet into something still more serious. The working-class residents who repeatedly raised concerns about their homes were not suffering from a simple failure of communication between government and governed. Their experience demonstrated how little weight their needs carried when measured against the financial, commercial and political priorities governing housing. This is why Grenfell must be understood not only as administrative negligence but as a class question.

Grenfell and social murder

Friedrich Engels famously employed the concept of “social murder” in The Condition of the Working Class in England to describe circumstances in which existing social relations knowingly condemn working people to premature death. The concept remains indispensable to understanding Grenfell because it moves discussion beyond the narrow search for a single catastrophic mistake. It directs attention towards the accumulated political and economic decisions that created the conditions in which catastrophe became possible.

Grenfell emerged from a historical process encompassing deregulation, outsourcing, the degradation of council housing, the fragmentation of responsibility and the increasing subordination of construction and housing to commercial interests. Individual decisions plainly mattered, as did questions of corporate and institutional responsibility, but those decisions were taken within a society dominated by the capitalist market. The tragedy cannot therefore be explained simply by saying that Kensington and Chelsea happened to be run by unusually callous Conservatives.

This is where the evidence presented in One Kensington begins to exceed the author’s own political framework. Dent Coad’s account describes a system operating according to recognisable class interests, but her proposed political remedies remain centred upon reforming the institutions through which that system operates. The contradiction becomes increasingly difficult to ignore as the book proceeds.

The limits of the parliamentary perspective

Dent Coad’s political horizon remains fundamentally that of Labour reformism. The principal enemy is Conservative-controlled Kensington and Chelsea, while the alternative is sought through community campaigning, progressive councillors, better MPs and the election of a Labour government committed to different priorities. The enthusiasm surrounding Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership forms an important part of this perspective. Yet Corbynism itself showed the limits of trying to channel mounting social opposition through the existing Labour and parliamentary apparatus.

The problem is not that better councillors, stronger regulations or more socially conscious MPs would make no difference. Reforms improving housing conditions and building safety should obviously be supported. The deeper question is why such elementary requirements continually collide with powerful economic interests. A council may regulate property development more aggressively than another; Parliament may enact improved building standards; governments may impose stricter requirements upon landlords and construction companies. Yet none of these measures abolishes the underlying contradiction between housing as a basic human necessity and housing as private property, a financial asset, and a source of profit.

Dent Coad’s political conclusions largely ignore that contradiction. Conservative mismanagement consequently becomes the explanation for conditions that developed under governments of both major parties. The Blair and Brown governments did not overturn the market transformation initiated under Thatcher. New Labour accommodated the essential economic framework created in the preceding decades, extending private-sector involvement in public services while accepting the market’s dominance over housing and land.

Corbynism and the unanswered political question

The election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader in 2015 expressed a genuine movement to the left among workers and young people after decades of austerity, war, privatisation and declining living standards. This social movement played a major role in Labour’s unexpectedly strong performance in the 2017 general election and in Dent Coad’s remarkable victory in Kensington. A constituency synonymous with wealth and Conservative power returned a Labour MP, apparently demonstrating the potential for a radical political realignment.

But the subsequent defeat of Corbynism exposed the fatal weakness of its perspective. Rather than building an independent political movement against the Labour right and the social forces it represented, Corbyn insisted that the Labour Party could be reconciled around a parliamentary road to reform. Repeated compromises strengthened his opponents while disorienting his supporters. Dent Coad’s loss of Kensington in 2019 by just 150 votes formed part of the broader defeat.

For One Kensington, this experience should have raised the most fundamental question: if the Labour Party could not be transformed even under conditions in which hundreds of thousands joined or supported it in the expectation of radical change, what basis remained for believing that the working class could achieve a fundamental social transformation through Labour parliamentarianism? The book never seriously answers this question. Instead, Labour’s defeat appears principally as a political setback rather than evidence requiring a reassessment of the party itself.

From indictment to socialist programme

One Kensington nevertheless deserves to be read. Dent Coad’s eyewitness evidence, accumulated detail and anger over the treatment of working-class residents give the book lasting value. She records a borough where immense concentrations of wealth existed alongside poverty, overcrowding and insecurity, and she shows the extraordinary distance between official rhetoric about community and the experiences of those forced to negotiate the institutions supposedly responsible for protecting them.

But the power of that testimony makes the weakness of the political conclusions still more apparent. The central question is not whether Kensington and Chelsea could be administered more compassionately. Clearly it could. Nor is it whether stronger building regulations, competent housing management, more council housing and genuine democratic accountability are urgently required. They are. The decisive issue is why these basic social requirements repeatedly conflict with the interests of private property.

Safe and decent housing for all cannot ultimately be guaranteed while housing remains subordinated to profit and speculation. The construction industry, major developers, land and essential building-material production cannot remain instruments of private enrichment. At the same time, society is expected somehow to guarantee that human need takes priority over financial return. The major corporations dominating these sectors must be placed under public ownership and democratic working-class control. At the same time, housing itself must cease to function primarily as a commodity and speculative asset and become a guaranteed social right.

Such measures inevitably raise the question that One Kensington avoids: political power. They cannot be realised merely by replacing bad administrators with good ones while preserving the economic relations determining what local and national governments can do. They require the independent political organisation of the working class based on an international socialist programme directed against capitalism itself.

The working people of North Kensington were never lacking courage. They were never lacking warnings, intelligence, solidarity or organisation. Before Grenfell, residents repeatedly tried to make their voices heard; afterwards, bereaved families, survivors, and the wider community showed extraordinary determination in demanding truth and accountability. Their tragedy was not the absence of community activism. It was the absence of a political movement capable of transforming that social anger into an independent struggle against the class interests responsible for the conditions they confronted.

That is ultimately the contradiction at the heart of One Kensington. Dent Coad provides an insider’s indictment of a profoundly unequal society, and much of the evidence she presents is devastating. But her politics remain tied to the institutions and the Labour Party through which that society has been administered. Her evidence points beyond municipal reform, parliamentary manoeuvre and hopes for another Labour renewal. It points to the need for independent political mobilisation of the working class and the socialist reorganisation of society. The book takes the reader to that threshold, but it does not cross it.

Bibliography

Dent Coad, Emma. One Kensington: Tales from the Frontline of the Most Unequal Borough in Britain. London: Quercus, 2022; paperback edition, 2023.

Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. 1845.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 Report. London: HMSO, 2019.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 2 Report. London: HMSO, 2024.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. 1848.


[1] One Kensington: Tales from the Frontline of the Most Unequal Borough in Britain, by Emma Dent Coad, Quercus, 2022; paperback edition, 2023.

Podcast Episode: Literature as “Resistance”: Alberto Manguel and the limits of moral protest

Pip: Alberto Manguel asks whether literature can compel society to recognize the evidence of facts — which is a braver question than most cultural essays dare to ask, and a harder one than most dare to answer.

Mara: freerein61 takes that question seriously in a post that moves from Manguel's Resistance through Aleksandr Voronsky's aesthetics, the Argentine dictatorship, and the politics of artificial intelligence. Let's start with what Manguel actually argues — and where the argument runs out of road.

Literature as Moral Protest — and Its Limits

Pip: The central tension here is between literature as something that illuminates reality and literature as something that can transform it — and whether Manguel's conception of resistance can hold both at once.

Mara: The post frames Manguel's book as asking whether society can be compelled to recognize the evidence, and whether the writer bears responsibility when truth comes under political attack. His tentative answer is captured in a phrase the post returns to repeatedly: "perhaps that is enough."

Pip: That hesitation is doing a lot of work. If affirmation is all resistance can offer, the post argues, then Manguel has reached the ceiling of the liberal conception — illumination without transformation.

Mara: The post is precise about why. It draws on Aleksandr Voronsky's Art as the Cognition of Life to sharpen the point: "Art is the cognition of life. It is therefore a form of thinking about the world in which the symbols and signs of culture are wielded in the expression of feelings, emotion and thoughts." The upshot is that art does not merely reflect reality — it is one of the means through which reality becomes known.

Pip: Which raises the stakes considerably. If literature is genuinely cognitive, then "perhaps that is enough" starts to sound like a scientist saying perhaps observation is enough.

Mara: The post uses Dante as the counter-example. The Divine Comedy achieves universality not by floating above history but by being inseparable from it — naming individuals, condemning corruption, placing popes in a moral universe. The Commedia's power comes from that interpenetration of the personal, political, and historical.

Mara: The contemporary vocabulary of resistance moves in the opposite direction. The post argues it has become a term that accommodates almost any individual disapproval while leaving the social foundations of what is being resisted unexplored.

Pip: The Trevor Griffiths discussion — a 2008 conversation with WSWS arts editor David Walsh — is brought in here as a useful contrast. Griffiths belonged to a generation shaped by actual mass radicalisation, where the connection between culture and collective social movement was lived experience, not aspiration.

Mara: And the post traces what happened when that connection broke. Defeats of working-class movements, Thatcherism, the dissolution of the Soviet Union — these shifted intellectual life away from transformation and toward transgression, personal expression, symbolic protest. Revolution gave way to resistance. The word fitted the changed climate because it requires no social force, no historical objective, no question of political power.

Pip: On artificial intelligence, the post insists the decisive issue is ownership, not technology as such. AI represents socially generated productive capacity concentrated in private hands — the same contradiction Marx identified, now unusually visible because the training material is humanity's collective culture.

Mara: The post is careful not to demand politically obedient literature. It explicitly defends artistic freedom and cites the disaster of Stalinist socialist realism as the warning. The criticism of Manguel is not that Resistance lacks a revolutionary programme. It is that resistance conceived as permanent moral protest tacitly assumes the forces being resisted will themselves remain permanent.

Pip: The final formulation is worth sitting with: literature is not enough, but it is necessary. Books become historically powerful when the truths they reveal encounter a social force capable of acting upon them.

Mara: Which means the reader, as the post puts it, is never simply a reader — they are also a worker, tenant, parent, student. At some point they close the book and re-enter the world.


Pip: The question Manguel raises — can literature help us see the world as it really is — turns out to demand a more unsettling answer than he offers.

Mara: Seeing clearly and acting on what you see are different capacities. That gap is where the next set of arguments will have to live.

Literature as “Resistance”: Alberto Manguel and the limits of moral protest

“Life aims to live, and to live means to be aware, joyously, drunkenly, serenely, divinely aware. In this state of god-like awareness one sings; in this realm the world exists as poem”

Henry Miller- The Wisdom of the Heart

“Life is not an easy matter…. You cannot live through it without falling into frustration and cynicism unless you have before you a great idea which raises you above personal misery, above weakness, above all kinds of perfidy and baseness.”
― Leon Trotsky, Diary in Exile, 1935

“The discovery of the art of reading is intimate, obscure, secret, almost impossible to explain.”
― Alberto Manguel, Packing My Library: An Elegy and Ten Digressions

“Art is ‘the cognition of life.’ It is therefore a form of thinking about the world in which the symbols and signs of culture are wielded in the expression of feelings, emotion and thoughts…”

Aleksandr Voronsky-Art as the Cognition of Life

Literature in an age of reaction

Alberto Manguel has spent much of his intellectual life writing about reading, books, libraries and the preservation of cultural memory. That is no small matter at a time when culture is increasingly subordinated to commercial calculation; libraries and other public institutions face financial pressure. Serious reading is forced to compete with a digital environment organised overwhelmingly around speed, distraction and profit. His latest work, Resistance, published in Yale University Press’s “Why I Write” series, poses questions that should concern every serious reader and writer. Can society be compelled to recognise the evidence? Can literature help human beings see the world as it really is? Why have authoritarian regimes repeatedly feared books, and what responsibility does the writer bear when truth itself comes under political attack?

These are not abstract literary questions. Resistance appears amid an increasingly visible crisis of capitalist society in which governments manufacture narratives to justify war and repression, historical falsification becomes integrated into political life, universities and cultural institutions face financial and ideological pressures, and enormous corporations exercise unprecedented influence over the production and circulation of information. At the same time, the extraordinary development of artificial intelligence has provoked understandable anxiety among writers, artists and intellectuals about the future of creative labour and even the distinction between genuine intellectual creation and mechanically generated cultural material. In such circumstances, Manguel’s insistence on the written word as a means of discovering and preserving truth has undeniable value.

The difficulty arises when the argument moves from the defence of literature to the meaning of resistance itself. Manguel suggests that literature may ultimately amount to an affirmation, a continuing refusal to surrender before falsehood and barbarism, before arriving at the tentative proposition that perhaps this is enough. That hesitation is significant. If the statement means that literature cannot overthrow governments or substitute for political organisation, it is obviously true. No serious conception of artistic creation should demand that novels, poems and plays function as political manifestos. But if literature as moral affirmation is proposed as an adequate response to the social forces threatening culture and civilisation, then Manguel has arrived at the limits of the liberal conception of resistance. Literature can illuminate reality, but illumination is not transformation. It can preserve historical consciousness, but consciousness becomes historically decisive only when it enters into a relationship with social forces capable of acting upon it.

Why censors fear books

Manguel is right that censors fear books, but the more difficult question is why they fear them. Writing is not inherently subversive. Libraries contain defences of monarchy alongside celebrations of revolution, justifications of empire beside denunciations of colonial oppression, and reactionary works beside the greatest expressions of human emancipation. The censor does not fear paper and ink. What authoritarian governments fear is the possibility that ideas may articulate suppressed social experiences, preserve memories that official history attempts to obliterate, and give people concepts through which they can understand their circumstances. A book becomes politically dangerous when the truth it contains intersects with the experiences and aspirations of living human beings.

Dante provides an instructive example because the Divine Comedy is inseparable from the historical world in which it was created. Dante does not speak from some timeless cultural realm standing above society. He writes out of the intensely conflict-ridden civilisation of late medieval Italy, from the standpoint of an exile whose personal fate had been intertwined with the political convulsions of Florence. His poem achieves universality not by escaping historical specificity but through it. Dante names individuals, condemns political and ecclesiastical corruption, judges the powerful and places popes and politicians within his moral universe. The enduring power of the Commedia derives precisely from this extraordinary interpenetration of the personal, political, historical and universal.

The contemporary vocabulary of “resistance” frequently moves in the opposite direction. Resistance has become a characteristic term of liberal cultural discourse because it can accommodate almost any form of individual disapproval while leaving the social foundations of what is being resisted unexplored. One can resist by reading, writing, purchasing a particular book, attending an exhibition, making a film or declaring oneself opposed to authoritarianism. The crucial questions gradually disappear: resistance to what social forces, conducted by which social classes, and directed towards what historical objective? Once stripped of these questions, resistance ceases to describe a process through which society might actually be transformed and instead becomes an ethical posture. The individual proves that they have not inwardly submitted, while the conditions producing the catastrophe continue largely undisturbed.

Argentina and the social roots of repression

Manguel’s connection with Argentina makes these questions particularly significant. The savagery of the military dictatorship cannot adequately be remembered merely as an assault upon writers, books and intellectual freedom. The junta certainly censored literature, persecuted intellectuals and attempted to suppress cultural opposition, but this formed part of a far wider programme of social and political repression directed against workers, students, left-wing organisations and all those regarded as threatening the existing economic and political order. The burning of books cannot therefore be separated from the suppression of the people who might read them, distribute them and act upon their implications.

The great upheavals preceding the dictatorship demonstrate why this distinction matters. The Cordobazo of 1969 revealed the explosive potential of the Argentine working class and indicated the depth of the social crisis confronting the ruling elite. What the Argentine state feared was not literature conceived abstractly but the development of political consciousness among social forces capable of challenging the established order. Books could form part of that process because culture can preserve historical experience and provide language through which previously isolated experiences become understood collectively. The dictatorship therefore sought not simply to silence writers but to destroy the political and social environment in which radical ideas might gain mass influence.

Manguel’s later tenure as director of Argentina’s National Library also raises, without requiring any question about his personal sincerity, the broader relationship between cultural institutions and political power. Libraries, museums, universities and publishing houses cannot hover permanently above the economic conditions of the societies that sustain them. Political decisions within a specific economic system ultimately shape their resources, priorities, and accessibility. The defence of cultural institutions consequently cannot be separated indefinitely from questions concerning who possesses society’s wealth, how public resources are allocated and what cultural activities are considered socially necessary. A government can praise national culture while imposing economic policies that undermine the material conditions required for its flourishing. The contradiction is social, not personal.

Literature and objective reality

The strongest aspect of Manguel’s argument is the conviction that literature can enable readers to see reality more clearly. This proposition takes on particular importance after decades in which significant tendencies within academic and cultural thought questioned whether objective reality could be meaningfully represented at all. Postmodernism transformed historical truth into competing narratives, displaced the analysis of social structures in favour of discourse and increasingly treated claims to objective knowledge with suspicion. Whatever Manguel’s differences with Marxism, his insistence that literature participates in the discovery of truth opposes this intellectual retreat.

The great tradition of realism rested precisely upon the conviction that society possesses an objective character that art can penetrate. Balzac and Thomas Mann remain perhaps the classic demonstration. His own conscious political sympathies hardly made him a revolutionary. Yet the artistic seriousness with which he examined post-revolutionary French society compelled him to reproduce, with extraordinary insight, the social forces transforming it. Marx and Engels admired Balzac not because he supplied an approved political programme, but because his artistic honesty revealed the movement of French society with a power that exceeded his conscious political prejudices. Something similar can be said of Tolstoy’s relationship to Russian society, Dickens’s exposure of Victorian England, Theodore Dreiser’s treatment of American capitalism and Thomas Mann’s treatment of German society.

Their achievements demonstrate why Marxist criticism cannot be reduced to searching works of art for correct political opinions. The artist who begins with predetermined conclusions and manipulates characters to illustrate them is unlikely to produce significant art. Genuine realism demands that the artist remain sufficiently open to reality for characters, situations and contradictions to develop beyond preconceived ideological formulas. Artistic truth may consequently collide with the writer’s own stated beliefs. The deepest social significance of literature frequently emerges from precisely this conflict between what an artist consciously intends and what an honest confrontation with reality compels them to reveal.

Art is not a political manifesto.

This distinction is essential when considering the most obvious objection to a Marxist criticism of Resistance. Manguel’s defenders could reasonably argue that a meditative essay about literature should not be condemned for failing to supply a revolutionary programme it never intended to provide. They might add that affirmation has its own value: preserving memory under dictatorship, maintaining intellectual independence under censorship, and insisting on human solidarity when political life is saturated with cruelty are not trivial accomplishments. This objection has force, and any criticism that measures literature by its proximity to political programme would be reductive.

