The Bluesky Scammers Are the New Yahoo Boys

The fraud networks preying on Bluesky users are not an aberration confined to one social-media platform. From Nigeria’s Yahoo Boys to the trafficking compounds of Southeast Asia, online fraud has developed alongside an economic order that produces mass insecurity and poverty while transforming the internet into another arena for private enrichment.

On 17 October, Bluesky acknowledged that a phishing campaign had compromised more than 4,500 accounts. The attack spread posts promoting a fake government payment. The company temporarily suspended compromised accounts while attempting to secure them and restore access to their owners. [thehackernews.com],

The scale of the aftermath is evident in an independent analysis of Bluesky’s public moderation stream. Agent Sky recorded 3,896 reversed account takedowns between 17 and 19 October. The researcher cautions that the moderation data do not themselves establish why each account was restored, although the exceptional increase coincided with the phishing incident. The episode was only the most visible manifestation of a problem that has grown alongside the platform.

Fake support accounts, impersonators, romance scams and investment fraud have followed users onto Bluesky. In December 2024, NBC News reported a “rapid increase in scam activity”, including romance and so-called pig-butchering scams. In March 2025, Bluesky Safety warned of scammers impersonating Bluesky and its staff while approaching artists through direct messages and attempting to move them off the platform. The potential target population has grown dramatically. According to the company’s 2025 Transparency Report, Bluesky grew from 25.94 million to 41.41 million users that year, an increase of nearly 60 per cent.

The comparison with the Nigerian “Yahoo Boys” is apt, although not in the manner suggested by racialised representations of Nigerian cybercrime. The fundamental connection is neither nationality nor ethnicity. It is the growth of an international economy of fraud alongside poverty, precarious employment and extraordinary concentrations of wealth.

What produced the Yahoo Boys

The Yahoo Boy phenomenon developed in Nigeria during the formative period of popular internet use in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The name reflected the importance of Yahoo and Yahoo Mail to early internet communications. Fraudsters exploited email for advance-fee scams, fabricated inheritances and other schemes. Over the ensuing decades, the methods expanded into romance scams, business fraud and financial sextortion.

The consequences for victims can be devastating. Statistics maintained by the Canadian Centre for Child Protection show a pronounced predominance of boys and young men among identified victims in the sextortion reports and requests for assistance it receives. An investigation by CBC Marketplace reported in October 2025 that it had verified more than 40 suicides across North America, Australia and the UK during the previous four years that were linked to sextortion, including five in Canada.

The social-media companies themselves have revealed something of the scale. In July 2024, Meta announced that it had removed around 63,000 Instagram accounts in Nigeria that had attempted to engage in financial sextortion. Among them was a coordinated network of approximately 2,500 accounts that the company linked to a group of around 20 individuals. Meta said that the coordinated network principally targeted adult men in the United States, though some accounts also attempted to target minors.

Explaining the social origins of such criminality is not an excuse. Where children and young people are subjected to financial sextortion, there can be no ambiguity about the destructive character of the crime. But moral denunciation by itself explains nothing about why the phenomenon has developed on such a scale.

Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and has enormous natural resources. Yet its official 2022 Multidimensional Poverty Index found that 133 million people—63 per cent of the population—were multidimensionally poor. Older claims that youth unemployment exceeded 50 per cent should no longer be repeated without substantial qualification, as Nigeria later changed its labour-force methodology. The National Bureau of Statistics reported unemployment of 7.2 per cent among 15-to-24-year-olds in the second quarter of 2023. But this headline figure hardly captures whether people have secure, well-paid work.

The same survey reported informal employment at 92.7 per cent, time-related underemployment at 11.8 per cent, and a youth NEET rate of 13.8 per cent. These statistics point to a social reality far more complex than an unemployment rate alone can reveal: enormous numbers of people classified as employed remain in informal and precarious economic circumstances.

Academic research has likewise placed Nigerian cybercrime within a broader social crisis. A doctoral investigation by Tolulope Lembola Ojolo at the University of KwaZulu-Natal conducted in-depth interviews with 29 Yahoo Boys across Lagos, Ibadan and Ado-Ekiti. The research identified poverty, unemployment, corrupt political leadership and law enforcement, the failure of vital social institutions, and the proliferation of internet services as conditions that combined to facilitate cybercrime. Some interviewees rationalised their activities as redistribution or retaliation for Africa’s historical exploitation through slavery and colonialism.

Such rationalisations do not transform fraud into anti-imperialism. The pensioner whose savings are stolen or the teenager subjected to financial blackmail bears no responsibility for colonial oppression. But the testimony reveals how social desperation can be refracted through a reactionary ideology in which exploiting another ordinary person is represented as revenge against the system. The result is not resistance to exploitation but its reproduction at another level.

The con moves to Bluesky.

As Bluesky attracted users leaving established social networks, fraud followed the migration. NBC News reported in December 2024 that scammers were using established romance and pig-butchering methods familiar from other platforms. Artists and writers have become targets. In July 2026, editor Rob Bignell documented what he described as the proliferation of supposed beta-reader and editor profiles targeting authors on Bluesky. He described profiles using similar approaches and said he had traced a number of the suspected scams to Nigeria, including through accounts on freelancing sites and suspicious LinkedIn identities. His investigation is an individual case study rather than a systematic measurement of fraud across the platform. Still, it illustrates how established forms of online fraud can be adapted to particular online communities.

The targets themselves are revealing. Writers, illustrators, editors and freelancers increasingly work under conditions of insecurity, competing for readers, commissions and contracts in a cultural economy being reorganised by digital platforms and artificial intelligence. Fraud preys upon the hope of a break. Somebody’s search for readers, professional recognition or employment becomes the scammer’s opening. One insecure layer of the international workforce is turned against another. Bluesky’s own statistics demonstrate the pressures created by rapid expansion. User-submitted moderation reports rose from 6.48 million in 2024 to 9.97 million in 2025, a 54 per cent increase. “Misleading” content accounted for 43.73 per cent of reports in 2025.

The October 2026 phishing attack provides another perspective. Agent Sky’s examination of the public moderation stream counted 76,772 account takedowns between 21 September and 20 October but no application of Bluesky’s “scam” label to accounts over the same period. The analysis recorded just nine “impersonation” labels. These figures come from an independent analysis, not statistics published by Bluesky itself, a distinction that should be maintained.  But the underlying contradiction goes beyond warning labels. Social networks depend upon enormous populations communicating with minimum friction while simultaneously confronting organised actors seeking to exploit precisely that openness.

Fraud becomes an industry.

The Yahoo Boys represent one historical and predominantly decentralised manifestation of online fraud. In Southeast Asia, however, the fraudulent economy has assumed something approaching an industrial form.

Enormous scam compounds have emerged in which criminal organisations combine internet fraud with human trafficking and forced labour. In 2023, the United Nations Human Rights Office reported that credible sources indicated at least 120,000 people across Myanmar might be held in situations where they were forced to conduct online scams, while estimates for Cambodia were around 100,000. Laos, the Philippines and Thailand were also identified as destination or transit countries.

This phenomenon demonstrates the contradictory character of the international scam economy. Among the people committing fraud are willing participants, but others have themselves been trafficked and coerced into criminal activity. Research published by Asia Times in April 2026 described the experience of a trafficked worker who reported working 15-hour days, seven days a week, simultaneously conducting multiple conversations with prospective victims. The account described an organised division of labour in which different workers established contact, cultivated targets and extracted payments.

A 2026 UN report also documented torture, sexual abuse and forced labour within scam centres. It reported that survivors described severe economic pressures before their recruitment and that some police and border guards were alleged to have been complicit. Here the language of individual criminality becomes insufficient. A person sitting behind a keyboard may be perpetrating fraud against someone thousands of miles away while simultaneously being coerced by the organisation controlling the compound. Recognising that reality does not minimise the harm inflicted upon the person being defrauded. It reveals the extraordinary social relationships through which contemporary cybercrime operates.

The revenues are enormous. Guardio, citing Chainalysis, estimated $17 billion stolen across cryptocurrency scams in 2025, while saying pig-butchering scams grew by nearly 40 per cent year on year. Separately, the Associated Press reported a UN estimate that losses from scams in Asia during 2023 were between $18 billion and $37 billion. Governments have responded with raids, criminal prosecutions and geopolitical pressure. On 13 October 2026, a Chinese court sentenced three members of the Wei family criminal organisation to death for their roles in a criminal network operating in Myanmar’s Kokang region. Another three were given life sentences, and 55 received prison terms of varying lengths.

But suppressing individual organisations does not abolish the economic conditions sustaining the industry. Research published in Asia Times described how infrastructure remained after supposed closures and argued that operations driven out of one location could reopen elsewhere. The same article cited estimates placing annual scam revenue in Cambodia at $12.9 billion in 2023, roughly 40 per cent of the country’s GDP.

The platforms and the limits of moderation

The same contradiction appears at platform level. There is extensive evidence that technology companies are aware of the growth of financial sextortion and organised internet fraud. The Network Contagion Research Institute documented the circulation of instructional materials, scripts and videos facilitating financial sextortion and described Yahoo Boys as playing a major role in the extraordinary expansion of financial sextortion targeting minors.

The scale makes moderation immensely difficult. In June 2026, Snap said it was enforcing against about 220 suspected sextortion instances per day, or roughly 6,600 per month globally, counting both proactively identified cases and alleged violations reported by users. The company published these figures specifically while disputing the decontextualised circulation of an earlier figure claiming 10,000 user reports of sextortion each month.

Bluesky faces the same problem on a smaller scale. Its moderation operation was expanded to roughly 100 moderators during 2024, a year in which its moderation service received 6.48 million reports. The company also increased automation, which reduced processing times but could produce false positives requiring subsequent human involvement and appeals. Bluesky’s decentralised architecture distinguishes it from some older social-media companies, but a different technical architecture cannot abolish the social relationships the technology operates within. A decentralised network connecting millions of people still exists within a world characterised by poverty, private wealth, commercial competition and economic insecurity.

Nor can the struggle against fraud justify unlimited surveillance. The existence of criminal exploitation cannot provide a blank cheque for states and corporations to impose universal identification or monitor legitimate political communications. Protection from fraud and defence of democratic rights must not be presented as mutually exclusive. Technology does not exist outside society. Neither do the criminals who exploit it.

The new Yahoo Boys

To describe the Bluesky scammers as “the new Yahoo Boys” therefore requires precision. It cannot mean that fraudulent accounts appearing on Bluesky are necessarily Nigerian, still less that fraud reflects some characteristic peculiar to Nigerians or Africans. The historical significance of the Yahoo Boys lies elsewhere. They represented an early manifestation of a criminal economy that has subsequently become international, technologically sophisticated and, in the Southeast Asian scam compounds, increasingly industrialised.

The form continually changes. The advance-fee email becomes the romance profile. The romance profile becomes the fraudulent cryptocurrency opportunity. Individual scammers operate alongside large criminal organisations commanding labour forces measured in the thousands.

The platform changes too. Yahoo Mail, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat and now Bluesky become different territories across which fraudulent activity migrates. What persists beneath technological change is an international social crisis that provides both vulnerable targets and a continual supply of people who can be recruited, voluntarily or coercively, into the scam economy.

The individual fraudster remains responsible for deliberate harm. Social explanation cannot become moral absolution. But individual morality alone cannot explain mass social phenomena. When similar criminal industries continually regenerate across different continents, platforms and technologies, the question necessarily becomes social. Police operations can arrest perpetrators. Platforms can remove fraudulent accounts. Stronger security can prevent particular phishing attacks. Human moderation can disrupt individual networks. These measures matter because they can prevent concrete harm.

What they cannot do is abolish the conditions continually reproducing the problem. The experience of the Southeast Asian compounds exposes this most starkly. The worker carrying out the online fraud may have been recruited through fraud. The person sending deceptive messages about fictitious employment, investments or relationships may himself have answered a deceptive advertisement promising legitimate work. Capitalist social relations can therefore transform the deceived into the deceiver and the exploited into an instrument for exploiting somebody else.

Romanticising the scammer is not progressive. The victims, particularly young people subjected to sextortion, have an unquestionable right to protection and justice. But neither is anything gained by transforming the Yahoo Boy into a racialised foreign menace whose existence supposedly expresses an exclusively Nigerian pathology. The phenomenon tells us considerably more about the world economy.

A global problem requires a global answer.

Online fraud reveals one of contemporary society’s sharpest contradictions. Humanity possesses communications technology capable of overcoming geographical isolation on a historically unprecedented scale. Yet this infrastructure has developed within societies characterised by staggering disparities of wealth and opportunity. The internet can connect the unemployed Nigerian graduate, the precarious British illustrator, the American teenager and the trafficked worker in a Cambodian compound instantaneously.

Capitalism determines the social circumstances under which they encounter one another. Too often that encounter becomes another relationship of exploitation. The answer cannot be nostalgia for an imaginary internet before fraud, nor continual migration from one commercial platform to another. Users moved to Bluesky. Fraud followed them.

Working people need both secure digital communications and democratic control over the infrastructure upon which social and economic life increasingly depends. These requirements cannot remain indefinitely subordinate to systems organised around private ownership, commercial competition, and wealth accumulation.

The worker whose savings are stolen and the unemployed young person recruited into cybercrime do not occupy morally equivalent positions. The latter has robbed the former. But both can confront different manifestations of the same international social order. Understanding those relationships does not diminish the crime. It helps explain why policing its symptoms has repeatedly failed to eradicate the underlying phenomenon.

A genuine solution ultimately requires reorganisation of economic life according to social need rather than private profit: secure employment, housing, and education for the world’s youth, together with democratic control over the communications infrastructure on which humanity increasingly depends. Only on such a foundation can the extraordinary productive and communicative power represented by the internet stop functioning as another arena in which desperation is turned against desperation.

Bibliography

Bluesky. Bluesky 2025 Transparency Report. 29 January 2026. [bsky.social]

Canadian Centre for Child Protection. Resources & Research: Statistics: Sextortion. Statistical data covering reports received by Cybertip.ca and related programmes. [protectchildren.ca]

CBC News. “Sextorters are targeting young boys online — and flaunting how rich the scam is making them.” 3 October 2025. [cbc.ca]

Hansen, Randall. “Don’t believe claims Southeast Asia scam schemes were shut down.” Asia Times, 16 April 2026. [asiatimes.com]

Livesey, Keith.“The Bluesky Scammers Are the New Yahoo Boys.” A Trumpet of Sedition, 3 November 2026. [Present article.]

