A Powerful Reflection on Housing, Homelessness and the Illusion of Progress

I took the time to read your article Cathy Comes Home carefully and found it both thought-provoking and deeply relevant. What struck me most was the way it connects a television drama made sixty years ago with a housing crisis that continues to affect individuals and families today. There is something deeply unsettling about recognising that, despite enormous social, economic and technological changes, many of the fundamental problems surrounding housing and homelessness remain with us.

The passage of time does not necessarily mean that society has progressed in the ways we might expect. If people today can still find themselves facing circumstances that would have been immediately recognisable to audiences six decades ago, then we have to ask what genuine social progress actually means.

I particularly appreciated the way the article presents homelessness not simply as an individual tragedy, or as the consequence of personal circumstances, but as something rooted far more deeply in the social and economic structures surrounding ordinary working people. Too often, homelessness is discussed through individual stories without sufficient attention being paid to the conditions that create housing insecurity in the first place.

That wider perspective is one of the article’s greatest strengths. It encourages the reader to look beyond the immediate circumstances of homelessness and consider the institutions, economic priorities and political decisions that can leave people vulnerable to losing their homes.

The discussion of housing becoming increasingly treated as a commodity rather than a fundamental social necessity is especially compelling. It raises a basic question: what is housing actually for? Is a home primarily somewhere in which individuals and families should be able to establish secure and dignified lives, or is property principally an asset to be bought, sold and accumulated for profit?

That question becomes increasingly difficult to ignore when secure housing remains beyond the reach of so many people.

I also found the examination of political change across those six decades particularly interesting. The article does not simply argue that successive governments have failed to do enough. It asks the reader to consider whether the persistence of the housing crisis reflects something more fundamental about the way the housing system itself operates.

That gives the argument considerably greater weight. If similar problems continue to emerge under different governments, in different economic circumstances and across different generations, then perhaps it is no longer sufficient simply to blame individual policies or political personalities. At some point, the underlying structure itself has to be examined.

There is also a disturbing historical irony here. A television drama produced decades ago could expose homelessness and housing insecurity as an urgent social problem and provoke audiences to question how such conditions could exist. Yet sixty years later, society is still confronting many of the same fundamental issues.

Perhaps even more troubling is the possibility that we have simply become accustomed to them.

That was the thought that stayed with me most strongly after reading the article. How does a society become so familiar with a recurring injustice that it gradually begins to regard it as an unfortunate but normal part of everyday life?

Homelessness appears so regularly in news reports, political debates and public appeals that there is a danger of regarding it as permanent and unavoidable rather than asking why a wealthy modern society continues to produce circumstances in which people can be denied something as fundamental as a secure home.

The historical comparison therefore does considerably more than demonstrate that homelessness existed sixty years ago. It forces the reader to confront an uncomfortable possibility: if essentially the same social problem continues to reproduce itself across generations, perhaps its persistence cannot simply be explained by temporary economic difficulties, inadequate policies or a lack of political attention.

It raises the more fundamental question of whether the economic and social arrangements that continually reproduce housing insecurity have ever seriously been challenged.

I also appreciated the way the article refuses to treat history as something safely confined to the past. By placing the television drama alongside the contemporary housing crisis, the past becomes a means of interrogating the present.

Indeed, the distance of sixty years makes the comparison more powerful. It provides a benchmark against which claims of social progress can be measured. Progress surely cannot be judged simply by advances in technology, increases in wealth or changes in lifestyles. It must also be measured by whether ordinary people possess greater security, dignity and freedom from social conditions that previous generations already recognised as unacceptable.

Overall, this is an informative, compelling and impressively considered piece. More importantly, it leaves the reader thinking long after reaching the final paragraph.

Its strength lies in the fact that it does not merely tell us that homelessness and housing insecurity remain serious problems. It asks why they remain serious problems, what economic and political forces allow them to persist, and what it says about our society that secure housing can still remain beyond the reach of so many.

The connection between past and present therefore gives the article a significance that reaches beyond either television history or the contemporary housing debate. It poses a much broader question about what we mean when we speak of social progress.

Perhaps that is the most powerful point of all. The passage of time should never be confused with progress. If an injustice recognised sixty years ago remains painfully recognisable today, the question is no longer simply why we have failed to solve it. We must also ask whether the social structures that continually reproduce it have ever genuinely been confronted.

The November 2026 Microsoft outage: Private monopoly and the fragility of global digital infrastructure

On Thursday, 12 November, a critical communications system underpinning modern capitalism began to fail. Outlook and other components of Microsoft 365 became inaccessible or unreliable across much of the world, with Teams and Copilot functions also affected. Government agencies, health services, courts, police forces, and private corporations relied on a single American technology corporation to restore communications over which they had virtually no direct control.

The immediate cause was technical. Microsoft later said the incident began with an earlier network capacity upgrade and became apparent after a subsequent network change. The company rejected suggestions that a cyberattack or artificial intelligence agents were responsible. The outage’s significance is heightened by the fact that it did not require intervention by a hostile state, criminal organisation, or sophisticated computer attack. A failure within a single corporation’s infrastructure was sufficient to disrupt institutions across multiple countries.

The outage revealed a fundamental contradiction in the organisation of contemporary technological society. Communications systems that serve hundreds of millions of people and are increasingly essential to hospitals, government departments, and other public services have been consolidated within a small number of privately owned corporations. While technology has become more international and social in character, ownership remains private, and strategic decisions are ultimately driven by profitability, competition, and shareholder interests.

Problems became apparent on Thursday afternoon when users reported being unable to access Exchange Online and Outlook. Microsoft initially described the disruption as affecting the Americas, before acknowledging that users in other regions were also impacted. Outlook was central to the failure, but other Microsoft 365 services were disrupted as well, along with external organisations whose systems relied on Microsoft’s infrastructure.

Microsoft’s explanation evolved as engineers worked to understand and contain the failure. Servers became unexpectedly unavailable, increasing the load on the remaining infrastructure. Initial restoration efforts achieved only limited success, as recovered capacity was insufficient to achieve immediate stability. Ultimately, Microsoft attributed the incident to a problem introduced during an earlier network capacity upgrade, which became apparent after a subsequent network change.

Currently, there is no evidence that Microsoft’s job cuts or AI investments directly caused the outage. Determining the precise chain of technical and organisational responsibility requires significantly more evidence than is currently available. However, this does not negate the broader economic issue. The central question is not whether a specific redundant engineer could have prevented this failure, but rather what occurs when essential infrastructure is managed according to the investment priorities of competing corporations.

The breakdown occurred less than three years after the July 2024 CrowdStrike incident, which demonstrated the vulnerability of extreme concentration in global computing. A faulty security update crashed millions of Windows computers and disrupted airlines, hospitals, banks, and businesses worldwide. Although governments and corporations pledged to learn from this event, the concentration of technological infrastructure that allowed a single defect to have global consequences remained fundamentally unaddressed.

The Microsoft outage should not be regarded merely as another instance of the CrowdStrike event. The immediate technical causes differed. However, both incidents share the same underlying social structure: large portions of global communications and computing infrastructure are concentrated among a small number of corporations. As a result, a decision or error that once affected only a single organisation can now propagate across countries and continents.

Cloud computing has intensified this contradiction. Centralisation brings enormous technical advantages. Computing resources can be distributed internationally, immense quantities of information can be processed and transmitted almost instantaneously, and sophisticated applications can be made available to organisations that cannot build such systems independently. These are genuine achievements representing an extraordinary development of humanity’s productive capabilities.

Under private ownership, however, technological integration results in corporate dependence. Governments, which are responsible for administering the lives of millions, increasingly operate as customers of Microsoft, Amazon, and a few other technology companies. Hospitals, police forces, courts, councils, and entire government departments therefore rely on infrastructure whose fundamental operation is beyond their direct control.

The most significant consequences of the November outage did not occur among office workers inconvenienced by the temporary loss of email, but rather in areas where public administration had become dependent on Microsoft’s systems. Health organisations, police forces, government institutions, and judicial bodies were affected internationally. The interruption revealed how deeply ordinary communications software has become embedded in essential social services.

It also exposed the increasingly artificial distinction between “front-line” and “back-office” services. Hospitals depend upon administrative communications to coordinate staff and information. Police forces use digital systems to receive and distribute reports. Courts depend upon them for official communications. Referrals, appointments, records, and innumerable administrative processes depend on systems that seem secondary until they stop working.

When these systems fail, their associated work does not vanish. The burden shifts directly to workers. Nurses, administrative staff, call handlers, doctors, police personnel, and IT engineers must set up alternative arrangements, revert to telephones or manual methods, address accumulated backlogs, and reassure members of the public who are unsure whether their communications have been received.

This additional labour represents one of the largely invisible social costs of corporate technology failures. Microsoft’s financial accounts do not adequately reflect these costs because much of the work is performed elsewhere. Public-sector employees, local IT departments, and users absorb the disruption while corporate engineers focus on repairing the central infrastructure. As a result, the economic damage from the failure is socialised, even though ownership and control remain private.

The outage also took place amid an unprecedented international investment race in artificial intelligence. Microsoft is one of the principal corporations allocating substantial resources to data centres, computing capacity, and AI infrastructure, competing with Amazon, Google, Meta, and other technology giants for a dominant position in what investors anticipate will become a central market in the coming decades.

It would be inappropriate to interpret this coincidence as an unsupported explanation for the outage. No evidence currently indicates that AI expenditure caused the November failure, just as Microsoft’s workforce reductions cannot automatically be blamed for a specific network malfunction. The significance lies in the priorities established by an economic system where investment is allocated based on anticipated profitability rather than democratically determined social needs.

Technology analyst Rupert Goodwins raised this broader issue during the disruption, contending that Microsoft’s intense focus on artificial intelligence risked marginalising mature services such as email and Teams. He also highlighted the departure of experienced engineers and the risk of losing accumulated institutional knowledge. While this argument does not establish the technical origin of the November failure, it sheds light on the corporate environment in which essential infrastructure is maintained.

For investors, artificial intelligence represents a potentially vast new field for capital accumulation. Outlook and Exchange are mature services whose operation may generate limited enthusiasm in financial markets. However, from a societal perspective, providing reliable communications to hospitals, ambulance services, courts, and government departments is likely more important than developing the next commercially promising AI application.

The market cannot resolve this contradiction because it generates it. Capital flows towards anticipated returns. Labour simultaneously appears as an expense to be reduced. Experienced engineers, administrators and support workers remain costs on corporate balance sheets even when the networks they maintain have become indispensable to the functioning of modern society.

The institutions of the capitalist state already acknowledge the extraordinary degree of concentration involved. Britain’s Competition and Markets Authority concluded that Amazon and Microsoft have significant market power in cloud services. It also identified obstacles to switching providers or operating effectively across multiple clouds, including interoperability issues and Microsoft’s software licensing practices.

Notably, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) describes cloud computing as “core infrastructure for the UK economy.” This characterisation raises a more fundamental question than the regulator may intend. If cloud computing constitutes core national infrastructure, and if hospitals, government institutions, and businesses cannot function effectively without it, we must ask why its organisation, staffing, and investment priorities should remain the private concern of Microsoft, Amazon, and other technology corporations.

The conventional answer is increased competition. Regulators propose making it easier for customers to move between cloud providers by lowering barriers to transferring data, increasing interoperability, and challenging restrictive licensing arrangements. Some of these changes could undoubtedly improve resilience and make individual organisations less dependent upon a particular provider. But competition between monopolies does not constitute democratic ownership. Dividing an organisation’s dependency between Microsoft and Amazon may reduce the consequences of one supplier’s failure, but society remains a customer, not the owner, of its essential infrastructure. The basic relationship therefore persists.

Perhaps the most politically revealing feature of the November failure was accordingly the position occupied by governments themselves. Ministers could investigate the effects upon public services, engineers could cooperate with Microsoft, and officials could communicate the corporation’s assurances that the event was not a cyberattack. But governments themselves could not repair Microsoft’s infrastructure.

They had to wait for Microsoft to diagnose its network, implement repairs, and explain the failure. Governments commanding intelligence services, armed forces, and enormous administrative bureaucracies have nevertheless allowed essential components of their civilian communications systems to depend on infrastructure controlled by private technology corporations.

This dependence partly explains the growing discussion of “digital sovereignty”, particularly within Europe. Yet reducing European dependence upon American technology companies is not equivalent to establishing democratic control over technology. Replacing Microsoft with nationally favoured European corporations would merely reorganise private technological dependency along geographical lines.

Under conditions of increasing protectionism, economic nationalism and geopolitical conflict, the demand for technological sovereignty can readily become part of the struggle between competing capitalist states. Workers have no fundamental interest in choosing between American, European or Chinese technology monopolies. The question facing them is who owns and controls the infrastructure itself.

Government policy nevertheless remains confined to regulation. Every major technological breakdown produces the same declarations. Resilience must be strengthened, updates tested more carefully, contingency arrangements improved, suppliers diversified and lessons learned. Investigations are promised, and regulators consider modifications to existing market structures. Then another failure occurs.