But this is not the issue. Marxism does not require every novelist to become a political organiser, every poet to formulate a programme or every playwright to transform characters into spokespeople for socialism. The disastrous experience of Stalinist “socialist realism” demonstrated where such prescriptions lead. Art cannot flourish when reality is subordinated to a bureaucratically predetermined conclusion. Characters become sociological categories, conflicts become predictable and the independent discovery through which serious artistic creation proceeds is replaced by propaganda. A Marxist approach worthy of the name must defend artistic freedom precisely because truth cannot be discovered by administrative instruction.

Manguel’s criticism is therefore not that Resistance fails to tell readers which political organisation to join. It is that the increasingly abstract conception of resistance within liberal culture separates moral opposition from the historical forces capable of overcoming the conditions being opposed. The writer bears witness, the reader retains an ethical consciousness, and civilisation somehow continues despite the destruction occurring around it. Resistance progressively becomes consolation. Marxism insists upon reconnecting culture with history without reducing the former to the latter. Art has its own forms and problems, but artists, readers, and cultural institutions nevertheless exist within a society structured by definite relations of property and class.

The Reader and the World, Albert Manguel, Aleksandr Voronsky and Art as the Cognition of Life

For Manguel, reading is never simply the mechanical decoding of words. Across his writings on books, libraries and literary culture, reading emerges as a means by which human beings organise experience, preserve memory and discover possibilities beyond the limits of their immediate circumstances. Yet the philosophical implications of this conception become clearer when placed beside the Marxist aesthetics of Aleksandr Voronsky. In Art as the Cognition of Life, Voronsky advances the remarkable proposition that art is not merely a reflection upon life but one of the means through which life itself becomes known.

The affinity between the two writers begins with their refusal to reduce literature to information. A summary of its contents cannot replace a novel because what literature communicates resides in the artistic organisation of experience itself. Characters, situations, images, rhythm and language enable the reader to perceive relationships that abstract propositions cannot reproduce. Literature matters because it enlarges the field of human experience.

But Voronsky gives this insight a more explicitly materialist foundation. Art has cognitive significance because an objective world exists and can be known. The artist does not simply construct an arbitrary reality out of language. Nor does the reader possess unlimited authority to manufacture whatever meaning they choose. Artist, work and reader confront the accumulated substance of social and natural existence.

This conception distinguishes Voronsky sharply from much of the theoretical thinking about literature that developed later in the twentieth century. If reality becomes merely discourse and the literary work an endlessly unstable network of signs, then literature’s claim to disclose anything beyond itself becomes increasingly difficult to sustain. Voronsky’s aesthetics begins from exactly the opposite direction. Human consciousness arose within the material world and possesses the capacity, however imperfectly and historically conditioned, to understand that world. Art constitutes one particular form of this struggle for understanding.

Here Manguel’s lifelong defence of reading takes on broader significance. The library is not valuable simply because old books possess cultural prestige. It represents an extraordinary accumulation of encounters between human consciousness and historical experience. Each generation returns to these works not simply to commemorate the dead but because earlier artistic discoveries can suddenly illuminate circumstances that their creators could never have anticipated.

This helps explain why great literature repeatedly escapes the purposes institutions try to impose on it. Governments, markets, universities and publishing industries classify works, construct canons and transform cultural objects into commodities. Yet the experience contained within a powerful work cannot finally be reduced to its market price, institutional reputation or approved interpretation. The reader may encounter something disturbing precisely because literature reveals contradictions that conventional ideology conceals.

Voronsky’s argument also challenges the crude assumption that Marxist criticism demands politically obedient literature. The artistic value of a novel cannot be measured simply by whether its author professes progressive opinions. Reactionaries can perceive important aspects of social life, while writers possessing admirable political convictions can produce lifeless art. The decisive question is whether the artist has penetrated beneath appearances and discovered something truthful about human beings and their relations with one another.

This argument becomes especially important in an age when literature is increasingly subjected to the logic of commodification. Books are marketed through categories, algorithms, celebrity endorsements and demographic niches. Reading itself can become another measurable consumption habit. Against this environment, both Manguel and Voronsky, from very different intellectual traditions, insist upon something considerably more demanding: the encounter with literature changes the reader’s relationship with reality.

Yet Voronsky supplies the deeper explanation of why this should be possible. Literature matters because reality is richer than the ideological abstractions imposed upon it. Genuine artists discover contradictions, emotions and social relationships that they may not themselves completely understand theoretically. Their works can therefore contain truths exceeding their conscious intentions.

This also explains the continuing power of literature written under historical conditions radically different from our own. We do not read Shakespeare, Tolstoy or Dickens merely as documents belonging to vanished societies. Their works disclose relationships between individuals and society, aspiration and necessity, wealth and poverty, love and property, freedom and constraint. The historical world changes, but the artistic cognition embodied in such works becomes part of humanity’s accumulated consciousness.

The encounter between Manguel and Voronsky therefore points towards a defence of reading more radical than cultural nostalgia. Libraries matter not because civilisation requires temples dedicated to books, but because literature preserves something capitalism continually threatens to diminish: the possibility of sustained attention to human experience outside the immediate requirements of profit and utility.

To read seriously is consequently to engage with the world rather than retreat from it. Manguel reminds us of the inexhaustible relationship connecting books, memory and readers. Voronsky explains why that relationship reaches beyond the private pleasures of reading. Art is a means of cognition, an attempt to penetrate appearances and grasp something truthful about life. The defence of literature therefore becomes inseparable from the defence of humanity’s capacity to know the world and, ultimately, to change it.

Artificial intelligence and the social question

The question becomes particularly sharp in relation to artificial intelligence. Writers and artists have legitimate reasons to regard the development of AI with anxiety. Intellectual and creative workers confront the possibility that corporations will use technologies trained on enormous quantities of existing cultural material to reduce costs, eliminate employment, and transform creative production itself. The increasing capacity to manufacture images, texts, music and synthetic media also creates obvious problems concerning authenticity and the social status of creative work. But none of these developments can adequately be understood by opposing human creativity to technology as such.

The decisive issue is ownership. Artificial intelligence did not descend upon society from outside history. It represents the accumulated product of scientific discovery, technological development, social knowledge and the labour of countless human beings. The contradiction is that socially generated productive capacities become concentrated in the ownership and control of private corporations and wealthy investors. The same technology that might be used to reduce monotonous labour, expand access to knowledge, translate vast bodies of literature, assist scientific research and increase the cultural possibilities available to humanity can, within capitalism, instead be employed to eliminate employment, intensify surveillance, strengthen military systems and subordinate intellectual activity still further to profit.

Trotsky identified the essential contradiction long before the development of digital computation when he discussed technology in Culture and Socialism. Under capitalism, machinery becomes an instrument for intensifying the exploitation of labour, but humanity cannot emancipate itself by rejecting the machine. The productive forces created under capitalism simultaneously establish the material possibilities for overcoming scarcity, drudgery and cultural backwardness. The Marxist answer to technological development is therefore neither corporate celebration nor romantic repudiation. It asks which social class controls technology, what economic principles guide its development, and what human purposes its capacities serve.

AI and humanity’s collective culture

Artificial intelligence makes this contradiction unusually visible because the material many AI systems depend on demonstrates the inherently collective character of culture itself. No writer invents the language in which they write. No scientist independently creates the accumulated body of knowledge upon which discovery depends. No historian creates the archive. Every generation inherits an immense cultural and scientific legacy produced by innumerable previous generations, and every genuinely significant intellectual achievement, in turn, enters that developing collective inheritance.

Digital technology has vastly enlarged the technical possibilities for making this inherited culture available. Libraries, historical archives, scientific research and enormous quantities of educational material can potentially become accessible to populations across the planet on a scale that previous generations could scarcely have imagined. Under rational social arrangements, AI could help organise and navigate that information, overcome linguistic boundaries, and extend access to intellectual resources far beyond the institutions where they have traditionally been concentrated. The genuinely revolutionary potential lies not in the fantasy that machines will replace human thought, but in technologies that could extend human capacity to think, learn, and create.

The obstacle is not technological but social. When accumulated human knowledge becomes privately appropriated, the contradictions surrounding AI become an expression of the contradiction between collective production and private ownership that Marx identified as foundational to capitalist society. A serious discussion of AI and culture therefore must go beyond the fear that the machine threatens the writer. It must ask who owns the machine and who controls access to the accumulated knowledge upon which it operates. Without that transition, cultural criticism risks treating the symptoms of technological change while leaving untouched the social structure determining how technology will be used.

Trevor Griffiths and the writer’s social orientation

The 2008 discussion between playwright Trevor Griffiths and WSWS arts editor David Walsh provides a useful contrast because it approaches the relationship between artistic work and politics historically rather than merely morally. Griffiths belonged to a generation shaped by the international radicalisation of the late 1960s and early 1970s, when questions of Marxism, revolution, the working class and political power entered cultural life with an intensity that would become almost unimaginable during the succeeding decades. Writers did not suddenly develop more courageous personalities. Their cultural development occurred within a wider movement of millions of people whose struggles transformed the intellectual atmosphere.

The importance of this experience lies precisely in the connection between culture and social life. Radical writing did not develop simply because writers chose to “resist”. A wider historical movement expanded the possibilities available to culture and made questions that had previously appeared marginal suddenly immediate. The subsequent defeats and betrayals of the radicalisation did not leave cultural life unaffected either. The turn to the right, the attacks associated with Thatcherism and Reaganism, the decline of the old labour organisations and finally the dissolution of the Soviet Union contributed to a profound transformation of intellectual life. Confidence in collective social transformation retreated. Class increasingly disappeared from cultural discussion, while politics became reinterpreted through personal identity, language and individual experience.

“Resistance” fitted this changed intellectual climate remarkably well. Revolution implies a social force, a historical objective and a question of political power. Resistance does not necessarily require any of them. One can resist indefinitely without confronting how society is to be reconstructed. The word therefore captures both the sincerity and the political limits of much contemporary cultural opposition.

From class politics to moral protest

This transformation did not arise merely from incorrect theoretical choices. It followed major political defeats and social transformations. The defeats of working-class movements during the closing decades of the twentieth century strengthened the apparent dominance of capitalism. They encouraged the conception that fundamental social transformation had become impossible. Politics increasingly adjusted itself to what was presented as an unalterable market order. In this environment, opposition shifted from transformation to transgression, personal expression, and symbolic protest. The language changed accordingly. Liberation gave way to representation, revolution to resistance, social transformation to individual empowerment.

None of these terms is necessarily meaningless. People genuinely resist oppression, and defending democratic and cultural rights remains essential. The problem arises when defensive resistance becomes an entire conception of historical possibility. A political culture organised merely around perpetual resistance tacitly assumes that the forces being resisted will themselves remain permanent. The individual may refuse inward submission, but the structure producing oppression survives. What appears radical can consequently conceal a deeply pessimistic historical conception.

Manguel’s final “perhaps that is enough” unintentionally expresses this pessimism. Literature preserves what is humane while the surrounding world becomes increasingly inhuman. The library becomes a shelter from barbarism rather than one element within humanity’s struggle to abolish the social sources of barbarism. Such a conception contains dignity, but it also embodies resignation.

Literature must disturb

Great literature has never confined itself comfortably to affirmation. It affirms humanity frequently through merciless criticism of the actual conditions under which human beings live. Its power lies partly in its capacity to destabilise assumptions so deeply embedded in social existence that they appear natural. The novelist can make visible relations that everyday consciousness conceals; the playwright can expose the contradiction between what individuals say and what their behaviour reveals; poetry can give expressive form to needs and experiences that have not yet found an adequate political vocabulary. Literature thereby does what political analysis alone cannot accomplish.

This disturbing quality is essential. Chekhov’s observation in “Gooseberries” that behind every contented person there ought to stand someone with a hammer reminding him continually that unhappy people exist captures something fundamental about serious art. Kafka’s celebrated image of literature as an axe for the frozen sea within us expresses the same demand in another form. Art should not merely confirm our existing morality. It should penetrate the defences through which individuals reconcile themselves to intolerable circumstances.

The greatest writing therefore does not simply inform readers that injustice exists. Newspapers can do that. It transforms perception. It makes previously accepted relationships strange and forces readers to reconsider their own experience. This process need not produce an immediately identifiable political conclusion. But it has enormous intellectual potential because fundamental social change becomes possible only when people stop treating the existing organisation of life as inevitable.

The reader is also a social being.

Nevertheless, there is a danger in turning reading itself into resistance. Capitalism is remarkably capable of commodifying its own criticism. Revolutionary imagery becomes advertising, rebellious music becomes fashion, political radicalism becomes a publishing category, and resistance becomes a marketable identity. The existence of radical books therefore proves very little about the political health of a society. An economic system can tolerate an enormous quantity of private dissent so long as that dissent remains disconnected from collective action directed against the foundations of social power.

The reader, moreover, is never simply a reader. The person sitting with a novel is also a worker or employer, tenant or landlord, parent, student, pensioner or unemployed person. They occupy a concrete position in society and participate in relationships that extend far beyond the page. Reading can alter how individuals understand these relationships, but the movement from understanding to transformation requires another sphere of activity. At some point the reader closes the book and re-enters the world.

This does not diminish reading. It identifies where its greatest significance potentially lies. A book may articulate something experienced by thousands or millions of individuals separately and thereby help transform private experience into social understanding. Once individuals recognise that what appeared to be a private misfortune is produced by conditions shared with countless others, consciousness has already begun moving beyond the individual. Literature can contribute powerfully to that process. But collective understanding becomes historically transformative only through collective action.

Seeing the world as it really is

Manguel therefore raises a considerably larger problem than his own solution can contain when he asks whether literature enables humanity to see the world as it really is. To confront reality today means recognising that capitalism is not simply an economy within which occasional injustices occur. It is a historically developed system of social relations characterised fundamentally by private ownership of the productive forces, the exploitation of wage labour and competition between corporations and nation-states. War, inequality, austerity and cultural impoverishment cannot be understood comprehensively as separate moral failures because they all arise within this wider social structure.

The same applies to the conditions confronting literature itself. The difficulties facing writers, libraries, publishing, arts education and serious journalism are continually treated as discrete cultural problems. Yet behind them stands the allocation of social resources. A society capable of producing extraordinary quantities of wealth nevertheless claims that it cannot adequately fund libraries, schools, museums, orchestras, theatres and other institutions through which cultural life develops. Writers are urged to accommodate themselves to market demands while publishers operate increasingly according to commercial imperatives. The contradiction is not a lack of technological or material resources, but their organisation around private accumulation rather than social need.

To see the world as it really is consequently requires seeing cultural decline as an expression of a broader social crisis. The defence of literature ultimately confronts the same questions as the defence of every other field of human activity: who owns society’s resources, who determines how they are distributed, and whose interests does production serve?

The question of the working class

This brings the argument to the subject that liberal theories of resistance generally avoid: the working class. Marxism did not assign workers a revolutionary role because Marx had a sentimental preference for industrial labour. The working class’s revolutionary significance arises from its position within capitalist production. Capital increasingly organises production collectively across national boundaries while ownership remains concentrated privately. Workers therefore participate every day in a highly socialised system whose productive capacities contradict the private appropriation of the wealth they create.

Modern technological development has intensified this contradiction rather than removed it. The global systems underlying digital communication, artificial intelligence, logistics, finance and scientific research depend upon vast networks of collective labour. Technologies celebrated as autonomous creations of entrepreneurs are actually impossible without generations of publicly and privately employed scientists, programmers, engineers, teachers, technicians and countless other workers, alongside accumulated cultural and scientific knowledge inherited from the past.

For writers, this question is decisive because culture itself increasingly depends upon the same globally integrated technical infrastructure. The interests of the serious artist ultimately collide with the same monopolistic relations that confront workers elsewhere. Intellectual property, digital platforms, publishing corporations and AI systems cannot be considered independently of the ownership structures controlling them. The defence of culture therefore develops an objective connection with the broader struggle over control of society’s productive and intellectual resources.

Literature is not a substitute for politics.

To argue this is not to demand politically obedient literature. On the contrary, literature becomes artistically impoverished when converted into political instruction. A novel organised to demonstrate conclusions that the author already possesses ceases to discover reality and becomes illustration. The greatness of art lies partly in its unpredictability, its capacity to uncover contradictions that neither the artist nor the reader initially anticipated.

But acknowledging the independence of artistic creation does not require pretending that literature exists outside historical development. The artist’s task is not identical to that of a political party, yet both confront the same objective world. Serious art and revolutionary politics approach reality through different forms, methods and purposes, but neither can indefinitely avoid the fundamental contradictions of its historical epoch.

The question is therefore one of orientation rather than prescription. Does the writer look towards society and attempt to penetrate its contradictions, or retreat from society into the assertion of individual moral integrity? Does cultural opposition seek historical clarification, or does it construct an enclave within which humane values can survive while the external world becomes increasingly barbaric? At this level, Manguel’s conception of resistance becomes inadequate.

Giving the argument against this criticism its due

There remains a serious counterargument. Admirers of Manguel can reasonably insist that Resistance is a literary meditation rather than a work of political economy. They may argue that the demand for cultural affirmation itself possesses value when censorship, historical falsification and political demoralisation threaten intellectual independence. Montaigne did not need to formulate a revolutionary programme for his essays to enlarge human self-understanding, nor must every contemporary writer transform reflections upon books into an analysis of capitalist property relations. Literature has moral, imaginative and aesthetic capacities that cannot be reduced to its relationship with class struggle.

This warning against reductionism should be taken seriously. A mechanical Marxism that treats every poem or novel simply as an ideological document generated by class position would be incapable of explaining why works produced in remote historical circumstances continue to move readers centuries later. Human beings have emotional and intellectual experiences that cannot be reduced to economic categories. Love, mortality, memory, betrayal, loneliness and hope are genuine elements of human life, and literature’s exploration of them possesses its own legitimacy.

But recognising this does not invalidate historical materialism. The universal in art does not exist by eliminating the particular. Human emotions themselves are experienced within historically developed social forms. Love in feudal society is not socially identical to love in modern capitalism, even though both contain recognisably human experiences. Literature becomes universal not by escaping the historical world but by rendering particular human experiences so truthfully that people living in different circumstances can recognise themselves within them. Marxism at its best therefore enlarges rather than diminishes the understanding of artistic universality.