Meta. “Combating Financial Sextortion Scams From Nigeria.” 24 July 2024. [about.fb.com]

Network Contagion Research Institute. A Digital Pandemic: Uncovering the Role of ‘Yahoo Boys’ in the Surge of Social Media-Enabled Financial Sextortion Targeting Minors. January 2024. [networkcontagion.us], [networkcontagion.us]

Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics. Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index (2022). [nigerianstat.gov.ng], [nigerianstat.gov.ng]

Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics. Nigeria Labour Force Survey Q2 2023. [nigerianstat.gov.ng]

Ojolo, Tolulope Lembola. A Criminological Investigation into the Lived Experiences of Cybercrime Perpetrators in Southwest Nigeria. Doctoral thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2020. [ukzn-dspac…ukzn.ac.za]

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. “Hundreds of thousands trafficked to work as online scammers in SE Asia, says UN report.” 29 August 2023. [ohchr.org]

Snap. “Fighting back against online sexual extortion.” 12 June 2026. [values.snap.com]

Kensington and Chelsea: An insider’s indictment that stops at the threshold of a socialist conclusion

Few places expose the class divisions of British capitalism more brutally than the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. Here fabulous private wealth exists alongside overcrowding, hunger and social deprivation. Within a relatively small area, multimillion-pound properties and apartments that function primarily as repositories of international wealth stand close to council estates whose residents have endured deteriorating services, insecurity, and decades of political neglect. These are not simply contrasting social worlds accidentally occupying the same geographical space. They are interconnected products of a society in which housing and land have increasingly been subordinated to private profit, property speculation and the accumulation of wealth.[1]

These contradictions acquired their most terrible expression on 14 June 2017, when the Grenfell Tower fire killed 72 people. Grenfell was not an inexplicable accident that suddenly descended upon an otherwise functioning social system. It exposed before millions of people the consequences of decades in which council housing, building regulation, local government and public services had been progressively subjected to austerity, privatisation, outsourcing and the requirements of the market. The catastrophe revealed, with terrible clarity, the social consequences of a political order in which the living conditions and safety of working-class residents were repeatedly subordinated to financial considerations.

This social landscape gives Emma Dent Coad’s One Kensington its considerable importance. A Labour councillor in Kensington and Chelsea from 2006, Dent Coad was elected MP for Kensington in the general election of 8 June 2017, only days before the Grenfell catastrophe. The tower stood at the end of her road. Her book consequently occupies an unusual position between eyewitness testimony, political memoir and an indictment of one of Britain’s wealthiest local authorities. Its strongest passages provide an invaluable account of the arrogance, indifference, and class contempt working-class residents encountered while trying to secure safe housing and decent public services.

But the book also contains a fundamental contradiction. The evidence Dent Coad accumulates points toward an indictment of the social order itself. At the same time, her political conclusions remain largely within the framework of Labourism, parliamentary reform, and improved local government. One Kensington comes repeatedly to the threshold of a socialist explanation of the conditions that produced Grenfell, only to retreat from the conclusions demanded by its own evidence.

A record of class contempt

The most compelling sections of One Kensington concern the everyday operation of class power. Dent Coad describes not merely incompetent administration but an entire political culture in which social tenants and working-class communities were increasingly seen as obstacles to redeveloping enormously valuable land. North Kensington residents lived in the same borough as billionaires, international investors and owners of extraordinarily expensive properties, some of which were rarely occupied. Yet immense accumulated wealth did nothing to guarantee decent housing, secure public services, or provide basic social protection for everyone living in the borough.

This is precisely why the personal attitudes of Conservative councillors cannot adequately explain the inequalities documented in the book, however contemptuous those attitudes may have been. Kensington’s extreme inequalities express the workings of the property market itself. The extraordinary rise in London land and housing values turned residential property into a major vehicle for accumulating and preserving wealth. Working-class communities therefore occupied homes standing on land that became increasingly attractive to developers and investors. Under these conditions, the language of “regeneration” acquired a definite class meaning: council estates could be represented as obsolete, existing communities disrupted and public land opened to forms of development from which those communities derived little or no benefit.

Dent Coad is particularly effective when demonstrating how these processes appeared at street and council level. Her background in architecture and housing gives her account an understanding of the relationship between planning decisions and social inequality. Food poverty, overcrowding, deteriorating estates and divisions in health and life expectancy appear throughout the book not as abstractions but as features of everyday existence within a borough internationally associated with extreme wealth. The result is a powerful documentary charge sheet against both Kensington and Chelsea Council and the broader social priorities it embodied.

Grenfell transformed that charge sheet into something still more serious. The working-class residents who repeatedly raised concerns about their homes were not suffering from a simple failure of communication between government and governed. Their experience demonstrated how little weight their needs carried when measured against the financial, commercial and political priorities governing housing. This is why Grenfell must be understood not only as administrative negligence but as a class question.

Grenfell and social murder

Friedrich Engels famously employed the concept of “social murder” in The Condition of the Working Class in England to describe circumstances in which existing social relations knowingly condemn working people to premature death. The concept remains indispensable to understanding Grenfell because it moves discussion beyond the narrow search for a single catastrophic mistake. It directs attention towards the accumulated political and economic decisions that created the conditions in which catastrophe became possible.

Grenfell emerged from a historical process encompassing deregulation, outsourcing, the degradation of council housing, the fragmentation of responsibility and the increasing subordination of construction and housing to commercial interests. Individual decisions plainly mattered, as did questions of corporate and institutional responsibility, but those decisions were taken within a society dominated by the capitalist market. The tragedy cannot therefore be explained simply by saying that Kensington and Chelsea happened to be run by unusually callous Conservatives.

This is where the evidence presented in One Kensington begins to exceed the author’s own political framework. Dent Coad’s account describes a system operating according to recognisable class interests, but her proposed political remedies remain centred upon reforming the institutions through which that system operates. The contradiction becomes increasingly difficult to ignore as the book proceeds.

The limits of the parliamentary perspective

Dent Coad’s political horizon remains fundamentally that of Labour reformism. The principal enemy is Conservative-controlled Kensington and Chelsea, while the alternative is sought through community campaigning, progressive councillors, better MPs and the election of a Labour government committed to different priorities. The enthusiasm surrounding Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership forms an important part of this perspective. Yet Corbynism itself showed the limits of trying to channel mounting social opposition through the existing Labour and parliamentary apparatus.

The problem is not that better councillors, stronger regulations or more socially conscious MPs would make no difference. Reforms improving housing conditions and building safety should obviously be supported. The deeper question is why such elementary requirements continually collide with powerful economic interests. A council may regulate property development more aggressively than another; Parliament may enact improved building standards; governments may impose stricter requirements upon landlords and construction companies. Yet none of these measures abolishes the underlying contradiction between housing as a basic human necessity and housing as private property, a financial asset, and a source of profit.

Dent Coad’s political conclusions largely ignore that contradiction. Conservative mismanagement consequently becomes the explanation for conditions that developed under governments of both major parties. The Blair and Brown governments did not overturn the market transformation initiated under Thatcher. New Labour accommodated the essential economic framework created in the preceding decades, extending private-sector involvement in public services while accepting the market’s dominance over housing and land.

Corbynism and the unanswered political question

The election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader in 2015 expressed a genuine movement to the left among workers and young people after decades of austerity, war, privatisation and declining living standards. This social movement played a major role in Labour’s unexpectedly strong performance in the 2017 general election and in Dent Coad’s remarkable victory in Kensington. A constituency synonymous with wealth and Conservative power returned a Labour MP, apparently demonstrating the potential for a radical political realignment.

But the subsequent defeat of Corbynism exposed the fatal weakness of its perspective. Rather than building an independent political movement against the Labour right and the social forces it represented, Corbyn insisted that the Labour Party could be reconciled around a parliamentary road to reform. Repeated compromises strengthened his opponents while disorienting his supporters. Dent Coad’s loss of Kensington in 2019 by just 150 votes formed part of the broader defeat.

For One Kensington, this experience should have raised the most fundamental question: if the Labour Party could not be transformed even under conditions in which hundreds of thousands joined or supported it in the expectation of radical change, what basis remained for believing that the working class could achieve a fundamental social transformation through Labour parliamentarianism? The book never seriously answers this question. Instead, Labour’s defeat appears principally as a political setback rather than evidence requiring a reassessment of the party itself.

From indictment to socialist programme

One Kensington nevertheless deserves to be read. Dent Coad’s eyewitness evidence, accumulated detail and anger over the treatment of working-class residents give the book lasting value. She records a borough where immense concentrations of wealth existed alongside poverty, overcrowding and insecurity, and she shows the extraordinary distance between official rhetoric about community and the experiences of those forced to negotiate the institutions supposedly responsible for protecting them.

But the power of that testimony makes the weakness of the political conclusions still more apparent. The central question is not whether Kensington and Chelsea could be administered more compassionately. Clearly it could. Nor is it whether stronger building regulations, competent housing management, more council housing and genuine democratic accountability are urgently required. They are. The decisive issue is why these basic social requirements repeatedly conflict with the interests of private property.

Safe and decent housing for all cannot ultimately be guaranteed while housing remains subordinated to profit and speculation. The construction industry, major developers, land and essential building-material production cannot remain instruments of private enrichment. At the same time, society is expected somehow to guarantee that human need takes priority over financial return. The major corporations dominating these sectors must be placed under public ownership and democratic working-class control. At the same time, housing itself must cease to function primarily as a commodity and speculative asset and become a guaranteed social right.

Such measures inevitably raise the question that One Kensington avoids: political power. They cannot be realised merely by replacing bad administrators with good ones while preserving the economic relations determining what local and national governments can do. They require the independent political organisation of the working class based on an international socialist programme directed against capitalism itself.

The working people of North Kensington were never lacking courage. They were never lacking warnings, intelligence, solidarity or organisation. Before Grenfell, residents repeatedly tried to make their voices heard; afterwards, bereaved families, survivors, and the wider community showed extraordinary determination in demanding truth and accountability. Their tragedy was not the absence of community activism. It was the absence of a political movement capable of transforming that social anger into an independent struggle against the class interests responsible for the conditions they confronted.

That is ultimately the contradiction at the heart of One Kensington. Dent Coad provides an insider’s indictment of a profoundly unequal society, and much of the evidence she presents is devastating. But her politics remain tied to the institutions and the Labour Party through which that society has been administered. Her evidence points beyond municipal reform, parliamentary manoeuvre and hopes for another Labour renewal. It points to the need for independent political mobilisation of the working class and the socialist reorganisation of society. The book takes the reader to that threshold, but it does not cross it.

Bibliography

Dent Coad, Emma. One Kensington: Tales from the Frontline of the Most Unequal Borough in Britain. London: Quercus, 2022; paperback edition, 2023.

Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England. 1845.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 Report. London: HMSO, 2019.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 2 Report. London: HMSO, 2024.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. 1848.


[1] One Kensington: Tales from the Frontline of the Most Unequal Borough in Britain, by Emma Dent Coad, Quercus, 2022; paperback edition, 2023.

For want of a horse: Manchester United and the parasitism of the football oligarchy

A crisis 21 years in the making

Manchester United is once again preparing to sack a manager. Sunday’s 3-0 home defeat to Bournemouth, following a 4-1 thrashing by Como, has left Michael Carrick’s position untenable barely months after he was handed the job permanently. He would become the eighth man to occupy the dugout since Sir Alex Ferguson retired in 2013. The club that dominated English football for two decades is now, in Wilson’s words, a mid-table laughing stock under a stadium roof that leaks whenever it rains.

In a column published Monday, Wilson poses the obvious question. When a club burns through managers at this rate, is the manager really the problem? He points upward: to director of football Jason Wilcox, to chief executive Omar Berrada, to Sir Jim Ratcliffe, whom he describes accurately as a cost-cutting tax exile, and finally to the Glazer family, whose 2005 leveraged buyout plunged the club into debt.

Wilson then reaches for literature. United’s story, he argues, has taken the form of a classical tragedy, in which a small, seemingly unrelated incident, swollen by pride, brings the whole edifice down. That incident was a horse called Rock of Gibraltar. The episode is worth recounting. It sheds a harsh light on the social layer that owns and runs modern football. But the conclusion Wilson draws from it, that a club was lost “for the want of a horse”, obscures far more than it reveals.

Millionaires at the races

The affair began in 1999 at York racecourse. Irish bloodstock magnate John Magnier won the Gimcrack Stakes with a horse. Custom required the owner to address the Gimcrack Dinner. Magnier, who disliked public speaking, asked his friend Alex Ferguson to speak for him. The racing establishment refused.

To spite them, Magnier began registering horses in Ferguson’s name. In 2001 one of them, Rock of Gibraltar, won the Gimcrack, and Ferguson duly gave his speech. Around the same time, Magnier and his business partner JP McManus began buying up shares in Manchester United, then a company listed on the London Stock Exchange.

The horse proved to be a champion, winning seven consecutive Group One races. The prize money ran to roughly £800,000. The real prize, however, lay in stud fees worth tens of millions. Ferguson claimed a verbal agreement entitled him to half of them. Magnier remembered the arrangement very differently.

Ferguson sued. What followed was a brawl fought by City methods. Questions about Ferguson’s transfer dealings began to circulate. Magnier and McManus submitted a list of 99 questions to the United board, which the Daily Mail promptly ran. Ferguson settled for £2.5 million.

The two Irish financiers then decided to sell. A buyer was waiting: Malcolm Glazer, an American businessman who had been accumulating United shares. According to Wilson, Ferguson backed Glazer. In 2005, Magnier and McManus sold out for £260 million, a profit of close to £100 million.

It is a revealing detail that Ferguson, a former Govan shipyard apprentice who began adult life as a trade union shop steward and has long presented himself as a Labour man, ended up supporting the asset-stripper who bought his club with borrowed money—two decades of proximity to wealth had done its work. When the interests of the workers and fans who sustained the club collided with his own, he chose his side with little doubt.

The leveraged buyout: debt as a business model

The Glazer takeover, valued at around £790 million, was a classic leveraged buyout. Most of the purchase price was borrowed, and the club took on the debt. United, which had been profitable and debt-free, was made to pay for the privilege of being bought.

What followed was two decades of extraction. By most independent estimates, well over £1 billion has flowed out of the club in interest payments, banking fees and dividends since 2005. In 2012, the Glazers floated a minority of shares on the New York Stock Exchange, structured so that the family retained voting control. They used the money to refinance debt, not rebuild the team.

Ferguson’s personal authority and an exceptional squad masked the rot for eight years. United won five more league titles and the 2008 Champions League. But once he retired, the club’s sporting operation was revealed as hollow. Successive managers—David Moyes, Louis van Gaal, José Mourinho, Ole Gunnar Solskjær, Erik ten Hag, Ruben Amorim and now Carrick—were hired and discarded. The club spent hundreds of millions on players assembled with no coherent plan.

Meanwhile, Old Trafford, once the country’s most admired stadium, was left to decay. Season ticket prices rose. The Glazers’ contempt for the club’s supporters peaked in April 2021, when they joined the abortive European Super League, a closed competition designed to guarantee revenue for a cartel of the richest clubs. Mass protests followed, and fans forced the postponement of a home match against Liverpool.

None of this deviated from the norm of English football. It was its logic carried through. The Premier League was founded in 1992 as a breakaway designed to capture television money for the top clubs. United had been floated on the stock market the year before. Football was being remade as an investment field, and every club became an asset to be bought, leveraged, and milked.

Ratcliffe: austerity on the terraces

When Sir Jim Ratcliffe bought a minority stake in 2024 and took over football operations, sections of the media hailed him as a saviour. The billionaire owner of the Ineos petrochemicals empire, a Brexit supporter who moved his residence to Monaco, was presented as a hard-headed businessman who would sweep away the Glazers’ incompetence.