The problem is not that technical failures can be permanently eliminated. Any sufficiently complex computing system will eventually experience hardware problems, programming errors, configuration mistakes or unforeseen interactions. Public ownership would no more abolish computer failures than public ownership of transport could abolish mechanical breakdowns.

The decisive question is who controls the conditions within which those failures take place. Who determines staffing levels, maintenance budgets and investment priorities? Who decides whether experienced engineers are retained? Who determines the level of redundancy built into critical systems? And who possesses the information necessary to investigate failures affecting millions of people?

Under the existing system, these questions are ultimately subordinate to corporate property. Microsoft’s engineers may possess immense technical expertise, but they do not determine Microsoft’s overall economic strategy. Decisions involving capital expenditure, employment and corporate priorities are conditioned by competition for markets, profitability and shareholder returns.

The contradiction therefore is not between competent engineers and unreliable technology. It lies between an immensely sophisticated collective productive apparatus and the social relations that control it. Digital networks are created and maintained through the labour of enormous numbers of people, yet decisive control over those networks remains concentrated within a tiny number of corporations.

The November breakdown belongs to a wider series of technological infrastructure failures. CrowdStrike in July 2024 demonstrated the international consequences of distributing a defective update across millions of computers. Amazon Web Services subsequently experienced major disruption, while Microsoft has suffered repeated service problems. The immediate technical explanations have varied considerably, but the underlying social relationship has remained remarkably consistent.

In each case, innumerable organisations depended upon technological infrastructure concentrated within a handful of companies. When something failed, customers depended on those companies to diagnose their systems, repair their infrastructure, and explain their failures. Corporate ownership survived while workers and the wider population absorbed the consequences.

This is why describing such events simply as “outages” is inadequate. The word isolates the immediate technical fault from the economic structure that gives it extraordinary social significance. A server malfunction is a technological event. Hundreds of millions of people becoming dependent upon the functioning of a relatively small number of privately controlled systems is a social relationship.

Cloud computing itself represents an extraordinary form of socialised production. Engineers, programmers, electricians, construction workers, semiconductor workers, scientists and telecommunications workers across numerous countries contribute to systems no individual corporation could have created independently of the accumulated development of modern science and technology.

The internet emerged from decades of scientific research and enormous public investment. Contemporary computing rests upon generations of work in physics, mathematics, telecommunications, semiconductor manufacturing and software engineering. Yet the resulting infrastructure confronts society as the private property of corporations.

Microsoft 365 expresses this contradiction starkly. Hospitals, courts, governments and businesses can communicate through interconnected networks spanning the globe. The technology demonstrates humanity’s extraordinary capacity to integrate productive and intellectual activity internationally. Yet a network change within one corporation can simultaneously interrupt those communications across national boundaries.

Capitalism has therefore created technological interdependence without creating democratic control over interconnected technology. Modern production and communication have taken on an increasingly international and social character, while ownership of essential infrastructure remains private and highly concentrated.

More careful testing, redundant systems, open standards and improved interoperability are all worthwhile. Governments, hospitals and other essential organisations plainly require reliable contingency arrangements when centralised systems fail. But these measures cannot answer the political question exposed by the events of 12 November.

Why should infrastructure upon which hospitals, courts, emergency services and governments depend be privately owned at all?

Microsoft’s technology is not the enemy, nor are the engineers who created and maintain it. On the contrary, the global communications systems operated by Microsoft and its competitors embody an extraordinary technical and social achievement. They show what internationally coordinated human labour and scientific development can produce.

The obstacle is subordinating this social achievement to private ownership. Essential digital infrastructure should instead be treated as a public utility, publicly owned and democratically controlled by the workers who build and maintain it together with the population that depends upon it.

Investment decisions could then be guided by social needs rather than corporate rivalry. Reliability, adequate staffing, redundancy, security and the preservation of accumulated engineering knowledge could become explicit social priorities rather than costs continually weighed against profit margins and investor expectations.

Such organisation cannot ultimately be achieved simply by nationalising one corporation within an otherwise capitalist economy. Digital infrastructure is already international. The workers producing it are international, the networks themselves cross borders, and the populations depending upon them extend across continents. The rational organisation of such infrastructure must therefore also assume an international character.

The November 2026 Microsoft outage demonstrated in concentrated form one of the central contradictions of contemporary capitalism. Humanity has created communications technology capable of integrating society on an unprecedented scale, yet control of that technology is increasingly concentrated within corporations accountable principally to private capital.

The solution is neither nostalgia for the world before cloud computing nor the nationalist project of replacing American monopolies with European or other national competitors. It is to bring ownership into conformity with the technology’s already social character.

Infrastructure society depends on should be collectively owned and democratically controlled. Until we resolve that fundamental contradiction, another massive technological failure will not be an inexplicable aberration. It will remain an ever-present possibility built into a system that has placed the increasingly interconnected infrastructure of social life under private monopoly control.

Bibliography

Al Jazeera. Heba Habib, “Microsoft hit by global outages: What happened and why?” 13 November 2026.

Competition and Markets Authority. Cloud Market Investigation: Final Decision Report. London: CMA, 2025.

Competition and Markets Authority. Update on Cloud Actions: Covering March–October 2026. London: CMA, 16 October 2026.

Competition and Markets Authority. Microsoft’s Business Software Ecosystem: Strategic Market Status Investigation. 2026.

CrowdStrike. Preliminary Post Incident Review: Windows Sensor Content Update. 2024.

Forbes. Kate O’Flaherty, “Microsoft Apologises for Outage and Reveals Cause.” 13 November 2026, updated 14 November 2026.

Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I. London: Penguin/New Left Review, 1976.

Marx, Karl. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. London: Penguin/New Left Review, 1973.

Braverman, Harry. Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.

Mandel, Ernest. Late Capitalism. London: New Left Books, 1975.

Noble, David F. Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Srnicek, Nick. Platform Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity, 2017.

Wu, Tim. The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010.

US House Committee on Homeland Security. Committee materials on the July 2024 CrowdStrike global IT outage. September 2024.

Sixty years since Cathy Come Home: Ken Loach’s indictment of the housing crisis has lost none of its force

On November 16, 1966, the BBC broadcast a 75-minute drama about a young mother driven into destitution by Britain’s housing shortage. Six decades later, record numbers of children are growing up in temporary accommodation, and the social order that produced Cathy’s fate remains in place.

On the evening of 16th November 1966, some 12 million people (a quarter of the UK population) were watching the Wednesday Play on BBC1 and saw Cathy Come Home. Jeremy Sandford wrote it, Tony Garnett produced it, and 30-year-old Ken Loach directed it. It’s the story of a young working-class woman going from a brief period of security to homelessness. It ends with her children being taken from her by the social workers in a railway station as she screams and writhes and the passers-by look on.

60 years on, that ending is not a historical footnote. The government’s own stats show that on 31st March 2026, 135,580 households in England were living in temporary accommodation (the highest ever recorded). Of those, 177,530 were children (another record, up 5% in the year). One in five families with children in temporary accommodation have been there for five years or more (one in three in London). In April, a parliamentary group reported that between April 2019 and March 2025, 104 children had died in England with temporary accommodation being a factor in their vulnerability, ill health or death. Of those 104, 76 were babies under one.

These are not the conditions of a society that had learned the lessons of Cathy Come Home. They are the conditions of a society that celebrated Cathy Come Home, set up all sorts of charities in its name, and then, over the next fifty years, systematically dismantled the modest gains achieved in the period that followed. The liberal framing of this anniversary is very telling. The “sixty years on and all we’ve really achieved is nothing” lament treats the continuing housing crisis as a mystery or a policy failure that some more enlightened government could have fixed. It isn’t. The housing crisis is not a failure of capitalism. It is a product of it.

A drama in the form of a documentary

It’s a very simple story, and that’s its strength. Cathy (Carol White) moves from the provinces to London where she meets and marries Reg (Ray Brooks), a lorry driver. For a brief period, they live in a fairly modern flat with all the paraphernalia of the postwar consumer boom. Reg gets injured at work, his wages cease, and the family are off down the dunny. They get evicted. They move into his mother’s overcrowded tenement flat, where tempers run high. They get rooms with a very kind old landlady and are then pushed out through the courts when she dies. They live in a caravan until the locals come over and attack the site. Then they’re in a derelict building. Eventually Cathy and the kids are put into a council hostel for the homeless. Husbands aren’t allowed there. The rules split up the family before force does.

Loach and Garnett had worked together on Up the Junction (1965), and in Cathy they went even further in defying the conventions of television drama. Much of it was actually shot on 16mm film on location with handheld cameras, real streets and real hostels. Union rules at the time meant that about ten minutes still had to be shot in the studio and spliced in. Over the images, Loach laid the voices of people experiencing homelessness that Sandford had recorded over many years of research, together with the rather dry pronouncements of officials. The film ends with a series of captions giving the bare statistics of the housing crisis.

The impact was absolutely staggering, and it caused real concern within the establishment. Critics were in no doubt that blending documentary with fiction was a form of deception, and that the viewer could not tell what was real. Underlying the complaint about the form was a complaint about the content. What the critics found so troubling wasn’t that Cathy was a fiction; it was that it was true. Every episode in the film drew on actual cases Sandford had documented. The welfare state the postwar Labour government had promised would look after its people ‘from cradle to grave’ was shown, in its day-to-day operation, to be a system that, in fact, penalised the poor for being poor.

The film’s real artistic achievement is that it doesn’t present Cathy and Reg as victims of their own shortcomings. They’re just ordinary, likeable, occasionally foolish young people. Nothing they do is in any way to blame for what happens to them. Each step down results from an external force: an injury, a landlord, a rule, a waiting list, a rent they can’t pay. The middle-class viewer who wanted to believe that homelessness was the inevitable fate of drunks and wasters had that belief completely eradicated.

This is what gives the film its enduring power. It doesn’t present homelessness as some individual’s misfortune or moral failing. It shows it as something the system does to people, the result of the system’s machinery in action (the landlord, the court, the council official, the hostel regime). Cathy is absolutely part of the great current of British art of that period: the realist tradition of the late 1950s and 1960s, when a whole generation of writers and filmmakers turned their attention to the pressing social issues of the day. As the WSWS pointed out in 2010, Loach “first came to prominence in the late 1960s with television work such as Cathy Come Home“. It is the most complete example of what that tradition could achieve in a mass medium.

What followed, and what was taken back

Shelter was founded on 1st December 1966, just a couple of weeks after the broadcast. It was a planned organisation, but it rode the wave of public outrage the film generated. The crisis returned in 1967, with the play performed again, taken up in Parliament, and discussed for years. It’s frequently credited with helping bring about the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977, which for the first time placed a legal obligation on local authorities to house certain categories of homeless families.

It would be a mistake to think the TV play shifted housing policy through moral suasion. Cathy came out at the height of the postwar boom, when a militant working class could still be expected to win concessions from the ruling class. Council house building was at its peak. Housing completions in Britain actually peaked in 1968 at over 400,000. The changes of that period resulted from the balance of class forces rather than any particularly enlightened policy by politicians.

When that balance was upset, they took back the concessions. Thatcher’s Right to Buy (1980) saw some 2 million council homes sold off in England, and councils were effectively prevented from using the proceeds to build new homes. New Labour under Blair and Brown continued the process via stock transfers and a reliance on private developers. The Conservative-Lib Dem coalition after 2010 froze housing benefit, introduced the bedroom tax and cut council budgets right across the board. The most horrific example of what decades of neglect of the working-class tenant had led to was the Grenfell Tower fire in June 2017, which killed 72 people.

The Labour government elected in 2024 promised to build 1.5m homes by 2029. They’re not on track. Their National Plan to End Homelessness (which only emerged in December 2025 after a very long delay) contains no assurance that the social housing required to end homelessness will actually be built. Their flagship £39bn programme targets around 300,000 social and affordable homes over the next decade, of which some 180,000 would be for social rent. That’s a very small proportion of what is required, and it’s spread over ten years. The freeze on Local Housing Allowance (the cap on housing benefit for private renters) was maintained in the Autumn Budget 2026, despite clear warnings from homelessness charities that this would push more and more families out of their homes.

Meanwhile, councils across England are now spending nearly £3bn a year on temporary accommodation. A significant portion of that goes to private landlords and hotel operators to house families in single rooms, often some way from their schools, their jobs and their families. The social workers who looked after Cathy’s children have all been replaced by ‘out of area placements’ and for many families the result is the same.

What’s changed in the last 60 years isn’t the crisis per se but the framework in which the crisis exists. The post-war social democratic settlement, which was the very context of Cathy Come Home and which the film implicitly sought to appeal to, is gone. Council housing has been sold off, rent controls have been removed, and housing has become a financial asset class. The crisis that Cathy Come Home first exposed in embryo has been generalised.