Beyond “Perhaps that is enough”

Manguel’s hesitant conclusion can now be reconsidered. Perhaps, he suggests, affirmation and continuing resistance are enough. But enough for what? Enough to preserve personal integrity? Certainly. Enough to maintain historical memory against those seeking to destroy it? Sometimes. Enough to produce great literature? Possibly, because artists have never required correct political theories as prerequisites for artistic achievement. But enough to confront the social processes threatening culture, democratic rights and human civilisation? No.

Books did not abolish slavery, overthrow feudalism or defeat fascism. Yet intellectual and artistic culture played enormous roles in the historical struggles through which people became conscious of these conditions and acted against them. The distinction is fundamental. The Enlightenment contributed to the intellectual preparation of bourgeois revolution because its criticism of inherited authority intersected with major changes in European society. Marxism acquired world-historical significance not simply because Marx wrote extraordinarily penetrating books, but because those works articulated the objective historical interests of a social force capitalism itself created.

Ideas become material forces when they enter into the consciousness of masses of people. Literature forms part of this process because it can transform perception long before political conclusions become fully articulated. It can reveal what society tries to hide, recover what official history seeks to forget, and show that apparently natural social relationships have histories and therefore can have endings.

Literature is not enough, but it is necessary.

The conclusion should therefore be neither the liberal celebration of literature as resistance nor a philistine dismissal of books as politically powerless. Literature is not enough, but it is necessary. Books constitute one of humanity’s greatest repositories of accumulated consciousness. Through them, individuals separated by centuries enter into conversation. The dead continue to participate in the living’s intellectual life. Historical experience survives the societies that created it, and readers encounter modes of human existence radically different from their own.

No socialist movement worthy of the name can regard this inheritance indifferently. The struggle for human liberation is inconceivable without defending and expanding culture because socialism is not simply a different mechanism for distributing goods. Its historical justification rests on creating conditions in which the productive, intellectual, and creative capacities of every human being can develop to a degree impossible in a society dominated by exploitation, economic insecurity, and social inequality.

Manguel is consequently right to defend literature against the forces seeking to diminish it. He is right to insist that books can challenge falsehood and enlarge perception. He is right to regard cultural memory as something worth preserving in an age increasingly characterised by historical amnesia. But the logic of his own questions points beyond the conclusion he offers. If literature teaches us to see the world as it really is, then eventually it must help us confront the historical character of that world. It must make visible not only suffering but the social relationships that reproduce suffering, not merely authoritarianism but the forces giving rise to it, not simply technological anxiety but the structures of ownership determining the purposes towards which technology is directed.

The writer cannot transform society through writing, and it would be disastrous for art to pretend otherwise. But the writer need not accept a permanent separation between cultural truth and social action. Literature reaches towards something greater than private consolation precisely when the truth it discovers becomes part of humanity’s consciousness of itself. At that point, the distinction between the library and the world does not disappear, but their relationship becomes clearer. The reader carries historical experience out of the book and back into society.

“Perhaps that is enough” expresses the honourable pessimism of an intellectual determined to preserve culture while uncertain that society itself can be transformed. The challenge confronting writers and readers in the twenty-first century requires a more ambitious perspective. Literature should not pretend to replace political struggle, but neither should it reconcile humanity to a permanent condition of resistance. Its highest function is not to reassure us that conscience survives. At the same time, the world deteriorates, but it deepens our understanding of that world, disturbs our accommodation to it, and enlarges our conception of what human beings might become.

Manguel asks whether society can be compelled to recognise the evidence of facts. History suggests that it can, but never through books alone. It requires human beings who have understood their circumstances, recognised their collective interests and become determined to act upon that understanding. Literature can profoundly help develop such consciousness. That is why the answer to Manguel should not be that literature is powerless. It is something more demanding: literature becomes historically powerful when the truths it reveals encounter a social force capable of acting upon them.

The task, then, is to move beyond resistance as permanent moral protest. The defence of culture must become inseparable from creating a society in which culture, science, and technology cease to be subordinated to private accumulation and become part of humanity’s common inheritance. Literature will not accomplish that transformation by itself. But the literature worthy of the coming struggles will undoubtedly help human beings understand why such a transformation is necessary.

Bibliography

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Chekhov, Anton. “Gooseberries.” 1898.

Dante Alighieri. The Divine Comedy. Various editions.

Dreiser, Theodore. An American Tragedy. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1925.

Dreiser, Theodore. Sister Carrie. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1900.

Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. 1845.

Lukács, Georg. Studies in European Realism. London: Hillway Publishing, 1950.

Lukács, Georg. The Historical Novel. Various editions.

Manguel, Alberto. A History of Reading. London: Flamingo, 1997.

Manguel, Alberto. A Reader on Reading. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.

Manguel, Alberto. Curiosity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015.

Manguel, Alberto. Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I.

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Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The German Ideology.

Plekhanov, G. V. Art and Social Life.

Tolstoy, Leo. Anna Karenina. Various editions.

Tolstoy, Leo. War and Peace. Various editions.

Trotsky, Leon. Literature and Revolution. 1924.

Trotsky, Leon. “Culture and Socialism.” 1927.

Voronsky, Alexander. Art as the Cognition of Life: Selected Writings, 1911–1936. Oak Park: Mehring Books.

Walsh, David. “The Writer and Revolution: WSWS arts editor David Walsh in conversation with Trevor Griffiths.” World Socialist Web Site, 2008.

Williams, Raymond. Culture and Society 1780–1950. London: Chatto & Windus, 1958.

Williams, Raymond. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

BBC HistoryExtra and Robert Tombs: The “better story” of British imperialism and the rehabilitation of the national past

Robert Tombs’s appearance on the BBC’s HistoryExtra platform promoting Our Islands’ Story: A Better Story About Britain, co-written with Nigel Biggar, matters for reasons that extend far beyond the merits of another popular history of Britain. The central issue the book and its promotion raise is not whether every aspect of British history should be condemned, nor whether historians should acknowledge achievements as well as crimes. It concerns something far more fundamental: whose history is being written, which social forces are concealed when “Britain” is treated as a unified historical subject, and why a rehabilitated national narrative has acquired renewed political importance.

Biggar and Tombs make no secret of wanting to challenge what they regard as an excessively negative conception of British history. Swift Press describes their book as a challenge to a supposedly “fashionable” narrative that emphasises the worst of Britain’s past while neglecting its best. The publisher goes further, describing the volume as an “antidote to contemporary cynicism” and declaring that the authors seek to tell a “better story about Britain”, one that recognises achievements of “enduring value” that supposedly deserve “our appreciation and care”. Our Islands’ Story was published on 22 October 2026. [swiftpress.com]

That language deserves serious attention. “Our”, “inheritance”, “appreciation” and “care” are not merely neutral historiographical categories. They construct a relationship between contemporary readers and the British state’s history. The effect is to transform history from the critical investigation of past societies into an argument about national inheritance. Events separated by centuries and produced by antagonistic social classes can therefore be gathered under an encompassing national “we”.

The accompanying endorsements make the political thrust still clearer. Andrew Roberts praises the book for rejecting what he calls “corrosive woke self-hatred”. At the same time, John Gray commends its opposition to a supposedly “crude progressive mythology” depicting British history principally through oppression and exploitation. The question is therefore not whether the book has politics. Its presentation makes clear that it consciously intervenes in contemporary disputes over national identity and historical memory. The question is what politics these arguments express and what conception of history underpins them.

Who is the “our” in Our Islands’ Story?

The title itself poses the central problem. Who exactly are “our”? No single British historical experience exists. The aristocrat enclosing land and the peasant deprived of customary rights did not inhabit history in the same way. The plantation owner accumulating wealth through enslaved labour and the enslaved labourer were not participants in a common achievement. The Manchester mill owner and the child employed in the factory cannot be dissolved into a collective national “we” without concealing their social relationship.

The British Empire similarly cannot be understood as the collective accomplishment or collective crime of an undifferentiated British population. Its governing apparatus, military power and commercial expansion arose from definite social interests. The profits generated by colonial commerce, plantation slavery, finance and industrial exploitation accumulated overwhelmingly within the possessing classes. British workers could themselves absorb imperial and nationalist ideology, and sections of the working class could derive particular advantages from imperial supremacy, but this did not abolish the fundamental class division within British society.

That is why the apparently straightforward language of national inheritance is so misleading. Tombs has long defended a more affirmative interpretation of England and Britain. Yet the central Marxist objection to this approach does not depend upon establishing whether England has been, at one moment or another, relatively prosperous, politically stable or constitutionally liberal compared with other countries. The real question is how such developments arose and which social forces struggled over their direction.

A national narrative inevitably converts contested achievements into national attributes. Parliamentary government, civil liberties, trade-union rights and extension of the franchise appear retrospectively as components of an evolving British political tradition. What disappears is the struggle required to obtain them and, above all, the resistance mounted by property and the state against those demanding them.

The material foundations of British power

Britain did not become the “workshop of the world” because of some timeless national predisposition towards liberty, enterprise or good government. British capitalism emerged from profound transformations in property, agriculture, commerce, production, and class relations.

The enclosure and commercialisation of agriculture helped produce both an increasingly capitalist system of farming and populations increasingly dependent upon wage labour. Colonial commerce expanded alongside the Atlantic slave economy. Wealth generated in the Caribbean, commercial expansion in Asia, and the growing power of finance interacted with transformations taking place within Britain itself. The Industrial Revolution did not descend from the ingenuity of an undifferentiated British people. It developed inside a new system of class relations in which the means of production were increasingly concentrated in private hands while millions possessed primarily their capacity to work.

The resulting wealth was extraordinary. So too was its social cost. Engels’s The Condition of the Working Class in England lies precisely in this. Engels did not look upon industrial Britain and see a single national community becoming progressively richer. He perceived interconnected classes. The factory system that generated enormous wealth at one pole of society generated insecurity, exhausting labour, overcrowding and premature death at another. The splendour of capitalist civilisation and the misery of the proletariat were not two unrelated phenomena. They arose from the same social relations.

This is what disappears whenever national prosperity becomes the principal measure of historical success. To ask whether Britain was rich is consequently inadequate. One must ask who controlled the wealth, who produced it, under what conditions it was accumulated and how it was distributed. To speak of British power without these questions is to convert the history of a class society into a national success story.

Empire and the morality of the balance sheet

The same methodological difficulty becomes still more visible when discussion turns towards empire. Biggar’s attempt to reconsider the morality of colonialism rests upon the claim that the historical record should not be reduced exclusively to oppression and atrocity. Our Islands’ Story extends the broader intellectual project into a national history advertised as recovering positive achievements against pervasive pessimism. The publisher explicitly presents the book in these terms.

At first sight, the demand for “balance” sounds unassailable. Any serious historian considers contradictory evidence. British imperial rule differed across regions and centuries. Its administrators did not possess identical motives. Colonial subjects were themselves divided by class, caste, religion and political outlook. Institutions transported around the world could acquire meanings unintended by those who introduced them. None of this, however, answers the essential question: what was empire?

Empire was not an assortment of disconnected moral actions awaiting classification as beneficial or harmful. It represented systems of political domination constructed within a developing capitalist world economy. British imperialism secured strategic territory, commercial routes, markets, investment opportunities and access to labour and resources. The forms of this domination varied enormously, but you cannot understand the social relationship by placing railways, schools, and legal institutions in a positive column while placing famine, dispossession, and repression in a negative one.

Railways themselves illustrate the problem. Infrastructure that later becomes essential to the economic life of an independent society cannot retrospectively explain the social purpose for which colonial authorities and investors supported its construction. A material development may have contradictory historical consequences. Marxism has never required denying this. On the contrary, contradiction stands at the centre of historical development.

The problem begins when consequences are converted into moral credits attributed to “Britain”. The Irish Famine, Amritsar, the Bengal famine of 1943 and repression in colonial Kenya cannot simply be positioned alongside legal institutions and infrastructure before historians calculate whether empire generated a positive or negative final score. Instead, historians must locate such events within the economic and political relations of the societies in which they occurred. The issue is explanation rather than retrospective national judgement.

The struggle for democracy was a class struggle.

This distinction matters especially when discussing the genuinely progressive traditions in British history. There is an enormous democratic inheritance. But its most powerful episodes repeatedly emerged through struggle against the existing political and social order. The seventeenth-century English Revolution shattered forms of monarchical government and released political arguments of extraordinary radicalism. The Levellers demanded an extension of political participation far beyond what Parliament’s propertied leaders were prepared to concede. The Putney Debates revealed that even within the parliamentary military coalition, profound disagreement existed over property, political rights, and the revolution’s meaning.

The radical tradition did not end there. The development of industrial capitalism produced a modern working class that created its own organisations and increasingly advanced its own political claims. Peterloo revealed how the state could answer demands for political reform. The Tolpuddle labourers demonstrated the hostility directed against collective organisation. Chartism created the first mass independent political movement of the working class, linking democratic demands with the experience of industrial society. The British political system eventually incorporated reforms once denounced as dangerous and revolutionary. But to transform that outcome into proof of Britain’s uniquely evolutionary genius is to reverse historical causation.

Rights conceded under pressure subsequently become celebrated components of a national tradition. The struggles that made concessions unavoidable recede into the background. This process of historical appropriation is crucial to understanding conservative national history. It does not necessarily deny popular struggle. More commonly, it absorbs its accomplishments. Democracy becomes British. Parliamentary sovereignty becomes British. Freedom becomes British. The working population is subsequently invited to identify with institutions whose democratic content was expanded precisely through generations of struggle against privileged elites. Marxism insists upon restoring that conflict to the centre of historical interpretation.

The working class has a history, not a national myth.

The alternative to conservative nationalism is therefore not national self-loathing. Workers living in Britain today have no reason to experience personal guilt for imperial crimes committed before they were born. A child in present-day Manchester is no more personally responsible for Amritsar than an Indian worker today is responsible for the actions of former Indian ruling classes. Collective hereditary guilt is an intellectually bankrupt approach to history. But collective national pride mirrors the same error. If contemporary workers are not personally guilty of the crimes of empire, they cannot logically inherit personal credit for Britain’s victories, imperial conquests or ruling-class achievements either.

History is something to understand, not something into which individuals should be conscripted in search of either inherited innocence or inherited guilt. This is where the conflict between Marxism and both sides of the conventional culture war becomes important. Racialist theories may present “whiteness”, “Europeans” or “the British” as collective historical subjects bearing responsibility across generations. Conservative national history responds by taking the same national categories and reversing the moral verdict. Instead of collective guilt, it offers collective pride. The apparent opponents consequently share far more than either acknowledges. Both can dissolve class antagonisms into identities extending across generations. Both obscure the fact that the decisive divisions in capitalist society arise from social relations of production, property and power. Marxism rejects the choice.

From the 1619 Project to History Reclaimed

This is also why opposition to racialised interpretations of history must not be surrendered to the political right. Legitimate criticisms of racial reductionism give Tombs and other conservative historians part of their intellectual opportunity. When enormous and complicated histories are rewritten as essentially eternal confrontations between racial categories, the resulting distortions make nationalist counterattacks easier. But the answer to racial essentialism cannot be national essentialism.

The history of Atlantic slavery, for example, becomes incomprehensible if the fundamental historical agency is relocated from class relations and developing capitalism into a timeless conflict between “white” and “black” people. But it becomes equally incomprehensible if the fact that Britain later participated in suppressing the Atlantic slave trade is employed to establish a moral credit for the British national story.

Historical materialism asks different questions. What economic relations generated racial slavery? Which classes accumulated wealth through it? How were racial ideologies developed to legitimise exploitation? Which economic, political and social transformations contributed to abolition? What interests subsequently shaped Britain’s use of anti-slavery in its international policy? Those questions lead away from moral competition between national pride and national shame and towards historical explanation.

Why resurrect the imperial inheritance now?

The timing of the dispute matters. Britain in 2026 is not the Britain that dominated nineteenth-century world commerce. Nor is it the imperial power that once controlled enormous territories. It is a capitalist society marked by intense social inequality and political disaffection, operating within a global system increasingly characterised by military confrontation and geopolitical instability. Under such circumstances, the ideological significance of national history increases.

A state demanding social sacrifice must perpetually present national interests as interests shared across class lines. Military expenditure must become “our” defence. Geopolitical objectives become “our” security. International competitors become threats to “us”. The tremendous disparities separating wealth and poverty disappear temporarily behind the image of national community. History provides this political vocabulary with a past. Empire consequently becomes more than a historical question. If the imperial past can be reinterpreted as on balance constructive, a source of institutions and values worthy of appreciation, then the contemporary British state can present itself as inheritor of a fundamentally progressive national tradition.

This was one of the central arguments in my earlier A Trumpet of Sedition article, “Biggar and Tombs’ Our Islands’ Story: An ideological brief for an empire preparing for war”. Published on 15 October, the article argued that the rehabilitation of empire should be considered within a wider ideological turn towards militarism and national cohesion. , [keith-pers…ogspot.com]

The BBC and the limits of “neutral” history

In principle, I have no objection to the BBC interviewing Tombs. His position deserves examination, particularly because it sits at the centre of a major contemporary historical controversy. The problem arises when a deeply political interpretation is treated principally as an exercise in correcting excessive negativity rather than subjected to sustained scrutiny of its assumptions. The questions to ask of this interpretation are not difficult to formulate.

What is gained and what is lost when Britain itself becomes the subject of history? Who possesses the collective inheritance repeatedly invoked in discussions of the national past? How can the accomplishments of ruling classes and the victories secured against them legitimately be incorporated into the same narrative of national achievement?

Does the parliamentary system demonstrate an inherent British attachment to liberty, or does its development reveal centuries of conflict over who possessed political rights? Can empire be morally evaluated apart from the economic system that shaped imperial expansion? And above all, what does the word “our” mean in a society divided by class? A genuinely searching discussion would have forced the national narrative to confront these contradictions. Instead, the danger of the “history wars” framework is that the argument is organised between two positions that reinforce one another: Britain as historical villain and Britain as historical benefactor. Once debate takes this form, Marxist historical explanation disappears almost completely.

Our Islands’ Story and the politics of historical memory

The publisher’s presentation of Our Islands’ Story is particularly revealing in this respect. The book is not advertised simply as offering discoveries about Britain’s past. It is offered as a corrective to attitudes towards the past. Readers are encouraged to recover something worthy of “appreciation and care” and to carry valuable elements of the inheritance “into the future”. That is an argument about historical consciousness.