Instead, he swept away jobs. The club made hundreds of staff redundant across two rounds of cuts. Concessionary tickets for children and pensioners were scrapped or curtailed. Prices for remaining matchday tickets were raised. Even small staff perks were withdrawn. The club’s workers and its working-class supporters were made to pay for a crisis created entirely at the top.

Wilson notes the irony that, had Magnier and McManus held on to their shares until Ratcliffe came along, they would have pocketed roughly £1 billion more. The figure is telling. While the team declined and the stadium crumbled, the club’s value as a financial asset soared. That is the essential contradiction. United’s decline as a football club and its rise as a speculative property were not opposites. They were two sides of the same process.

Not a tragedy, but a social process

Wilson is one of the most thoughtful writers on football, and his account of the Rock of Gibraltar affair is valuable. But his framework is the liberal one of accident and personality. The club fell, in his telling, because of a quarrel between proud men over a horse.

This turns history upside down. Had Rock of Gibraltar never raced, United would still have been a publicly traded company in an industry flooded with television money. It would still have been circled by hedge funds, private equity and billionaires seeking an asset with a global brand. The horse determined which speculator acquired the club, and when. It did not determine that a speculator would.

Every major English club tells a version of the same story. A Russian oligarch bought Chelsea and sold it to a US private equity consortium. Gulf states own Manchester City and Newcastle United. American sports investment groups hold Liverpool, Arsenal and others. Lower down the pyramid, clubs such as Bury and Macclesfield Town have been driven out of existence by financial mismanagement. United’s fate is not exceptional. It is the most visible expression of a general process.

That process mirrors capitalism’s development over the past four decades. The leveraged buyout, the stripping of assets, the ballooning of share values alongside the decay of the real enterprise: the City and Wall Street perfected these methods before applying them to football. Under the Thatcher and Blair governments, they applied the same methods to industry, housing and public services. Football was simply another social institution handed over to the market.

Manchester United was born in 1878 as Newton Heath, a team of railway workers. For most of its history, it was a focus of collective identity for the working class of an industrial city. Today it is a ticker symbol. Those who sustain it, the staff in its offices and kitchens and the supporters in the stands, have no say in its direction.

The solution does not lie in finding a better billionaire, nor in the various schemes of “fan ownership” that leave the profit system intact. As long as football remains a commodity, capital will govern it. Restoring it to the people who love it requires bringing it, like every other major sphere of social life, under democratic public control. That task is bound up with the broader struggle of the working class against the financial oligarchy that dominates economic life. Rock of Gibraltar did not destroy Manchester United. Capitalism did.

Sources

New comment on Race, reaction and the fight for democratic rights: The political issues posed by the Cofnas meeting at Oxford

Not bad, Keith. I am impressed you squeezed in almost all the issues of interest to the chattering class over a speech by Cofnas on how DEI has influenced education. From addressing the ” immense ” wealth distribution to racism to the rising power of the right. And of course our Arday. Now Cofnas has achieved his 15 minutes of fame because he finally exposed this fraud. In my opinion, that is what he was. It’s not worth debating. In fact, I suggest there is potential PHD for a PhD in explaining why Cofnas gained traction where others before him failed to expose both the man and the system that promoted him. Remember, I liked your post.

Your article suggests that, at last, people are prepared (or brave enough) to say we need a diversity of views that are expressed and debated, instead of cancelling those that contradict the current accepted views. I liked your opinion that, in this case, university administrators should not promote cancellations, since that would imply they hold the correct view. But how can our protesters outside the venue feel satisfied?

Robert street

Reply

Thanks. I think your last sentence is actually the most interesting part of your response. The protesters outside the venue get satisfaction by protesting and making their case, not necessarily by stopping the meeting.

If Cofnas is wrong, argue against him. If someone’s academic reputation is inflated, demonstrate it with evidence. Protesters have every right to say a speaker should never have been invited and to oppose them as forcefully as they wish. But once we move from criticism and protest to insisting that university administrators prevent people from hearing certain arguments, we create a much bigger problem: who decides what may legitimately be discussed?

My objection is not to protest—quite the opposite. Protest, disagreement and argument are essential parts of democratic intellectual life. My objection is to replacing political and intellectual argument with administrative prohibition. Once university management is granted the authority to determine which opinions are acceptable, there is no reason to suppose that this power will always be exercised against people whose views we dislike. The same machinery can just as readily be turned against radical, socialist, anti-war or otherwise unpopular opinions.

So the protesters should have their say, Cofnas should have his, and the audience should be treated as adults capable of reaching its own judgement. The answer to objectionable ideas is not to ask administrators to make them disappear, but to expose their weaknesses publicly.

Victoria and Albert Museum workers strike across all four London sites against “Amazon-style” conditions and poverty pay.

Workers at the Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A) will strike across all four of the institution’s London sites on October 29 and 30 in an escalating dispute over poverty wages and increasingly intolerable working conditions.

The action, involving union members at South Kensington, V&A East Museum, V&A East Storehouse in Stratford and the Young V&A in Bethnal Green, marks the first time the museum’s entire London network will be hit simultaneously by industrial action. It follows a series of September strikes that exposed a growing rebellion among workers at one of Britain’s premier cultural institutions.

Behind the V&A’s carefully cultivated image as a world-class museum lies a workplace regime that workers have compared to an Amazon fulfilment centre. The dispute first erupted at the newly opened V&A East Storehouse, where staff reported being denied sufficient time for drinking water and toilet breaks during shifts.

That workers had to organise strike action to secure what should be the most basic workplace rights is a damning indictment of the conditions imposed in Britain’s cultural sector. Every Storehouse worker who voted in the ballot supported industrial action, with turnout approaching 88 per cent, reflecting deep-rooted anger over management practices.

Only after the threat of strikes did management partially retreat, agreeing in August to provide two paid breaks per day. Yet this concession addressed only the most visible symptom of a much broader crisis confronting museum workers.

Across the V&A estate, employees have reported staff shortages, excessive workloads and years of declining living standards. PCS members voted 95.39 per cent for strike action with an 87.04 per cent turnout, showing overwhelming support for a fight against management’s offensive. Workers have described severe workplace overheating, dehydration, and even colleagues fainting on journeys home after shifts.

The scale of opposition became clear in September, when about 700 workers, more than half the V&A’s workforce, took part in strike action that forced the closure of several sites.

The workforce’s demands are modest. PCS and Prospect members are seeking a 4 per cent pay increase and an uplift that would bring the lowest-paid workers to £14.80 per hour, making the V&A an accredited Real London Living Wage employer.

Management has portrayed these demands as unaffordable. Yet PCS estimates the difference between its pay claim and management’s existing offer would be roughly £500,000 annually, a negligible sum for a national institution.

Workers have every reason to reject museum management’s claims of poverty. The V&A holds around £72 million in reserves while continuing to invest heavily in major capital projects. As workers have pointed out, funding always seems available for new buildings, refurbishments, and expansion projects, while employees responsible for keeping the institution running are told they must accept further declines in their living standards.

The current dispute unfolds against the backdrop of years of attacks on museum workers. Hundreds of jobs were lost during restructuring carried out throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Real wages have since been eroded by below-inflation pay settlements, with workers absorbing substantial losses in purchasing power during recent years of inflation.

One worker speaking to Museums Journal summed up the widespread mood: “We’ve finally reached breaking point.”

Management has responded by preparing a fresh round of cuts. Last month, the V&A announced a voluntary exit scheme covering all sites, fuelling fears that the institution is preparing further workforce reductions. Such schemes invariably increase workloads for those who remain while undermining public service delivery.

Responsibility for these attacks ultimately lies not only with museum management but with the Labour government. The V&A itself has acknowledged that government funding settlements amount to real-terms reductions once inflation is taken into account. Across the museum and heritage sector, institutions are being compelled to operate under permanent austerity conditions. The result is a familiar pattern: workers are expected to bear the burden through worsening conditions, suppressed wages and job cuts. At the same time, management pursues financial targets dictated by government spending priorities.

Far from representing an isolated dispute, the struggle at the V&A is part of a broader movement among museum and heritage workers. At Royal Museums Greenwich, workers have balloted for industrial action over pay and Living Wage accreditation. The Royal Armouries is pursuing plans to reduce labour costs. Across the sector, management is advancing virtually identical programmes under the banner of “financial sustainability”, while workers face deteriorating conditions and declining real incomes.

The role of V&A Director Tristram Hunt, a former Labour MP, is politically significant. Hunt’s reported refusal to participate in negotiations shows how little management values the workforce. But the issue is not simply one individual’s attitude. Hunt embodies a wider layer of Labour politicians, public-sector executives and cultural administrators tasked with implementing austerity while presenting cuts as responsible management.

The trade union apparatus’s conduct throughout the dispute raises important questions.

PCS General Secretary Fran Heathcote has correctly described it as a scandal that a leading national museum fails to pay all staff a genuine living wage. Yet union leadership has limited workers to a series of isolated, carefully managed stoppages while directing appeals to Labour politicians who are themselves enforcing spending cuts.

No serious effort has been made to unify the developing disputes across museums, galleries, libraries and cultural institutions throughout Britain. Workers face the same employers’ offensive everywhere: understaffing, declining pay, intensified labour, and threats to jobs. Yet struggles remain fragmented, institution by institution.

Workers have already demonstrated their collective strength through strikes, overtime bans, work-to-rule measures and other forms of industrial action. These actions show that museums cannot function without the labour of the workers who maintain collections, assist visitors, provide security, manage archives, and run daily operations.

The decisive question is how to organise and direct that power. V&A workers need new organisations of struggle, rank-and-file committees independent of the union bureaucracy, to transfer decision-making power directly into the hands of workers themselves. Such committees could unite workers across all V&A sites, establish direct links with staff at other museums and cultural institutions, and coordinate a common fight against pay cuts, redundancies and deteriorating working conditions.

They should appeal for support not only among museum workers but also among Amazon warehouse workers, postal workers, civil servants, transport workers, educators, and health workers facing the same attacks amid deepening austerity.

The struggle at the V&A raises fundamental questions about society’s priorities. Vast resources fund prestige projects, corporate subsidies, and military expenditure, while workers responsible for preserving humanity’s artistic and historical heritage are told there is no money for decent wages or humane working conditions.

The treasures housed within the V&A were created through generations of labour. The workers who safeguard and maintain those collections today have every right to insist on secure employment, decent pay, and dignified working conditions. Their struggle deserves the support of workers throughout Britain and internationally.

France’s Erupting Student Revolt and the Political Lessons of 1968: A Warning Against the SWP’s Spontaneity Myths

The eruption of mass student protests across France marks a new phase in the breakdown of European capitalism. Beginning with lycée blockades in Créteil on 18 September, the movement has spread at extraordinary speed. By mid-October, the main student union reported that around 90 per cent of France’s universities were blockaded or closed; unions claimed 480,000 demonstrators nationwide; and protests had already spread to Belgium, Albania, Greece and Italy. One demonstrator has been killed, more than 2,000 arrested, and Limoges’ 143-year-old town hall burned. Macron is preparing to address the nation- a sign of the ruling class’s fear, not its strength.

The crisis unfolding in France is not an isolated national event. It is part of a global rise in class struggle, driven by war, austerity, and the collapse of the post-Cold War order. Across Europe, governments are cutting social spending to fund rearmament, militarising domestic policing, and preparing for confrontation with Russia. The eruption of youth anger in France is one expression of this broader crisis. Still, you can’t understand the political questions it raises without confronting the lessons of France’s last great revolutionary crisis: May–June 1968.

In a recent article, Socialist Worker (SWP) asks whether the present revolt is “our 1968.” It is a legitimate question, but their answer is politically evasive. Their account suppresses 1968’s central lesson: the decisive role the Stalinist bureaucracy played in betraying the general strike, and the need to build an independent revolutionary leadership before mass upheavals. This suppression is no accident. It follows from the SWP’s own political orientation: its adaptation to the trade-union apparatus, its glorification of spontaneity, and its refusal to confront the bureaucracies that strangle every major working-class movement.

Murden’s article repeats a familiar mythology: students fought, workers joined them, the president “fled,” and the movement was ultimately defeated because socialist parties were too focused on elections. This narrative is politically convenient because it obscures the real forces that determined the outcome. The May–June 1968 general strike, involving ten million workers, was not defeated by “electoralism.” The French Communist Party (PCF) and the CGT trade-union bureaucracy it controlled betrayed it. These forces negotiated the Grenelle accords behind the strikers’ backs, broke the strike factory by factory, and led the working class into the June elections, which the Gaullists won by a landslide.

De Gaulle did not flee. He flew to Baden-Baden to secure the army’s support, then returned to dissolve the Assembly and call elections, confident that the PCF would keep the workers in line. This betrayal was no aberration; it was the predictable outcome of Stalinism’s nationalist, reformist programme and hostility to workers’ power. The SWP refuses to name this betrayal because its own state-capitalist tradition has always adapted to the bureaucracies- Stalinist, social-democratic, or trade-union that sit atop mass movements.

The Role of the Unions Today

The SWP’s silence on the unions is not merely a matter of history; it directly affects the present movement. Youth anger has not erupted in a political vacuum. It confronts a trade-union apparatus with a decade-long record of systematic demobilisation, fragmentation, and defeat. Any serious analysis of the current struggle must begin with this fact. Murden’s article omits it because acknowledging it would require breaking with the SWP’s entire political orientation.

The Intersyndicale’s record is well known. In 2023, it led millions in a series of isolated “days of action” as Macron’s pension reform passed. These demonstrations were deliberately designed to prevent a general strike. With weeks of inactivity between each “day,” the government could wait out the movement while the unions kept control of the calendar. Last autumn’s Bloquons tout movement was similarly dissipated. Youth and workers repeatedly called for indefinite action, only to be told to wait for the next scheduled march. Many participants objected that the unions were setting the protest calendar and called for dates independent of the bureaucracies. Their demands were ignored.

By December 2025, the consequences of this strategy were clear. A CGT–FSU–Solidaires strike day drew just 31,900 protesters, according to interior ministry estimates, and caused little disruption. Years of controlled, symbolic protest had worn workers down and convinced many that union-led mobilisations were futile. The bureaucracies had achieved their real aim: preventing a unified national movement from emerging to challenge the state.

Today, the unions have joined the marches “to protect pupils and limit violence.” This wording is revealing. Their role is not to lead a struggle against the state, but to contain it, regulate it, and ultimately channel it back into parliamentary politics. They appear at demonstrations as stewards, not fighters. Their presence is a warning, not a promise.

Murden’s article says nothing about this. Workers and young people are not warned that the same apparatus is preparing the same outcome. They are not told that the unions are already negotiating with the interior ministry, discussing “security,” and preparing the next controlled march. Nor are they told that the bureaucracies will oppose any attempt to connect lycée blockades with strikes in transport, health, logistics, or industry. They are not told that the unions will fight rank-and-file organisation harder than they fight Macron.

Most importantly, they are not urged to build rank-and-file committees independent of the union bureaucracies, linking schools, factories, transport and hospitals across France and internationally. These committees are the only organisational form capable of coordinating a general strike, resisting bureaucratic sabotage, and articulating the working class’s political demands. They embody the lessons of every major struggle of the past century, from the factory occupations of 1936 to the mass strikes of 1968.