The limits of a perspective

The film’s makers were not neutral observers. Garnett and Loach were drawn towards revolutionary socialist politics in the years after Cathy, and their later collaborations, such as Days of Hope (1975), written with Jim Allen, dealt directly with the betrayals of the Labour leadership. Loach has remained the most consistently socially critical filmmaker Britain has produced, from Kes (1969) to I, Daniel Blake (2016) and The Old Oak (2023).

The WSWS have repeatedly acknowledged the seriousness and integrity of this body of work from Kes through to Riff Raff, My Name is Joe, I, Daniel Blake, The Navigators and I and Route Irish. David Walsh’s 2010 review of Route Irish said Loach had stood out in the rather dismal cinematic landscape of the previous 30 years. His political journey has also shown the limits of an approach that pressures Labour and the state into doing the right thing. He founded Left Unity in 2013, backed Corbyn’s leadership from the outset and was kicked out of the Labour Party in 2021 under Keir Starmer. The party he had so passionately encouraged working people to put their faith in has, in fact, turned on him and, in office, has seen record levels of child homelessness.

Loach’s political perspective has remained anchored to the Labour Party and the trade union bureaucracy, the very institutions that, in office, presided over the destruction of the housing stock his films document. His 2013 documentary The Spirit of ’45 expressed this most clearly. It looked back on the Attlee government’s nationalisations and council housebuilding with nostalgia, as a lost golden age to be restored rather than a period whose limits the following decades exposed. Stefan Steinberg’s review on the WSWS argued that the film revealed Loach’s “very serious and even fatal limitations.” A return to 1945 cannot solve the housing crisis, because the reforms of 1945 were themselves concessions made within capitalism, and capitalism has spent the decades since clawing them back.

This attitude also appears in Cathy Come Home itself. The film’s anger is directed at the bureaucracy, the rules and the sheer indifference of the officials. The closing captions are, in effect, a plea to the government to build more houses. That was a legitimate and very valid demand in 1966. The film doesn’t ask why, in one of the richest countries in the world, housing should be treated as a commodity and a source of profit rather than a social right.

To the Guardian, on the film’s 50th anniversary in 2016, Loach said more people than ever wanted a home. Back in 1966, there was still council housing; now there is only the market, and the market has failed. That description of the state of affairs is spot on. The diagnosis is a bit off. From the point of view of the developers, landlords, and financial investors who own housing in Britain, the market has not failed in the least. Rents and house prices are at record levels, and housing is one of the most profitable assets in the economy. The market is working perfectly, as designed. It has failed the working class.

This was Engels’ point in The Housing Question (1872) in direct opposition to the petty-bourgeois reformers of his day who thought they could solve the housing question within the existing order. He showed that the housing shortage was a product of the capitalist mode of production: the subordination of land and shelter to the pursuit of profit, rising rents, and the periodic clearance of working-class districts to make way for commercial development. As long as the capitalist mode of production exists, then “it is sheer folly to hope for an isolated solution of the housing question”. Only its abolition could make a real solution possible. That analysis is just as valid in 2026 as it was in 1872 or 1966. Every gain won within the system is only temporary and is easily reversed, as the last 60 years have so clearly demonstrated.

A film for today

Cathy Come Home has not lost an iota of its power. The images of a young family being shuffled from room to hostel to the street, of a mother having her children taken from her because she has no place to live, are just as potent in 2026 as they were in 1966. The technique remains remarkable in its urgency, its complete lack of sentimentality, and its use of real voices to cut through the fiction.

The real lesson of Cathy Come Home at 60 is not so much that nothing has changed as why that is the case. Housing is still a commodity. The parties that profess to be the voice of the working people have, in fact, served the property-owning class in office. The working class have not yet forged the independent political force which could take housing out of the market. Over 177,000 children in England today have no home at all. The solution isn’t a better charity or a more compassionate government. The solution is socialist expropriation of banks, landlords, and property developers, and the conversion of housing from a source of profit to a social right.


Bibliography

The film

Cathy Come Home. Dir. Ken Loach. Writ. Jeremy Sandford. Prod. Tony Garnett. The Wednesday Play, BBC1, first broadcast November 16, 1966.

The Spirit of ’45. Dir. Ken Loach. 2013.

Books and articles

Cooke, Lez. British Television Drama: A History. London: BFI Publishing, 2003.

Engels, Friedrich. The Housing Question. 1872. Various editions, including Marx/Engels Selected Works, Vol. 2.

Fitzpatrick, Suzanne, and Hal Pawson. “Fifty Years since Cathy Come Home: Critical Reflections on the UK Homelessness Safety Net.” International Journal of Housing Policy 16, no. 4 (2016): 543–555.

Fuller, Graham, ed. Loach on Loach. London: Faber and Faber, 1998.

Garnett, Tony. The Day the Music Died: A Life Behind the Lens. London: Constable, 2016.

Hill, John. Ken Loach: The Politics of Film and Television. London: BFI/Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Sandford, Jeremy. Cathy Come Home. London: Pan Books, 1967.

Steinberg, Stefan. “What filmmaker Ken Loach makes of The Spirit of ’45.” World Socialist Web Site, 2013; republished March 26, 2023.

Walsh, David. “Ken Loach’s Route Irish: the Iraq war comes home.” World Socialist Web Site, October 21, 2010.

Whitehouse, Lisa. “Are there any ‘deserving poor’ anymore?” Southampton Law School Blog, April 1, 2026.

Official statistics and reports

All-Party Parliamentary Group for Households in Temporary Accommodation / Shared Health Foundation. Child Mortality in Temporary Accommodation. April 2026.

Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee. England’s Homeless Children: The Crisis in Temporary Accommodation. House of Commons, 2025.

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. National Plan to End Homelessness. December 11, 2025.

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. Statutory Homelessness in England: January to March 2026. Published August 13, 2026.

Press and campaign sources

Big Issue. “Everything you need to know about Labour’s homelessness strategy.” 2025.

Big Issue. “104 children’s deaths linked to living in temporary accommodation: ‘We should be outraged’.” April 2026.

Big Issue North. “Preview: Cathy” (on Cardboard Citizens’ adaptation and Loach’s 2016 Guardian interview). December 2016.

Jeraj, Samir. “How homeless children die.” New Statesman, April 26, 2026.

Puddicombe, Stephen. “50 years on, Ken Loach’s Cathy Come Home is as powerful as ever.” Little White Lies, November 16, 2016.

Shelter. “Number of children homeless in England highest since records began.” Press release, August 13, 2026.

Philippines: Poverty, Big Tech and the sextortion economy

Sextortion, image-based sexual abuse and the online exploitation of children are spreading fast across the Philippines. They grow out of mass poverty, a labour-export economy and the profit drive of the tech monopolies, and Manila’s political establishment has neither the will nor the means to stop them.

Over the past decade, the Philippines has become one of the main centres of a global trade in sexual blackmail. In its most common form, a perpetrator wins a victim’s trust online, gets hold of intimate images, then threatens to send them to family, friends or employers unless the victim pays money or hands over more material. Images are sometimes obtained by deception, sometimes recorded in secret, and increasingly faked outright with artificial intelligence.

The victims are Filipino and foreign: schoolchildren in the provinces, young women blackmailed by former partners, overseas workers, and teenage boys in Britain, the United States and Hong Kong. The crimes are carried out on Facebook, Messenger, Instagram, WhatsApp, Telegram and TikTok. Some of the richest corporations on earth own the platforms.

The arrests reported in the Philippine press this year give only a glimpse. A man in Zamboanga City was arrested in February for blackmailing a former girlfriend with explicit photographs. The National Bureau of Investigation arrested another man in January for leaking intimate videos to coerce an ex-partner. A woman overseas Filipino worker (OFW) was targeted by a sextortionist shortly after landing at Ninoy Aquino International Airport. In March, police in Manila arrested a suspect accused of extorting foreign nationals online.

The Foundation for Media Alternatives (FMA), which tracks technology-facilitated gender-based violence, documented 52 cases in the first half of 2026 alone. It noted that reports rose in the opening months of the year. It covers only cases that reach the foundation. The real figure is many times higher. Shame, family pressure to protect the household’s reputation and distrust of the police keep most victims silent.

A generation targeted

Children and adolescents bear the brunt. The Disrupting Harm in the Philippines study was published in 2022 by ECPAT International, Interpol and UNICEF’s Office of Research-Innocenti. It surveyed internet-using children aged 12 to 17. One in five said they had suffered grave forms of online sexual exploitation and abuse in the previous year, including blackmail into sexual acts and the sharing of their images without consent. Scaled to the population, the researchers estimated that as many as two million children were affected in a single year.

Where this abuse happened on social media, Facebook and Messenger accounted for more than 90 per cent of cases. Most cases Philippine authorities investigated were first reported by foreign police forces and NGOs, not detected at home.

UNICEF has estimated that 80 per cent of Filipino children are vulnerable to online sexual abuse. In 2016, it described the country as the global epicentre of the trade in live-streamed child sexual abuse. Its national study listed the conditions that make the country such fertile ground: widespread English, cheap access to phones and the internet, and well-established money-transfer networks built to serve the remittance economy. In some cases, it found, children’s own parents arranged the abuse.

A July 2025 report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime found that teenage boys are by far the largest target group in the recent surge of financial sextortion. Typically, criminals approach them through fake profiles posing as girls. The same report noted that the Philippines is home to criminals who run sextortion schemes against victims in other countries. Britain’s National Crime Agency made this point in a 2025 campaign aimed at boys. Government operations rescued 41 minors from online sexual abuse in January and February 2026 alone.

Blackmail runs like a call centre.

Sextortion in the Philippines is not mainly the work of lone individuals. Much of it is an organised industry, and it copies the labour discipline of the business process outsourcing (BPO) sector that dominates the country’s urban employment.

This became clear in 2014, when Philippine police and Interpol arrested 58 people in a crackdown on an international sextortion network. In Bicol, investigators found that the operations were disguised as call centres. The Bicol groups had also built their own payment arrangements, designed to be hard for the authorities to trace. A Hong Kong police official told Inquirer.net that almost all the sextortion cases in his territory could be traced back to the Philippines.

At the time, the national police chief called the Philippines the “sextortion capital of the world.” Interpol officials rejected the label, pointing out that similar operations existed elsewhere and that the Philippines had been singled out because Manila had requested cooperation. That point deserves to be stressed. The problem is not a Filipino national trait. It is what happens when a desperate, educated, English-speaking workforce is plugged into a global digital economy with few legitimate outlets.

The money flows through the same channels as the remittances of millions of OFWs. A 2023 study by the University of Nottingham’s Rights Lab found that money service businesses such as Western Union and PayPal remain the main payment routes in online child exploitation cases in the Philippines. The corporations that profit from the remittance trade have every incentive to keep that infrastructure fast, cheap and lightly policed.

The class roots of the crisis

The official discourse treats sextortion as a problem of individual morality, parental neglect or poor “digital literacy.” This conveniently ignores the social conditions that produce it.

The Philippines is a country where millions of workers survive on informal and precarious jobs. Millions more are exported abroad as domestic workers, seafarers and care workers because the domestic economy cannot employ them. Whole families depend on remittances. Phones and cheap data are everywhere, but decent jobs are not. In these conditions, criminal syndicates find no shortage of recruits, and abusers find no shortage of vulnerable targets.

The COVID-19 pandemic made everything worse. Under Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines imposed some of the longest and harshest lockdowns in the world, enforced by police and the military. Children were banned from public spaces such as parks and shopping malls and confined to their homes and their phones. At the same time, mass layoffs plunged millions of families into deeper poverty. Researchers and child welfare agencies agree that online sexual exploitation surged in this period, driven in part by job losses and economic hardship.

The overseas worker system adds its own vulnerabilities. Long separations break up families and relationships, and intimate communication moves online. Workers abroad and their partners at home become targets for blackmail, and the threat of exposure to an employer can mean the loss of a job on which a whole family depends.

The tech monopolies and the deepfake threat

The platforms through which this abuse is carried out are not neutral pipes. Meta, which owns Facebook, Messenger, Instagram and WhatsApp, built its fortune on maximising engagement and harvesting user data. Its business model depends on letting strangers connect with as little friction as possible. Facebook dominates internet use in the Philippines to the point that, for many, it is the internet.

These corporations spend vast sums on lobbying and public relations, and comparatively little on protecting the people who use their services in poorer countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Content moderation in Filipino languages has long been under-resourced. When Meta made end-to-end encryption the default on Messenger at the end of 2023, child protection organisations warned it would make abuse harder to detect. The company went ahead regardless.

Now artificial intelligence is adding a new dimension. Cheap tools can produce convincing fake sexual images of anyone from an ordinary photograph. In February 2026, Philippine child-rights groups warned of rising online child exploitation using AI tools. Victims no longer need ever to have shared an intimate image to be blackmailed or humiliated. The same technology companies racing to dominate the AI market, and pouring hundreds of billions of dollars into it, have shown little interest in the social consequences.

Laws on paper, poverty in practice

The Philippine ruling class points to its laws: the Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, the Safe Spaces Act of 2019 and the Anti-Online Sexual Abuse or Exploitation of Children law of 2022. Each was passed with fanfare. Neither has stemmed the tide.