The difference matters because history and memory perform different intellectual functions. Historical investigation should challenge inherited assumptions. National memory frequently seeks continuity. History disaggregates supposedly unified communities and discovers conflicts beneath them. National mythology instead tends to turn contradictory experiences into a common inheritance. Marxist history’s task is precisely to uncover those contradictions.

We should therefore reject the argument that criticism of empire involves hating Britain just as emphatically as we reject claims that acknowledging cultural or political achievements requires defending empire. Shakespeare does not belong to imperialism. Newton does not require colonial apologetics. The Levellers do not belong to the historical tradition of the British ruling class simply because their struggles occurred in England. Chartism cannot be transformed into an ornament of British constitutionalism without doing violence to the social conflict that created it. Cultural achievement, scientific discovery and democratic struggle are part of humanity’s inheritance. The history of ordinary people struggling to improve their conditions belongs most profoundly to those continuing the struggle for human emancipation.

Against both national shame and national pride

The choice facing historians is therefore not between denunciation and celebration. Neither category provides an adequate method. The British Empire should not be studied so that contemporary Britons can be instructed to feel ashamed of themselves. Nor should it be studied so they can emerge feeling reassured that the national ledger ultimately remains in credit. Both approaches subordinate historical explanation to contemporary moral identity. The materialist historian instead seeks to reconstruct the social relations from which events arose.

This means examining Britain’s transformation through agrarian capitalism, colonial expansion and industrialisation. It means tracing the formation of classes and the relationship between domestic accumulation and international exploitation. It means investigating the state as an instrument shaped by historically developing property relations rather than imagining it as the political embodiment of a timeless national character.

It also means paying attention to resistance. The enslaved person who rebelled against plantation slavery, the Irish tenant resisting landlordism, the Indian opponent of colonial domination and the British worker confronting the factory owner do not belong in separate moral histories. Their experiences were connected through the developing world capitalist system. This is precisely why Marxism possesses an international conception of history fundamentally at odds with conservative nationalism.

There was never one British story.

Finally, no single British story can reconcile these experiences without distorting them. The history of the landowner is not the history of the dispossessed agricultural labourer. The imperial administrator did not have the same historical experience as the colonised population. The millionaire and the docker inhabited the same country without occupying the same social world. The attempt to merge them produces precisely that mystified entity Marxism exists to penetrate: the nation conceived as a community standing above class.

Biggar and Tombs want the reader to recover confidence in national inheritance. The description issued by Swift Press leaves little ambiguity on this score, presenting Our Islands’ Story as an uplifting corrective to cynicism about the British past. But workers need no such reassurance. They possess a historical inheritance far richer than the achievements of their rulers. It includes those who resisted enclosure and dispossession; those who carried the English Revolution beyond the limits acceptable to its propertied leadership; the Levellers who argued over political equality at Putney; the reform movements brutally confronted at Peterloo; the Tolpuddle labourers; the Chartists; generations of trade unionists, socialists and anti-imperialists; and all those who insisted that ordinary men and women were capable of directing society themselves. This history cannot be made the property of the British state. Nor is it exclusively British. Its greatest significance lies precisely in its connection with the struggles of workers and oppressed populations internationally.

A better history requires abandoning the national myth

The weakness of Our Islands’ Story ultimately lies in its title. A “better story about Britain” remains organised around Britain as its fundamental historical subject. But the history that genuinely needs recovering is the history concealed when the nation takes centre stage. Britain certainly has a past. That does not mean everyone who lived within it shared the same historical interests.

The critical question for history is not whether “we” should be proud or ashamed. It is who constituted this “we” in the first place. Who owned the land? Who worked it? Who owned the factories? Who laboured inside them? Who profited from colonial expansion? Who administered the empire? Who experienced its domination? Who controlled Parliament, and who struggled for admission into political life? Who accumulated the wealth, and who produced it?

Once those questions are asked, the harmonious national picture begins to disintegrate.

That is why the current rehabilitation of national history has contemporary political significance. A society divided ever more visibly between immense private wealth and widespread insecurity requires ideological mechanisms that can assert an overriding community of interests. National history provides one such mechanism. It takes the conflicts through which modern society developed and transforms their outcomes into common property. The state ceases to appear as a product of historical struggles and becomes the guardian of a supposedly shared inheritance.

The possibilities contained in British history are far greater than that conservative narrative allows. They lie not primarily in the state’s continuity but in repeated challenges to established authority. From the revolutionary ferment of the seventeenth century through Chartism and the establishment of an organised working-class movement, Britain’s most enduring contribution to human progress cannot be separated from struggles waged from below.

Workers and young people therefore require neither an education in national guilt nor lessons in patriotic pride from historians seeking to restore confidence in Britain’s past. They need history in its most rigorous sense: the reconstruction of the social forces, material interests and class struggles through which the present world came into existence. Tombs and Biggar’s “better story” responds to the crisis of national confidence by attempting to repair the national narrative. Marxist history begins from an altogether different premise. The task is not to produce a better national myth, but to dispense with the myth that rulers and ruled ever possessed one common history. What deserves to be recovered is not an imperial inheritance but the revolutionary and democratic tradition that repeatedly challenged property, privilege and empire. That inheritance belongs to neither Westminster nor the British state. It belongs to the international working class.

Bibliography and further reading

Biggar, Tombs and the current controversy

Biggar, Nigel and Robert Tombs. Our Islands’ Story: A Better Story About Britain. Swift Press, 2026. The publisher gives 22 October 2026 as the publication date and explicitly advertises the book as an antidote to contemporary pessimism concerning Britain’s history.

Biggar, Nigel. Colonialism: A Moral Reckoning. London: William Collins, 2023.

Tombs, Robert. The English and Their History. London: Allen Lane, 2014.

Tombs, Robert. This Sovereign Isle: Britain In and Out of Europe. London: Allen Lane, 2021.

Marx, Engels and imperialism

Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. 1845.

Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I. 1867.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. 1848.

Lenin, V. I. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. 1916.

Trotsky, Leon. Where Is Britain Going? 1925.

British capitalism, empire and the working class

Williams, Eric. Capitalism and Slavery. 1944.

Thompson, E. P. The Making of the English Working Class. London: Victor Gollancz, 1963.

Hill, Christopher. The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution. London: Temple Smith, 1972.

Hobsbawm, Eric. Industry and Empire. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968.

Kiernan, V. G. The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes to Other Cultures in the Imperial Age. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969.

Blackburn, Robin. The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492–1800. London: Verso, 1997.

From A Trumpet of Sedition

A Trumpet of Sedition. “Biggar and Tombs’ Our Islands’ Story: An ideological brief for an empire preparing for war.” 15 October 2026. This is particularly worth retaining in the bibliography because the present article works naturally as its companion: the earlier essay focuses on the ideological rehabilitation of empire and argues that this must be located within a wider turn toward militarism. [atrumpetof…dition.org],

Publisher material

Swift Press. Our Islands’ Story, publisher’s description and endorsements. [swiftpress.com]

The Guardian Bookshop. Our Islands’ Story, publication details and author biographies. Its listing identifies Biggar as Lord Biggar of Castle Douglas and Emeritus Regius Professor of Moral Theology at Oxford, noting that he entered the House of Lords as a Conservative peer in January 2025; it identifies Tombs as Emeritus Professor of French History at Cambridge and a Life Fellow of St John’s College. [guardianbookshop.com]

Friends in Youth: An elegy for the “moderates” of the English Revolution

Minoo Dinshaw’s Friends in Youth: Choosing Sides in the English Civil War has been warmly received. The book is an impressive achievement: learned, elegantly written, densely researched, and unusually attentive to personality, friendship, and the texture of political life. But the critical enthusiasm surrounding it also speaks to the political atmosphere in which the English Revolution is now being interpreted. The publisher presents its protagonists as principled young men hoping to restore harmony between Crown and Parliament. At the same time, the book’s publicity repeatedly emphasises reluctant choices, subtle differences, accident and the tragedy of unnecessary civil conflict. [penguin.co.uk]

That interpretation has proved especially congenial to reviewers. The Telegraph described the book as a “necessary cautionary tale about the human cost of political division”. At the same time, the Financial Times praised its “elegiac portrait of well-meaning moderates who tried to halt the slide towards violent division”. The publisher’s material and elsewhere reproduce these descriptions. Andrew Gimson’s ConservativeHome review goes further, explicitly welcoming Dinshaw’s resistance to the supposedly inadequate division of seventeenth-century politics into Cavaliers and Roundheads and concluding with Dinshaw’s own vision of his subjects as embodying an “attractive common world” opposed to party enmity.

The response matters because Dinshaw’s book frames the English Revolution as, above all, a tragedy of political polarisation: a catastrophe in which thoughtful, cultivated, and essentially decent men found themselves divided by forces that wiser statecraft might have controlled. Against revolution stands conversation; against ideology, friendship; against mass political mobilisation, the civilised intercourse of lawyers, scholars and gentlemen.

But this framing raises a more fundamental historical question. What if the destruction of that “common world” was not primarily the consequence of a failure of moderation? What if the institutions within which Edward Hyde, Bulstrode Whitelocke, John Selden and Lucius Cary moved were themselves being destabilised by transformations that no amount of cultivated conversation could reconcile? The great limitation of Friends in Youth is that it approaches a social revolution through the consciousness of men who desperately wanted to prevent it from becoming one.

Two friends and the collapse of a political world

Dinshaw builds his narrative around the remarkable parallel careers of Edward Hyde, later Earl of Clarendon, and Bulstrode Whitelocke. Their friendship developed in the intellectual and social environment of the Inns of Court. Both became lawyers, parliamentarians, politicians, and eventually historians of the revolution they lived through. Yet in 1642 they chose opposing camps.

This imaginative strength is central to Dinshaw’s project. Rather than starting with the armies already assembled, he reconstructs the political world before those divisions hardened. John Adamson notes that the originality of the conception lies partly in recognising how deep the friendship between Hyde and Whitelocke had been and how closely their political careers and attitudes had once converged.

Both men belonged to the extraordinary cultural world surrounding the Inns of Court, which functioned as far more than professional training grounds for lawyers. They brought together law, politics, literature, patronage and intellectual discussion. Their association with the Great Tew circle around Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland, placed them within a cultivated milieu that recoiled from both Laudian authoritarianism and what its members regarded as Puritan fanaticism. Jackie Eales describes this circle as characterised by scepticism towards religious dogmatism and a tolerance of political disagreement, even as its individual members eventually divided over the war. [historytoday.com]

The tragedy at the centre of Dinshaw’s story therefore has genuine historical substance. Hyde and Whitelocke were not ideological opposites destined from youth to become Cavalier and Roundhead. Both opposed important features of Charles I’s Personal Rule. Both were hostile to prerogative government. Their differences sharpened as the parliamentary movement itself developed. Hyde interpreted Parliament’s increasingly radical demands as constitutional innovation, whereas Whitelocke remained with Parliament while continuing to seek compromise. Blair Worden summarises Dinshaw’s interpretation by noting his emphasis upon the comparatively small original political distance between the two men and upon the tragedy of their eventual separation. This makes for compelling biography. But it does not in itself explain the revolution [the-tls.com].

The virtues and limitations of political biography

Dinshaw possesses an exceptional eye for character. His narrative brings court, chambers, country houses, parliamentary debates, and personal relationships to life in remarkable detail. His use of memoir, correspondence, and Hyde and Whitelocke’s later historical writings lets him reconstruct how contemporaries understood their own decisions without simply accepting their retrospective accounts at face value.

The book should therefore not be dismissed as merely conservative history dressed up in elegant prose. The emotional consequences of political rupture were real. Friendships were broken, families were divided, property destroyed and careers overturned. It is also historically unsatisfactory to imagine that everyone entering political conflict in 1640 already knew England would experience civil war, regicide, and republican government before the decade was out. Dinshaw is right to restore uncertainty to historical experience. History is lived forwards even if it is written backwards. The danger arises when uncertainty becomes explanation. Neither contingency nor individual political actors’ reluctance shows that the structural crisis producing their choices was accidental. A revolutionary situation can contain innumerable contingencies yet still emerge from profound contradictions within a society. This is precisely where biography reaches its limits. The crucial historical question is not simply why Hyde eventually chose Charles while Whitelocke remained with Parliament. It is why, by 1642, those alternatives confronted them at all.

Revisionism rendered as literature

In this respect Friends in Youth belongs, even if not programmatically, within the historiographical landscape created by the revisionist assault on older interpretations of the English Revolution. From the late twentieth century, historians including Conrad Russell, John Morrill and Kevin Sharpe challenged explanations that emphasised long-term social transformation and class conflict. They drew renewed attention to religion, political contingency, the composite monarchy, conflicts among the three kingdoms, parliamentary-political contingencies, and Charles I’s decisions.

That intervention corrected real weaknesses in schematic accounts in which a “rising bourgeoisie” appeared almost automatically upon the historical stage to overthrow feudalism. Historical materialism cannot be reduced to assigning political actors fixed class labels and then treating everything they subsequently do as an expression of an economically predetermined script. But the revisionist reaction frequently produced the opposite distortion. In discarding crude determinism, they also erased social development itself. The causes of revolution dissolved into a chain of political accidents, misunderstandings, confessional disputes and personal decisions.

Dinshaw’s narrative is particularly effective as a literary expression of this approach because biography naturally privileges the immediate field of individual consciousness. His protagonists knew one another personally. Their choices were difficult. Their disagreements could sometimes appear surprisingly narrow. Therefore the subsequent catastrophe appears all the more tragic. Yet revolutions rarely begin because everyone wants a revolution. On the contrary, revolutionary crises historically develop precisely through the failure of successive attempts at compromise.

Beneath Westminster: the transformation of English society

The weakness of a history organised around political friendship becomes apparent once the social transformation of seventeenth-century England is restored to the picture. England experienced enormous changes in agriculture, property relations, commerce, and the concentration of population and wealth. Agrarian capitalism had advanced further than in much of continental Europe. Competitive leasing, market dependence, enclosure, and the transformation of relations among landlords, tenant farmers, and rural labourers reshaped the countryside. London expanded dramatically, becoming the centre of government, finance, trade, printing, and popular political mobilisation. The dispute between Crown and Parliament developed within this changing society.

This does not mean that Charles I represented “feudalism” while Parliament straightforwardly represented “capitalism”. Both camps contained landowners; commercial interests crossed political divisions; religious allegiance mattered enormously; and Parliament itself included men terrified by popular radicalism. But these complexities do not abolish class relations. They show how political institutions inherited from an earlier social order mediate class interests.

Robert Brenner’s Merchants and Revolution matters precisely here. Brenner showed that political conflicts surrounding Parliament cannot be reconstructed solely from parliamentary speeches or constitutional theory. The changing organisation of overseas commerce and the interests of London merchant groups shaped the material environment of political radicalisation. Similarly, Brian Manning insisted that the revolution cannot be understood exclusively through the political nation. London crowds, apprentices, artisans, tradespeople and poorer sections of society intervened directly in political events. Street pressure affected Parliament itself. Once these forces enter the picture, “moderation” ceases to be a politically neutral category.

The problem of the crowd

The parliamentary crisis of 1640–42 cannot be understood simply as a dispute within an educated governing class. Calling the Long Parliament created a political opening through which grievances accumulated during the Personal Rule could be articulated on a different scale. Petitions circulated. Print expanded. Crowds gathered around Westminster. Religious disputes became mass political issues. The struggle over Strafford, episcopacy, and the militia increasingly took place in an environment where political action could not be confined to the Commons and Lords.

Here Hyde’s evolution takes on a social dimension that describing him merely as a constitutional royalist cannot capture. Hyde had opposed important abuses of royal government. But as the opposition movement increasingly mobilised forces outside the established political elite, his overriding concern became preserving political and social order. The controversy over the Grand Remonstrance marked the widening division. The question was no longer merely whether to correct particular royal abuses. It increasingly became a question of who possessed political authority and on which forces that authority would depend.

For men such as Hyde, mobilising wider layers of the population threatened to transform constitutional opposition into something altogether more dangerous. This is the contradiction within the politics of the celebrated “moderates”. They could oppose arbitrary monarchy when the issue concerned the political rights of the propertied classes, but recoiled when resistance threatened to mobilise those below them. Moderation therefore describes not an absence of political interest, but a definite social standpoint.

Falkland and the tragedy of moderation

No figure better embodies Dinshaw’s elegiac interpretation than Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland. Falkland’s death at the first Battle of Newbury in September 1643 became inseparable from the mythology that was later constructed around him. He appears as a sensitive intellectual destroyed by political fanaticism, a gentleman so disgusted by civil conflict that death became a release. Dinshaw’s world naturally gravitates toward such a figure. Yet Falkland’s tragedy was also the tragedy of a political programme.

The constitutional royalists hoped to restrain the monarch and preserve the monarchy; defend Parliament while containing the popular forces increasingly mobilised behind it; oppose religious authoritarianism without permitting radical religious pluralism; and reform the state without letting reform develop into revolution. The programme became increasingly impossible because the conflict itself transformed the forces engaged in it. War required taxation, administration, recruitment and mobilisation. Parliamentary victory ultimately demanded a reorganisation of military power. The creation of the New Model Army in 1645 produced not merely a more effective army but a social and political institution within which religious and political radicalism could flourish. The revolution was beginning to develop its own organs and political language.No Great Tew conversation could halt that development.

Hyde, Whitelocke and the search for peace

Dinshaw does not end his story with Falkland’s death, which makes his account of attempted reconciliation more interesting than a simple elegy ending at Newbury would have been. As Blair Worden notes, Hyde and Whitelocke met during wartime negotiations, including at Oxford and Uxbridge, where Dinshaw portrays them as continuing their attempts to settle. But these negotiations actually reinforce the deeper historical problem. Why did peace repeatedly prove impossible? If civil war resulted principally from misunderstanding or extremist passions, reasonable negotiators ought eventually to have discovered a constitutional formula capable of reuniting the protagonists. Yet every stage of the conflict produced new facts on the ground and new demands.

A settlement had to determine control of the armed forces, religion, parliamentary authority, and the King’s position. Behind these questions stood competing conceptions of sovereignty and different social constituencies that the war itself had encouraged to mobilise. The failure of negotiation therefore cannot simply be reduced to inadequate statesmanship. Contradictions progressively consumed the middle position it could not resolve.

Revolution breaks through its moderates.