This silence is political. It reflects the SWP’s refusal to break with the trade‑union apparatus, which it treats as a vehicle for “pressure from below” rather than as an instrument of state control over the working class. The SWP’s state‑capitalist tradition has always adapted to whatever bureaucracy sits atop a movement. It insists that militancy can force unions into action, even though their function is precisely to keep militancy from becoming political. It celebrates “the streets” while refusing to confront the organisations that police them.

Mélenchon and the Electoral Trap

Murden warns that “the logic of the system” will try to channel street anger into electoral politics. In the next breath, she praises Jean‑Luc Mélenchon for showing up at protests. The warning and the endorsement cancel each other out. It is impossible to denounce the diversion of mass anger into parliamentary channels while simultaneously legitimising the politician whose central function is to carry out that diversion.

Mélenchon’s role is clear. In 2024, La France Insoumise (LFI) entered a “New Popular Front” with the Socialist Party, the party responsible for Hollande’s austerity, labour‑market deregulation, and entrenching the state of emergency. LFI then withdrew candidates in run‑offs to benefit Macron’s camp under the banner of a “republican front.” This was not a tactical misstep but the logical expression of LFI’s programme: defence of the Fifth Republic, French nationalism, and the preservation of capitalist order through parliamentary manoeuvres.

With the 2027 election approaching, LFI faces the same challenge the PCF faced in June 1968: turning a mass movement into votes. In 1968, the PCF broke the general strike factory by factory, then led ten million workers to the polls, where they delivered a landslide victory for the Gaullists. Today, Mélenchon’s presence at demonstrations serves a similar purpose: presenting himself as the “responsible” left alternative, channelling youth anger into electoral support, and preventing the emergence of independent organs of working-class power.

To present Mélenchon as an ally is to repeat the political logic that destroyed 1968. Murden’s article concludes by declaring that “the power to change the system lies in the streets.” This is spontaneism dressed up as revolutionary rhetoric. In 1968, the streets did not lack militancy. They lacked a party fighting for workers’ power against the Stalinists. The general strike was defeated not because workers failed to act, but because they acted under the leadership of a bureaucracy committed to preserving the capitalist state.

Celebrating “the streets” while remaining silent on programme and leadership leaves the field open to the bureaucracies and to Mélenchon. It is a politics of mood, not strategy. It replaces emotional identification with protest with the hard, necessary work of building independent rank-and-file committees and a revolutionary leadership capable of confronting the state and breaking the union apparatus’s grip. This is the lesson of 1968and the lesson Murden’s article refuses to draw.

What Is Required

Conditions today may be more explosive than in 1968. The crisis is global, the ruling class has nothing left to concede, and the movement is already crossing borders. The French protests are not an isolated national disturbance but part of a worldwide breakdown of capitalist stability: war in Europe and the Middle East, austerity budgets across the continent, collapsing public services, and a generation of youth confronting a future of permanent insecurity. Under these conditions, even movements that begin in schools and universities can quickly take on a broader social character. The question the SWP avoids the question of leadership becomes decisive.

The ruling class is acutely aware of the danger. Macron’s preparations to address the nation, the mass arrests, and the deployment of riot police are not signs of confidence but of fear. The state understands that social anger among youth can ignite broader layers of workers whose living standards have eroded over more than a decade. The unions understand this too, which is why they have intervened not to escalate the struggle but to contain it. The pseudo‑left parties understand it, which is why they are already positioning themselves as electoral safety valves. The only force that is not being prepared is the working class itself.

What is needed is the independent political mobilisation of the working class, internationally and on a socialist programme, against Macron, the RN, and the bureaucratic and pseudo-left apparatuses that will seek to block it. No movement can move forward while confined to the organisational structures that have repeatedly sabotaged struggles in France: the trade-union bureaucracies, the parliamentary left, and nationalist frameworks that divide workers by race, religion or citizenship. The youth blockades have shown courage and initiative. Still, without a deliberate strategy to connect their actions with workplaces, hospitals, transport hubs and logistics centres, their struggle will remain isolated and vulnerable.

The lessons of 1968 are clear. A general strike, prepared by rank-and-file committees, democratically controlled by workers, and coordinated across sectors and borders, is the only way to break the union apparatus’s grip. A revolutionary leadership, built in advance, rooted in the international working class, and armed with a Marxist programme, is the only force capable of turning mass anger into a struggle for power. An article that omits these lessons offers a miniature version of the PCF’s road a road that leads not to victory, but to defeat.

Bibliography

Trotskyist and Marxist Analysis

  • Trotsky, Leon. The Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution. New York: Pathfinder Press.
  • Trotsky, Leon. The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany. New York: Pathfinder Press.
  • North, David. The Russian Revolution and the Unfinished Twentieth Century. Mehring Books.
  • North, David. The Frankfurt School, Postmodernism and the Politics of the Pseudo‑Left. Mehring Books.
  • Steiner, Alex and David North. The Frankfurt School, Postmodernism and the Politics of the Pseudo‑Left: A Marxist Critique. Mehring Books.
  • International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI). The Heritage We Defend. Mehring Books.

May–June 1968: Historical Studies

  • Seidman, Michael. The Imaginary Revolution: Parisian Students and Workers in 1968. Berghahn Books.
  • Singer, Daniel. Prelude to Revolution: France in May 1968. Hill and Wang.
  • Ross, Kristin. May ’68 and Its Afterlives. University of Chicago Press.
  • Williams, Philip. Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic. Penguin.
  • Dreyfus, François. Histoire de la CGT. Seuil.
  • Kriegel, Annie. Les Communistes Français: Essai d’histoire du mouvement communiste français. Seuil.

French Trade‑Unionism and the CGT

  • Mouriaux, René. Le Syndicalisme en France. La Découverte.
  • Andolfatto, Dominique and Dominique Labbé. Histoire des syndicats: 1906–2010. Seuil.
  • Tartakowsky, Danielle. Les Manifestations de rue en France: 1918–1968. Publications de la Sorbonne.
  • Lefranc, Georges. Les Syndicats en France. Presses Universitaires de France.

Contemporary French Politics and the Pseudo‑Left

  • Amable, Bruno and Stefano Palombarini. L’Illusion du Bloc Bourgeois. Raisons d’Agir.
  • Mélenchon, Jean‑Luc. L’Ère du Peuple. Fayard.
  • Perrineau, Pascal. La France au Front. Fayard.
  • Chrisafis, Angelique. The Rise of the French Far Right. Guardian reporting (summaries only).
  • WSWS Editorial Board. The Pseudo‑Left and the Crisis of Capitalism. Mehring Books.

Youth Movements, Policing, and the Banlieues

  • Fassin, Didier. Enforcing Order: An Ethnography of Urban Policing. Polity Press.
  • Beaud, Stéphane and Michel Pialoux. Retour sur la condition ouvrière. Fayard.
  • Hmed, Choukri. Les Mouvements des Banlieues. Presses de Sciences Po.

European Austerity, War, and Capitalist Crisis

  • Tooze, Adam. Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World. Allen Lane.
  • Varoufakis, Yanis. Adults in the Room. Bodley Head.
  • WSWS International Editorial Board. The Return of Great‑Power Conflict and the Crisis of World Capitalism. Mehring Books.

General Works on Marxism, Revolution, and Class Struggle

  • Luxemburg, Rosa. The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions.
  • Lenin, V.I. State and Revolution.
  • Lenin, V.I. What Is To Be Done?
  • Harman, Chris. The Fire Last Time: 1968 and After. Bookmarks (critical reference only).
  •  

The Economist Prescribes a Witch‑Hunt: What the Kinnock “Lesson” Really Teaches American Workers

The Economist’s mid‑August intervention was not a neutral exercise in transatlantic political comparison. It was an unmistakable act of class politics. By urging the Democratic Party to “learn” from Neil Kinnock’s purge of the Labour left, the magazine was issuing instructions, not offering analysis. Its framing of how to stop “extremists” from making a party unelectable reveals its real audience: the American ruling class, increasingly anxious about the erosion of its political instruments and the electorate’s growing volatility.

The historical parallel is telling. Kinnock’s assault on the Labour left in the 1980s was not about electoral strategy; it was a decisive effort to destroy any organised socialist tendency within a major party and to prepare the ground for the neoliberal transformation later carried out by Tony Blair. The Economist’s call for Democrats to replicate this process is therefore a demand for pre‑emptive political cleansing. It reflects a fear that social anger accumulating in the United States over inequality, war, and the decay of democratic institutions might find expression in forces the ruling class cannot control.

The magazine’s tone, dressed up in jokes about Joe Biden’s 1987 plagiarism scandal, cannot conceal its purpose. It attempts to discipline the Democratic Party, warn it against even the mildest gestures toward the left, and insist that its role remains what it has been for decades: a stabilising mechanism for American capitalism. The Economist is not worried about “unelectability.” It is worried about legitimacy. It senses that the traditional political order is fraying and that the Democratic Party, long a pillar of that order, must be fortified against internal dissent. In this sense, the article reveals more about elite anxiety than about the actual dynamics of American politics. It is a defensive manoeuvre by a ruling class confronting a crisis it cannot resolve.

A Fear Disguised as Advice

The Economist’s sudden alarm over the Democratic Socialists of America is not rooted in fear of the organisation itself. It stems from fear of the conditions that produced its growth. By fixating on Zohran Mamdani’s election as mayor of New York City- the highest-turnout election since 1969- the magazine tries to frame the DSA as a contemporary analogue to the Militant tendency in 1980s Labour.  The comparison is politically motivated rather than analytically serious. Militant was a disciplined pseudo-Trotskyist faction with a defined programme; the DSA is a diffuse, ideologically inconsistent formation whose elected officials operate comfortably within the Democratic Party. The ruling class knows this. Its concern lies elsewhere.

What unsettles The Economist is the emergence of a broad, generational shift in political consciousness. Decades of falling living standards, grotesque inequality, endless war, and the authoritarian turn under Trump have produced a situation in which millions of young people and workers are willing to embrace anything labelled “socialist.” One poll widely cited in responses to the article found that more than half of Americans under 30 view socialism favourably. This is not an endorsement of any particular organisation. It reflects deep social malaise. The magazine’s invocation of Kinnock’s purge is therefore not a warning about the DSA’s strength but a demand for pre‑emptive containment.

The Economist proposes a prophylactic: identify, isolate, and expel any tendency that might channel this sentiment into an independent political form. It argues that the Democratic Party must be cleansed before discontent crystallises into something uncontrollable. In this sense, the article is less a commentary on the DSA than a reflection of elite anxiety. It reveals a ruling class that recognises the fragility of its political instruments and fears that the crisis of American capitalism may soon produce forces beyond its reach.

What Kinnock Actually Achieved

The magazine’s history is a fable. Kinnock’s purge did not make Labour electable. He led the party to defeat in 1987 and again in 1992against a Tory government hated across Britain for the poll tax. What his witch‑hunt did achieve was the beginning of a transformation that Tony Blair later completed: the scrapping of Clause Four, the conversion of Labour into an open instrument of big business, and the launching of the criminal war against Iraq.

The “electability” The Economist celebrates is electability on terms acceptable to the banks. Under Keir Starmer, the same method was used against the hundreds of thousands who joined Labour behind Jeremy Corbyn. Members were suspended or expelled for opposing the Gaza genocide; Corbyn himself was barred from standing as a Labour candidate. The lesson Britain offers is not how to win elections. It is how to bind the working class to a party of capital by bureaucratic force.

The Democratic Party needs no tutoring on this. It is the world’s oldest capitalist party. For more than a century and a half, it has buried every social-opposition movement that entered it, from Populism to the antiwar movement to the Sanders campaigns.

The Pseudo‑Left and the Dead End of “Realignment”

Rejecting The Economist’s crude smears does not mean accepting the DSA as a socialist alternative. The DSA is not “ultra‑left.” It is a faction of the Democratic Party and has said so openly for decades. Its strategy is to win office inside a party controlled by Wall Street and the intelligence agencies.

The record of DSA officeholders is decisive. In power, they confront the realities of municipal budgets tied to bond markets and the police. Mamdani’s mayoralty is the clearest example: cuts to school and homeless programs, abandonment of free bus service, praise for the NYPD amid fatal shootings, reaffirmed support for Democratic House leader Hakeem Jeffries, and even hosting Trump at Gracie Mansion. As one socialist critic concluded, Mamdani staffed his administration with figures “intended to convince the political establishment and big business in New York that the DSA is not a threat to their core interests.”

The DSA’s most prominent voices spend their time assuring the bourgeoisie of their loyalty. Their function is not to threaten the Democratic Party but to absorb and neutralise workers’ and youth radicalisation before it takes independent political form. The Economist’s witch‑hunt prescription and the DSA’s self‑presentation are two sides of the same operation.

Militant and the Historical Roots of Entrism

Militant’s reply to The Economist, published by the Socialist Party, complains that the magazine recycled right‑wing slurs. That is true. But Militant’s own tradition offers no way out of today’s crisis facing workers.

Militant’s decades of “deep entrism,” its belief that Labour could be pressured into a vehicle for socialism, and its later admission that Labour ceased to be a workers’ party only after Blair’s changes, all amount to an indictment of its perspective.

The historical record is clear. Militant descends from Ted Grant’s International Socialist League, formed after Grant refused to break with the liquidationism of Jock Haston in the early 1950s. Haston resigned from the Revolutionary Communist Party declaring that Labour was “one of the most democratic workers’ organisations in existence” and that the task was to “adhere loyally to the mass party” and help transform it. The Fourth International warned that these positions expressed liquidationist tendencies- an abandonment of the fight for an independent revolutionary party.

Grant’s refusal to break with this outlook, and his subsequent construction of a tendency premised on permanent entry into Labour, was the seed of everything that followed. The working class lost decades to the illusion that a bourgeois workers’ party could be reclaimed from within.

Today, the same organisation regrets that Sanders did not run independently after 2016 and that Corbyn’s “Your Party” failed to capitalise on its initial support. But Sanders endorsed Clinton, then Biden, then Harris. Corbyn capitulated on every fundamental question, from Trident to NATO to the antisemitism smear campaign, and then, through his own party, banned revolutionary organisations by name. These were not accidents. They were the political choices of men committed to reforming capitalism. And capitalism cannot be reformed.

The Real Lesson

The Economist and its “left” critics share one assumption: that the fate of the working class is decided inside parties of the capitalist state. Britain’s real lesson runs the opposite way. Every attempt to transform Labour from Bevan to Benn to Militant to Corbyn ended in defeat. Each defeat strengthened the right and left workers disarmed before the next attack. The question facing American workers is not how to make the Democratic Party electable, nor how to capture it. The question is how to break from it.

That means building rank‑and‑file committees in factories, warehouses, schools, and hospitals independent of the union bureaucracies that serve the Democrats. It means building an independent working-class political party based on an internationalist and socialist programme. Such a party would oppose war, the authoritarian turn of the Trump administration, and the capitalist profit system that produces both. The Economist is right to fear socialism. It is wrong only about where the danger is coming from.