The Cybercrime Prevention Act is telling. Its most vigorous use has been its online libel provisions, wielded against journalists and critics of the government. The police anti-cybercrime units are small and swamped. Courts are slow. Victims who come forward face a gruelling process, and many give up.

Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration has other priorities. It has thrown open the country to an expanded US military presence and is integrating the Philippines into Washington’s war preparations against China. Resources flow to the armed forces while public schools, social welfare and child protection services are starved. Arrests of individual blackmailers and periodic raids on “dens” make good headlines, but they leave untouched the conditions that keep recruits and new victims coming.

The sexual exploitation of Filipino children and young people is a crime of global capitalism. It is fed by the poverty created by decades of imperialist domination, by an economy organised around exporting cheap labour, and by tech corporations that profit from every click. Ending it requires more than awareness campaigns and tougher sentences. It requires that the vast resources monopolised by a tiny elite be used to guarantee every family secure, well-paid jobs, decent housing, free quality education and real social services.

It also requires that the social media giants be taken out of private hands and placed under the democratic control of the working class, so that they are run to meet human need rather than to maximise profit. That is a task facing workers in the Philippines, the United States, Britain, and around the world, who must unite across borders in the fight for socialism.

Sources

Podcast Episode: The Era of Trial by Social Media Comes of Age

Pip: Russell Brand is in prison, and freerein61 has written what might be the most carefully argued piece you will read about why that fact — whatever you think of it — should make everyone uncomfortable.

Mara: The episode covers one extended argument: what happens to democratic rights when accusation, amplification, and corporate punishment arrive years before a jury does. Let's start with the case itself and what it reveals about how guilt gets decided in public life.

The Era of Trial by Social Media Comes of Age

Pip: The central claim here is structural, not personal. The argument is that a new sequence has replaced the rule of law in public life — and that the replacement happened so gradually that most people have stopped noticing it.

Mara: The post sets out that sequence precisely. The concern is "the evolving political and legal context in which guilt is determined in public life, and the degree to which foundational democratic principles are being supplanted by a sequence of accusation, media amplification, corporate sanction, and only subsequently, judicial process."

Pip: So the order is inverted. Punishment first, trial later — sometimes years later. And by the time the jury speaks, the economic and reputational damage is already permanent.

Mara: That is exactly the stakes the post identifies. Search engines embed allegations in a person's permanent digital identity. Employment disappears. Contracts end. Even acquittal, as the Kevin Spacey case demonstrated, cannot restore what years of publicity removed. The post notes that the key institutional question shifts from what has been proven to what will happen to us if we are seen not to punish.

Pip: Which is a remarkably honest description of how reputational risk management works — and a fairly damning one.

Mara: The post draws on several historical cases to make the pattern visible. The Cliff Richard case, where a police search was broadcast before any charge was laid. Operation Midland, where allegations about a Westminster abuse network collapsed entirely and the accuser was eventually convicted. The Lucy Letby conviction, raised not to question the verdict but to argue that journalism must retain the capacity to scrutinise established narratives without that scrutiny being treated as morally illegitimate.

Pip: The Birmingham Six get a mention there too — a reminder that the campaigns that eventually overturned those convictions required exactly the kind of scepticism toward dominant narratives that the current media environment actively punishes.

Mara: On the class dimension, the post is direct: "precisely because workers lack wealth and institutional power, they require protection against state and corporate arbitrariness more urgently than society's privileged layers." A millionaire can retain solicitors and reputation managers. A worker facing an online accusation usually cannot.

Pip: And the attention economy makes this worse, not better. The post puts it sharply: the platform's economic logic collides directly with the deliberative requirements of justice. A jury must listen. An algorithm must engage.

Mara: The Online Safety Act 2023 enters the argument here — not as simple censorship, but as a regulatory framework that places the state in an increasingly expansive relationship with private platforms. The post is careful to say the concern is not that Ofcom officials directly police opinions, but that the infrastructure for doing so is being constructed, and that powers created to target unpopular defendants rarely remain limited to them.

Pip: The conclusion is unambiguous: an accusation is not a conviction, virality is not proof, and a society that lets corporations decide who may participate in public life will not produce democratic speech. Where that leaves us is squarely in the territory of who controls the infrastructure of communication itself.


Mara: The thread running through all of this is that democratic rights were never gifts — they were won through struggle, and they require active defense precisely when they are least popular to defend.

Pip: Next time, we will see where that argument goes when the crisis deepens. Stay with us.

The Era of Trial by Social Media Comes of Age

In defence of democratic rights

The recent incarceration of Russell Brand has been widely portrayed in the British media as the culmination of a prolonged public controversy. Regardless of personal opinions about Brand or views on the verdict, a broader issue emerges that transcends the specifics of this case. The central concern is the evolving political and legal context in which guilt is determined in public life, and the degree to which foundational democratic principles are being supplanted by a sequence of accusation, media amplification, corporate sanction, and only subsequently, judicial process.

The implications of the Brand case extend well beyond the individual. In the past decade, a form of extrajudicial punishment has emerged that can be described as trial by social media. Newspapers and broadcasters publish allegations, then social-media platforms rapidly disseminate them. Employers, publishers, advertisers, and technology companies impose economic sanctions, while parliamentary committees and politicians intervene. Commentators frequently call for institutions to sever ties with the accused as a demonstration of virtue. Frequently, these actions occur before any evidence is presented to a jury. This process inverts the traditional sequence associated with the rule of law: rather than investigation, charge, trial, verdict, and punishment, society is increasingly encouraged to accept accusation, publicity, punishment, and only later, potentially years afterwards, a trial. Such developments pose a significant threat to democratic rights.

The presumption of innocence

The presumption of innocence is often characterised as an outdated legal technicality, relevant only within the courtroom and irrelevant to broader society. In fact, it represents a fundamental historical principle: the state bears the burden of proving its case against the individual, who is not required to establish innocence before a potentially prejudiced public. British contempt law restrictions were partly instituted in recognition of this issue. Limiting prejudicial publication during active proceedings aims not to shield defendants from criticism, but to safeguard the integrity of the trial process. Jurors are expected to determine guilt based on admissible evidence presented in court, not on media headlines, edited television segments, or viral social media posts encountered before jury service. Digital communication has subjected this principle to unprecedented strain. Information is now instantly replicable across jurisdictions and remains accessible indefinitely. While a judge may instruct a jury to disregard inadmissible material, such directions cannot eliminate the effects of prolonged publicity from collective memory.

This transformation is both quantitative and qualitative. Traditional mass media wielded significant influence, yet publication was largely confined to identifiable newspapers and television networks, each subject to certain legal and editorial constraints. Social media introduces a vast apparatus for instantaneous content reproduction. A newspaper investigation can evolve into a television discussion, followed by thousands of clips, memes, posts, podcasts, reaction videos, and search results. Allegations become embedded in an individual’s permanent digital identity. The core issue is not the existence of public opinion on criminal cases, which has always existed, but the emergence of an industrial system that translates accusations into reputational and economic penalties before judicial determination. This explains the importance of corporate intervention. A private technology corporation taking action against someone’s ability to publish or earn an income is not equivalent to a jury returning a criminal verdict. The evidential standards differ, the procedures differ, and the opportunities for appeal may differ radically. Yet precisely this distinction has increasingly disappeared from public discussion. In the social-media age, corporations occupy positions once unimaginable for private enterprises. A handful of enormous companies control major infrastructures through which political argument, journalism, culture and entertainment circulate. Their moderation and monetisation decisions therefore have consequences that extend far beyond ordinary commercial relationships.

The risks are heightened when corporate decisions align with political pressures. Although the formal distinction between government and private platforms remains significant, democratic oversight is essential because decisions affecting public expression often arise from relationships more complex than direct government censorship. This issue has gained further prominence with the establishment of the British online-safety regulatory framework. The Online Safety Act 2023 imposes statutory obligations on social-media companies and search services regarding illegal content and child protection. According to government guidance, platforms have borne legal responsibilities for illegal content since 17 March 2025, and Ofcom holds enforcement powers that include investigations, substantial financial penalties, and, in the most severe cases of non-compliance, applications to the courts to block services.This legislation must be represented accurately. Ofcom states that its role is to ensure regulated companies implement systems to protect users from harms identified in the legislation, and its published guidance requires providers to assess illegal-content risks and establish appropriate safeguards. The political concern is not that Ofcom officials directly determine permissible online opinions, but rather that the state has established an increasingly expansive regulatory relationship with private corporations whose infrastructures mediate a substantial portion of modern public communication. This development warrants thorough democratic scrutiny, not complacency.

From Fleet Street to the algorithm

Trial by media is not new. British newspapers have damaged reputations for generations. Sensational reporting, moral panics, and politically motivated campaigns predate platforms like Facebook, X, YouTube, and TikTok. The primary change lies in the technological and economic infrastructure. While the traditional press produced newspapers on a daily cycle, digital platforms continuously monitor audience reactions and disseminate content through automated recommendation systems. Controversy acquires economic value because attention itself is monetised. Consequently, an accusation involving a celebrity becomes more than a news story; it generates content that can be perpetually reproduced across a vast ecosystem of professional journalism, amateur commentary, and algorithmically distributed material.

The commercial incentives are evident. Moral outrage sustains audience engagement, with each new allegation prompting additional cycles of reaction. Even denials generate further content, and every development can be repurposed into new programs, articles, or videos. As a result, capitalism has industrialised denunciation. However, this does not imply that allegations are inherently false due to media profit motives, nor does it suggest that individuals alleging abuse should remain silent. The fundamental point is that neither commercial profitability nor viral popularity should determine criminal guilt.

The lessons of previous media disasters

British history offers numerous warnings against disregarding this distinction. Sir Cliff Richard is a prominent example of the consequences of turning a police investigation into a televised spectacle. Police searched his home in connection with an allegation, and the event was broadcast widely. Richard was neither arrested nor charged, and his successful privacy case against the BBC illustrated the profound harm publicity can inflict before any judicial determination. The Metropolitan Police investigation known as Operation Midland serves as another cautionary example. Extraordinary allegations regarding an alleged Westminster abuse network were entertained and publicised, resulting in severe consequences for those accused. The eventual collapse of these allegations and the subsequent conviction of accuser Carl Beech demonstrated the significant costs incurred when institutional credulity and public certainty surpass evidentiary standards.The intention is not to suggest direct equivalence among these cases, as they differ substantially in their facts, investigations, and legal outcomes. The common thread is the caution against conflating accusation with adjudication.This warning remains relevant even when an individual is ultimately convicted. The principle of a fair trial derives its significance from its universality. Democratic rights must not depend on the prior sympathies of journalists, politicians, or the public. Rights that apply only to popular defendants are not genuine

The prosecution of Kevin Spacey exemplifies another aspect of this issue. Although his eventual acquittal in the London proceedings resolved the criminal charges before the jury, it could not restore his professional and reputational standing, which years of allegations and publicity had already damaged. This distinction is of considerable importance. The current media environment generates consequences that extend beyond judicial decisions: employment opportunities vanish, contracts are terminated, and access to cultural work is lost. Search engines permanently associate individuals’ names with allegations. Friends and professional associates may fear that maintaining contact could themselves become grounds for denunciation. Certain institutional responses may be justified, as organisations have obligations to employees and the public, particularly when credible allegations concern immediate safety. However, precaution and conviction are not synonymous. Failing to recognise this distinction encourages institutions to act primarily based on reputational considerations. The central question shifts from “What has been proven?” to “What will happen to us if we are seen not to punish?” This represents an extraordinarily dangerous foundation for public life.

The controversies surrounding Lucy Letby’s conviction show that the argument cannot be reduced to protecting celebrities accused of wrongdoing. Questions regarding media certainty are significant both before and after conviction. Once a high-profile criminal case becomes embedded in a dominant public narrative, challenging any part of it becomes extremely difficult. Journalists may have invested years in the story. Institutions have defended their actions through it. Politicians have commented on it. Documentaries, podcasts, and books have been commissioned around it. The financial and institutional interests generated by a major criminal narrative do not dissipate when the jury retires. This does not imply that any specific conviction is necessarily unsafe; only the appropriate judicial and review processes can determine that. Rather, it establishes a more fundamental point: journalism must retain the capacity to investigate potential miscarriages of justice without treating criticism of an established narrative as morally illegitimate.

The historic campaigns surrounding miscarriages of justice, from the Birmingham Six and Guildford Four onwards, demonstrate the importance of precisely such scepticism. The disorders following the killings in Southport in 2024 revealed another dimension of this transformation. Social-media communication became closely linked to debates about disorder, misinformation, criminal prosecution, and the legitimate boundaries of expression. No socialist can object to prosecuting genuine incitement to violence under the law. Freedom of speech has never entailed freedom from responsibility for criminal conduct. However, hateful or irresponsible expression should not erase the distinction between speech, incitement, and physical action. A broader risk is normalising exceptional procedures whenever politicians declare an emergency. Governments facing social crises often assert that extraordinary conditions necessitate extraordinary powers. However, powers created to address unpopular targets rarely remain limited to those groups. Legal and technological mechanisms established today may be employed in entirely different political contexts in the future. The working class should therefore evaluate every extension of state power not solely from the perspective of the government’s current target, but from the perspective of potential future applications.