This was the process that Leon Trotsky, looking back on the English Revolution from the revolutionary struggles of the twentieth century, considered essential. In Where Is Britain Going?, he emphasised the conflict’s revolutionary significance and how political leadership passed beyond those initially seeking limited opposition to the monarchy. The history of the 1640s repeatedly confirms this pattern. The Presbyterian leadership sought victory over the King but feared the social and religious forces the struggle released. The Independents pushed further. The military crisis produced the New Model Army. Within the army, political radicalisation increasingly challenged the gentlemen who believed Parliament’s victory should end the revolutionary process. Then came the Levellers.

At the Putney Debates of 1647, questions implicit during the initial constitutional conflict became explicit: who constituted the political nation? Did political authority ultimately derive from property or from the people? What political rights did men who had fought for Parliament but lacked sufficient property to qualify for conventional political power possess? Putney’s enormous historical significance lies in the fact that the revolution brought into political speech people whose voices had previously been largely excluded from the constitutional arena. This is precisely the world that is not easily seen from Great Tew.

The people enter history.

The Levellers represented one expression of the radicalisation. Their programme of political reform, religious toleration, and substantially enlarged male political participation went far beyond anything the constitutional opposition envisaged in 1640.

Beyond them stood the Diggers, whose challenge went further still. Christopher Hill’s The World Turned Upside Down remains indispensable not because every theological radical can be translated into a modern political category, but because Hill grasped something that much subsequent historiography has tried to push back to the margins: once the old structures of authority fractured, groups previously excluded from political discourse began asking questions about property, religious authority and social hierarchy that the parliamentary leadership had never intended to place on the agenda. The revolution opened political possibilities larger than the objectives of those who began the parliamentary struggle. That is what revolutions do.

It also explains why the language of “moderation” must be treated critically. Moderate relative to whom? Moderate in defence of what? From the perspective of the Leveller soldiers who demanded political rights after risking their lives in Parliament’s army, restrictions imposed in the name of property and social stability did not constitute political neutrality. The centre was already situated inside a social order.

Clarendon and the memory of revolution

Hyde’s later career as Earl of Clarendon adds significance to the story. His monumental History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England became a foundational interpretation of the revolution. The title itself announced the perspective. What later generations might interpret as revolution appeared, from Clarendon’s standpoint, as rebellion: a rupture of legitimate government, social hierarchy, and political order. Clarendon was far too intelligent an observer to produce simple royalist propaganda. The enduring power of his history comes precisely from its psychological acuity and its understanding of political character. Yet these literary qualities should not obscure the social assumptions organising the narrative.

Clarendon’s hostility to political enthusiasm and mass mobilisation expressed the standpoint of a governing elite traumatised by discovering what could happen when political conflict escaped the established political classes’ control. Dinshaw approaches Clarendon critically, rather than taking his retrospective account at face value. John Adamson praises the book for its alertness to distortions in its subjects’ later accounts. But the larger problem remains: Friends in Youth reconstructs an emotional world that is overwhelmingly that of the educated and propertied classes.

We learn what revolution felt like through the eyes of gentlemen who feared losing control of it. Whitelocke is in some respects the more revealing figure because he survived politically through successive revolutionary regimes. His career shows the inadequacy of dividing the period into revolutionaries and conservatives solely by formal allegiance in 1642. He remained Parliamentarian without becoming a social revolutionary. Under the Republic and Protectorate, he held important state positions; John Adamson describes him as a senior legal figure in the English Republic and a Cromwellian confidant.

This career matters beyond personal adaptability. The English Revolution destroyed one political order without abolishing property or creating social equality. Its bourgeois character lay precisely in the contradiction between its revolutionary destruction of essential components of the old political structure and the social limitations that constrained that transformation. The propertied classes required revolutionary methods against the Crown, yet feared the democratic implications of mobilising the lower orders.

Cromwell himself personified this contradiction at a far higher historical level. The force capable of defeating royalism had to be mobilised through religious and political energies that could not subsequently be switched off at will. Hence the revolutionary army could become a political threat to the very property-owning forces whose victory it had secured. The suppression of the Levellers cannot be separated from Parliament’s victory. They were contradictory moments within the same bourgeois revolutionary process.

1660 did not turn the clock back

The Restoration therefore did not simply erase the revolution. Charles II returned, but neither the political nor the social world of the 1630s could be reconstructed. The revolutionary decades had transformed relations between monarchy, Parliament, taxation, religion, landed wealth and commerce. The later settlement culminating in 1688–89 would confirm a political order fundamentally more congenial to the development of capitalist property and parliamentary government than the Personal Rule of Charles I had been. This is one reason why interpreting the 1640s exclusively through tragedy is inadequate.

Revolutions are undoubtedly tragic for individuals. They involve violence, dislocation and suffering. But historical judgement cannot stop at registering catastrophe—the enslaved person who rebels causes disorder. The peasant who refuses feudal obligations disrupts established custom. The worker who strikes interrupts economic life. Judging every social struggle primarily by the tranquillity it destroys already adopts the standpoint of the existing order. The English Revolution must therefore be judged not only by what collapsed but by what historical possibilities were created.

Marxism and the bourgeois revolution

The older Marxist interpretation was never as simple as its critics suggested. Karl Marx recognised the seventeenth-century English Revolution and the French Revolution of 1789 as struggles whose significance extended far beyond the political language consciously employed by their participants. The actors might appeal to religion, ancient liberties, or constitutional precedent; nevertheless, the struggles they pursued transformed the conditions of European social development. This distinction between political consciousness and objective historical function is essential.

Hyde did not have to understand himself as defending one configuration of class society for his actions to possess a class content. Whitelocke did not need to imagine himself an agent of capitalist development for parliamentary victory to affect the political environment in which capitalist relations subsequently expanded. Historical materialism asks not simply what people said they were doing, but what social relations made their activity possible and what consequences followed from their victory or defeat. Revisionism often turns the discrepancy between intention and outcome into an argument against social explanation. Marxism sees that discrepancy as one of the central problems historical explanation must solve.

The contemporary appeal of the “moderate”

This brings us back to the remarkable reception of Dinshaw’s book. Readers are not wrong to find parallels between the political divisions of the seventeenth century and those of the present. Indeed, the Guardian review explicitly opened this comparison, linking the appeal of Dinshaw’s subject to more recent experiences of political division. But such analogies themselves require political examination. “Polarisation” has become a preferred category for discussing contemporary political crises. Political conflict appears as a disease of democratic culture. The solution is dialogue, moderation, civility, and rebuilding a political centre. This language excludes the possibility that polarisation itself has objective causes.

Growing social inequality, declining living standards, war, collapsing confidence in established parties and institutions, and widespread hostility towards existing political arrangements cannot simply be explained as failures of civility. A political centre can disintegrate because the social relationships that support it have become unstable. From this perspective, Dinshaw’s reconstruction of the “common world” of Hyde, Whitelocke and Falkland resonates unmistakably today. It presents a lost world of cultivated men who disagree but keep talking, whose tragedy is being overwhelmed by less restrained political forces. The danger lies not in telling their story. It lies in mistaking their story for the revolution’s meaning.

The view from Great Tew and the view from Putney

Friends in Youth deserves to be read. Dinshaw’s achievement is considerable. He reconstructs a political and intellectual milieu with unusual intimacy and reminds readers that historical actors cannot be reduced to the labels later attached to them. Hyde was more complicated than “Royalist”; Whitelocke more complicated than “Roundhead”. Men who eventually fought on opposite sides could start with overlapping assumptions and still be haunted by the destruction of their earlier friendships. Dinshaw’s strength is that it lets us understand these people from inside their world. But historical explanation must also stand outside that world.

The gentlemen of Great Tew believed civilisation depended upon moderation, learning, hierarchy and conversation among educated men. The revolution demonstrated that England contained other voices and other interests. The distance between Great Tew and Putney is therefore more than geographical. At Great Tew, cultivated members of a narrow elite discussed how England should be governed. At Putney, the political revolution raised a far more disturbing question: who possessed the right to govern England at all? Friendship could not answer that question.

Conclusion: the revolution the moderates could not prevent

A collective loss of political manners did not cause the English Revolution. Neither was it the mechanical product of an economically predestined bourgeoisie marching towards capitalism. It emerged from the interaction of profound social transformation, religious conflict, constitutional crisis, capitalist development, popular mobilisation and the international and British crisis of the Stuart kingdoms. Contingency operated everywhere. But contingency operated inside structures.

The tragedy of Hyde, Whitelocke and Falkland was therefore more substantial than the tragedy of friendship destroyed by political extremism. They represented a political milieu that wanted reform without revolution and resistance without mobilising forces from below. Events repeatedly demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining that position. The revolution advanced because the moderates could neither defeat the King decisively nor restore the old equilibrium. The forces required to win the struggle transformed it. The New Model Army, the Independents, the Levellers and the Diggers did not appear because English political society temporarily forgot the virtues of moderation. They arose from contradictions that moderate constitutionalism could not resolve.

That is why the story cannot end emotionally with the lost civilisation of Great Tew. It must proceed to the army councils, the Leveller petitions, the Putney Debates, the regicide and the republic. Minoo Dinshaw has written a beautifully crafted portrait of men watching their political world collapse. Friends in Youth deserves praise for helping us understand what that collapse looked like from their chambers, libraries, and country houses. But the observer who remains there will misunderstand the revolution.

To understand why the old world collapsed, you must leave Great Tew and Westminster and follow the revolution into London’s streets, the parliamentary army, and the debates at Putney. There artisans, soldiers and men without great property entered a political argument from which the established order had largely excluded them, and asked the question the cultivated moderates could never satisfactorily answer: if ordinary people had fought to determine the future of the kingdom, by what right should political power remain the monopoly of the propertied few? That democratic eruption from below, rather than the disappearance of an “attractive common world” among gentlemen, gives the English Revolution its enduring historical significance.

Bibliography

Brenner, Robert. Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550–1653. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Clarendon, Edward Hyde, Earl of. The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England. Various editions.

Dinshaw, Minoo. Friends in Youth: Choosing Sides in the English Civil War. London: Allen Lane, 2025.

Hill, Christopher. The English Revolution 1640. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1940.

Hill, Christopher. The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714. London: Nelson, 1961; later editions.

Hill, Christopher. The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution. London: Temple Smith, 1972.

Manning, Brian. The English People and the English Revolution, 1640–1649. London: Heinemann, 1976.

Manning, Brian. 1649: The Crisis of the English Revolution. London: Bookmarks, 1992.

Morrill, John. The Revolt of the Provinces: Conservatives and Radicals in the English Civil War, 1630–1650. London: Allen & Unwin, 1976.

Russell, Conrad. The Causes of the English Civil War. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

Sharpe, Kevin. The Personal Rule of Charles I. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

Trotsky, Leon. Where Is Britain Going? 1925.

Whitelocke, Bulstrode. Memorials of the English Affairs. First published 1682; various subsequent editions.

Reviews and contemporary responses

John Adamson, “Lawyers in Arms”, Literary Review, review of Friends in Youth. Adamson describes the work as a major exercise in historical narration, emphasising Dinshaw’s discovery of the extent of Hyde and Whitelocke’s early friendship and political affinities. [literaryreview.co.uk]

Jackie Eales, review of Friends in Youth, History Today, March 2025. The review stresses Dinshaw’s treatment of the Great Tew circle, the parallel legal and political careers of Hyde and Whitelocke, and their developing constitutional disagreements. [historytoday.com]

Andrew Gimson, “Book review: Politics is not just a battle between Cavaliers and Roundheads”, ConservativeHome, 31 January 2025. Particularly useful for assessing the conservative reception of Dinshaw’s conception of moderation and the supposedly lost common political culture. [conservativehome.com]

Kathryn Hughes, review of Friends in Youth, The Guardian, 22 January 2025. Hughes focuses on the parallel lives and reluctant divergence of Hyde and Whitelocke, and explicitly places the book in a modern context of political division. [theguardian.com]

Blair Worden, “Long divisions: A friendship broken by war”, Times Literary Supplement, 24 January 2025. Especially valuable as a critical counterweight to the more celebratory notices: Worden identifies both the gains produced by Dinshaw’s close-focus method and the historical problems generated by that restricted perspective. [the-tls.com]

A Stalinist museum piece returns: Mikhail Basmanov’s Contemporary Trotskyism reissued

The republication of a 1972 Soviet polemic against Leon Trotsky and the Fourth International provides an opportunity to reconsider the political function of anti-Trotskyism within Stalinist ideology and the historical fate of the bureaucracy that produced it. Mikhail Basmanov’s Contemporary Trotskyism: Its Anti-Revolutionary Nature was not simply an academic assessment of a rival political tendency. It was part of a broader campaign in which the Soviet bureaucracy sought to discredit Trotskyism and suppress the historical significance of the Left Opposition’s struggle against Stalinism. The persistence of such polemics decades after Trotsky’s assassination showed the bureaucracy’s continued sensitivity to a Marxist critique that challenged its claim to represent the political continuity of the October Revolution.

The subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union gives these arguments an additional historical significance. The bureaucracy that proclaimed Trotskyism politically bankrupt ultimately presided over the destruction of the USSR and the restoration of capitalism. Basmanov’s work should therefore be read today primarily as a document of Stalinist political ideology, revealing how the Soviet apparatus sought to answer an opposition whose analysis of bureaucracy, nationalism and the danger of capitalist restoration raised questions that official Soviet historiography could never satisfactorily resolve.

Who was Mikhail Basmanov?

Biographical information on Basmanov is surprisingly scarce in readily available sources. We can establish with greater certainty his political and literary role in the Soviet ideological apparatus. He was a specialist writer on Trotskyism, and his best-known work, Contemporary Trotskyism: Its Anti-Revolutionary Nature, was published in English by Moscow’s Progress Publishers in 1972 under the auspices of the CPSU Central Committee’s Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

The circumstances of the book’s production are particularly revealing. The publisher of the new edition describes Basmanov as a “professional in the genre” of Soviet anti-Trotskyist literature and connects the book with a 1971 directive by CPSU Central Committee Secretary Ponomarev calling for an ideological offensive against Trotskyism. Contemporary Trotskyism therefore cannot be approached simply as an academic historian’s independent scholarship. Its original title page explicitly identifies the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU, while its chapters attack Trotsky, permanent revolution, the Fourth International and contemporary Trotskyist organisations from the standpoint of official Soviet ideology.

David North and the Stalinist falsification of Trotskyism

Basmanov’s Contemporary Trotskyism becomes clearer when placed within the broader tradition of historical falsification examined by David North. North’s defence of Trotsky has repeatedly insisted that attacks upon Trotsky cannot be separated from the political struggle over the historical meaning of the October Revolution, the rise of Stalinism and the fate of the Soviet Union. His In Defence of Leon Trotsky, for example, challenges what he regards as the transmission of Stalinist distortions into contemporary historical writing. The WSWS presentation of the Russian edition described the book as a refutation of attacks by British historians upon Trotsky’s political and intellectual legacy and explicitly connected these controversies with the earlier Stalinist falsification of Soviet history. [wsws.org]

This provides an important framework within which to read Basmanov. The essential issue is not whether we can dismiss every factual assertion in Contemporary Trotskyism because its author wrote within the official Soviet ideological apparatus. The more profound question concerns the political method by which Trotskyism is defined. Rather than beginning with Trotsky’s programme and historical writings and examining their relationship to the major experiences of the twentieth-century working class, the Stalinist polemical tradition began by identifying the Soviet bureaucracy with socialism. Opposition to that bureaucracy could consequently be represented as opposition to the Soviet Union and, ultimately, as counter-revolution.

North’s writings approach the question from the opposite standpoint. In a 2024 speech commemorating Trotsky’s exile on Büyükada, he situated Trotsky’s historical importance particularly in relation to the defeat of the German working class, the rise of Nazism and Stalinist betrayals in Germany, France and Spain. He argued that understanding these historical defeats remains necessary to confronting contemporary political problems. This emphasis on historical experience exposes the fundamental weakness of Basmanov’s method. Trotskyism must be judged not by the denunciatory vocabulary of official Soviet ideology but by examining the policies for which Trotsky and his opponents actually fought. [wsws.org]

The contrast became still more important after 1991. The bureaucracy that had declared Trotskyism historically bankrupt presided over the Soviet Union’s final crisis and dissolution. The WSWS account of the Russian publication of In Defence of Leon Trotsky explicitly links the Soviet Union’s fate to the historical struggle between Trotsky, the Left Opposition, and Stalinism, arguing that contemporary political questions in Russia cannot be understood apart from that history. Whatever judgement one ultimately reaches about North’s political conclusions, this is a question that any retrospective defence of the official Soviet attack on Trotskyism must answer. [wsws.org]

In this context, republishing Mikhail Basmanov’s Contemporary Trotskyism: Its Anti-Revolutionary Nature offers more than antiquarian interest. The Soviet attack on Trotsky did not disappear with the state apparatus that produced it. Stalinist distortions of Trotsky and the Russian Revolution continued to find expression long after the USSR’s dissolution. Basmanov’s book, now republished with a critical introduction by Dmitry Chasovennikov, deserves attention because it preserves, in unusually concentrated form, the political methods the Soviet bureaucracy used to discredit Trotsky, the Left Opposition, and the Fourth International.

The book’s historical provenance is unmistakable. Contemporary Trotskyism appeared in English from Progress Publishers in Moscow in 1972 and carried on its title page the attribution “Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU”. Its chapters announce the political character of the work before the argument has properly begun: “How the Trotskyites Permanently Fought Against the Revolution”, “A Scornful Attitude to the Peasantry”, “The Ideological Collapse of Trotskyism”, and “How the ‘Fourth International’ Was Hammered Together and What Came of It”.

This was not history written from an academic distance. It was political propaganda produced by an official institution of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union against the revolutionary tendency whose leading representatives had been persecuted and physically annihilated by the Stalinist bureaucracy during the preceding decades. The circumstances surrounding its production underline this character. The publisher of the new edition states that, in Kommunist no. 18 of 1971, Boris Ponomarev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, called for exposing Trotskyism’s supposed connections with anti-communism and right- and left-wing opportunism. It describes Basmanov’s volume as executing that political directive “at book length”. Contemporary Trotskyism’s interest, therefore, lies far less in what it can tell readers about Trotskyism than in what it reveals about Stalinism.

Why 1972?