🟥 1. On the Democratic Party and ruling‑class strategy

  • “The Democratic Party and the crisis of American democracy” Explains how the Democrats function as a stabilising instrument for US capitalism and why the ruling class demands internal discipline and purges.
  • “The Democrats’ war against the left” Analyses repeated efforts by the Democratic establishment to suppress left‑wing sentiment, including attacks on Sanders supporters and youth radicalisation.
  • “The ruling class fears the growth of anti‑capitalist sentiment” A broader examination of why elite institutions panic when polls show rising support for socialism among young people.

🟥 2. On the DSA and pseudo‑left politics

  • “What is the Democratic Socialists of America?” A foundational critique of the DSA as a middle‑class, pro‑Democratic Party formation incapable of representing working‑class interests.
  • “DSA and the politics of the pseudo‑left” Explains why the ruling class does not fear the DSA itself, but fears the social anger that drives people toward anything labelled socialist.
  • “The DSA and the crisis of American capitalism” Connects the organisation’s growth to worsening living standards, inequality, and political instability.

🟥 3. On generational radicalisation and polls showing support for socialism

  • “Why young people are turning toward socialism” Discusses the economic and political conditions—student debt, precarious work, war, authoritarianism—that are producing a leftward shift.
  • “Poll shows majority of young Americans view socialism favourably” WSWS analysis of the widely cited poll you mention, placing it in the context of a broader crisis of legitimacy for American capitalism.

🟥 4. On historical parallels: Militant, Kinnock, and Labour’s purge

  • “Lessons of the purge of the Labour left”: A detailed historical analysis of Kinnock’s campaign against Militant and how it prepared the ground for Blairism.
  • “The Economist and the rewriting of Labour history” Critiques establishment media attempts to use the Militant precedent to justify new purges in contemporary politics.

🟥 5. On elite media interventions (including The Economist)

  • “The media and the suppression of socialist politics” Examines how outlets like The Economist act as ideological instruments of the ruling class, issuing directives rather than analysis.
  • “The Economist warns of rising left‑wing sentiment”: A direct WSWS response to similar interventions, analysing the class interests behind them.

Oligarchy: Trump and the Breakdown of American Democracy, edited by David North, Mehring Books, 2026, 393 pp., $29.95

A Marxist Intervention into a Degraded Political Literature

Over the past decade, an enormous, largely superficial literature on Donald Trump has accumulated. It comprises memoirs by disillusioned staffers, psychological profiles, insider gossip, and endless liberal laments over violated norms. Yet this genre seldom asks the only question that matters to anyone seeking to understand the crisis of American democracy: In whose class interests does Trump rule? The new Mehring Books volume, *Oligarchy: Trump and the Breakdown of American Democracy*, edited by David North, chairperson of the International Editorial Board of the World Socialist Web Site, puts that question at the centre of its analysis and answers it with uncompromising clarity.

North’s foreword opens by rejecting the two dominant bourgeois explanations for Trump’s rise. The first, favoured by the liberal establishment, casts Trump as a monstrous aberration—a freakish intrusion into an otherwise healthy democratic system. The second, its reactionary mirror image, depicts him as a demonic political genius, a singular figure imposing his will on a helpless nation. Both explanations share the same flaw: they reduce a profound social process to one individual’s personality, obscuring the class forces that produced Trump and the material interests he serves.

Against these illusions, the volume insists on a historical materialist truth: Trump is not the cause of oligarchic rule but its political instrument. He did not create the conditions for authoritarianism; he emerged from them. His ascent reflects the interests of a financial oligarchy whose wealth and power have grown to grotesque proportions and whose relationship with democratic forms of rule has become openly hostile.

The book uses stark figures to make this reality clear. More than 900 American billionaires now control roughly $8.2 trillion—nearly twice the wealth of the population’s bottom half. Their political interventions are decisive, not symbolic. In 2024, Elon Musk spent more than $250 million to return Trump to the White House. It was rewarded with the Department of Government Efficiency, which he used to dismantle regulatory agencies and social programmes. Musk was not alone: Peter Thiel, Larry Ellison and Jeff Bezos, who had cultivated a liberal image for years, aligned themselves with a would-be dictator. They concluded that authoritarian rule would protect their wealth more reliably than the decaying institutions of bourgeois democracy.

This is the central argument of *Oligarchy*: Trumpism is not a departure from American capitalism, but its logical outcome amid terminal decline. The book places Trump’s rise within a half-century of economic and political degeneration. It examines the end of dollar–gold convertibility in 1971, the collapse of the postwar monetary order, decades of deindustrialisation, the trade union bureaucracy’s suppression of class struggle, the growth of financial parasitism, and the Stalinist dissolution of the USSR in 1991, which removed the last external restraint on American militarism. Trump did not create these processes; he is their political crystallisation.

By grounding its analysis in class relations rather than personality cults, the volume cuts through the fog of liberal moralism and reactionary mythmaking. It demonstrates that the crisis of American democracy cannot be understood through psychological speculation or appeals to civic virtue. It must be understood as the political expression of a ruling class that has become irreconcilably hostile to democratic constraints.

In this sense, *Oligarchy* is more than a book about Trump: it examines the social order that produced him and warns that defending democratic rights requires a struggle against the oligarchic power he represents. For workers and young people seeking to understand how American democracy reached its current state, this volume is indispensable.

The Oligarchs Behind the Throne

The book marshals figures that reveal Trumpism’s real social foundation. More than nine hundred American billionaires now control approximately eight point two trillion dollars—nearly twice the wealth held by the bottom half of the population. This concentration of wealth is no incidental feature of contemporary capitalism; it is the essential precondition for the political phenomena the book analyses. Trumpism is rooted in the interests of a ruling class whose fortunes have reached levels incompatible with democratic rule. The oligarchs who dominate American society have concluded that the traditional mechanisms of bourgeois democracy no longer reliably defend their wealth. Their turn toward authoritarianism is not a matter of personal preference, but of class necessity.

The book offers concrete examples of this oligarchic layer’s direct intervention in politics. In 2024, Elon Musk spent more than $250 million to help return Trump to the White House. In return, he gained the Department of Government Efficiency, a new bureaucratic instrument he used to dismantle regulatory bodies, social programmes, and environmental protections. Musk’s actions were not the eccentricities of one billionaire; they formed part of a coordinated movement among the financial elite. Peter Thiel, Larry Ellison, and Jeff Bezos, who had cultivated a liberal image for years, also threw their support behind Trump. Bezos’s shift was especially revealing: his earlier image as a socially progressive billionaire collapsed when preserving his wealth required authoritarian rule. The book shows that these figures did not merely support Trump as individuals. They represented a class whose interests were threatened by political instability and growing anger among the working population.

The oligarchs concluded that the decaying institutions of bourgeois democracy could no longer guarantee their dominance. Trump was their solution. He offered a form of rule that dispensed with the constraints of constitutional procedure and replaced them with executive fiat, militarised repression, and the cultivation of a fascist movement. The book argues that Trumpism is not an aberration but the political expression of a ruling class that has exhausted the democratic forms through which it once governed. The oligarchs did not choose Trump because he was charismatic or ideologically aligned with them. They chose him because he was willing to act as the instrument of their interests, and because his contempt for democratic norms made him uniquely suited to the tasks they required.

The book situates this development within a broader historical trajectory. The rise of Trumpism is inseparable from the long decline of American capitalism. The end of dollar–gold convertibility in 1971, the collapse of the postwar monetary order, decades of deindustrialisation, the trade union bureaucracy’s suppression of class struggle, and the hypertrophy of financial parasitism created a social landscape defined by inequality, insecurity, and political decay. The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 removed the last external restraint on American militarism and opened a period of unending war. These processes eroded the foundations of democratic governance and produced a ruling class increasingly reliant on coercion rather than consent.

In this context, the oligarchs’ support for Trump appears not as a sudden departure but as the culmination of a long process. The book shows that the financial elite did not merely tolerate Trump’s authoritarian tendencies. They encouraged them, financed them, and integrated them into the machinery of the state. Their actions reveal a ruling class that has abandoned any commitment to democratic principles and embraced a form of governance that protects its wealth through repression and violence.

The book’s analysis is therefore not limited to Trump as an individual. It is a study of the social order that produced him. It demonstrates that the crisis of American democracy cannot be understood through psychological speculation or moral condemnation. It must be understood as the political expression of a ruling class whose interests have become irreconcilable with democratic constraints. Trumpism is the form of rule that emerges when oligarchic wealth reaches a point where democracy becomes an obstacle rather than a mechanism of governance.

A History Written in Real Time

The book’s distinctive value lies in its method. It is not a retrospective reconstruction shaped by hindsight or by the smoothing effects of historical distance. It is a chronicle written as events unfolded, drawn from thousands of articles, statements, and lectures published by the World Socialist Web Site between 2015 and 2026. Each text was produced when the outcome of events was still uncertain, the political crisis was developing in real time, and the broader public had not yet fully recognised the dangers confronting the working class. Read sequentially, these documents form a running record of a political catastrophe. They show how a Marxist analysis, rooted in class relations rather than personality cults, made it possible to identify the emergence of a fascist conspiracy at a time when the media and political establishment dismissed it as bluster or theatrical excess.

The book shows that the WSWS could foresee the trajectory of Trumpism because it treated the phenomenon not as a psychological curiosity but as the political expression of deep historical processes. The rise of Trump is situated within the long decline of American capitalism, a decline that unfolded over half a century and reshaped every aspect of social and political life. The volume traces this decline through several decisive stages. It begins with the end of dollar–gold convertibility in 1971, which shattered the postwar monetary order and inaugurated a period of financial instability. It examines the decades of deindustrialisation that followed, during which entire regions of the United States were stripped of their industrial base and millions of workers were thrown into economic insecurity.

The book also analyses how the trade union bureaucracy suppressed class struggle, transforming unions from defensive working-class organisations into instruments of corporate management. This suppression created a political vacuum that reactionary forces could exploit. The hypertrophy of financial parasitism further intensified the crisis. The growth of speculative capital, Wall Street’s dominance over productive industry, and the economy’s transformation into a mechanism for enriching a narrow elite produced levels of inequality incompatible with democratic stability.

Finally, the volume emphasises the significance of the Stalinist dissolution of the USSR in 1991. This event removed the last external restraint on American militarism and opened a period of unbroken war. The United States embarked on a global campaign of military interventions, coups, and occupations, and the methods used abroad increasingly shaped domestic political life. The erosion of democratic norms, the expansion of executive power, and the militarisation of the state were not accidental developments. They were the internal consequences of imperialist policy.

This is the historical terrain on which Trump emerged. The book shows that you cannot understand his rise apart from these long-term processes. Trumpism is not an aberration but the political crystallisation of a declining social order. The WSWS recognised this because it analysed events through the lens of class struggle and historical materialism. The book’s method is therefore inseparable from its conclusions. It demonstrates that only a Marxist perspective can make sense of the crisis of American democracy and reveal the forces driving it toward authoritarian rule.

Part One (2015–2020): The Social Roots of Trumpism

Part One examines the conditions that produced Trump. It begins from the premise that his rise cannot be understood apart from the social devastation inflicted on the American working class, the bipartisan commitment to imperialist war, and the Democratic Party’s promotion of identity politics as a substitute for any challenge to capitalist power. The book shows that Trump did not emerge from a political vacuum. He arose from a society marked by inequality, militarism, and the systematic suppression of class struggle. These conditions were not created by one party or one administration. They were the cumulative product of decades in which both parties of the ruling class dismantled social protections, enriched the financial elite, and cultivated forms of politics that obscured the real sources of social misery.

A central contribution of the WSWS during this period was its early rejection of the slander, promoted by Democrats and the media, that Trump was the creation of a reactionary white working class. This narrative served two essential purposes. First, it absolved the two-party system of responsibility for the social catastrophe it had produced. By blaming workers for Trump’s rise, the political establishment avoided any examination of the policies that had destroyed jobs, gutted communities, and created the conditions for widespread anger. Second, it redirected popular anger downward, away from the financial elite from which Trump himself emerged. The myth of the reactionary worker transformed legitimate social grievances into a moral failing. It let the ruling class present itself as democracy’s defender against the very people it had impoverished.

The book shows that this narrative was not merely false but politically dangerous. It obscured the real class forces behind Trump and prevented any serious analysis of the authoritarian tendencies developing within the state. The WSWS insisted that Trump’s base was not the working class but sections of the petty bourgeoisie, elements of the police and military, and layers of the financial elite who saw in him a vehicle for their interests. This analysis shows the first term not as chaotic improvisation but as the deliberate laying of foundations for a fascist movement.

The first term witnessed the growth of armed militias, the encouragement of vigilante violence, and the cultivation of a political culture defined by resentment and nationalism. Anti-immigrant agitation became a central organising principle of the administration, used to divide workers and legitimise the expansion of state repression. Executive power grew rapidly, with Trump asserting the right to override legal constraints and govern through decree. These developments were not isolated episodes. They formed part of a coherent political strategy to create a movement capable of overturning democratic norms and establishing a form of rule suited to the oligarchy’s needs.

Part One therefore provides more than a chronicle of events. It offers a framework for understanding how social decay, political opportunism, and class interests combined to produce a movement that threatened the foundations of American democracy. It shows that Trumpism was not an accident but the expression of a ruling class that had lost confidence in democratic mechanisms and turned toward authoritarian solutions.

Part Two: The 2020 Coup and Its Cover‑Up

Part Two reconstructs the conspiracy to overturn the 2020 election and shows that January 6 was not an eruption of spontaneous chaos but the culmination of a coordinated effort to nullify the vote and impose authoritarian rule. The book presents January 6 as the endpoint of a months-long plot involving parts of the Republican Party, layers of the state apparatus, and influential figures in the financial elite. Trump was the figurehead of this operation, but he was not its sole architect. The conspiracy developed through legal challenges, pressure campaigns, the mobilisation of fascist groups, and the deliberate creation of conditions in which violence could be used to achieve political ends.

The WSWS identified this danger early because it analysed the unfolding crisis through the lens of class interests rather than through the personal behaviour of Trump. The book shows that the coup attempt was rooted in the needs of an oligarchy that viewed democratic procedures as an obstacle to its wealth and power. The refusal to accept the election results was not a psychological reaction but a political strategy. It aimed to create a precedent for overturning future elections and to establish a form of rule in which executive authority could override constitutional constraints.

The Biden administration’s response is presented as a cover-up. By reducing the conspiracy to the actions of one man and a mob, Biden shielded the network of officials, financiers, and Republican leaders who orchestrated the plot. The administration insisted that the country needed a strong Republican Party, even as that party had just attempted to overturn an election. The January 6 committee spent eighteen months narrowing its investigation until it resembled a criminal case against a single individual rather than an examination of a broad political conspiracy. This approach protected the stability of the two-party system and kept from exposure the class interests that drove the coup attempt.

The book argues that the cover-up was not a failure of political courage but a deliberate act. The Democratic Party shares with the Republicans a commitment to defending oligarchic wealth and American imperialism. To expose the real forces behind January 6 would have required confronting the financial elite, the military and police apparatus, and the political structures that sustain capitalist rule. The Democrats chose instead to present the coup as an aberration, a moment of madness, rather than as the logical outcome of decades of social decay and political reaction.