Who possesses the microphone?

Advocates of social-media denunciation often characterise it as the democratisation of justice. From this perspective, established institutions historically silenced victims, while social networks now enable ordinary individuals to speak. This claim has some validity. Digital communication has undoubtedly allowed individuals to publish allegations and testimony without prior approval from newspaper editors or broadcasting executives. However, the theoretical ability to post content does not equate to possessing equal social power. The primary mechanisms of amplification remain profoundly unequal. Billionaire-owned media corporations employ professional newsrooms. Technology corporations control platforms through which vast audiences communicate. Governments possess press offices, police forces, and regulatory powers. Celebrities and corporations can purchase professional public-relations services. Ordinary workers possess nothing comparable. The worker subjected to harassment by a manager, victimised by an employer or injured because a corporation ignored safety measures does not ordinarily receive days of national broadcasting attention. Thousands of social grievances disappear almost completely from public discussion. What therefore presents itself as democratisation can conceal another hierarchy: everyone may speak, but only certain institutions possess the power to ensure that millions hear them.

The class content of democratic rights

For Marxists, democratic rights cannot be treated as gifts a benevolent state bestows on the population. They emerged historically through bitter struggles against arbitrary authority. The English Revolution challenged monarchical absolutism and generated unprecedented debates concerning sovereignty, representation and popular rights. The Levellers’ agitation demanded political equality beyond the objectives of much of Parliament’s propertied leadership. Later struggles for freedom of the press, trade-union organisation and universal suffrage were inseparable from the emergence of an increasingly self-conscious working class.

Chartism transformed democratic demands into a mass social movement. None of these struggles abolished class rule, but they established rights upon which subsequent working-class political and social organisation depended. This historical experience makes the fashionable dismissal of civil liberties particularly reactionary. The presumption of innocence, freedom of speech, public trials and procedural protections are sometimes derided as merely “bourgeois rights”. But precisely because workers lack wealth and institutional power, they require protection against state and corporate arbitrariness more urgently than society’s privileged layers. A millionaire can employ solicitors, barristers, reputation managers and political contacts. A worker hauled before a court or dismissed because of an online accusation usually cannot. One of the most politically damaging developments of recent years has been the tendency within affluent sections of the middle class to portray elementary principles of due process as obstacles to justice. The reasoning is fundamentally wrong. Abuse does not cease to be abuse merely because evidence must be demonstrated. Nor is somebody “silenced” because an allegation is investigated rather than automatically accepted as fact.

A serious response to sexual violence, exploitation or harassment requires properly funded investigative institutions, access to legal support, social provision for victims and judicial proceedings capable of establishing facts. Replacing those things with social-media denunciation does not strengthen the oppressed. It replaces legal proof with social power. And once social power decides guilt, the advantage inevitably passes to those possessing newspapers, money, political connections, corporate platforms and influence. The underlying transformation cannot therefore be understood simply as a decline in journalistic standards. Media organisations and technology platforms operate within definite social relations. Their overriding economic purpose is not to discover truth but to accumulate profit. Enormous corporate interests concentrate ownership, while relationships with governments, advertisers, and financial markets shape the environment in which editorial decisions are made. The attention economy intensifies these tendencies because outrage itself has become monetisable. Measured in clicks, views, subscriptions and advertising impressions, indignation can become a commodity. Complex evidence develops slowly; accusation travels instantly. Qualification is difficult to package; certainty generates reaction. A judicial proceeding may last months, while social-media judgement requires seconds. The platform’s economic logic therefore collides directly with the deliberative requirements of justice. A jury must listen. An algorithm must engage. Confusing the two is catastrophic.

War, austerity and democratic repression

These developments acquire their full significance only when placed within the wider crisis of capitalist democracy. Across Europe, governments confronting deepening economic inequality, military confrontation, collapsing public services and mounting social opposition are simultaneously expanding mechanisms for regulating political communication. The relationship is not accidental. A ruling elite preparing increasingly unpopular policies cannot depend indefinitely on popular consent. It therefore seeks ways to manage opposition, shape information, and delegitimise dissent. Measures introduced under apparently unobjectionable objectives can create legal and technological infrastructures with much broader applications.

The Online Safety Act 2023 itself illustrates the scale of the regulatory transformation. The Act received Royal Assent on 26 October 2023 and imposes new legal duties upon user-to-user and search services. Official guidance states that providers must implement systems and processes to address illegal content, while Ofcom establishes codes and has enforcement powers. The Act also formally recognises rights considerations. Government guidance states that Ofcom must consider users’ rights when developing measures and that providers themselves have corresponding duties regarding users’ rights. These provisions make it especially important that criticism remain precise. The political concern is not established by simply labelling all online regulation “censorship”. It concerns how regulatory powers operate in practice, how definitions develop, how corporate platforms respond to compliance incentives, and whether mechanisms designed to target genuinely illegal material can contribute to broader restrictions on lawful political expression. Such questions should be investigated, not assumed.

Because allegations against a famous and controversial individual evoke strong reactions, democratic principles matter. Defending due process for an accused person does not require admiration for that person. It does not require endorsing his politics, lifestyle, previous statements or public persona. And it certainly does not require indifference towards people alleging serious abuse. It requires only recognition of a foundational principle: a criminal allegation has to be proved. If that principle is abandoned whenever an accused person becomes unpopular, it ceases to exist as a principle. The socialist movement has historically defended democratic rights not because courts under capitalism are politically neutral institutions, but because limitations upon arbitrary state power provide essential conditions in which the working class can organise and fight. The same principle applies today to corporate power. A society in which banks can economically exclude individuals, platforms can erase audiences, employers can dismiss workers and media corporations can pronounce guilt before trial is not becoming more democratic because those institutions are technically private. Private concentrations of power can be as destructive of freedom as state bureaucracy, particularly when the two increasingly interact.

None of this diminishes the suffering caused by sexual violence or other serious crimes. Genuine accusations must be investigated. Evidence must be obtained. Witnesses must be heard and treated with dignity. Prosecutors must make decisions based on the evidence. Defendants must have access to the case against them and the opportunity to challenge it. Juries must determine guilt according to admissible evidence and the legal standard of proof. These are not bureaucratic obstacles standing between victims and justice. They are justice. Without them, society has only competing assertions backed by unequal amounts of money, publicity, and institutional influence. The answer to failures of the criminal-justice system is therefore not to replace courts with newspapers, parliamentary committees or technology companies. It is to fight for a genuinely democratic judicial system, adequately funded legal representation and independent investigation, while defending freedom of expression and the presumption of innocence.

The working class must defend democratic rights.

Ultimately, democratic rights cannot be safely entrusted to those whose social power increasingly depends on restricting them. The media corporations will not dismantle the profitable machinery of sensationalism. Technology monopolies will not voluntarily surrender their enormous power over communication. Governments will not renounce regulatory powers simply because those powers might someday be abused. Defending democratic rights therefore requires a social constituency whose interests fundamentally oppose arbitrary power. That constituency is the international working class. Workers require freedom of speech to organise politically. They require freedom of association to build organisations independent of employers and governments. They require the presumption of innocence and due process because they lack the money to insulate themselves against arbitrary prosecution. They require an independent press because the dominant media overwhelmingly articulates the interests and assumptions of the privileged layers of society. The struggle against arbitrary state and corporate power is consequently inseparable from the struggle against the capitalist social order that concentrates both economic wealth and control over communication in extraordinarily few hands. Trial by social media has reached maturity because the technological foundations of mass communication have developed far more rapidly than democratic control over them. Humanity has communications technology that gives billions of people unprecedented access to information, while ownership of the most important infrastructure remains concentrated in private corporations.

That contradiction cannot be resolved by demanding still greater power for billionaires to police their platforms, nor by handing governments unlimited authority over digital communication. It requires bringing the technological resources upon which modern social communication depends under genuine democratic control. The central principle must therefore remain uncompromising. An accusation is not a conviction. Popularity is not evidence. Virality is not proof. Corporate punishment is not due process. A parliamentary demand is not a judicial verdict. The rights won through centuries of struggle remain indispensable precisely because political reaction repeatedly presents their destruction as progress. A society that abandons the presumption of innocence in the name of protecting victims will ultimately protect neither victims nor defendants. A society that lets corporations decide who may participate in public life will not produce democratic speech. And a society accustomed to seeing punishment precede proof is being prepared for forms of political repression extending far beyond the sensational celebrity cases through which those methods have been normalised. The defence of democratic rights must therefore be taken out of the hands of media monopolies, technology corporations, and the capitalist state. It must become a conscious political struggle of the working class itself.

Bibliography and further reading

Legislation and official material

Contempt of Court Act 1981. UK Public General Act 1981 c.49.

Online Safety Act 2023. UK Public General Act 2023 c.50. The official legislation database provides the statutory text and records subsequent amendments. [legislation.gov.uk]

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, Online Safety Act: Explainer. The government’s account outlines the Act’s scope, platform duties and Ofcom’s regulatory responsibilities. [gov.uk]

Ofcom, Illegal Content Duties under the Online Safety Act, updated 25 June 2026. Particularly useful for distinguishing the actual statutory compliance regime from broader political arguments about censorship. [ofcom.org.uk]

Ofcom, Online Safety. Current regulatory material and guidance relating to implementation. [ofcom.org.uk]

Civil liberties, justice and the state

E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act. London: Allen Lane, 1975.

E. P. Thompson, Writing by Candlelight. London: Merlin Press, 1980.

E. P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays. London: Merlin Press, 1978.

John Rees, The Leveller Revolution: Radical Political Organisation in England, 1640–1650. London: Verso, 2016.

Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution. London: Temple Smith, 1972.

Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714. London: Nelson, 1961.

George Rudé, Wilkes and Liberty: A Social Study of 1763 to 1774. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.

Dorothy Thompson, The Chartists: Popular Politics in the Industrial Revolution. London: Temple Smith, 1984.

Media, capitalism and public communication

Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon, 1988.

Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity, 2017.

Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. London: Profile Books, 2019.

Dan Schiller, Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999.

Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication. London: Sage, 2009.

Christian Fuchs, Social Media: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage, 2014.

Robert W. McChesney, Digital Disconnect: How Capitalism Is Turning the Internet Against Democracy. New York: New Press, 2013.

From ‘Revolution’ to the Dock: The Political and Social Demise of Russell Brand

A verdict, and a political trajectory

On 5 November 2026, a jury at Southwark Crown Court convicted Russell Brand of one count of rape and three counts of sexual assault. The jury of eight men and four women, required by Mr Justice Bennathan to reach unanimous verdicts, acquitted him on two further counts of rape and one of attempted indecent assault. The convictions relate to offences committed between 2004 and 2009. The rape conviction concerns a 21-year-old woman whom Brand met after a performance in west London in 2009.

Brand, 51, denied every charge and was remanded in custody following the verdict. On 9 November, Mr Justice Bennathan sentenced him to 10 years and six months’ imprisonment. Brand must serve at least two-thirds of the sentence before becoming eligible for release.

In his sentencing remarks, the judge told Brand that as he became famous he had also become a“sexual predator”, and said that the offences demonstrated a disregard for women’s right to refuse sexual contact. The judge also stressed that the sentence concerned only the offences of which the jury had convicted Brand and that he disregarded allegations on which the jury had returned not-guilty verdicts. The Metropolitan Police have said that further allegations concerning Brand remain under investigation. Those allegations are separate from the convictions for which he was sentenced and have not been determined by a court.

The victims are entitled to lifelong anonymity, and this article does not cover their testimony. What concerns us here is the social and political figure: the man who, little more than a decade ago, was hailed in liberal circles as the voice of a disaffected generation, and whose political evolution subsequently carried him into the orbit of Tucker Carlson, Elon Musk and the Trump movement.

Brand’s trajectory is not merely a story of personal collapse. It is a concentrated expression of the bankruptcy of celebrity “anti-politics”, of the media industry that manufactured and protected him, and of the decay of a petty-bourgeois radicalism that rejected the working class as the conscious agent of social change. That Brand could travel in scarcely a decade from calling for “revolution” on BBC Newsnight to sharing platforms with figures associated with the American right is itself a devastating commentary on the politics he represented.

An honest accounting must also be made of the proceedings against him. When the allegations first became public in September 2023, following a joint investigation by The Times, The Sunday Times and Channel 4’s Dispatches, the World Socialist Web Site warned against trial by media and insisted upon the presumption of innocence. That principle did not entail declaring Brand innocent. It meant insisting that criminal guilt could be determined only through established judicial procedures in which allegations could be tested, and the accused could mount a defence.

That process has now taken place. Brand was charged, represented by senior counsel, tried before a jury over several weeks, convicted on some counts and acquitted on others. Each charge had to be determined according to the evidence relating to it. Whatever criticisms socialists must make of the capitalist state and judicial system, the proceedings themselves refute the crude contention circulated by Brand’s right-wing defenders that a fair trial was simply impossible in Britain.