The date of publication is essential to understanding the book. Basmanov was writing in the aftermath of a period of enormous international political upheaval. The revolutionary crisis in France in May-June 1968, the struggles surrounding the Prague Spring, mass international opposition to the Vietnam War, and the political radicalisation of a new generation transformed the political atmosphere in Europe and beyond.

Even Basmanov could not simply ignore this process. The opening of his book describes the period as one of profound revolutionary change, specifically citing intensifying class struggle in advanced capitalist countries and the emergence of students and parts of the intelligentsia as active political forces. The new publisher draws attention to an even more revealing feature of the original. Basmanov himself acknowledged that, after supposedly being defeated during the 1920s and 1930s, Trotskyist movements began to revive from the 1950s onward. The publisher argues that the intensity of the Soviet polemic reflected the growth of the Fourth International and other radical tendencies among workers and students after 1968.

This contradiction runs through the whole enterprise. The Soviet bureaucracy insisted that Trotskyism was politically bankrupt, historically discredited and without a significant social base. Yet it continued to devote considerable ideological resources to combating it. The very existence of Contemporary Trotskyism is therefore evidence that the bureaucracy did not regard Trotsky’s political heritage with the indifference appropriate to a genuinely dead tendency.

Basmanov’s subsequent work makes the anxiety still clearer. In 1973 the Novosti Press Agency in Moscow published his Where Are Trotskyites Leading the Youth?, an English-language pamphlet of roughly 100 pages dealing explicitly with Trotskyism, political activity and youth. The title itself tells us something important. The bureaucracy was no longer merely conducting retrospective arguments about disputes from the 1920s. It was concerned with the influence of Trotskyist ideas upon a contemporary younger generation.

The method of the Stalinist school of falsification

The organisational structure of Contemporary Trotskyism displays the characteristic method of official Soviet anti-Trotskyism. Permanent revolution becomes an alleged rejection of the revolutionary capacities of the peasantry. Opposition to the Stalinist programme of socialism in one country becomes disbelief in socialism itself. The Soviet bureaucracy identifies opposition to its diplomatic manoeuvres and political betrayals as hostility to the Soviet Union.

The table of contents demonstrates the procedure particularly clearly. Basmanov moves from supposed Trotskyist hostility to the peasantry to the “rejection” of socialism in one country, the alleged ideological collapse of Trotskyism and finally the claim that contemporary Trotskyism was undermining the anti-imperialist and national liberation movements.

The method is significant. Political disagreements are not analysed according to their actual historical content. Instead, opposition to the policies of the Soviet bureaucracy is progressively identified with opposition to socialism itself. The bureaucratic leadership is thereby transformed from a historically specific political stratum into the personification of socialism, and criticism of the bureaucracy becomes by definition counter-revolutionary. This ideological formula had justified persecuting the Left Opposition long before Basmanov wrote his book.

Consequently, this framework pushed aside the historical questions that might have discredited it. What was the social basis of bureaucratisation in the Soviet Union? Why did Lenin, in the final period of his political life, express increasing alarm over the growth of bureaucratic tendencies? What political meaning did the theory of socialism in one country have, which had never formed part of the Bolshevik Party programme before 1924? What explained the catastrophic policies pursued by the Communist International in Britain, China and Germany? And why did the Soviet leadership undertake the physical extermination of so large a section of the revolutionary generation that had led the October Revolution?

These questions lead directly to writings that official Soviet polemics could not answer through historical investigation alone: Trotsky’s The Third International After Lenin, his writings on Germany and the rise of fascism, and, above all, The Revolution Betrayed.

The fundamental political significance of The Revolution Betrayed lay in Trotsky’s attempt to explain the Soviet Union’s contradictions from a Marxist standpoint. He rejected both the Stalinist identification of the bureaucracy with socialism and the claim that the October Revolution had created another form of capitalism. He instead characterised the Soviet Union as a degenerated workers’ state in which the social gains represented by nationalised property coexisted with a parasitic bureaucratic caste exercising political power. Whether that analysis was correct is a historical and political question requiring serious examination. Basmanov instead begins from the legitimacy of the Soviet bureaucracy and evaluates its opponents accordingly.

The shadow of the Moscow Trials

A deeper historical continuity is involved. Basmanov’s 1972 language was less murderous than that of the Great Terror, but the basic political logic had changed far less than the softer terminology suggested. Trotskyism continued to be presented not as a Marxist tendency whose political analysis might be right or wrong, but as a fundamentally anti-revolutionary phenomenon serving forces hostile to socialism.

That accusation was central to the Stalinist campaign against the Left Opposition. During the Moscow Trials of the 1930s, former leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution were accused of extraordinary conspiracies and subsequently executed. Trotsky, exiled from the Soviet Union, was made the central political defendant in absentia.

The twentieth-century history of Stalinism therefore cannot be separated from the history of anti-Trotskyism. Opposition to Trotsky was not one ideological feature among many. It played an essential role in destroying the political memory of the October Revolution and establishing a new official version of Soviet history in which Stalin’s emergence appeared as the legitimate continuation of Bolshevism.

The contradiction became particularly striking after Nikita Khrushchev denounced parts of Stalin’s record. Once it was conceded that crimes on an enormous scale had been committed, an obvious question followed. What of the political opposition that had fought the bureaucracy before those crimes reached their height? Answering that question required reconsidering the history of the Left Opposition itself.

What Basmanov cannot explain

Basmanov’s book’s decisive weakness follows from its political purpose. To acknowledge Trotskyism as a genuine Marxist opposition to bureaucratic domination would have required reopening the basic political struggles through which the Stalinist regime consolidated itself. This problem extends beyond Trotsky personally. The history of the Fourth International after his assassination posed equally difficult questions for Soviet apologetics.

Particularly important was the 1953 conflict within the Fourth International associated with the tendency headed by Michel Pablo and Ernest Mandel and the formation of the International Committee of the Fourth International. The issue was not simply one more organisational split among left-wing groups. At the centre of the conflict was a debate over the historical role of Stalinism and other bureaucratic and nationalist formations.

For an official Soviet polemicist, treating all these conflicting tendencies as undifferentiated “Trotskyism” was politically convenient. The distinctions disappeared, and with them disappeared the awkward fact that one of the central conflicts within postwar Trotskyism concerned precisely whether revolutionary Marxists should adapt themselves politically to the Stalinist bureaucracies and allied movements.

The homogenisation of politically hostile tendencies therefore performs an ideological function. It lets Basmanov construct “Trotskyism” as a single counter-revolutionary phenomenon rather than examine the historical struggles through which different movements claiming the Trotskyist inheritance evolved.

A surprisingly useful primary source

However, Basmanov’s work contains an irony that the publisher of the new edition itself emphasises. Unlike many polemics in this genre, Contemporary Trotskyism quotes extensively from the publications of the movements it attacks. The publisher calls it unusually well documented for a Soviet source on the post-1968 radical left, noting its references to publications from several countries.

This gives the book a secondary value quite different from the one its author intended. It can be read as evidence of what the Soviet bureaucracy monitored, which tendencies it considered threatening, and how its ideological institutions tried to categorise developments on the international left.

The book is therefore potentially illuminating when approached against the grain. The reader should ask not merely, “What does Basmanov say about the Trotskyists?” but “Why was an institution of the CPSU commissioning and publishing this argument in 1972?” Seen in this way, the polemical excess becomes historical evidence.

History’s verdict

The greatest problem confronting Basmanov’s argument emerged after he published his book. Trotsky insisted that bureaucratic rule did not provide a stable path to socialism. His conception of political revolution stemmed from the contradiction between the nationalised property relations produced by the October Revolution and the bureaucracy’s political domination. In his analysis, defending the social foundations created by October required the Soviet working class to remove the bureaucracy and restore workers’ democracy.

The ultimate fate of the Soviet Union therefore poses a decisive historical question: which analysis more penetratingly captured Soviet society’s contradictions, the bureaucracy’s apologetics or the Marxist opposition to it? The state whose political invincibility was assumed throughout official Soviet literature disappeared in 1991. The CPSU ceased to rule. The Soviet Union was dissolved, and capitalist property relations were restored across the former USSR.

This does not mean that every prediction made by every tendency describing itself as Trotskyist was vindicated. Nor does the collapse of the USSR automatically settle every controversy over Soviet history. But it does require the central claims of official Soviet ideology to be subjected to an accounting that Contemporary Trotskyism, for obvious chronological reasons, could never make. The bureaucratic order Basmanov defended did not provide a stable and irreversible transition to communism. Its political institutions proved incapable of preventing capitalism’s restoration.

This is why Soviet historian Vadim Rogovin’s work matters in any retrospective assessment of Basmanov. In his multi-volume Was There an Alternative?, Rogovin reconstructed the history of the Left Opposition and the struggle against Stalinism as a real political conflict rather than treating the bureaucracy’s ascendancy as the inevitable outcome of the Russian Revolution. The very title posed the historical question that decades of official Soviet historiography had sought to suppress: was Stalinism the unavoidable development of Bolshevism, or did a Marxist alternative exist?

From this perspective, the conflict between Stalinism and Trotskyism cannot be relegated to a dispute between personalities or rival factions. It concerned the international strategy of the socialist revolution, the relationship between Soviet economic development and world revolution, the nature of socialist democracy and, ultimately, whether the bureaucratic regime would defend or undermine the social foundations established in October 1917.

The new introduction

The 2026 edition’s distinguishing feature is Dmitry Chasovennikov’s introduction. The available evidence here requires an important correction to the assumption that the reissue straightforwardly represents an attempt to revive Basmanov’s political standpoint. The publisher explicitly describes the new introduction as “written from inside the tradition the book sets out to bury” and presents Basmanov’s book as “Moscow’s book-length answer to the post-1968 growth of the Fourth International”. Amazon reproduces substantially the same description, characterising the original as a Soviet attack on Trotsky, the Fourth International and the far left. [amazon.co.uk]

That substantially changes how the republication should be evaluated. On the evidence available from the publisher, the book is being presented not simply as a restored Stalinist polemic for contemporary use but as a historically situated document accompanied by a critical introduction. Nevertheless, one important question remains that the publisher’s promotional description alone cannot settle: how far does Chasovennikov’s introduction pursue the historical implications of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the archival record of Stalinist repression, and the political disputes inside the Fourth International? Without the complete text of the introduction, it would be unjustified to attribute specific answers to him.

The responsible criticism, therefore, is not to pretend that the new editor endorses Basmanov. The more interesting question is what contemporary readers can learn from republishing the book as an historical document.

Why republish it now?

On that basis, there is a legitimate reason to make Contemporary Trotskyism available again. Stalinist anti-Trotskyism deserves historical study. So do the institutions that manufactured it, the political vocabulary they employed and the historical episodes they systematically distorted or suppressed.

Indeed, the publisher’s framing unintentionally makes the book particularly suitable for such a reading. It notes that Basmanov’s polemic followed Ponomarev’s 1971 directive, stresses the political circumstances of its appearance, and explicitly characterises the volume as a response to the revival of revolutionary currents after the late 1960s.

Read critically, therefore, Contemporary Trotskyism can illuminate a significant episode in the ideological history of the Cold War. It shows how the Soviet bureaucracy understood the challenge revolutionary movements posed to its left and how it sought to inoculate Communist Party members and sympathisers against Trotsky’s political legacy. But precisely because of this, the book should never be read in isolation.

Readers seeking to understand these controversies should place Basmanov alongside the principal documents produced by the people he attacks. They should read Trotsky on permanent revolution, the Communist International, the German catastrophe, the Soviet bureaucracy and the founding of the Fourth International. They should investigate the Moscow Trials and the subsequent historical and documentary record. They should examine the conflicts within the Fourth International rather than accepting an omnibus category called “Trotskyism”.Above all, they should compare the rival historical perspectives with what actually happened.

A museum piece, but an instructive one

The most striking feature of Contemporary Trotskyism today is the disappearance of the political world from which it spoke with such institutional confidence. Basmanov wrote from within an enormous state and party apparatus that declared itself the authoritative embodiment of Marxism-Leninism and treated Trotskyism as a defeated deviation relegated to history. Yet the CPSU and the Soviet Union are themselves gone.

The political questions Trotsky fought over have not disappeared with them. The relationship between nationalism and international socialism, the political independence of the working class, the dangers of bureaucracy, the character of revolutionary leadership and the relationship between socialist revolution and democracy remain indispensable questions for anyone attempting to understand the twentieth century or the crisis of contemporary capitalism.

That is the final irony surrounding Basmanov’s resurrection. His book sought to demonstrate that Trotskyism belonged to the past. Half a century later, Basmanov’s polemic returns primarily as a historical artefact from a vanished political apparatus.

The new edition can therefore perform a useful service, provided it is read critically and historically. Approach contemporary Trotskyism not as an authoritative guide to Trotsky or the Fourth International, but as a primary source for understanding how the Soviet bureaucracy represented its Marxist opponents in the last decades of its existence.

And there is an appropriate way to test its claims. Read Basmanov. Then read Trotsky. Read the Left Opposition documents and the political conflicts within the Fourth International. Read the archival scholarship produced after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Finally, set the conflicting analyses against the history that followed.

That historical comparison transforms this republished polemic from an attack on Trotskyism into an unintended document of the political order against which Trotskyism fought.

Bibliography

Primary text

Basmanov, Mikhail Ivanovich. Contemporary Trotskyism: Its Anti-Revolutionary Nature. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972. The digitised original identifies the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU and confirms the 1972 English printing. [archive.org]

Basmanov, Mikhail Ivanovich. Contemporary Trotskyism: With a New Critical Introduction. Introduction by Chasovennikov. Progress Publishers Library, 2026. The electronic edition is listed as appearing in September 2026. [progresspu…ishers.org], [fnac.com]

Basmanov, Mikhail. Where Are Trotskyites Leading the Youth?. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1973. [openlibrary.org]

Trotsky and the Left Opposition

Trotsky, Leon. The Permanent Revolution. 1930.

Trotsky, Leon. The Third International After Lenin. 1928.

Trotsky, Leon. The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going? 1936.

Trotsky, Leon. The Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution. 1938.

Trotsky, Leon. In Defence of Marxism. 1942.

Stalinism and the historical struggle over Trotskyism

Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879–1921. Oxford University Press, 1954.

Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921–1929. Oxford University Press, 1959.

Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky, 1929–1940. Oxford University Press, 1963.

Rogovin, Vadim. Was There an Alternative? Multi-volume study of the Left Opposition, Stalinism and the political struggles in the Soviet Union.

North, David. The Heritage We Defend: A Contribution to the History of the Fourth International. Detroit: Labour Publications, 1988.

Further reading

Broué, Pierre. Trotsky. Paris: Fayard, 1988.

Serge, Victor. From Lenin to Stalin. 1937.

Sedov, Leon. The Red Book on the Moscow Trials. 1936.

The unions, the bureaucracy and the “forward march”: A review of John Kelly’s Trade Unions and Socialist Politics

John Kelly’s Trade Unions and Socialist Politics appeared in 1988, three years after the defeat of the British miners’ strike and amid the organised labour movement’s continuing retreat under the Thatcher government. It targeted a growing body of opinion among left academics, Communist Party intellectuals, and trade union officials who argued that changes in the working-class composition, declining trade union membership, and Thatcherism’s electoral victories had rendered the traditional politics of class struggle obsolete. Verso’s description confirms that Kelly explicitly challenged claims that unions were in chronic decline or had exhausted their progressive potential, calling such arguments based on “poor sociology and bad history”.

Kelly sets himself two fundamental questions. What kinds of trade union strategy are most likely to develop political class consciousness among workers? And what role could such strategies play in a transition to socialism? These are serious questions, and Kelly treats them with a seriousness absent from much of the literature generated by the demoralised British left of the late 1980s. The book is extensively researched and draws on historical material, strike statistics, surveys, and the writings of classical Marxists. Yet the volume’s fundamental weakness is that it keeps these questions within the political horizons of the existing trade union apparatus and the Labour Party. Nearly four decades later, the fate of these organisations provides an objective test of the perspective advanced in 1988. That test has not favoured Kelly’s conclusions.

Kelly’s argument

The book examines the classical Marxist literature on trade unionism before considering the political and strategic problems confronting British unions during the 1980s. Kelly begins with Marx and Engels, for whom unions were both an elementary organisational expression of workers’ resistance to capital and a potential means for broader class consciousness to emerge. He then considers Lenin’s What Is To Be Done? (1902), with its argument concerning the limitations of spontaneous trade union consciousness, before turning to Antonio Gramsci and his discussion of trade unionism and the factory councils.

Kelly’s sympathies lean heavily toward Rosa Luxemburg. In The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions (1906), Luxemburg examined how mass struggles affect the working class’s political consciousness and organisation. Kelly draws on historical evidence from strike movements to argue that participation in industrial struggle can transform workers’ consciousness. This argument is central to his response to those who, during the 1980s, increasingly depicted the working class as fragmented, politically quiescent, and incapable of collective action. Verso’s account of the book similarly stresses Kelly’s use of empirical evidence to support Luxemburg’s emphasis on the transformative consequences of participation in trade union struggles.

From this foundation, Kelly conducts a two-front polemic. Against the Eurocommunist and “new realist” currents associated with Marxism Today, which drew ever more pessimistic conclusions about the working class’s historical prospects, Kelly argues that the difficulties confronting trade unions in the 1980s were neither historically unprecedented nor evidence that collective working-class organisation had reached its end. His criticism of this standpoint remains one of the book’s strongest elements. The labour movement was experiencing a serious defeat. Still, defeat is not the same thing as the disappearance of the working class or the abolition of the fundamental antagonism between labour and capital.

On the other flank, however, Kelly challenges conceptions of the trade union bureaucracy, particularly those associated with tendencies to his left. He opposes the claim that full-time trade union officials constitute a distinctive conservative bureaucracy that systematically seeks to contain the struggles of the workers they nominally represent. Drawing on empirical studies, Kelly argues that officials may, under certain circumstances, be as militant as, or even more militant than, sections of their membership. The weakness here lies less in his evidence than in the political conclusion he draws from it. Comparing degrees of individual militancy cannot settle the Marxist critique of trade union bureaucracy. It concerns the apparatus’s objective social position and political function within capitalist society.

Kelly’s strategic conclusions follow from this approach. He examines corporatist arrangements between governments, employers and union organisations and considers the possibilities for a more class-conscious trade union movement capable of placing political pressure upon the state. His ultimate perspective nevertheless remains centred upon militant trade unionism combined with a Labour Party committed to radical economic reform. The democratic road to socialism comes with qualifications, but it remains recognisably within the political traditions of the British Labour left.