Eric London’s August 2021 lecture on the social origins of the conspiracy stands out as one of the volume’s most incisive analyses. London traces the roots of the coup attempt to the long decline of American capitalism, rising social inequality, and the ruling class’s increasing reliance on authoritarian methods. He shows that January 6 was not an isolated event but part of a broader movement toward oligarchic rule. His lecture provides the theoretical foundation for understanding why the coup occurred and why the political establishment refused to confront its real causes. Part Two therefore offers more than a narrative of January 6. It provides a framework for understanding the breakdown of American democracy and the class forces driving it.

Part Three: The Second Term and the Open Dictatorship of the Oligarchy

Part Three chronicles the second Trump administration and presents it as the moment when the oligarchy assumed direct command of the state. The book shows that the first term’s authoritarian tendencies not only intensified but also became systematised. What had previously been preparatory measures became the foundation of a new form of rule. The administration operated on the premise that democratic norms were obstacles to be circumvented and that preserving oligarchic wealth required using state power in its most coercive form.

One defining feature of the second term was the declaration of a state of exception. Drawn from the theory of authoritarian rule, this concept refers to a situation in which the executive claims the right to suspend legal constraints in the name of national security or public order. The book shows that this declaration did not respond to any genuine emergency. It was a political instrument used to concentrate power in the presidency and create a legal environment in which repression could occur without accountability. The state of exception became the framework through which the administration justified its actions, from domestic deployments to foreign interventions.

The book documents the deployment of ICE paramilitaries and federal troops into American cities. These forces were used not to protect the population but to intimidate it. Their presence in urban centres signalled a shift from traditional policing to militarised occupation. The administration relied on these units to suppress protests, break strikes, and enforce executive directives. The use of paramilitary forces against civilians revealed the extent to which the state had been transformed into an instrument of oligarchic rule.

The killings carried out by federal agents, including the atrocities in Minneapolis in January 2026, are presented as emblematic of this transformation. The book treats these events not as isolated abuses but as expressions of a political strategy that relied on terror to maintain control. The violence in Minneapolis demonstrated the willingness of the administration to use lethal force against the population and the inability of existing institutions to restrain it. The response of the political establishment, which sought to minimise or justify the killings, further exposed the complicity of both parties in the erosion of democratic rights.

The second term also saw the illegal invasion of Venezuela. This action was justified through familiar rhetoric about restoring order and promoting democracy, but the book shows that its real purpose was to secure strategic and economic interests. The invasion marked a new stage in American imperialism, one in which military aggression was carried out without even the pretence of congressional oversight. The war against Iran, launched on February 28, 2026, followed the same pattern. It was an act of aggression driven by geopolitical calculations and carried out solely under the executive’s authority.

Part Three presents these developments as the anatomy of an authoritarian regime serving capitalist interests. It shows that the second Trump administration did not merely violate democratic norms. It replaced them with a system of rule designed to protect the oligarchy’s wealth and power through repression, militarism, and the dismantling of constitutional constraints.

Accomplices and Enablers: Republicans, Democrats, and the Pseudo‑Left

The book’s most politically significant sections focus not on Trump himself but on the forces that made his rise possible. Trump did not ascend to power through personal magnetism or ideological coherence. A ruling class saw him as a useful instrument, and political institutions that had long abandoned democratic principles elevated him. The book therefore turns its attention to the Republicans, the Democrats, and the pseudo-left, showing how each played an indispensable role in the breakdown of American democracy.

The Republicans are presented as willing accomplices. They embraced Trump as the vehicle for oligarchic rule and recognised that his contempt for democratic norms aligned with their own strategic interests. The party leadership understood that Trump’s authoritarian tendencies could be harnessed to implement policies that enriched the financial elite, expanded military power, and dismantled regulatory constraints. The book shows that Republican support for Trump was not reluctant or tactical. It was enthusiastic and rooted in a shared class outlook. Trump did not cause the party’s transformation into an openly reactionary force. It predated him and made his rise possible.

The book portrays the Democrats as indispensable enablers. The book argues that the Democratic Party is ruthless against opponents on its left but impotent against Trump because it shares his commitment to defending capitalist wealth and American imperialism. The record is damning. After the 2016 election, Barack Obama described the contest as a scrimmage between members of the same team, revealing how both parties operate within a shared ideological framework. Two days after the events of January 6, Joe Biden declared that the country needed a strong Republican Party, even though that party had just attempted to overturn an election. The January 6 committee spent eighteen months reducing a broad conspiracy to the crimes of one man, thereby shielding the network of officials, financiers, and political operatives who orchestrated the plot. The Biden administration served as an interregnum devoted to securing bipartisan support for war in Ukraine and for policies that contributed to the suffering of civilians in Gaza. These actions show that the Democrats’ primary concern was not defending democratic institutions but preserving the stability of the two-party system and protecting the interests of the ruling class.

The book also examines the role of the pseudo-left. Figures such as Bernie Sanders denounced the billionaire class in rhetoric but ultimately reinforced the Democratic Party’s authority. Sanders endorsed Hillary Clinton in 2016 and later offered to work with Trump, signalling his willingness to subordinate social opposition to the needs of the political establishment. Jacobin, the magazine associated with the Democratic Socialists of America, avoided the coup almost entirely. Its silence reflected a political orientation that prioritised access to the Democratic Party over any serious confrontation with the forces threatening democratic rights. The pseudo-left is presented as a political tendency that channels social anger back into bourgeois political structures and prevents the emergence of an independent working-class movement.

By analysing these forces together, the book shows that Trumpism was not an isolated phenomenon. It expressed a political system in which both major parties and their ideological satellites had abandoned any commitment to democratic principles. The Republicans acted as the architects of authoritarian rule. The Democrats provided the cover that allowed it to develop—the pseudo-left neutralised opposition from below. Trump benefited from this alignment, but the forces that sustained him were far larger and far more dangerous than any individual.

The Social Opposition and the Question of Leadership

Against this record of capitulation from the political establishment, the book documents a continuous and determined opposition from below. It begins with the mass protests that erupted on Trump’s first day in office, demonstrations that revealed a broad social revulsion toward authoritarianism and inequality. It continues through the multiracial uprising that followed the murder of George Floyd, an eruption of anger that exposed the brutality of the American state and the depth of social injustice. The book then turns to the No Kings demonstrations of 2025 and 2026, the largest single-day protests in American history, in which millions rejected attempts to impose monarchical or dictatorial rule. These movements were spontaneous, diverse, and often politically inchoate, but they expressed a profound social reality. The objective basis for a mass socialist movement exists. What is missing is conscious revolutionary leadership.

The programme advanced by the volume is therefore clear and uncompromising. It calls for forming rank-and-file committees independent of the union bureaucracy, which has long served as an instrument of corporate management and a barrier to genuine working-class struggle. It insists on the working class’s political independence from both capitalist parties, rejecting the illusion that the Democratic Party can serve as a vehicle for social reform or democratic renewal. It advocates the international unification of workers in the struggle against war and fascism on a socialist programme, recognising that the crisis of American democracy is inseparable from the global crisis of capitalism and cannot be resolved within national boundaries.

The book situates this programme within a broader historical framework. It appears on the eve of the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the American Revolution, a moment that invites reflection on the democratic principles that shaped the nation’s origins. The volume argues that a ruling class openly contemptuous of 1776’s egalitarian ideals now governs the country. The commitment to popular sovereignty, equality, and resistance to tyranny that animated the first American Revolution has been replaced by a political order defined by oligarchic wealth, militarism, and authoritarianism.

The book connects this contempt to the WSWS’s polemic against the New York Times’ 1619 Project. That project sought to recast the American Revolution and the Civil War as episodes in an eternal racial conflict, stripping them of their democratic content and obscuring their significance as revolutionary struggles. The volume argues that such interpretations serve the interests of a ruling class that wishes to sever the working class from its own revolutionary heritage. By reducing the past to racial antagonism, the 1619 Project denies the possibility of universal emancipation and undermines the historical foundations of a socialist movement.

The democratic principles of the first two American revolutions can be defended and extended only by a third. The book insists that the working class must conquer political power and reorganise economic life on socialist foundations. This is not a rhetorical flourish but a historical conclusion drawn from the contradictions of contemporary capitalism. The concentration of wealth, the militarisation of society, the erosion of democratic institutions, and the descent into perpetual war have created conditions in which democratic rights cannot survive without a fundamental transformation of the social order. The working class must complete the unfinished tasks of American history by establishing a society based on equality, rational planning, and collective ownership.

The book closes with a fictional Letter from Afar by Abraham Lincoln. This device allows the authors to draw a direct line between the moral and political struggles of the nineteenth century and those of the present. In the letter, Lincoln argues that capitalism today is as intolerable as slavery was in his time. He insists that Trump is a symptom, not the disease, and that the real enemy is a social system that produces inequality, violence, and authoritarianism. The letter reminds us that the fight for democracy has always required revolutionary action and that the working class must assume the role once played by the abolitionists and the soldiers of the Union Army.

The book’s conclusion is stark and unambiguous. Humanity faces a choice between fascism and socialism. Reforms, appeals to civility, and reliance on existing political institutions cannot resolve the crisis of American democracy. It requires a conscious working-class movement, armed with a socialist programme and guided by historical understanding. Oligarchy is essential reading for every worker and young person seeking to understand how American democracy reached this point and what must be done to prevent catastrophe. It calls for action and warns that today’s choices will determine the future.

Bibliography

North, David, ed. Oligarchy: Trump and the Breakdown of American Democracy. Mehring Books, 2026.

North, David. “Foreword.” In Oligarchy: Trump and the Breakdown of American Democracy. Mehring Books, 2026.

London, Eric. “The Social Origins of the January 6 Conspiracy.” Lecture delivered August 2021. World Socialist Web Site.

International Editorial Board of the World Socialist Web Site. Articles, statements, and analyses published between 2015 and 2026. World Socialist Web Site. https://www.wsws.org

World Socialist Web Site. Coverage of the 2020 election crisis, the January 6 coup attempt, and the second Trump administration. https://www.wsws.org

World Socialist Web Site. “The New York Times’ 1619 Project and the Falsification of History.” Series of articles and critiques, 2019–2020.

North, David. The New York Times’ 1619 Project and the Racialist Falsification of History. Mehring Books, 2021.

North, David. The Crisis of American Democracy: The Political and Social Roots of the Breakdown. Mehring Books, 2024.

Mehring Books. Publications on American politics, imperialism, and the crisis of capitalism, 2015–2026. https://mehring.com

Federal Reserve Data. Wealth distribution statistics for American billionaires and the bottom half of the population, 2024–2026.

Public campaign finance records. Documentation of political contributions by Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, Larry Ellison, and Jeff Bezos, 2023–2024.

United States Department of Defence. Public statements and records relating to military operations in Venezuela and Iran, 2025–2026.

United States Department of Homeland Security. Public records concerning ICE deployments and federal paramilitary actions, 2025–2026.

Historical sources on the American Revolution and Civil War—primary documents from 1776 and 1861, including speeches, letters, and constitutional debates.

Lincoln, Abraham. “Letter from Afar.” Fictional reconstruction in Oligarchy: Trump and the Breakdown of American Democracy. Mehring Books, 2026.

Podcast Episode: Bread, Circuses and Balance Sheets: The IFR’s State of the Game and the Crisis o

Pip: A 244-page government report concludes that English football generates nine billion pounds a year and nearly every club loses money — and calls this a paradox. freerein61 has a different word for it.

Mara: The post is a Marxist reading of the Independent Football Regulator's State of the Game report, covering financialisation, ownership, labour, and what a regulator can and cannot do. Let's start with the report itself and what it actually reveals.

Bread, Circuses and Balance Sheets: The IFR's Report and Capitalist Football

Pip: The IFR presents its State of the Game report as sober, technocratic analysis — a neutral audit of English football's finances. The post's argument is that the document is actually something more uncomfortable: an accidental indictment of the system the regulator was built to protect.

Mara: The post frames it this way: "Its authors describe a 'paradox' at the heart of the sport: unprecedented wealth alongside systemic insolvency. A Marxist analysis shows there is no paradox at all. What the IFR calls a puzzle is simply capitalism's logic asserting itself with brutal clarity."

Pip: That reframe is the spine of the whole piece. If the wealth and the insolvency are not separate phenomena but two sides of the same process, then the regulator's toolkit — stress tests, action plans, enhanced oversight — is aimed at the wrong target entirely.

Mara: The numbers bear that out. Premier League revenue has grown thirty-fold since 1992, but costs have risen faster. Ninety-four per cent of clubs in the top five divisions lose money. The post notes that seventeen EFL and National League clubs would lose money even if they paid their players nothing — which rather undercuts the report's framing of wage inflation as the root cause.

Pip: So the disease is structural, and the regulator is prescribing paracetamol.

Mara: On financialisation specifically, the data are striking. Transfer factoring has increased fourteen-fold in four years. One point two billion pounds in future transfer receipts has already been sold. Interest payments have quadrupled. Five lenders control 93.6 per cent of the transfer finance market. The post reads this as fictitious capital in Marx's strict sense — value that does not yet exist, monetised and spent before it is earned.

Pip: Clubs selling tomorrow's income to survive today's arms race. The post is clear that this is not mismanagement; it is what the structure compels.

Mara: Ownership tells a similar story. Non-domestic owners control 75 per cent of Premier League revenue. North American capital controls nearly half the pyramid. The average indicative return across clubs is minus 41 per cent, yet capital keeps flowing in. The post argues this is not irrational — football offers soft power, speculative upside, and, as the IFR itself notes, exposure to money laundering through offshore structures and opaque sponsorship arrangements.

Pip: A loss-making investment that doubles as a geopolitical branding exercise and a conduit for surplus capital. The post also takes the regulator's own stated priorities as evidence of its limits — its first distribution goal is preserving the Premier League as the world's leading league, and the top club earns 605 times the revenue of the smallest National League side.

Mara: Engels described the capitalist state as the "ideal collective capitalist" — managing the system's common affairs to preserve it as a whole. The post applies that framework directly to the IFR: a regulator the Premier League endorsed, whose tools stop well short of challenging debt dependency, multi-club ownership, or the private model itself.

Pip: Fans get a voice, not a vote. Supporters must be "considered." The post's alternative — pooled broadcast income, debt caps, 50-plus-one ownership, community control of grounds — is framed not as utopian but as the minimum required to reverse what the report documents.

Mara: The closing argument is that the IFR has produced the most detailed evidence yet of football's transformation into a financial asset class, while its prescriptions aim only to make that asset class more orderly. The regulator can manage symptoms; it cannot cure the disease.

Pip: Which means the most damning thing about the report is not what it gets wrong — it's how much it gets right, and what it refuses to conclude.


Mara: The IFR's own data make the case that the post is arguing — the regulator just declines to follow it to its conclusion.

Pip: A 244-page document that describes the disease in forensic detail and then recommends better handwashing. The next episode will have more to say about who gets to ask the harder questions.