The celebrity revolutionary, 2013–2015

Brand’s emergence as a political celebrity was facilitated by the very institutions that he professed to oppose. In October 2013, he guest-edited the New Statesman and, days later, sat opposite Jeremy Paxman on BBC Newsnight. Brand said he had never voted, denounced a political establishment subordinated to corporations, and spoke in favour of a “socialist egalitarian” society.

The interview was watched millions of times. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crash, years of austerity and the Liberal Democrats’ repudiation of their promises over university tuition fees, Brand’s denunciations struck a chord with many young people who saw nothing in the official political establishment that represented their interests.

Sections of the liberal media responded in an instructive way. Rather than seriously interrogating what Brand meant by revolution, parts of the press transformed him into a political phenomenon. Prospect included him among its “World Thinkers” in 2015. His book Revolution, published in 2014, became a bestseller. His YouTube series The Trews attracted a large audience, while his involvement in the struggle of tenants at the New Era estate in Hoxton against eviction by a US investment fund seemed to connect his rhetoric to genuine social opposition.

Yet the political content of Brand’s “revolution” was always profoundly confused. It combined elements of anarchism, Eastern mysticism, self-help and twelve-step recovery culture with hostility towards organised politics itself. Instead of calling for the construction of an independent political movement of the working class, he counselled abstention from conventional politics and elevated personal transformation and local direct action into substitutes for political programme, organisation and historical perspective.

Capitalism consequently appeared not primarily as a definite system of property and class relations, founded upon private ownership of the means of production and production for profit, but as a kind of spiritual and psychological disorder. Alienation might therefore be overcome through consciousness, authenticity, community action and individual awakening. Class in the Marxist sense, as an objective social relationship and the foundation of political organisation, virtually disappeared.

This perspective’s limitations were dramatically exposed within eighteen months. Days before the May 2015 general election, having previously encouraged his followers not to vote, Brand interviewed Labour leader Ed Miliband and urged support for Labour. The supposedly uncompromising rejection of establishment politics thus ended in an endorsement of the party of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, the Iraq War and the deregulated City of London.

The episode revealed something fundamental. Without a programme, historical analysis or class orientation, radical rhetoric could swing abruptly from denunciation of the parliamentary system to accommodation with one of its principal parties. The “revolution” had discovered the ballot box almost overnight.

From the ‘left’ to the far right

The Covid-19 pandemic accelerated Brand’s political evolution. His enormous online audience had originally been built through attacks on inequality, corporate power and the political establishment. Increasingly, however, these themes became entangled with scepticism concerning vaccination and public-health policies, alongside a growing preoccupation with vaguely defined “elites”, censorship and the “Deep State”. In 2022, his programme Stay Free with Russell Brand moved to Rumble, a video platform that became increasingly associated with conservative and right-wing online politics in the United States.

Some of Brand’s interventions still contained elements of genuine opposition to official policy, including criticism of the role of the United States and NATO in Ukraine. But these positions no longer fit within a coherent critique of imperialism or capitalism. Instead, opposition to war and corporate power increasingly coexisted with the themes and personalities of the American culture wars.

After the allegations against him emerged in 2023, Brand’s public political and personal identity shifted again. He converted publicly to Christianity, was baptised in 2024, and increasingly cultivated an audience among conservative Christians and supporters of the American right. He appeared with Tucker Carlson and became associated with political environments involving Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Turning Point USA.

The political distance travelled was considerable. A man once presented by sections of the British liberal establishment as the charismatic representative of anti-capitalist youth was now being welcomed by forces associated with Trump’s political movement. Yet this development should not simply be understood as a betrayal of a previously coherent socialist politics. No such politics existed to betray. Rather, Brand’s evolution exposed the inherent instability of his earlier outlook.

A politics that rejected the independent political mobilisation of the working class, interpreted complex social relations primarily through the actions of shadowy or corrupt elites, and elevated individual authenticity above programme and organisation possessed no reliable political compass. Its language of rebellion could therefore migrate remarkably easily between ostensibly left-wing and right-wing forms of populism. Under conditions of deepening social crisis, opposition to “the establishment” ceased to have any necessarily progressive content. Anti-politics became increasingly compatible with the politics of reaction.

The trial and the myth of the ‘political prisoner’

After the allegations became public, Brand increasingly portrayed himself as the victim of an establishment campaign directed against a dissident voice. Sections of the American right enthusiastically adopted this interpretation. Elon Musk publicly supported Brand after the allegations appeared in 2023. Tucker Carlson subsequently connected Brand’s predicament to his attacks on pharmaceutical companies, establishment institutions and Western policy towards Ukraine. After criminal charges were brought, Carlson presented the proceedings as politically motivated and questioned whether Brand could receive justice in Britain.

This campaign had little to do with a consistent defence of democratic rights. Brand had become a politically useful media figure, and his legal difficulties could therefore be incorporated into an existing narrative in which right-wing personalities and online influencers portrayed themselves as victims of an all-powerful liberal establishment. It was nevertheless necessary to reject the opposite position. Brand’s defenders’ politically reactionary arguments could not justify declaring him guilty before trial. Democratic rights cannot be defended selectively according to whether one approves of the accused.

That is why opposition to trial by media in 2023 was correct. The principle involved is elementary: allegations, however grave, are not criminal convictions. Guilt must be established through evidence tested before a court in proceedings in which the accused has the right to defend himself. The subsequent trial did precisely what Brand’s political defenders claimed could not occur. He was represented by experienced counsel and permitted to contest the allegations against him. His barrister urged the jury to distinguish between behaviour they might find personally objectionable and conduct proved to be criminal. The resulting verdicts show that the jury distinguished between the charges, returning both acquittals and convictions.

The claim that Brand was simply a “political prisoner” therefore cannot be sustained merely by asserting that he had become an opponent of establishment politics. His political opinions neither proved guilt nor provided immunity from criminal prosecution. Brand’s highly visible turn towards Christianity also became part of his new public identity. His appearances carrying a Bible and his repeated references to his faith fit neatly into the wider narrative of spiritual rebirth he had developed for his international audience. Whatever Brand’s personal beliefs, the political significance of this transformation is unmistakable. The former advocate of loosely defined spiritual revolution had reconstructed himself as a Christian dissident confronting what he and his allies described as a corrupt establishment.

The industry that made him

Any serious assessment of Brand must also examine the entertainment industry that created the conditions for his extraordinary celebrity. He committed the offences for which he was convicted while rising rapidly through British television and radio before moving into Hollywood. Brand’s deliberately provocative sexual persona was not incidental to this ascent. It became part of the commodity being sold. Broadcasters constructed programmes around his personality and cultivated the image of the uncontrollable celebrity provocateur. The commercial imperative was obvious: outrage generated attention, attention generated audiences, and audiences generated revenue.

The notorious 2008 BBC Radio 2 scandal involving obscene prank calls to the actor Andrew Sachs finally demonstrated that there were limits to what institutions could tolerate once controversy threatened the institution itself. But by then the mechanisms through which celebrity behaviour was indulged, normalised and monetised were already evident. Subsequent investigations into how concerns about Brand were handled raised broader questions about institutional culture and junior employees’ capacity to challenge powerful performers. The essential issue therefore cannot be reduced to the moral character of one celebrity.

This is where a socialist analysis must distinguish itself from the approach associated with the more affluent sections of the #MeToo milieu. In 2023, parts of the liberal media collapsed the distinction between accusation and conviction, turning the individual celebrity into the exclusive explanation for an entire institutional culture. Such an approach simultaneously threatens fundamental democratic principles and obscures the social relations that make abuses of power possible.

The hierarchical organisation of the entertainment industry places enormous influence in the hands of celebrities, executives and owners. Junior researchers, production workers, runners and other often precariously employed workers can find themselves dependent upon precisely those above them for continued employment and advancement. Celebrity itself is a commodity. Once corporations have invested substantial amounts of money in a profitable personality, enormous commercial incentives arise to preserve that personality’s market value.

The phenomenon is therefore not reducible simply to “bad men”. It involves structures of wealth, employment, power and dependency embedded within the entertainment business itself.

Brand’s later political evolution also cannot be separated from the economics of alternative online media. Digital media has created a lucrative market in permanent outrage. The successful influencer must continually produce novelty, controversy and conflict to maintain engagement. Audiences are encouraged to regard conventional journalism as inherently dishonest, while the influencer’s personality becomes the principal guarantee of truth. Grievance consequently becomes a business model.

Within this economy, every criticism can be framed as censorship, every institutional sanction as persecution, and every controversy as further confirmation that the dissident personality threatens powerful interests. Brand did not merely participate in this media economy. Increasingly, it shaped his public identity.

The lessons

The rise and fall of Brand contains political lessons extending far beyond one individual. The social anger he expressed in 2013 was genuine. Millions of young people had experienced the consequences of the financial crash, austerity, declining living standards, war and extreme concentrations of wealth. They confronted an official political culture seemingly incapable of articulating any alternative. That alienation has certainly not disappeared.

But Brand demonstrated precisely why such anger cannot be entrusted to celebrities, however charismatic, nor channelled through a politics that substitutes personality, lifestyle and authenticity for an understanding of class, history and political organisation. The extraordinary ease with which Brand travelled from the pages of the New Statesman to the political environment surrounding Tucker Carlson demonstrates the instability of celebrity anti-politics. A vague denunciation of corrupt “elites” does not constitute socialism.

Capitalism is not simply the rule of dishonest politicians, greedy bankers, pharmaceutical corporations, media executives or secretive bureaucracies. It is a historically developed social system based upon definite class relations and the private ownership of society’s productive forces. Without understanding this, opposition to capitalism can be redirected endlessly from one supposed enemy to another without ever confronting the social foundations of exploitation.

There is another lesson. It was correct in 2023 to oppose trial by media and insist upon the presumption of innocence. That principle does not disappear because a defendant subsequently proves unpopular, nor does it become retrospectively mistaken when a jury eventually returns guilty verdicts. The principle has now been tested through the judicial process. Brand faced criminal charges, contested those charges and was acquitted on some while being convicted on others. To continue to portray the verdict itself as sufficient proof of a political conspiracy is not a defence of democratic rights. It attempts to transform political sympathy for an individual into immunity from the ordinary requirements of criminal law.

Brand’s political career began with a genuine social phenomenon: mass disgust with inequality, official politics and the consequences of the capitalist crisis. But celebrity radicalism proved incapable of providing any way forward. The working class requires no prophets manufactured by the entertainment industry. It requires a political perspective grounded in the accumulated historical experience of the international workers’ movement and an organisation capable of uniting workers across national, racial and religious divisions against the capitalist system itself.

Brand once offered “revolution” without class, programme or party. What remained after the rhetoric had evaporated was the individual personality itself. That was always the fundamental weakness. And it was ultimately the political trajectory the project contained from the beginning.

Bibliography

Books and primary material

Brand, Russell (2014), Revolution. London: Century.

BBC Newsnight (2013), Jeremy Paxman interview with Russell Brand, broadcast 23 October 2013.

New Statesman (2013), issue guest-edited by Russell Brand, 24 October 2013.

Russell Brand: Comedy, Celebrity, Politics (2016). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Socialist and political commentary

Scripps, Thomas (2023), “Media mob lynches comedian and actor Russell Brand over sexual assault allegations”, World Socialist Web Site, 21 September 2023.

McRedmond, Finn (2023), “We have lost Russell Brand”, New Statesman, 7 March 2023.

McRedmond, Finn (2025), “Russell Brand’s transatlantic trial”, New Statesman, 30 May 2025.

Prospect (2015), “World Thinkers 2015: Russell Brand”, 16 February 2015.

News reports: allegations, charges and right-wing response

Mediaite (2023), “‘I Support Russell Brand’: Elon Musk gives full-throated backing”.

Salon (2023), “Right-wing conspiracists flock to support Russell Brand”, 20 September 2023.

Mediaite (2025), “Tucker Carlson calls on Trump to ‘rescue’ Russell Brand”.

NPR (2025), “Russell Brand pleads not guilty to rape, sexual assault charges in U.K.”, 30 May 2025.

PBS NewsHour/AP (2025), “Russell Brand pleads not guilty to charges of rape and sexual assault”.

Variety (2026), “Russell Brand’s rape trial delayed to October”.

News reports: verdict and sentencing

CNN (2026), “Actor and comedian Russell Brand found guilty of rape and sexual assault”, 5 November 2026.

Al Jazeera (2026), “Russell Brand found guilty of rape and sexual assault by UK court”, 5 November 2026.

The Hollywood Reporter (2026), “Russell Brand found guilty of rape and sexual assault at London trial”, 5 November 2026.

NPR (2026), “From comedian to convicted rapist: What to know about Russell Brand”, 5 November 2026.

CNN (2026), “Hiding in plain sight? Russell Brand’s conviction poses tough questions for UK entertainment industry”, 8 November 2026.