The missing question: the unions’ programme

Kelly’s book is strongest when it challenges the new realists’ pessimism. Workers had not lost their capacity for collective struggle. The miners demonstrated this with extraordinary force in 1984-85, sustaining a year-long confrontation with a government that mobilised the capitalist state’s resources against them. The strike therefore never raised a deficiency of courage or militancy among miners. It was the political isolation of their struggle.

The miners’ defeat poses a problem that Kelly’s theoretical framework struggles to answer. A trade union bureaucracy cannot be adequately defined through the subjective qualities of individual officials. A bureaucrat can speak militantly, support particular strikes, and occasionally find himself pushed into conflict with employers, yet he remains fundamentally distinct from the membership in social and political terms. The decisive issue is how the trade union apparatus relates to capitalist property relations, the national state, and the political organisations that defend the existing social order.

Trotsky’s unfinished 1940 essay “Trade Unions in the Epoch of Imperialist Decay” matters precisely here. Trotsky sought to link the development of monopoly capitalism to the tendency toward closer integration of the trade union apparatus with the capitalist state. He did not conclude from the bureaucracy’s conservatism that revolutionaries should abandon workers organised in trade unions. Rather, he saw the revolutionary party’s political independence from the apparatus as essential precisely because large sections of the working class remained organised within the unions.

Kelly’s presentation of Lenin and Luxemburg tends to blur this issue by presenting their differences too strongly through the categories of pessimism and optimism towards spontaneous industrial struggle. Lenin argued that workers were not incapable of militant struggle, nor that economic struggles could never contribute to political radicalisation. The essential point was that spontaneous struggle alone does not resolve the problem of socialist political consciousness and revolutionary leadership. The working class encounters not merely the employers but an entire network of political institutions and ideological pressures through which bourgeois society reproduces itself.

This distinction becomes decisive when Kelly moves from empirical evidence to strategic conclusions. His alternative to the demoralisation of the new realists is ultimately not to build an independent revolutionary leadership but to make the established relationship between the unions and the Labour Party more militant. This is the central limitation of Trade Unions and Socialist Politics. Kelly correctly insists that the working class retains an enormous capacity for struggle. Still, he does not adequately confront the possibility that the existing organisations claiming to represent that class had themselves become increasingly important mechanisms for subordinating workers’ struggles to the requirements of British capitalism.

The verdict of history

In the decades after Kelly’s book was published, this question gained an importance that 1988 could only partly have anticipated. The globalisation of capitalist production placed immense pressure upon nationally based trade union programmes. Corporations increasingly organised production across borders, while unions remained institutionally and politically tied to the national state. The old reformist perspective, which held that union pressure on national employers and Labour governments could produce an indefinite succession of improvements, became increasingly untenable.

Kelly’s own later scholarship continued to engage extensively with these problems. Rethinking Industrial Relations developed a mobilisation approach to industrial relations and collective action, and Kelly later revisited that work in a 2018 article examining conceptual and empirical questions that had arisen since its publication. His later research also examined union revitalisation, organising strategies, social partnership, and strike activity. His academic profile identifies industrial conflict, trade unions, and union organising as subjects associated with this work.

This later development matters because mobilisation theory addresses a key problem: how grievances acquire a collective character and become organised action. Yet, from a Marxist standpoint, it does not, by itself, resolve the more fundamental political question posed by Trade Unions and Socialist Politics. Explaining why workers mobilise is not the same as explaining the political role of the organisations through which they mobilise, nor does it determine which political programme their struggles should pursue.

The British strike wave of 2022-23 demonstrated the enduring relevance of this distinction. Rail workers, postal workers, nurses, doctors, teachers and other sections of the working class entered into major struggles over wages and conditions. The eruption of these conflicts vindicated a key aspect of Kelly’s polemic against those who had written off collective working-class struggle during the 1980s. But industrial militancy did not automatically resolve the question of political strategy and leadership. Lenin’s central problem, identified more than a century earlier, remained: what political perspective should guide the struggles generated by the objective antagonism between workers and capital?

Consequently, the historical fate of Kelly’s argument is ironic. Against the “new realists”, he was right to insist that the working class had not disappeared and that trade unions still had the capacity for collective action. But the labour movement’s subsequent history showed that these observations alone were insufficient. The more fundamental question was whether organisations rooted in national reformism could provide a progressive way forward under conditions of globally integrated capitalist production.

From Trade Unions and Socialist Politics to mobilisation theory

Kelly’s subsequent intellectual development makes Trade Unions and Socialist Politics particularly interesting in retrospect. His later Rethinking Industrial Relations shifted the analytical emphasis towards mobilisation, collectivism and the processes through which workers become involved in collective action. Kelly returned to that work in “Rethinking Industrial Relations revisited”, describing the later article as an examination of the origins and consequences of the earlier book and of conceptual and empirical questions raised subsequently.

His wider work on union revitalisation likewise examined the organisational possibilities confronting unions in a changing economic environment. Union Organisation and Activity, edited with Paul Willman, addressed union organising, statutory recognition, public-sector union strategies, partnership agreements, and the barriers existing union structures may pose to revitalisation. This provides an important bridge between the 1988 arguments and Kelly’s subsequent industrial-relations scholarship.

Yet continuity matters as much as development. Whether the analytical language is socialist politics, mobilisation, organising or revitalisation, the decisive unresolved issue concerns the political character of trade unionism itself. Unions cannot be understood solely as mechanisms through which grievances become collective action. Their leadership pursues definite programmes, operates within definite institutional relationships, and responds to pressures generated by its position between labour, employers, and the capitalist state.

This is ultimately why Kelly’s examination of the classical Marxist controversy cannot be resolved by industrial-relations sociology alone. The question is political. Under conditions of globally integrated production. At the same time, the trade unions remain nationally organised, can the existing apparatus become the vehicle for an international socialist struggle against capital, or does its programme bind workers ever more closely to national economic competitiveness and the capitalist state?

Conclusion

Trade Unions and Socialist Politics deserves to be read. Kelly’s critique of pessimistic currents that declared the working class historically exhausted contained an important element of truth, and his insistence on the transformative potential of collective struggle stood in sharp contrast to the increasingly fashionable abandonment of class politics during the 1980s. The empirical seriousness of his work distinguishes it from much of the superficial theorising produced during that period.

But the book’s greatest significance today lies in the contradiction at its centre. Kelly correctly defended the working class’s continued capacity for collective struggle but underestimated the political problem posed by the organisations that mediated those struggles. Workers’ defeats cannot be explained simply by insufficient mobilisation, unfavourable economic conditions, or variations in membership militancy. They raise questions of organisation, programme and political leadership.

Read nearly four decades after its publication, Trade Unions and Socialist Politics poses a problem more clearly than it solves. The issue is not whether the working class can fight. Repeated eruptions of class struggle have answered that question. The fundamental question is whether workers can advance through organisations whose political perspective remains subordinate to national reformism and the capitalist state.

The alternative is not political passivity or withdrawal from workers already organised within trade unions. It is the struggle for the working class’s political independence from the bureaucracy, combined with the development of democratic organisations through which workers can exercise direct control over their struggles and link them internationally. From this standpoint, rank-and-file committees are not simply a militant supplement to the existing apparatus but an organisational expression of a fundamentally different political orientation, based on the international unity and political independence of the working class.

That is the central question Trade Unions and Socialist Politics raised in 1988 but could not resolve. The intervening decades have made its resolution more urgent, not less.

Bibliography

Primary text

Kelly, John. Trade Unions and Socialist Politics. London: Verso, 1988.

Classical Marxist sources

Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from Political Writings, 1910–1920. Edited by Quintin Hoare. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977.

Lenin, V. I. What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement (1902). In Collected Works, vol. 5. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1961.

Luxemburg, Rosa. The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions (1906). London: Bookmarks, 1986.

Marx, Karl. “Trade Unions: Their Past, Present and Future.” Resolution of the International Working Men’s Association, Geneva Congress, 1866.

Trotsky, Leon. “Trade Unions in the Epoch of Imperialist Decay” (1940). In Leon Trotsky on the Trade Unions. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1969.

Kelly’s later work on trade unions and industrial relations

Kelly, John. Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilisation, Collectivism and Long Waves. London: Routledge, 1998. Kelly subsequently revisited the arguments of this book in 2018. [eprints.bbk.ac.uk]

Frege, Carola M., and John Kelly. “Union Revitalisation Strategies in Comparative Perspective.” European Journal of Industrial Relations 9, no. 1 (2003): 7–24. [scholar.google.com]

Frege, Carola M., and John Kelly, eds. Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalisation in a Globalising Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. [scholar.google.com]

Kelly, John, and Paul Willman, eds. Union Organisation and Activity. London: Routledge, 2004. The volume examines organising, recognition, partnership, public-sector unionism and union revitalisation. [routledge.com]

Kelly, John. Ethical Socialism and the Trade Unions: Allan Flanders and British Industrial Relations Reform. London: Routledge, 2010. John Kelly’s ORCID record lists the work among his publications. [orcid.org]

Kelly, John. “Rethinking Industrial Relations Revisited.” Economic and Industrial Democracy 39, no. 4 (2018): 701–709. [eprints.bbk.ac.uk]

Related works

Hobsbawm, Eric. “The Forward March of Labour Halted?” Marxism Today, September 1978.

Hyman, Richard. Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism. London: Pluto Press, 1971.

Kelly, John. Labour and the Unions. London: Verso, 1987.

North, David. The Heritage We Defend: A Contribution to the History of the Fourth International. Detroit: Labour Publications, 1988.

Contemporary reviews

Grimshaw, Bruce J. Review of Trade Unions and Socialist Politics, by John Kelly. Hummer, no. 24.

Review of Trade Unions and Socialist Politics, by John Kelly. American Political Science Review 83, no. 4 (December 1989).

An Injury to All: A history of the British working class that cannot answer its own question

Published by Verso on 27 October 2026, Ewan Gibbs’s An Injury to All: The Unmaking of the British Working Class sets itself an important historical and political task. Verso describes it as a social history of the British working class since 1945, extending “from the picket lines of the Miners’ Strike to the Amazon warehouses of today”. Through first-hand testimony, the book follows the transformation of a class once concentrated in mines, shipyards, and other centres of heavy industry into one dispersed across call centres, warehouses, and the gig economy. Its culminating question is explicitly political: “who now speaks for labour?”

That question could hardly be more urgent. The old organisations that claimed for generations to represent the working class have undergone a protracted collapse. The Labour Party has moved ever further from the reformist programme it was historically identified with, while the trade-union bureaucracy increasingly functions as an apparatus for containing workers’ struggles. The destruction of manufacturing employment, the privatisation of state industries, the erosion of social provision and the growth of precarious employment have transformed the social landscape in which millions live.

Gibbs brings considerable knowledge to this subject. He is a Senior Lecturer in Economic and Social History at the University of Glasgow and describes his research interests as encompassing energy, industry, work and protest. His earlier book, Coal Country: The Meaning and Memory of Deindustrialisation in Postwar Scotland, examined the decline of deep coal mining in Scotland and its consequences for work, communities, memory, class and nationhood. His subsequent research has extended into the political economy of energy and the problems associated with industrial transition.

The empirical virtues of this work should not be dismissed. Verso stresses the prominence Gibbs gives to first-hand accounts, while Rhian E. Jones praises the book specifically for “letting its subjects speak for themselves”. The recollections of miners, engineers and workers from communities devastated by industrial closure constitute important historical evidence. Such testimony preserves experiences that would otherwise be submerged beneath official statistics and the complacent narratives of politicians who have treated deindustrialisation as the unavoidable price of economic modernisation.

But the preservation of experience does not by itself provide a historical explanation. History must establish the relationship between experience and the social forces that produced it. It must explain not merely what happened, but why, which political forces intervened, what programmes they advanced, and what alternatives existed. It is precisely here that the concept of the “unmaking” of the British working class raises fundamental problems.

From the “making” to the “unmaking” of the working class

The title consciously echoes E. P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class. The intellectual ancestry of the argument is made especially clear by Gibbs’s 2019 essay, “The Unmaking of the British Working Class: A Highly Provisional Thesis”. There he defined the “unmaking” primarily through the atrophy of what he called “Labourism”: the political and institutional world centred on organised labour and its attachment to the Labour Party. He linked this process to deindustrialisation, suburbanisation, the demise of collective action, and the political demoralisation visible in former industrial areas.

This is an important starting point because the decline of “Labourism” is not identical to the disappearance of the working class. The conflation of the two contains the central theoretical difficulty. The working class is not defined by living in a mining village, wearing overalls, possessing a particular regional accent or belonging to a trade union. It is defined fundamentally by its relationship to the means of production. Workers who do not own significant productive property must sell their labour power to live. Changes in technology, occupation and geography can profoundly alter the forms through which class consciousness develops without abolishing the underlying class relation.

Indeed, Verso’s own description of An Injury to All illustrates the contradiction. It describes a class once “forged in mines and shipyards” becoming one spread across call centres and gig-economy applications. But this is not, strictly speaking, the disappearance of the working class. It is a transformation in the occupational structure and geographical concentration of wage labour. What has been shattered is something different: an historically specific form of working-class organisation and consciousness that grew alongside nationally regulated capitalism and became politically subordinated to the Labour and trade-union bureaucracy.

The distinction is decisive. If the decline of mining, shipbuilding, steelmaking and large-scale manufacturing automatically meant the decline of the working class, then the pessimistic conclusions associated with post-industrial sociology might follow. But if capitalist restructuring destroyed certain concentrations of workers while simultaneously producing new ones, the historical problem changes entirely. We are no longer asking why the working class disappeared. We are asking why organisations created in its name proved incapable of responding progressively to this transformation.

The exhaustion of national reformism

The postwar settlement in Britain emerged from definite international historical conditions. The Depression, fascism, and the Second World War had radicalised workers’ masses internationally. Britain emerged from the war economically weakened and increasingly subordinate to the United States. At the same time, the long postwar economic expansion provided the resources to make significant social concessions while preserving capitalist property relations.

Nationalisation, the National Health Service, expanded welfare provision, council housing, and collective bargaining did not abolish capitalism. They represented concessions made within it under the immense pressure of the working class. This was the environment within which Labourism acquired its postwar authority. The Labour Party claimed that Parliament could gradually transform capitalism while trade unions negotiated improvements within the existing economic order. The bureaucracy’s privileged position depended on its ability to mediate between workers and employers.

The breakdown of the postwar economic order increasingly undermined this arrangement’s foundations. The growing internationalisation of production brought national industries directly into competition within a globally organised system of production and finance. British capitalism responded by demanding wage restraint, rationalisation, closures, deregulation and attacks upon social spending. The Labour and trade-union bureaucracy confronted a historical choice. Either the working class had to challenge capitalist property relations, or its organisations had to accept British capitalism’s demands. They chose the second course.

This is the history that the language of “unmaking” threatens to obscure. Workers did not wake up one morning and decide that solidarity had become unfashionable. Collective institutions did not simply evaporate under the influence of individualism or suburbanisation. Nor was Thatcherism merely the ideological expression of an inexplicable change in national “structures of feeling”. A sustained political offensive targeted the working class, and the organisations through which workers traditionally fought increasingly became mechanisms for suppressing resistance. From the standpoint of Marxism, therefore, Thatcherism cannot be understood independently of the crisis of Labourism. The strength of the Conservative offensive ultimately depended on the political paralysis its existing leadership imposed on the working class.

The miners’ strike and the decisive historical defeat

The 1984-85 miners’ strike occupies an unavoidable position in any account of this transformation. Verso foregrounds the miners’ struggle in An Injury to All, describing its narrative as extending from the miners’ picket lines to contemporary Amazon warehouses. The strike represented a historic confrontation between the working class and the Thatcher government. The government understood that the miners represented far more than one occupational group. Their defeat would alter class relations throughout Britain.

But the decisive question is therefore not simply why the mines subsequently closed. It is why the miners were defeated. An explanation centred upon geographical restructuring or the weakening of industrial solidarities reverses cause and effect. The demoralisation that followed the destruction of the coalfields cannot adequately explain a defeat that helped produce that demoralisation.

Consequently, labour movement leadership becomes indispensable. The miners needed to mobilise the working class as a whole. Instead, their struggle remained confined to an industrial dispute, while the Labour and trade-union bureaucracy opposed any political mobilisation that could threaten the Thatcher government. The subsequent devastation of the coalfields was enormous. Jobs disappeared, communities lost their economic foundations, and decades of accumulated collective experience came under sustained pressure. But these consequences must be understood historically as the aftermath of a major political defeat.

Gibbs’s 2019 essay provides valuable evidence of the bitterness that survived in former coalfield constituencies. Discussing Bolsover, he noted hostile memories of the miners’ strike and how electoral allegiances subsequently fractured. He placed this within a broader trajectory of deindustrialisation, demobilisation, and declining attachment to the labour movement.  But hostility towards the former institutions of the labour movement cannot be treated merely as evidence of weakening working-class identity. It must also be understood as the distorted product of decades of bitter political experience.

Workers repeatedly mobilised through organisations that claimed to represent them, only to discover that those organisations refused to wage a struggle against the social order responsible for declining living standards and industrial destruction. The resulting alienation did not mean class antagonism had disappeared. It showed Labourism’s growing inability to contain that antagonism within its traditional political forms.

Hobsbawm, Marxism Today and the retreat from the working class

The theoretical lineage behind the concept of “unmaking” therefore deserves closer examination. Eric Hobsbawm’s famous intervention, “The Forward March of Labour Halted?”, offered an influential formulation of the claim that the traditional working class was losing the social weight socialist politics had supposedly depended on. Such arguments subsequently became central to the Eurocommunist current associated with Marxism Today.

The consequences were far-reaching. Rather than examining the betrayals the working class suffered and the need to build an alternative revolutionary leadership, this tendency increasingly treated changes in capitalism’s occupational composition as evidence that class politics itself had to be supplemented or replaced by broader democratic politics organised around diverse social constituencies.

The political development eventually contributed to an intellectual climate in which accommodation to the market could be presented as realism. What had begun as an argument about changes within the working class became an argument for abandoning the working class as the central revolutionary agency of socialist politics.