Bread, Circuses and Balance Sheets: The IFR’s State of the Game and the Crisis of Capitalist Football

The Independent Football Regulator’s State of the Game report presents itself as a sober, technocratic assessment of English football’s financial health. In reality, it is an extraordinary document: a 244-page anatomy of a social institution hollowed out by capitalist irrationality—and an unwitting indictment of the very economic system the regulator exists to stabilise. Its authors describe a “paradox” at the heart of the sport: unprecedented wealth alongside systemic insolvency. A Marxist analysis shows there is no paradox at all. What the IFR calls a puzzle is simply capitalism’s logic asserting itself with brutal clarity.

English football today is the clearest example of competitive accumulation. Clubs are compelled to spend beyond their means—not because they are reckless or poorly managed, but because the industry’s structure leaves them little choice. Since 1992, Premier League revenue has grown thirty-fold, far outpacing the wider economy, while costs have risen even faster. Ninety-four per cent of clubs in the top five divisions lose money. This is not a departure from capitalist norms; it is their fulfilment. The IFR cannot acknowledge this, because doing so would mean admitting that the crisis is systemic, not accidental.

The report’s own data show how sport has been transformed into a financial asset class. Labour-power is converted into amortised capital, future transfer fees are sold off as fictitious capital, grounds and badges are pledged as collateral, and a handful of lenders extract value regardless of sporting outcomes. Football has become a site of financialisation, governed not by sporting logic but by the imperatives of debt, leverage and speculative investment. The IFR documents this process in forensic detail while refusing to confront its implications.

Ownership patterns point to the same reality: global capital, multi-club networks, and North American investment groups dominate the game. Returns are overwhelmingly negative, yet capital keeps flowing in—not for sporting reasons, but because football offers global reach, cultural legitimacy, and opportunities for speculation, soft power, and, as the report notes, money laundering.

The regulator’s role is not to challenge this system, but to preserve it. Its proposals amount to managerial tinkering that keeps the Premier League dominant and the pyramid intact, while leaving the underlying relations of ownership, finance, and exploitation untouched. Rather than resolve football’s contradictions, the IFR merely catalogues them, revealing the need for a fundamentally different model.

The so‑called paradox: wealth without stability

David Kogan’s foreword presents English football as both the world’s richest, most competitive league system and one on the verge of collapse. The figures are stark: clubs generated £9 billion in revenue last season, yet 94 per cent of those in the top five divisions lost money. No other major industry could report such figures without prompting immediate questions about systemic failure. Yet the IFR treats this as a managerial problem: poor governance, inadequate oversight, and clubs failing to “live within their means.” This is the ideological reflex of bourgeois regulation: to blame crises on individual actors’ behaviour rather than on the system’s structure.

A Marxist analysis begins from the opposite premise. When nearly every firm in an industry fails in the same way, the cause lies not in management but in the structure of accumulation. Marx explained long ago that competition forces capitalists to expand, invest and outspend their rivals to survive. The capitalist does not accumulate because he is greedy or irrational; the system compels him to. English football clearly illustrates this dynamic. Clubs spend beyond their means not because they are reckless, but because they have to. Falling behind in the competitive arms race risks relegation, lost broadcast income, collapsing commercial revenue and, ultimately, extinction.

The IFR’s own data confirm this. Since 1992, Premier League revenue has grown thirty-fold, far outpacing the wider economy, while costs have risen even faster. Wage bills, transfer amortisation, agent fees, stadium financing, and debt servicing have all increased alongside revenue. The report presents this as a failure of “financial management,” as if clubs could spend less without jeopardising their competitive position. But in a system driven by accumulation, restraint is punished. A club that refuses to overspend isn’t prudent; it gets relegated.

This is why the IFR cannot acknowledge the crisis’s real nature. To do so would mean admitting that the contradictions it describes are not deviations from normal capitalist functioning, but its inevitable outcome. The regulator must therefore frame the crisis as a technical problem—liquidity, governance, and risk—rather than a structural one. It must pretend that stress tests, action plans, and “enhanced oversight” can correct football’s financial instability, rather than fundamentally transforming ownership, finance, and distribution.

The report’s language reflects this ideological constraint. Kogan describes a “paradox”: unprecedented wealth alongside systemic insolvency, as though the two were unrelated phenomena that mysteriously coexist. But there is no paradox: wealth and insolvency are two sides of the same process. The more revenue the game generates, the more capital flows in. The more capital flows in, the sharper the competitive pressures become. As those pressures intensify, clubs must spend more, and their losses deepen. The IFR describes the symptoms while refusing to name the disease.

The Political Economy of Football’s Financialisation

To understand the IFR’s findings, we should place English football within the broader political economy of late capitalism. Over the past three decades, it has undergone the same transformation as other major sectors of the global economy: a shift from production to financialisation, from profits generated through activity to profits extracted through ownership, leverage and speculation. Once a commercial entertainment industry, football has become a financial asset class, governed less by sporting logic than by the imperatives of capital accumulation.

This transformation did not happen overnight. Football’s first metamorphosis—from a working-class pastime to a commercial commodity—came in the early twentieth century. Its second, from commodity to global media product, gathered pace with television and culminated in the Premier League’s 1992 reorganisation. But the decisive shift came after the 2008 financial crisis, when the collapse of productive investment across advanced capitalist economies pushed capital into new fields of speculation. With its global reach, predictable revenue streams and intense brand loyalty, football became an ideal arena for financial expansion.

Financialisation means that profit comes less from producing goods or services and more from manipulating financial instruments. In football, it turns every aspect of the sport into a tradable asset. Player contracts are amortised like industrial machinery; future transfer fees are sold as receivables; and stadiums, training grounds and even club badges are used as collateral. Multi-club ownership groups operate like private equity portfolios, moving players, revenues and liabilities across borders to maximise returns. Debt is no longer a temporary burden but a permanent operating condition.

The IFR’s own data show the scale of this transformation. Transfer factoring has increased fourteen-fold in four years, and £1.2 billion in future transfer receipts has already been monetised. Interest payments have quadrupled as borrowing costs have surged, while five lenders now control almost the entire transfer finance market. This is no marginal development; it is a structural reorganisation of the sport, driven by the dominance of finance capital.

Marx, Hilferding and Lenin all described how, once dominant, financial capital subordinates productive activity to its own logic. That logic now governs English football. Clubs borrow not to invest in long-term development, but to keep pace with the competitive arms race. They sell future transfer fees not out of prudence, but because the system compels them. Financialisation does not stabilise football; it destabilises it, creating fragility, dependency and exposure to shocks. Relegation clauses mean sporting failure can trigger creditor seizure, reducing clubs to shells through which capital circulates.

Why football? Because it offers what late capitalism craves: scarcity, global visibility, emotional attachment and cultural legitimacy. It is one of the few sectors where losses can be tolerated for years because the club retains symbolic value as an asset. As the IFR notes, the sector is also vulnerable to money laundering, offshore structures, and opaque sponsorship arrangements. Distressed clubs become conduits for capital flows unrelated to sport.

The IFR documents this transformation with forensic detail while refusing to confront its implications. It describes the symptoms of financialisation, debt dependency, factoring, and multi‑club networks, but treats them as technical problems rather than structural ones. It cannot admit that English football’s crisis is not a deviation from capitalist functioning but its fulfilment. To do so would be to question the very model the regulator exists to preserve.

From commodity to media product to financial instrument

Football’s first transformation from a working-class pastime into a commercial commodity occurred in the early 20th century, as clubs evolved from voluntary associations into businesses selling gate receipts, advertising space, and professional players’ labour-power. Its second transformation from commodity to media product followed the rise of television and culminated in the Premier League’s 1992 reorganisation. Broadcasting turned football into a mass-produced cultural product, shaped by scheduling, advertising, and global distribution. But the decisive shift came after the 2008 financial crisis, when football became a financial instrument.

This is not a metaphor; it is literal. Clubs borrow against future transfer fees. Contracts are amortised like industrial machinery. Clubs pledge grounds and badges as collateral. Revenues are securitised. Multi-club groups operate like private equity portfolios. Every component of the sport- labour, infrastructure, intellectual property, and future income- is converted into an asset that can be traded, leveraged, or used as security. The IFR’s data show the scale of this transformation with forensic clarity: transfer factoring has risen fourteen-fold in four years, £1.2 billion of future receipts have already been sold, interest payments have quadrupled as the cost of debt has surged, and five lenders control almost the entire market for transfer finance. This is not a marginal development; it is the sport’s structural reorganisation under the dominance of finance capital.

What Hilferding described in *Finance Capital*- the fusion of banking and industrial capital into a financial oligarchy that extracts value regardless of productive outcomes- is now evident on the balance sheets of English football clubs. Lenin’s analysis of how these oligarchies dominate entire sectors and turn them into instruments of speculation applies with almost uncanny precision. English football has become one of those sectors.

Financialisation means profit comes less from producing goods or services and more from manipulating financial instruments. In football, this shows up in the conversion of every aspect of the sport into tradable assets: player contracts become depreciating capital goods, transfer fees become receivables, stadiums become collateral, clubs become vehicles for debt-fuelled expansion, and multi-club networks become platforms for arbitrage, talent extraction, and regulatory evasion.

The consequences are profound. Financialisation does not stabilise football; it destabilises it, creating fragility, dependency and exposure to shocks. Relegation clauses mean sporting failure can trigger creditor seizure, while clubs become shells through which capital circulates. The IFR documents this fragility but cannot explain it, because doing so would require acknowledging that the instability is structural, not accidental.

Why football? Because it offers exactly what late capitalism craves: scarcity, global visibility, emotional attachment and cultural legitimacy. Few sectors can absorb years of losses while their core asset- the club- retains symbolic value. As the IFR itself notes, football is also vulnerable to money laundering, offshore structures and opaque sponsorship arrangements. Distressed clubs can become conduits for capital flows unrelated to sport.

Financialisation also helps explain why capital continues to flow into football despite negative returns. The IFR reports an average indicative return of minus 41 per cent across clubs, yet ownership is becoming more global, institutional and concentrated. This is not irrational; it reflects financial capital’s pursuit of control over assets it can leverage, securitise, or use to anchor broader commercial ecosystems. A Premier League club is more than a football team: it is a content engine, a data-harvesting platform, a global brand, a political instrument and a financial vehicle.

The IFR describes the symptoms of this transformation- debt dependency, factoring, and multi-club networks- but treats them as technical rather than structural problems. It cannot admit that English football’s crisis is not a deviation from capitalism but its fulfilment. Doing so would mean questioning the very model the regulator exists to preserve.

Why football?

Football is uniquely suited to financialisation because it possesses characteristics that make it a coveted prize for capital. Few industries offer such a potent combination of global reach, emotional intensity, predictable revenue, scarcity and cultural legitimacy. These features are not incidental; they are precisely what make football attractive to finance capital in an era of stagnation, falling productive investment and the search for new fields of extraction.

Its global reach is unmatched. The Premier League reaches hundreds of millions of homes, giving capital access to a ready-made global consumer base. In a world of saturated traditional markets, football offers immediate access to audiences on every continent. Its emotional connection is even more valuable. Football clubs command a level of brand loyalty that no commercial product can replicate. Supporters do not switch allegiances based on price or quality. Their loyalty is inherited, irrational and lifelong. For capital, this is ideal: a captive market whose consumption is driven by identity rather than choice.

Football also offers predictable revenue streams. Broadcast rights, sponsorships, merchandise, digital content and hospitality packages bring in recurring income that can be securitised, borrowed against and bundled into financial products. Predictability is the lifeblood of financialisation. Then there is scarcity. Only a handful of elite clubs exist, and there is just one Premier League. Scarcity drives valuations, intensifies competition among investors and ensures that even failing clubs retain symbolic and financial value.

Finally, football enjoys cultural legitimacy. It presents itself as tradition, community, and heritage, masking the extraction taking place beneath the surface. This legitimacy gives political cover to private equity firms, sovereign wealth funds, and multinational corporations. In a low-growth economy, football offers something rare: an asset class with global visibility and political utility. It serves as a vehicle for surplus capital, a platform for soft power, and, as the IFR itself notes, a conduit for money laundering through offshore structures, opaque transfers, and sponsorship. Football’s financialisation is no accident. It is structural, and the IFR merely catalogues its symptoms.

Financialisation as crisis

Financialisation does not stabilise football; it destabilises it. The IFR’s own data reveal a sport whose financial architecture has been reshaped around debt, leverage and speculative instruments. Debt dependency, transfer factoring, leveraged ownership and sprawling multi-club networks do not build resilience; they create fragility. They tie clubs to financial obligations that become more burdensome precisely when sporting performance declines. Relegation clauses now embedded in most Premier League loans mean sporting failure can trigger creditor seizure when a club is at its weakest. A bad season becomes not just a sporting setback but a financial catastrophe. Clubs stop being community institutions and become shells through which capital circulates.

Factoring shows this dynamic with brutal clarity. When a club sells future transfer receipts to raise cash now, it mortgages tomorrow’s income to cope with today’s pressures. This is fictitious capital in Marx’s strict sense: value that does not yet exist, monetised and traded as if it were already real. The IFR reports that factoring has increased fourteen-fold in four years, with £1.2 billion in future receipts already sold. This is not prudent financial management; it is a symptom of systemic desperation. Clubs are not planning for the future; they are consuming it.

Leveraged ownership compounds the instability. Owners buy clubs with borrowed money, load the debt onto the club, and extract returns through management fees, refinancing, and asset sales. Multi‑club networks extend this logic across borders, treating clubs as nodes in a financial ecosystem rather than as sporting entities. Players move to meet balance‑sheet needs rather than tactical ones. Revenues are shifted to optimise tax and regulatory arbitrage. The club becomes a financial vehicle first and a football team second.

The IFR’s report is, unintentionally, a catalogue of these contradictions. It describes a sport that generates enormous wealth but cannot sustain itself, because financial channels siphon that wealth away before it can stabilise the system. The crisis is not accidental; it is structural. Football’s financial instability is not caused by mismanagement, incompetence or isolated excess. It is the predictable result of reorganising the sport around the imperatives of financial capital. The regulator documents the symptoms but cannot name the cause. Doing so would mean acknowledging that English football’s crisis is not a deviation from capitalism but an expression of it and that no amount of technocratic oversight can resolve contradictions rooted in the system itself.

Labour as a cost, labour as an asset, labour as a battleground

The report’s treatment of labour is revealing. The report presents players almost exclusively as a cost, a liability to manage, rather than as the producers of the commodity behind the game’s enormous revenues. Wage bills have risen 33 per cent across the Premier League pyramid, 32 per cent in the Championship, 71 per cent in League One, and 63 per cent in League Two. Twenty clubs spend more than 80 per cent of their revenue on salaries. The regulator’s response is predictable: cost control, wage restraint, “responsible spending.” In other words, disciplining labour.

First, players are not simply workers; they are labour-power converted into financial assets. Modern football treats labour not just as a production cost but as a capitalised resource. Contracts are amortised like industrial machinery: depreciated over time, securitised, borrowed against and used as collateral in complex financial arrangements. Agent fees, now £584 million, are part of this same machinery, serving as transaction costs in a financialised market for labour-power. The doubling of amortisation to £2.6 billion is no accounting quirk; it marks the conversion of labour into fictitious capital: value that exists only on balance sheets, yet is traded and leveraged as if it were real.