NPR (2026), “Russell Brand to learn sentence after being found guilty of rape and sexual assault”, 8 November 2026.

NBC News (2026), “Russell Brand awaits sentencing as he faces ‘significant’ prison time”, 9 November 2026.

Old Trafford’s 4–4: The Death Throes of a Giant Club

Sunday’s eight-goal draw between Manchester United and Aston Villa was billed as a classic. It was better understood as a symptom. A club that generates more than half a billion pounds a year now sits in the relegation zone, while its supporters protest against the owners who have bled it for more than two decades.

Manchester United, 20-time champions of England, went into the November international break in 18th place after drawing 4–4 with Aston Villa at Old Trafford on Sunday afternoon. The team has won once in ten league games and has gone eight league matches without a victory. It dropped into the bottom three on Saturday for the first time in 40 years, entering Sunday’s match in 19th place. The draw lifted United to 18th, with eight points from ten matches, its lowest position at that stage of a top-flight season since 1986–87, when the club stood 20th.

The match itself was a study in disintegration. Alysson scored for Villa after 59 seconds, and Nicolas Jackson added a second in the fourth minute. Bruno Fernandes converted a penalty in the 16th minute before Youri Tielemans equalised for United shortly before half-time. Within eight minutes of the restart, Villa led 4–2 after a John McGinn penalty and a goal from Leon Goretzka. Only stoppage-time goals from Joshua Zirkzee in the 92nd minute and Patrick Dorgu in the 96th rescued a point.

The sporting press has treated the comeback as a possible reprieve for manager Michael Carrick, who told reporters that he expected to remain in charge. In a testy exchange with a Sky Sports interviewer, he replied: “You’re telling me what you think, aren’t you?” Within weeks, however, he may become the latest in a long line of managers sacrificed to protect the people who actually own and run the club.

The real story was in the stands. Before kick-off, supporters released green-and-gold balloons, the colours associated with Newton Heath, the railway workers’ club from which United developed. They were answering a call from the supporters’ group The 1958 to protest against the Glazer family and minority co-owner Sir Jim Ratcliffe, and to boycott spending inside the stadium. A separate call had been made for a walkout in the 21st minute, marking 21 years of Glazer ownership, but the walkout did not materialise. The pre-match protest did. Supporters unfurled a banner declaring, “We don’t want a new stadium, we want the owners out,” and chanted against both the Glazers and Ratcliffe.

It was the second such protest in a week. At the Champions League match against Roma on Tuesday, fans threw green-and-gold balloons and tennis balls onto the pitch, briefly halting play, and police arrested three people. The owners can leave the ground. They cannot absent themselves from the crisis they have created.

A club turned into a financial instrument.

The decline of Manchester United cannot be explained by bad signings, a poor coach or a shortage of “winning mentality,” the explanations favoured by television pundits. It stems from the club’s transformation, over the past three decades, into a vehicle for accumulating private wealth.

In 2005, the Florida-based Glazer family bought United in a takeover valuing the club at approximately £790 million. The acquisition was structured as a leveraged buyout, with approximately £525 million of acquisition debt ultimately loaded onto the club. In effect, United was made responsible for financing its own purchase. Money that could otherwise have been invested in the team, stadium, workforce, or community was instead consumed by interest payments, financing costs, and shareholder dividends. 

When the Glazers looked for outside investment, they did not sell the club. In February 2024, Sir Jim Ratcliffe, the petrochemicals billionaire behind INEOS, completed a deal worth about £1.3 billion for an initial 25 per cent stake and gained control of football operations. Additional investment later increased INEOS’s stake to nearly 29 per cent. The Glazer family nevertheless remained the majority owner. Ratcliffe, a prominent Brexit supporter who moved his tax residence to Monaco in 2020, was portrayed in much of the media as a Mancunian saviour who would restore the club to its proper place. 

The opposite has happened. Ratcliffe’s arrival did not end Glazer ownership. It shored it up. The family retains majority control, while the INEOS administration has subjected United to sweeping cost reductions: jobs have been eliminated, staff benefits withdrawn and ticket prices increased. Even sections of the organised support that initially viewed Ratcliffe as a possible alternative to the Glazers are now protesting against both ownership factions.

Workers and supporters pay the bill.

The club’s accounts for the year ending 30 June 2026 tell the story. United reported record revenue of £677.6 million and an operating profit of £22.6 million. Yet it still recorded a net loss of £43 million, compared with a £33 million loss the previous year. This was the club’s seventh consecutive annual loss.

United’s broader debt burden, when historic borrowing, revolving credit and outstanding transfer payments are combined, has been reported at approximately £1.15 billion. This comprises around £578 million in historic debt, £200 million drawn on its revolving credit facility and approximately £375 million owed in outstanding transfer fees. The club borrowed a net additional £90 million after the end of the financial year while financing its summer recruitment programme. The £1.15 billion figure must therefore be understood as a composite debt total, rather than £1.15 billion in conventional bank loans.

The cost of balancing these books has fallen heavily on the club’s employees. Over the two years to 30 June 2026, United’s permanent workforce fell from 1,127 to 805, a reduction of 322 jobs, or 28.6 per cent. Staffing in the club’s media department fell by about 45 per cent, and in its commercial department by about 44 per cent. Administrative and related departments, including ticketing, lost 161 positions, while football operations, including scouting and academy coaching, lost another 60.

Earlier rounds of cuts closed the employee canteen at Old Trafford and ended free hot lunches for ordinary staff, replacing them with fruit at the stadium. At Carrington, non-playing staff were offered reduced soup and bread, while first-team players continued to receive full meals. Executives described such measures as necessary to restore financial stability. For cleaners, administrators, ticket-office staff, media workers, and other affected employees, they meant diminished conditions or lost livelihoods.

Supporters, many of them working people from Manchester and the surrounding towns, have been hit by repeated ticket-price increases. Meanwhile, United spent £191.7 million on summer player acquisitions, including agents’ fees and Premier League levies. The club also incurred compensation costs tied to managerial changes, including the departure of Ruben Amorim, contributing to its ongoing losses.

On top of this comes the plan to replace Old Trafford, home to the club since 1910, with a proposed 100,000-seat stadium nearby. Designed by Foster + Partners, the project has been presented as the centrepiece of a wider regeneration scheme. Its initial estimated construction cost is about £2 billion, although the final cost and financing arrangements remain unsettled. The club has already spent £63.5 million acquiring a 25-acre parcel of land for the development. 

The commercial purpose is clear: to increase revenue per match through greater capacity, premium seating, hospitality, sponsorship, naming rights and associated development. Whatever the final financing structure, supporters and employees have every reason to expect that the costs will be recouped through higher prices, increased commercialisation and further demands for “efficiency.”

The protests and their limits

The anger in the stands is genuine and justified. The documented grievances advanced by the 1958 and associated supporter groups include the ownership structure, rising debt, the demolition or abandonment of Old Trafford, ticket policies, declining standards and what they regard as the erosion of traditional match-going culture.

But the perspective that guides these protests cannot resolve the crisis. The demand is that the Glazers sell up and, increasingly, that Ratcliffe go too. Sell to whom? In the world of the Premier League, the only buyers with the billions required are other financial oligarchs, private-equity organisations or sovereign wealth funds such as Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, which controls Newcastle United. Each new owner is greeted as a potential liberator. Each has bought the club as an asset serving financial, commercial or geopolitical purposes.

The green and gold of Newton Heath has become a protest symbol, but its significance goes deeper than nostalgia. Workers associated with the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway founded the club in 1878. Like dozens of English clubs, it grew out of the working-class communities created by the industrial towns. Those roots have been progressively severed by the transformation of football, accelerated by the founding of the Premier League in 1992, into a global entertainment industry dependent upon television rights, corporate sponsorship and speculative capital.

Balloon releases and spending boycotts express that anger, but they leave the underlying property relations untouched. The task is not to find a better billionaire. It is to connect the struggle of supporters with that of the workers whose jobs and conditions are being destroyed at United and throughout the economy.

A sport owned by the few

United’s fall is not an aberration. It is the most visible expression of what the profit system does to everything it touches. A game created and sustained by working people has been turned into a commodity, its clubs into tradable assets, and its supporters into revenue streams to be priced, divided, and squeezed.

The same logic that closes the staff canteen at Old Trafford closes hospitals, schools and factories across Britain. The same financial oligarchy that buys football clubs dominates the economy and dictates policy to governments, Labour and Conservative alike.

Sunday’s chaotic draw may buy Michael Carrick a few more weeks. It will not save Manchester United from its owners. Football can be returned to those who play and watch it only as part of a broader struggle to place society’s resources under the democratic control of the working class, organised to meet human need rather than private profit.

Sources

  1. ESPN match report and confirmed scoring chronology [espn.com]
  2. Aston Villa official match report [avfc.co.uk]
  3. Manchester United official match report [manutd.com]
  4. Sky Sports: Carrick expects to remain in charge [skysports.com]
  5. ESPN: ownership protest and failed 21st-minute walkout [espn.com]
  6. The People’s Person: The 1958 protest call and Roma arrests [thepeoplesperson.com]
  7. Manchester United official 2026 financial results [ir.manutd.com]
  8. Manchester United 2026 annual-report page [ir.manutd.com]
  9. Report on workforce reductions and combined debt [tvcnews.tv]
  10. The Guardian: closure of the Old Trafford staff canteen [theguardian.com]
  11. Place North West: £63.5 million stadium-land purchase [placenorthwest.co.uk]
  12. The Independent: the Glazer leveraged buyout and United’s debt [independent.co.uk]
  13. Sky Sports: Ratcliffe’s original minority investment [skysports.com]
  14. AFP report: Ratcliffe’s stake increased to nearly 29 per cent [news18.com]

Grenfell Britain: An insider’s indictment that stops at the threshold of socialism

A record of class contempt

The forthcoming Grenfell Britain: Greed, Power and a National Tragedy by Emma Dent Coad promises to be a powerful indictment of the social relations that produced the Grenfell Tower fire and of the political establishment that has denied justice to its victims ever since. Dent Coad stands in a unique relationship to the events. She was elected Labour MP for Kensington only four days before the fire of 14 June 2017, lived close to the tower and had already spent years as a councillor opposing the policies pursued by the Conservative-controlled Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The publisher presents the book as both an act of witness and an examination of what Grenfell reveals about Britain as a whole.

That starting point is entirely justified. Grenfell cannot be understood as an isolated building failure or even as the product merely of individual corruption, bureaucratic incompetence and corporate dishonesty. Seventy-two people died in a disaster whose essential conditions had been created over decades through deregulation, privatisation, attacks on council housing, cuts to fire services and the subordination of elementary human needs to property speculation and corporate profit. The final Grenfell Tower Inquiry report acknowledged that every death was avoidable and documented extensive failures extending through government, construction companies, manufacturers and the institutions supposedly responsible for protecting residents.

The term that best describes these processes was supplied nearly two centuries ago by Friedrich Engels: social murder. In The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845), Engels used the concept to describe how society knowingly places workers in circumstances that prematurely destroy their lives and then permits those circumstances to continue. The concept matters because it rejects attempts to separate individual catastrophes from the social order that produces them. The World Socialist Web Site applied this analysis to Grenfell immediately, and the Anatomy of the Grenfell Tower fire address delivered at the Socialist Equality Party’s August 2017 public meeting traced the disaster through the interconnected processes of deregulation, austerity, property speculation and the degradation of social housing. [wsws.org]

Evidence since then has vindicated that assessment. The inquiry’s final report found what the World Socialist Web Site described as “systematic dishonesty” among companies connected with the refurbishment, including efforts to manipulate testing, misrepresent data and conceal the dangers associated with products used in the tower. At the same time, government departments had failed over many years to respond adequately to warnings about combustible materials on high-rise buildings. [wsws.org]

What makes Dent Coad’s intervention potentially valuable is that she approaches these processes not as an outside commentator but as somebody who witnessed the extraordinary gulf separating two Kensingtons. On one side stand enormous concentrations of property wealth, luxury housing and some of the richest households in Britain. On the other are council tenants, low-paid workers and families struggling for decent housing in what the publisher itself describes as a broader housing crisis. The publicity for Grenfell Britain explicitly connects the disaster to unsafe housing, empty luxury developments and the continuing domination of housing policy by wealth and privilege.

Grenfell exposed this class divide with almost unbearable clarity. Residents had repeatedly warned of the dangers confronting them. The Grenfell Action Group’s warnings before the fire are now notorious. The failure was therefore not principally one of insufficient knowledge. Those with institutional authority possessed warnings and evidence, while those without power were treated as troublesome obstacles. As the inquiry’s own findings later showed, avoidable danger coexisted with corporate cost-cutting and government failure.

This is precisely why Grenfell cannot be reduced to the language of “lessons learned”. The facts point towards something far more fundamental: a social order in which the accumulation of private wealth takes precedence over the safety and dignity of working people. The facts Dent Coad assembles point towards a conclusion the working class of Grenfell had already reached by bitter experience.