It is significant in this respect that Gibbs opened his 2019 essay with Hall’s formulation from “Gramsci and Us”: “You lose because you lose because you lose.” The phrase encapsulates the danger of converting political defeats into sociological inevitabilities. Workers lose. Industrial communities decline. Labour loyalties disintegrate. Nationalism or right-wing populism fills the vacuum. History becomes an accumulation of defeats whose explanation resides increasingly in transformed identities, cultures and geographies. But Marxism must ask a different question: why did they lose?

Who led these struggles? What political programme did that leadership defend? What alternatives were suppressed? Why did enormous demonstrations of working-class militancy repeatedly terminate in retreats brokered by organisations that claimed to represent the workers? Once those questions are posed, the history of postwar Britain assumes a profoundly different shape.

The working class was transformed, not abolished.

The central empirical fact confronting the “unmaking” thesis is that capitalism has not transcended wage labour. It has enormously extended it. The old industrial landscape has certainly disappeared in many areas. The pit head, shipyard and steelworks that once dominated entire towns have closed. Millions no longer work in enterprises around which dense occupational cultures developed over generations. But capitalism replaced them with other forms of proletarian labour.

Hospitals, schools, logistics depots, supermarkets, telecommunications networks, warehouses, call centres and digital platforms depend upon vast numbers of wage workers. Privatisation has transferred former public services into corporate hands while retaining workers whose labour remains socially indispensable. The important historical transition, therefore, is not from a working-class society to a post-working-class society. It is from one configuration of the working class to another.

The social character of production has meanwhile become vastly more international. A worker employed in a warehouse or logistics depot in Britain participates in production and distribution systems that extend across continents. Components, data, finance and commodities cross national borders continuously. Capital already organises production internationally. Labour remains politically divided by national institutions. This contradiction is crucial because it suggests that nationally based Labourism cannot accommodate it. The development of globalised production did not destroy the material basis for international working-class solidarity. It strengthened it.

The turn towards nationalism

Here the Scottish dimension of Gibbs’s political outlook becomes especially revealing. In his 2019 New Socialist essay, he argued that Labour’s future in Scotland required breaking with its commitment to the unitary British state. He described nationalism as having “displaced Labourism” in Scotland, supported recognition of the right to another independence referendum and advocated pressure upon the Scottish government to defy Westminster. He suggested that such confrontation could be accompanied by civil disobedience. An important democratic question concerns opposition to coercive attempts to suppress national aspirations. But that does not settle nationalism’s class character or establish it as a progressive alternative to Labourism. The Marxist starting point must be the independent interests of the working class.

A worker in Glasgow does not have fundamentally antagonistic social interests to a worker in Liverpool, Newcastle, Cardiff or London. They confront the same capitalist ownership structures, financial institutions, and, increasingly, the same multinational corporations. Nationalism translates capitalism-generated social grievances into political demands organised around national territory. It thereby offers another national programme precisely when capitalist development has made economic life more internationally integrated than ever before. The answer to the exhaustion of British national reformism therefore cannot be Scottish national reformism.

Changing the constitutional boundaries within which capitalist property relations operate does not abolish those relations. Neither does exchanging administration from Westminster for administration from Edinburgh resolve the contradictions between wage labour and capital. If the decisive historical development since the 1970s has been the internationalisation of capitalist production, the socialist response cannot consist of creating smaller national frameworks within which workers continue competing for investment. It must politically unify workers across national boundaries against globally organised capital.

Grangemouth and the limits of “just transition”

Gibbs’s recent work on Grangemouth provides a contemporary expression of these issues. His University of Glasgow profile describes his research into energy and industrial transition and records his involvement in work on the Grangemouth refinery closure. His publications include “Workers’ perspectives on an unjust transition: place, history, and workplace closure at Grangemouth oil refinery, Scotland”, “The Grangemouth oil refinery closure: lessons for ‘just transition’ governance” and, in 2026, “Scotland’s unjust transition: the view from Grangemouth”. Grangemouth sharply frames the conflict between social need and private ownership.

The fundamental question is not whether workers should be consulted more effectively about industrial transition. It is who controls the productive resources upon which entire communities depend. Workers possess enormous accumulated technical knowledge. Yet under capitalist ownership, the continued operation or closure of productive facilities ultimately depends on profitability. Decisions affecting thousands of lives appear as the private prerogative of corporations and investors. A genuinely rational transition to sustainable energy production would begin from entirely different premises. Society would determine energy investment according to environmental need and human welfare rather than private profit. Workers displaced from environmentally damaging production would be guaranteed decent employment, training and living standards as productive resources were redirected. But such planning immediately raises the property question. Who owns the energy industry? Who controls investment? Who determines whether a refinery, power station or industrial plant operates? Who decides what replaces it?

These are class questions rather than merely problems of governance. A socialist programme would therefore fight to place major energy corporations and strategic industries under public ownership and democratic workers’ control as part of an internationally coordinated transformation of production.

“Who speaks for labour?”

We can now return to the question Verso asks in An Injury to All: “who now speaks for labour?” The wording itself can mislead. The fundamental problem confronting workers is not discovering somebody willing to “speak for” them. Labour politicians have spoken in workers’ names for generations. Trade-union officials do so every day. The real issue is political leadership. A class becomes an independent political force only when it understands its historical interests and develops organisations capable of fighting for them. No amount of sociological reconstruction can substitute for this task.

The old labour organisations developed within the nation-state framework. Their bureaucracy mediated between working people and national capital. When capitalist production became globally integrated, these organisations did not become internationalist. Instead, they defended the national economy more explicitly. The consequences followed inexorably. If British companies had to become “competitive”, wages and conditions had to be restrained. If investment might move elsewhere, workers had to accept concessions. When factories faced closure, union leaders sought agreements to persuade corporations that production would remain profitable.

The worker thereby ceased to be represented as a member of an international class and instead became a cost on the balance sheet of “our” national economy. This transformation cannot be understood merely as weakened solidarity. It was the political bankruptcy of nationalism and reformism under conditions of globally organised capitalism.

Not the unmaking of the working class, but the collapse of Labourism

This is ultimately the conceptual problem contained in the title An Injury to All. What disappeared was real and historically significant. Mining communities were devastated. Manufacturing towns were hollowed out. Trade-union membership declined. Labour loyalties weakened. Institutions through which generations of workers had expressed a collective identity deteriorated.

But none of this established that the working class ceased to exist. What collapsed was the identification of working-class politics with a particular set of national institutions. This distinction completely changes the historical perspective. If the working class has been “unmade”, socialist politics becomes an exercise in assembling coalitions among fragmented identities, regions and social movements. Politics moves from class towards culture, nationality and electoral sociology.

If Labourism has been exhausted while the working class itself has been objectively enlarged and internationally integrated, an entirely different conclusion follows. The problem becomes one of revolutionary leadership. The central lesson of the last half century is not that workers possessed too much belief in class struggle. Rather, enormous manifestations of class struggle remained politically subordinated to organisations committed to defending capitalism. The task therefore cannot be to recreate the labour movement of the 1950s.

Nor should socialists romanticise the industrial communities that have disappeared. Their solidarity and collective traditions represented tremendous achievements, but national reformism, trade-union bureaucracy, and, in important areas, Stalinism also dominated their political life. The future cannot be built by reconstructing the past’s institutional arrangements.

An injury to one is an injury to all.

Gibbs’s title is therefore ironic. “An injury to one is an injury to all” contains a conception far more radical than nostalgia for industrial Britain’s vanished institutions. It expresses the elementary internationalist truth that workers share fundamental interests arising from their common relationship to capital. Today that proposition possesses an objective material foundation on an unprecedented scale.

The worker in a British warehouse is integrated into the same international production and distribution processes as workers throughout Europe, Asia and North America. The nurse confronting deteriorating public services, the teacher facing declining real incomes, the delivery worker controlled through an application and the engineer employed by a multinational corporation occupy different workplaces but confront the same fundamental relationship between labour and capital.

Capitalism has globalised production while preserving private ownership and the nation-state system. It has created the material foundations for international working-class unity while continuously mobilising nationalism to prevent that unity from assuming conscious political form. That contradiction, rather than the disappearance of the proletariat, defines the present historical period. Gibbs has accumulated valuable material concerning the experience and memory of deindustrialisation. His previous work demonstrates sustained engagement with the workers and communities most immediately affected by industrial restructuring. His research encompasses precisely the terrain upon which some of the central class conflicts of modern Britain have unfolded. But An Injury to All cannot ultimately be resolved through oral history, electoral sociology, or the politics of national reconstruction. “Who speaks for labour?” is the wrong question if it means searching among the remains of Labourism for another institutional representative. The working class must speak for itself.

Doing so requires a political movement independent of the Labour Party and the trade-union bureaucracy, hostile to every attempt to divide workers by nationality, and consciously based on the international character of modern capitalist production. The British working class was not “unmade”. A historically specific labour movement based upon national reformism has undergone a profound degeneration and collapse. The distinction is not semantic. It determines whether the defeats of the past half century are seen as evidence of the disappearance of working-class politics or as historical experiences from which a new socialist movement must draw lessons.

The mines closed. Shipyards disappeared. Council estates were sold. The institutions associated with Labourism decayed. But labour did not disappear. Capital could not survive for a single day without it. The historical question is therefore not how to reconstruct the Britain of the postwar settlement. It is how the enormously expanded and internationally interconnected working class can transform itself from an objective social force into a conscious political force. In that sense the old slogan remains entirely contemporary: an injury to one is an injury to all. But taking those words seriously means following them beyond Labourism and nationalism to their necessary political conclusion: the international unity of the working class in the struggle for socialism.

Bibliography

Gibbs, Ewan. An Injury to All: The Unmaking of the British Working Class. London: Verso, 2026. [versobooks.com]

Gibbs, Ewan. Coal Country: The Meaning and Memory of Deindustrialisation in Postwar Scotland. London: University of London Press, 2021. [gla.ac.uk]

Gibbs, Ewan. “The Unmaking of the British Working Class: A Highly Provisional Thesis.” New Socialist, 19 December 2019. [newsocialist.org.uk]

Hobsbawm, Eric. “The Forward March of Labour Halted?” Marxism Today, September 1978.

Hall, Stuart. “Gramsci and Us.” Marxism Today, June 1987. Gibbs uses Hall’s “You lose because you lose because you lose” as the epigraph to his 2019 essay. [newsocialist.org.uk]

Nairn, Tom. The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism. London: New Left Books, 1977.

Shibe, Riyoko and Ewan Gibbs. “The Grangemouth oil refinery closure: lessons for ‘just transition’ governance.” Journal of the British Academy, 13 (1), 2025. [gla.ac.uk]

Marsden, Chris and Julie Hyland. “Britain: 20 years since the year-long miners’ strike.” World Socialist Web Site, 5 March 2004. This is particularly relevant to your argument because it links the miners’ defeat to the roles of Labour and the TUC and connects the exhaustion of national reformism to the globalisation of production. [wsws.org], [wsws.org]

Marsden, Chris and Julie Hyland. “Forty years since the British miners’ strike.” World Socialist Web Site, 5 March 2024. The article places the 1984-85 struggle within the international shift toward deregulation, global investment, and internationalised production, and argues that the reformist and Stalinist organisations’ betrayals were decisive in this period’s defeats. [wsws.org]

For want of a horse: Manchester United and the parasitism of the football oligarchy

A crisis 21 years in the making

Manchester United is once again preparing to sack a manager. Sunday’s 3-0 home defeat to Bournemouth, following a 4-1 thrashing by Como, has left Michael Carrick’s position untenable barely months after he was handed the job permanently. He would become the eighth man to occupy the dugout since Sir Alex Ferguson retired in 2013. The club that dominated English football for two decades is now, in Wilson’s words, a mid-table laughing stock under a stadium roof that leaks whenever it rains.

In a column published Monday, Wilson poses the obvious question. When a club burns through managers at this rate, is the manager really the problem? He points upward: to director of football Jason Wilcox, to chief executive Omar Berrada, to Sir Jim Ratcliffe, whom he describes accurately as a cost-cutting tax exile, and finally to the Glazer family, whose 2005 leveraged buyout plunged the club into debt.

Wilson then reaches for literature. United’s story, he argues, has taken the form of a classical tragedy, in which a small, seemingly unrelated incident, swollen by pride, brings the whole edifice down. That incident was a horse called Rock of Gibraltar. The episode is worth recounting. It sheds a harsh light on the social layer that owns and runs modern football. But the conclusion Wilson draws from it, that a club was lost “for the want of a horse”, obscures far more than it reveals.

Millionaires at the races

The affair began in 1999 at York racecourse. Irish bloodstock magnate John Magnier won the Gimcrack Stakes with a horse. Custom required the owner to address the Gimcrack Dinner. Magnier, who disliked public speaking, asked his friend Alex Ferguson to speak for him. The racing establishment refused.

To spite them, Magnier began registering horses in Ferguson’s name. In 2001 one of them, Rock of Gibraltar, won the Gimcrack, and Ferguson duly gave his speech. Around the same time, Magnier and his business partner JP McManus began buying up shares in Manchester United, then a company listed on the London Stock Exchange.

The horse proved to be a champion, winning seven consecutive Group One races. The prize money ran to roughly £800,000. The real prize, however, lay in stud fees worth tens of millions. Ferguson claimed a verbal agreement entitled him to half of them. Magnier remembered the arrangement very differently.

Ferguson sued. What followed was a brawl fought by City methods. Questions about Ferguson’s transfer dealings began to circulate. Magnier and McManus submitted a list of 99 questions to the United board, which the Daily Mail promptly ran. Ferguson settled for £2.5 million.

The two Irish financiers then decided to sell. A buyer was waiting: Malcolm Glazer, an American businessman who had been accumulating United shares. According to Wilson, Ferguson backed Glazer. In 2005, Magnier and McManus sold out for £260 million, a profit of close to £100 million.

It is a revealing detail that Ferguson, a former Govan shipyard apprentice who began adult life as a trade union shop steward and has long presented himself as a Labour man, ended up supporting the asset-stripper who bought his club with borrowed money—two decades of proximity to wealth had done its work. When the interests of the workers and fans who sustained the club collided with his own, he chose his side with little doubt.

The leveraged buyout: debt as a business model

The Glazer takeover, valued at around £790 million, was a classic leveraged buyout. Most of the purchase price was borrowed, and the club took on the debt. United, which had been profitable and debt-free, was made to pay for the privilege of being bought.

What followed was two decades of extraction. By most independent estimates, well over £1 billion has flowed out of the club in interest payments, banking fees and dividends since 2005. In 2012, the Glazers floated a minority of shares on the New York Stock Exchange, structured so that the family retained voting control. They used the money to refinance debt, not rebuild the team.

Ferguson’s personal authority and an exceptional squad masked the rot for eight years. United won five more league titles and the 2008 Champions League. But once he retired, the club’s sporting operation was revealed as hollow. Successive managers—David Moyes, Louis van Gaal, José Mourinho, Ole Gunnar Solskjær, Erik ten Hag, Ruben Amorim and now Carrick—were hired and discarded. The club spent hundreds of millions on players assembled with no coherent plan.

Meanwhile, Old Trafford, once the country’s most admired stadium, was left to decay. Season ticket prices rose. The Glazers’ contempt for the club’s supporters peaked in April 2021, when they joined the abortive European Super League, a closed competition designed to guarantee revenue for a cartel of the richest clubs. Mass protests followed, and fans forced the postponement of a home match against Liverpool.

None of this deviated from the norm of English football. It was its logic carried through. The Premier League was founded in 1992 as a breakaway designed to capture television money for the top clubs. United had been floated on the stock market the year before. Football was being remade as an investment field, and every club became an asset to be bought, leveraged, and milked.

Ratcliffe: austerity on the terraces

When Sir Jim Ratcliffe bought a minority stake in 2024 and took over football operations, sections of the media hailed him as a saviour. The billionaire owner of the Ineos petrochemicals empire, a Brexit supporter who moved his residence to Monaco, was presented as a hard-headed businessman who would sweep away the Glazers’ incompetence.

Instead, he swept away jobs. The club made hundreds of staff redundant across two rounds of cuts. Concessionary tickets for children and pensioners were scrapped or curtailed. Prices for remaining matchday tickets were raised. Even small staff perks were withdrawn. The club’s workers and its working-class supporters were made to pay for a crisis created entirely at the top.

Wilson notes the irony that, had Magnier and McManus held on to their shares until Ratcliffe came along, they would have pocketed roughly £1 billion more. The figure is telling. While the team declined and the stadium crumbled, the club’s value as a financial asset soared. That is the essential contradiction. United’s decline as a football club and its rise as a speculative property were not opposites. They were two sides of the same process.

Not a tragedy, but a social process

Wilson is one of the most thoughtful writers on football, and his account of the Rock of Gibraltar affair is valuable. But his framework is the liberal one of accident and personality. The club fell, in his telling, because of a quarrel between proud men over a horse.

This turns history upside down. Had Rock of Gibraltar never raced, United would still have been a publicly traded company in an industry flooded with television money. It would still have been circled by hedge funds, private equity and billionaires seeking an asset with a global brand. The horse determined which speculator acquired the club, and when. It did not determine that a speculator would.

Every major English club tells a version of the same story. A Russian oligarch bought Chelsea and sold it to a US private equity consortium. Gulf states own Manchester City and Newcastle United. American sports investment groups hold Liverpool, Arsenal and others. Lower down the pyramid, clubs such as Bury and Macclesfield Town have been driven out of existence by financial mismanagement. United’s fate is not exceptional. It is the most visible expression of a general process.

That process mirrors capitalism’s development over the past four decades. The leveraged buyout, the stripping of assets, the ballooning of share values alongside the decay of the real enterprise: the City and Wall Street perfected these methods before applying them to football. Under the Thatcher and Blair governments, they applied the same methods to industry, housing and public services. Football was simply another social institution handed over to the market.

Manchester United was born in 1878 as Newton Heath, a team of railway workers. For most of its history, it was a focus of collective identity for the working class of an industrial city. Today it is a ticker symbol. Those who sustain it, the staff in its offices and kitchens and the supporters in the stands, have no say in its direction.

The solution does not lie in finding a better billionaire, nor in the various schemes of “fan ownership” that leave the profit system intact. As long as football remains a commodity, capital will govern it. Restoring it to the people who love it requires bringing it, like every other major sphere of social life, under democratic public control. That task is bound up with the broader struggle of the working class against the financial oligarchy that dominates economic life. Rock of Gibraltar did not destroy Manchester United. Capitalism did.

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