This transformation is central to football’s financialisation: labour-power becomes a financial instrument, with its value fluctuating according to market conditions, performance metrics, and speculative expectations. The IFR describes this process without understanding it, treating amortisation as a technical matter rather than as a structural reorganisation of labour under finance capital.

Second, wage restraint is class struggle. The PFA’s successful challenge to salary caps in 2020, and its current High Court action, are not “governance friction.” They are organised workers resisting an attempt to fix their share of the surplus. The IFR cannot admit this because it would require acknowledging that labour has interests irreconcilable with capital. The regulator’s framework assumes harmony among stakeholders, owners, leagues, players, and fans, and treats conflict as a managerial problem. But wage restraint is not a governance issue. It is a matter of class power.

The report’s language exposes this ideological blind spot. It describes wage inflation as a “risk,” a “pressure,” and a “threat to sustainability.” Nowhere does the IFR consider that rising wages reflect labour’s bargaining strength in a sector where workers create enormous value. The regulator’s job is to protect clubs’ financial stability, not workers’ living standards or bargaining power. As a result, it frames wage growth as a pathology rather than as a sign of labour asserting itself.

Third, the category “player wages” masks profound stratification. A Premier League star earning £300,000 a week has little in common with a League Two professional on a precarious one-year deal. Yet the IFR treats “player wages” as a single category, obscuring class divisions across the labour force. The report focuses on elite wage inflation while overlooking the conditions most football workers face: academy staff, cleaners, stewards, groundskeepers, analysts, youth coaches, and hospitality workers. The analysis renders these workers invisible. The IFR’s framework counts their labour only where it intersects with financial risk.

This invisibility is ideological. It reflects the regulator’s assumption that players perform the “real” labour of football, and that the “real” costs are those that affect balance sheets. The thousands of workers who make football possible maintaining stadiums, training youth players, cleaning facilities, managing logistics, providing security, and running matchday operations are treated as background noise. Their exploitation goes unanalysed because it is not financialised.

The most devastating statistic is the one the IFR buries: seventeen EFL and National League clubs would lose money even if they paid their players nothing. That fact alone undermines the report’s central claim that wage inflation is the root problem. If clubs cannot break even without paying a single player, wages are not driving insolvency; the business model is. Ownership structure, reliance on debt, value extraction through financial channels, volatile revenue streams, and the competitive arms race drive the crisis.

But the IFR cannot say so. To do so would mean admitting that labour is not the problem; capital is. It would mean acknowledging that the financialisation of football has created a system that blames workers for a crisis caused by owners, lenders, and speculative investors. It would also mean recognising that wage restraint is not a solution but an attack on labour. The report thus treats labour as a cost to be controlled rather than a source of value. It documents the symptoms of exploitation but refuses to name the exploiters. It catalogues the contradictions in football’s labour market while defending the system that creates them. In doing so, it reveals regulation’s limits under capitalism: labour can be disciplined, but capital cannot be challenged.

Finance capital takes control.

The report’s most explosive revelations concern finance capital’s penetration into every pore of the sport. What the IFR documents, often without grasping its significance, is English football’s near-total subordination to the logic of financialisation. Transfer factoring has increased fourteen-fold in just four years. £1.2 billion in future transfer receipts has already been sold- income that does not yet exist, monetised and spent before a single pound has been earned. Interest payments have surged from £97 million to £455 million as the cost of debt has tripled. Five lenders control 93.6 per cent of transfer finance, with one lender alone controlling nearly half. This is not a competitive market. It is an oligopoly.

None of this is accidental. It is the predictable outcome of reorganising football according to the imperatives of finance capital. Hilferding, writing more than a century ago, described how banking and industrial capital fuse into a single financial oligarchy that extracts value regardless of productive outcomes. Lenin showed how such oligarchies dominate entire sectors, turning them into instruments of speculation. English football is now one of those sectors. The IFR’s data could have been lifted directly from Finance Capital or Imperialism.

Factoring future fees is fictitious capital in Marx’s strict sense: money raised today against value that does not yet exist. Clubs sell tomorrow’s transfer income to survive today’s pressures, mortgaging their future to remain competitive in the present. This is not prudent financial management. It is systemic desperation. The club consumes its future to survive its present.

The collateralisation of heritage assets is equally revealing. Grounds, badges, and training facilities, the physical and symbolic infrastructure of the people’s game, are increasingly pledged as security for loans. The IFR notes that 60 per cent of Premier League clubs have relegation‑triggered repayment clauses. This means sporting failure can trigger creditor seizure. A bad season is no longer merely a sporting setback; it is a financial catastrophe. The club’s identity, history and community assets become bargaining chips in negotiations with lenders.

Leveraged ownership compounds the instability. Owners acquire clubs with borrowed money, load the debt onto the club itself, and extract returns through refinancing, management fees and asset sales. Multi‑club networks extend this logic across borders, treating clubs as nodes in a financial ecosystem rather than as sporting institutions. Players move to meet balance‑sheet needs rather than tactical ones. Revenues are shifted to optimise tax and regulatory arbitrage. Clubs become shells through which capital circulates.

The IFR’s report is, unintentionally, a catalogue of these contradictions. It shows a sport that generates enormous wealth yet cannot sustain itself because financial channels siphon that wealth off before it can stabilise the system. The crisis is not accidental. It is structural. Football’s financial instability is not the result of mismanagement, incompetence or isolated excess. It is the predictable outcome of reorganising the sport according to the imperatives of financial capital.

The regulator documents the symptoms but cannot name the cause. To do so would be to acknowledge that English football’s crisis is not a deviation from capitalism but its expression and that no amount of technocratic oversight can resolve contradictions rooted in the system itself.

Ownership without roots, capital without loyalty

The IFR’s ownership data show a sport transformed into a global asset class. English football is no longer a national game but a marketplace for international capital. Non‑domestic owners now control 75 per cent of Premier League revenue. North American capital controls nearly half of the entire pyramid. Eighty‑five per cent of Premier League clubs belong to multi‑club or multi‑sport groups, integrated into sprawling corporate networks that treat football teams as interchangeable units within a global portfolio. This is not cosmopolitan modernisation. It is the sport’s financial colonisation.

The most striking fact is that returns are overwhelmingly negative. The IFR reports an average indicative return of minus 41 per cent across clubs, with only 21 of 76 making a positive return. Yet capital continues to flow in. The report cannot explain this. It treats negative returns as a puzzle, as though investors were behaving irrationally. But a Marxist analysis can. Capital does not enter football to earn conventional profits. It enters because football offers value extraction, political leverage, and speculative opportunity unavailable in the productive sectors of a low‑growth economy.

Football offers speculative opportunities. Promotion windfalls can transform a club’s valuation overnight. Leveraged buyouts let owners acquire clubs with borrowed money and load the debt onto the club. Asset stripping selling stadium land, training facilities, or intellectual property can generate returns even when the club loses money. The IFR notes that distressed clubs are particularly vulnerable: their financial weakness makes them easy targets for acquisition, refinancing and exploitation. The “community club” becomes a conduit through which capital passes, its heritage assets collateralised, its future income securitised, its identity commodified.

Football also offers soft power. Sovereign wealth funds, oligarchs, and politically connected investors use clubs to project influence, launder reputations, and embed themselves in Western cultural institutions. Ownership becomes a diplomatic tool. The club becomes a platform for geopolitical branding. The IFR acknowledges this obliquely, noting concerns about “suitability” and “integrity,” but it cannot confront the political reality: English football has become a theatre for state power.

Then there is the laundering of surplus capital. In a low‑growth economy, productive investment yields diminishing returns. Capital seeks outlets to move, disguise, or recycle money through complex financial structures. Football provides precisely this. As the IFR itself notes, the sport is exposed to money laundering through offshore ownership, opaque sponsorship deals, and transfer arrangements routed through tax havens. Transfers often involve multiple intermediaries, shell companies, and inflated valuations, providing ideal mechanisms for moving capital across borders. Sponsorship deals from offshore entities allow funds to enter clubs with minimal scrutiny. Distressed clubs, desperate for liquidity, are the easiest entry points.

Multi‑club ownership networks intensify these dynamics. They let capital move players, revenues, and liabilities across borders, exploiting regulatory differences and arbitrage opportunities. Clubs become nodes in a global financial ecosystem, with their sporting identity secondary to their role in the network. The IFR describes this trend but cannot analyse it. It treats multi‑club ownership as a governance challenge rather than a structural expression of financial imperialism.

The regulator’s data reveal a sport whose ownership model is not merely globalised but financialised. Clubs are not owned to win matches. They are owned to extract value, launder capital, project influence and anchor wider commercial ecosystems. The IFR catalogues these realities but cannot name them. To do so would be to admit that English football is no longer a sport governed by sporting logic but an asset class governed by the imperatives of global capital.

The regulator as the ideal collective capitalist

Engels described the capitalist state as the “ideal collective capitalist”: an institution that manages the bourgeoisie’s common affairs, sometimes against individual capitalists, to preserve the system as a whole. The IFR fits this description precisely. Its first goal is to protect the hierarchy. The report’s distribution aims begin with preserving the Premier League as the world’s leading league and the Championship as the leading second tier. Inequality is to be eased, not ended. The top club earns 605 times the revenue of the smallest National League club.

The industry welcomes the regulator. The Premier League endorsed the report and claims its own proposals already meet the IFR’s objectives. A regulator embraced by the dominant firms is not a regulator that threatens them. Its tools are mild: action plans, stress tests, risk assessments. No hard liquidity floors until 2028–2030. No limits on transfer‑finance exposure. No challenge to debt dependency, multi‑club ownership or the private model itself. Fans receive a voice, not power. Clubs must “consider” supporters’ views. The model allows no mutual ownership, 50+1, or public stakes. Supporters remain consultees, not owners. Even Kogan’s stated fear that the supply of owners and media money may dry up reveals the limits of the IFR’s worldview. The worry is that capital might stop flowing in. No one ever asks whether capital should run the game at all.

The IFR has produced the most detailed evidence yet of how English football has been transformed into a financial asset class. Its data, often presented with bureaucratic neutrality, amount to a devastating indictment of the system the regulator exists to preserve. But its prescriptions aim only to make the commodity sustainable, not to liberate the sport from the market. The IFR’s task is not to challenge capital’s domination of football but to ensure that domination continues in a more orderly, less visibly chaotic form.

A Marxist programme begins where the report ends. To reclaim football as a social institution rather than a financial instrument, we must dismantle the foundations of the current model. That means pooling broadcast income across the entire pyramid to end the grotesque inequality that makes competitive overspending inevitable. It means capping debt and banning factoring so clubs can’t mortgage their future to survive the present. It means supporter and worker ownership on a 50+1 basis or stronger, ensuring that those who produce and sustain the game control it. It also means public or community ownership of grounds, removing heritage assets from finance capital’s collateral chains. Finally, it means recognising all club workers—not only players—as producers of the game, with rights, protections, and democratic power.

These measures are not utopian. They are the minimum required to reverse the financialisation documented in the IFR’s own report. They would transform football from an asset class back into a public good. They would replace extraction with stewardship, speculation with solidarity, and debt dependency with democratic control. The regulator can manage symptoms. It cannot cure the disease. It can stabilise insolvency, not prevent it. It can discipline labour, not restrain capital. It can protect heritage assets as collateral, not as community property. It can preserve the hierarchy, not democratise it.

The IFR’s State of the Game is therefore more than a report. It is a mirror held up to a decaying system. It shows a sport that generates extraordinary wealth yet cannot sustain itself because financial channels siphon it off. It shows a regulator tasked with preserving a model that produces crisis. And it shows, unintentionally, that the only real alternative lies outside market logic. Football must be reclaimed as a social institution, not a financial instrument. Only then can the contradictions the IFR describes be resolved, not through technocratic oversight, but through democratic control, collective ownership and the abolition of football’s subordination to capital.

Bibliography

Marxist Theory and Political Economy

  • Marx, Karl. Capital: Volume I. London: Penguin Classics, 1990.
  • Marx, Karl. Capital: Volume III. London: Penguin Classics, 1991.
  • Marx, Karl. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. London: Penguin Classics, 1993.
  • Engels, Friedrich. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975.
  • Engels, Friedrich. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. London: Penguin Classics, 2010.
  • Hilferding, Rudolf. Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development. London: Routledge, 1981.
  • Lenin, V. I. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970.
  • Luxemburg, Rosa. The Accumulation of Capital. London: Routledge, 2003.
  • Harvey, David. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
  • Lapavitsas, Costas. Profiting Without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All. London: Verso, 2013.
  • Chesnais, François. Finance Capital Today. Leiden: Brill, 2016.

Football Governance, Economics and Financialisation

  • Szymanski, Stefan. Money and Football: A Soccernomics Guide. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.
  • Szymanski, Stefan & Kuypers, Tim. Winners and Losers: The Business Strategy of Football. London: Viking, 1999.
  • Kuper, Simon & Szymanski, Stefan. Soccernomics. London: HarperCollins, 2022.
  • Müller, Jan. “Multi‑Club Ownership and the Financialisation of Football.” Journal of Sport Economics 24(3), 2023.
  • Serby, Tom. “Regulating Football: The Limits of Governance Reform.” International Sports Law Journal, 2022.
  • Conn, David. The Fall of the House of FIFA. London: Yellow Jersey Press, 2017.
  • Chadwick, Simon & Widdop, Paul (eds.). The Geopolitical Economy of Sport. London: Routledge, 2023.

Reports, Regulatory Documents and Industry Data

  • Independent Football Regulator (IFR). State of the Game: Draft Report, 2026.
  • Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). Football Governance White Paper, 2023.
  • Premier League. Annual Report and Financial Statements, various years.
  • English Football League (EFL). Financial Sustainability Review, 2024.
  • UEFA. European Club Footballing Landscape Report, 2023–2026.
  • FIFA. Global Transfer Market Report, 2025.

Investigative Journalism and Contemporary Coverage

  • Conn, David. “English Football’s Debt Crisis Exposed.” The Guardian, 2024.
  • Ingle, Sean. “How Finance Capital Took Over Football.” The Guardian, 2025.
  • Sky Sports. “IFR Report: Key Findings and Financial Risks.” Sky Sports News, 2026.
  • The Athletic. “Inside the Transfer Finance Boom.” 2025.
  • Financial Times. “Premier League Clubs Turn to Factoring as Debt Costs Rise.” 2026.
  • The Economist. “The Financialisation of Football.” 2025.
  • Canberra Times. Coverage of IFR draft report, 2026.
  • The Esk. “IFR Draft Analysis: Page‑Referenced Breakdown.” 2026.
  • The Star. “Premier League Response to IFR Findings.” 2026.

Money Laundering, Offshore Capital and Sport

  • Sharman, Jason. The Despot’s Guide to Wealth Management. Cornell University Press, 2017.
  • Cooley, Alexander. Dictators Without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia. Yale University Press, 2017.
  • Transparency International. Global Corruption Report: Sport, 2016.
  • OECD. Money Laundering Through Sports and Entertainment, 2024.