The limits of the parliamentary perspective

The fundamental political problem posed by Dent Coad’s account, however, is the contradiction between the devastating character of the evidence and the parliamentary Labour framework within which its author has historically operated. Grenfell does not simply indict Conservative politicians, corrupt companies or an unusually callous local authority. It raises an unavoidable question about the Labour Party and the entire political system through which capitalist interests have been defended.

Dent Coad’s personal record of opposition to Kensington and Chelsea Council deserves serious treatment. But individual sincerity cannot resolve the historical problem Labour itself represents. Grenfell took place after decades in which Conservative and Labour governments successively deregulated the economy, expanded the power of private capital, facilitated the financialisation of housing and subordinated local government to austerity and market mechanisms. In its assessment of the inquiry report, the World Socialist Web Site noted that the inquiry itself identified governmental failures stretching through both Conservative and Labour administrations, while failing to impose genuine political accountability on the leading figures responsible. [wsws.org]

Jeremy Corbyn’s experience is decisive in this respect. Corbyn’s election as Labour leader generated enormous expectations among workers and young people who saw his leadership as a chance to reverse decades of Blairism, austerity and war. Yet the political orientation remained centred upon transforming the Labour Party and achieving social change through Parliament rather than constructing an independent revolutionary movement of the working class. Grenfell itself exposed the consequences of this orientation.

The World Socialist Web Site repeatedly warned that Labour’s participation in the government-established Grenfell Inquiry risked subordinating popular demands for justice to institutions incapable of providing it. A 2018 report on a Justice4Grenfell meeting noted that Dent Coad participated alongside figures from the trade-union movement in pressuring the official inquiry and existing institutions. Another WSWS assessment in 2019 argued that Labour and its allies were legitimising an inquiry that could not itself establish criminal liability. [wsws.org]

The issue was never whether individual Labour politicians genuinely sympathised with the bereaved or regarded the conduct of the council and corporations with disgust. The more fundamental question was whether justice could be secured through the very state institutions responsible for maintaining the economic and political structures that produced Grenfell. It could not.

The 2019 general election supplied another bitter lesson. Dent Coad lost Kensington after having secured the historically Conservative constituency in 2017. But Labour’s defeat cannot seriously be explained simply through electoral arithmetic. Corbyn’s leadership retreated repeatedly before Labour’s right wing and refused to mobilise the enormous movement that had emerged around his leadership in a political struggle against the party’s Blairite apparatus. The result was not the transformation of Labour into an instrument of socialist politics but the preparation of conditions for restoring the party’s openly pro-business leadership. Grenfell therefore poses the question that parliamentary reformism cannot answer: what happens when the institutions the working class is told to appeal to are themselves structurally integrated into the defence of capitalist property and political power?

After the Inquiry: Where is the justice?

The publication of the final Grenfell Tower Inquiry report in September 2024 demonstrated the dimensions of this contradiction. It identified extensive failings and corporate wrongdoing, yet years after the disaster, criminal accountability had still not followed. The Grenfell Tower fire public inquiry’s final whitewash noted that the inquiry had no power to determine criminal or civil liability and that, when the report appeared, the Metropolitan Police had not arrested or charged anyone in connection with the disaster.

The subsequent After the Grenfell Fire inquiry: Where are the arrests? drew out the political implications. Its central argument was that Grenfell involved identifiable decisions made under conditions in which profit and commercial advantage were treated as more important than working-class safety. The inquiry documented regulatory failures, corporate dishonesty and the ability of private businesses to exploit a weakened regulatory regime, yet justice remained deferred. [wsws.org]

This continued under the Labour government elected in 2024. The final inquiry report appeared under Keir Starmer’s premiership. Starmer apologised on behalf of the British state and said that the disaster should never have happened. Still, the response did not overturn the basic conditions that had allowed political responsibility to be evaded. The WSWS noted at the time that the government promised to consider the inquiry’s recommendations, while accountability through prosecutions remained unresolved.

There could be little more devastating evidence of the inadequacy of the proposition that institutional exposure automatically produces justice. Grenfell has been investigated, reconstructed, analysed, documented and memorialised. Parliamentary statements have been delivered. Political apologies have been issued. Thousands of pages of inquiry evidence have entered the historical record. Yet the fundamental issue raised by the bereaved and survivors from the outset remains. Justice has not followed automatically from truth. Nor has the housing crisis that gave rise to Grenfell disappeared. Indeed, the publicity for Dent Coad’s forthcoming book makes precisely this argument. Grenfell Britain is promoted as asking why, if Grenfell failed to change everything, the conditions surrounding housing inequality and insecurity remain embedded in British society.

This is the question the book must ultimately confront. But the answer cannot finally be found by demanding that the existing political establishment behave differently. The persistence of the conditions exposed at Grenfell is not simply a failure of political will. It expresses social interests.

Grenfell and the logic of capitalism

Housing under capitalism possesses a fundamental contradiction. For the working class it is a basic social necessity. For capital, it is property, an investment, an asset class, and a source of rent, interest, and speculative wealth. In London this contradiction reaches grotesque proportions. Homes exist simultaneously as places where human beings must live and as financial instruments whose profitability may depend on restricting supply, increasing rents, or maximising land values.

Public housing represented, however partially and inadequately, an intrusion of social need into this logic. This is why its destruction became a central component of the neoliberal offensive associated with the Thatcher governments and why subsequent administrations never reversed that offensive. Council estates sitting upon enormously valuable London land occupy territory whose potential exchange value is regarded by developers, banks and investors as being squandered when it provides secure and affordable accommodation to working people. Grenfell stood at the geographical centre of this social antagonism.

The disaster therefore cannot be answered by regulatory rearrangement alone, necessary though rigorous safety regulation unquestionably is. Regulations operating within a society dominated by private profit are under continual pressure from the corporations they regulate. Housing remains shaped by the power of landowners, banks, developers and construction conglomerates. Local authorities operate amid financial constraints imposed from above. Governments of every political colouration insist that the commanding heights of economic life must remain privately owned.

This is why the concept of social murder remains indispensable. It shifts attention from individual wickedness towards the social structure that continuously reproduces conditions in which preventable suffering becomes normal. That does not absolve individuals or corporations of responsibility. On the contrary, those responsible for criminal conduct must be held accountable. But prosecution, however necessary, cannot by itself eliminate the economic system that generates the same conflict between private profit and social need in another form.

What is to be done

The great merit of Emma Dent Coad’s proposed indictment is therefore also the source of the political questions it must raise. If Grenfell demonstrates the consequences of corporate greed, political cowardice and class privilege; if successive governments allowed conditions to emerge in which working-class lives could be subordinated to commercial interests; if official investigations can document devastating evidence without automatically producing justice; and if the housing crisis persists after all the pledges that Grenfell must never happen again, then what conclusion follows?

Britain cannot need merely better politicians administering the same economic system. The necessary conclusion is a break with Labourism and every conception that the machinery of capitalist government can gradually be transformed into an instrument for abolishing the power of capital. The working class requires its own independent political movement, organised internationally and armed with a socialist programme. In Britain, this means building the Socialist Equality Party as the British section of the International Committee of the Fourth International and developing independent organisations of working-class struggle that can challenge the authority of the trade-union and Labour bureaucracies.

Housing must cease to be organised primarily as a vehicle for private accumulation. The major property interests, construction conglomerates and financial institutions upon which the housing system depends must be brought under democratic public ownership and workers’ control. Housing construction, maintenance and fire safety must be planned according to social need and scientifically established standards, not the profitability requirements of investors and contractors. Vast social resources must be directed towards building high-quality council housing and making existing homes genuinely safe. That would not constitute an administrative modification of capitalism. It would mean an attack upon capitalist property relations themselves.

Grenfell’s residents did not lack warnings. They did not lack intelligence. They did not lack determination. They did not lack evidence. Long before the fire they understood the danger facing them, and after the catastrophe survivors, relatives and residents refused to allow the dead to disappear beneath official condolences and public-relations exercises. What they lacked, and what the working class continues to lack, is political power.

Grenfell’s enduring significance lies here. The tower stands not merely as the site of a terrible disaster but as an indictment of an entire social order. No inquiry report can resolve that indictment, because the decisive question lies beyond any inquiry’s jurisdiction: which class controls society, and in whose interests are its immense resources organised? The answer to social murder is not another promise that capitalism will regulate itself more carefully. It is socialism.

Bibliography

Dent Coad, Emma. Grenfell Britain: Greed, Power and a National Tragedy. London: Verso, forthcoming 8 June 2027. The publisher description presents the book as an examination of Grenfell’s legacy and Britain’s continuing housing crisis. [penguinran…mhouse.com]

Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. 1845.

Scripps, Thomas. Anatomy of the Grenfell Tower fire. World Socialist Web Site, 22 August 2017. [wsws.org]

Scripps, Thomas. After the Grenfell Fire inquiry: Where are the arrests?. World Socialist Web Site, 12 September 2024. [wsws.org]

Stevens, Robert. Grenfell Tower fire public inquiry delivers its final whitewash. World Socialist Web Site, 4 September 2024.

Stevens, Robert. Labour and unions seek to corral social anger over Grenfell fire behind official inquiry. World Socialist Web Site, 20 June 2018. [wsws.org]

Stevens, Robert. Grenfell fire anniversary used by pseudo-left to boost Labour and Corbyn. World Socialist Web Site, 17 June 2019. [wsws.org]

Stevens, Robert. Grenfell Tower to be dismantled: Why is there still no justice?. World Socialist Web Site, 11 February 2025. [wsws.org]

Podcast Episode: The Bluesky Scammers Are the New Yahoo Boys

Pip: Fraud follows users the way spam follows email — and freerein61's latest piece for A Trumpet of Sedition asks why that keeps happening no matter which platform we flee to.

Mara: The post traces online fraud from Nigeria's Yahoo Boys to Southeast Asia's scam compounds to Bluesky's phishing wave last October — and argues the thread connecting all of it is economic, not technological.

Pip: Let's start with the Bluesky attack itself and what it reveals about who the scammers actually are.

The Bluesky Scammers and the Economy Behind Them

Mara: The starting point is a phishing campaign that hit Bluesky on 17 October — compromised accounts pushing a fake government payment, and a platform scrambling to contain it.

Pip: The scale is concrete. Agent Sky's independent analysis of Bluesky's public moderation stream recorded 3,896 reversed account takedowns between 17 and 19 October alone, coinciding with the incident.

Mara: And that sits inside a platform growing fast — Bluesky went from 25.94 million to 41.41 million users in 2025, nearly 60 per cent growth. More users, more surface area for fraud.

Pip: So the phishing attack is the headline, but the post is really asking a harder question: why does this keep regenerating everywhere?

Mara: The argument is structural. The post draws a direct line to Nigeria's Yahoo Boys — not as a racial explanation, but as an economic one. It quotes the doctoral research of Tolulope Lembola Ojolo, who interviewed 29 Yahoo Boys across Lagos, Ibadan and Ado-Ekiti and identified "poverty, unemployment, corrupt political leadership and law enforcement, the failure of vital social institutions, and the proliferation of internet services as conditions that combined to facilitate cybercrime."

Pip: That list is doing real work. Nigeria's 2022 Multidimensional Poverty Index found 133 million people — 63 per cent of the population — multidimensionally poor. The headline unemployment figure is 7.2 per cent, but informal employment runs at 92.7 per cent. The number hides the precarity underneath.

Mara: The post is careful to say social explanation is not moral absolution. The victims — particularly young people targeted by sextortion, with verified links to more than 40 suicides across North America, Australia and the UK — have an unqualified right to protection.

Pip: And then the post moves to Southeast Asia, where the scam economy has gone fully industrial — compounds combining internet fraud with human trafficking, with the UN estimating 120,000 people potentially held in Myanmar alone, forced to run scams.

Mara: The post also covers how this pattern reached Bluesky specifically. Romance scams, pig-butchering schemes, impersonators targeting artists — NBC News flagged a rapid increase in December 2024. Editor Rob Bignell documented fake beta-reader and editor profiles targeting writers in July 2026. Writers and illustrators working precariously are exactly the population fraud preys on.

Pip: One insecure layer of the workforce turned against another. That's the mechanism the post keeps returning to.

Mara: And moderation alone cannot close that gap. User-submitted reports on Bluesky rose 54 per cent between 2024 and 2025. "Misleading" content accounted for 43.73 per cent of reports in 2025. The platform expanded to roughly 100 moderators during 2024 — a year it received 6.48 million reports.

Pip: The post's conclusion is that policing symptoms has repeatedly failed because the conditions reproducing the problem — mass insecurity, concentrated wealth, precarious employment — remain untouched.

Mara: What it calls for is democratic control over communications infrastructure and economic reorganisation around social need. That's the argument the title is pointing toward all along.


Pip: So the Bluesky phishing wave is a symptom, and the Yahoo Boys are a historical chapter in a much longer story about what poverty does to the internet.

Mara: And what the internet does to poverty. The next episode will tell us whether the platforms or the underlying conditions move first.